非洲人民很行(2)

枣红马

原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.com 翻译：Red___Sword

#20         01-14-2012
delft （荷兰）代夫特陶器
Senior Member  Join Date Nov 2009
Posts 1,923
Good quality railways are necessary for the development of Africa, especially for connections between countries and with the sea. Here is news of Chinese investment in African railways:
Railway Gazette: Work to begin on Chad rail network.
http://www.railwaygazette.com/ne ... d-rail-network.html
A railway through Darfur will increase the power of the central government and detract from the chances of the rebels, but will also increase the prosperity of the people. What is more important, in the long run?

高质量的铁路对于非洲发展很有益，尤其是把各国之间以及与海岸间联接起来。这里有一则中国在非洲投资铁路的新闻：

铁路集市（媒体名字）：乍得铁路开工http://www.railwaygazette.com/ne ... d-rail-network.html

一条穿越达尔富尔的铁路不仅可以提高中央政府的权力以及威慑叛乱的可能性，而且可以给人民带来繁荣。长远来说，还有什么更重要的吗？

以下引用铁路集市文章：

13 January 2012
2012年1月13日
CHAD: Construction of what may be the country's first railway is set to begin in February, following the signing of an agreement between the Ministry of Transport & Civil Aviation and China Civil Engineering Construction Corp on December 24.

乍得：自交通与民航部与中国建筑工程公司于（2011年）12月24日的签约以来，也许是这个国家的头一条铁路设于（2012年）二月开工。

The US$5·6bn four-year plan covers a 1 364 km standard gauge network, to be built to Chinese standards and suitable for 120 km/h diesel operation using rolling stock to be supplied from China. Work is expected to take four years.

这个 560亿 美元的4年计划包括一条 1364km 的标准测量线路，完全按照中国可以跑120km/h 的柴油机车的标准来建设，全部机车中国供货。工程预计耗时4年。

Two lines are proposed. The South line will run 528 km south from the capital N'Djamena to Moundou and Koutéré on the border with Cameroon, approximately 250 km from the Cameroon railhead at Ngaoundéré

计划两条线路，南线将从首都 N'Djamena 恩贾梅纳 往南行 528km 到 Moundou 蒙杜 和 与喀麦隆边界接壤的 Koutéré，大约距离喀麦隆的铁路起点 Ngaoundéré 恩冈代雷 250km。

The East line will run 836 km east from N'Djamena to Abéché and Adré on the border with Sudan. The easternmost 161 km section between Abéché and Adré is scheduled to be completed first, at a cost of US$1·13bn.

东线将从首都 恩贾梅纳 往东行 836km 到 Abéché 阿贝歇 和苏丹边界接壤的 Adré 阿德雷。最东边的阿贝歇和阿德雷之间的线路计划以 11.3亿美元开销最先完工。

Last year Sudan and China signed an agreement for a line running around 300 km through the Marra Plateau region of western Darfur to link the Sudanese railhead at Nyala with Chad.

去年苏丹与中国敲定了一条从西部达尔富尔 Marra 马尔拉高原地区连接苏丹与乍得的铁路起点 Nyala 尼亚拉的约 300km 的线路。

以上引用铁路集市文章

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#21         01-16-2012
Red___Sword  红剑三道杠
Junior Member Join Date Dec 2010
Posts 830
引用 #20.

“高质量的铁路对于非洲发展很有益，尤其是把各国之间以及与海岸间联接起来。这里有一则中国在非洲投资铁路的新闻：
铁路集市（媒体名字）：乍得铁路开工
http://www.railwaygazette.com/ne ... d-rail-network.html
一条穿越达尔富尔的铁路不仅可以提高中央政府的权力以及威慑叛乱的可能性，而且可以给人民带来繁荣。长远来说，还有什么更重要的吗？”

要致富，先修路 - A slogan popularly seen even at the most unforgiving rural places in China, means "Construct Road to well being" where "road" could be from dusty rammered even(more or less) ways which only animal driven wagons can step on, to, CRH railways.

要致富，先修路——一个即使在中国最偏远的山区也流行的口号，其中“路”的概念可以从最简单的尘土飞扬的牲畜行走的砂石平路到 CRH 高铁。

Railway to a nation, esp a developing nation, is like artery that sends flesh blood to organs far away from heart, prevent it from decaying and consolidate the body as a whole. How did British colonies distinct from the other surrounding antique countries so that those colonies would later PROUDLY consider themselves as Commonwealth? How did North American Union know as US of A took the lead of the new continent? How the hell the Czar knows what's happening at Siberian and have a saying about it? Prussia united because of it, Paris surrenderd because of lossing it... It's all Railway.

铁路之于一个国家，尤其是发展中国家，就犹如大动脉，往远离心脏的各个器官输送新鲜的血液，防止器官腐朽并把全身统而为一。英国殖民地如何与周边古老腐朽的国家区别开来并在后来【自豪的】称自己为“英联邦”的？北美大陆联盟也就是后来的 USA 是怎样在新大陆上取得领先的？沙皇又怎么可能知道远在西伯利亚发生了什么事情并且加以影响的？普鲁士因为它而统一，巴黎因为失去了它而投降……

都是因为铁路。

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#22          01-16-2012
Kurt 库尔特
Junior Member Join Date Dec 2011
Posts 567

引用 #20.

“高质量的铁路对于非洲发展很有益，尤其是把各国之间以及与海岸间联接起来。这里有一则中国在非洲投资铁路的新闻：
铁路集市（媒体名字）：乍得铁路开工
http://www.railwaygazette.com/ne ... d-rail-network.html
一条穿越达尔富尔的铁路不仅可以提高中央政府的权力以及威慑叛乱的可能性，而且可以给人民带来繁荣。长远来说，还有什么更重要的吗？”

It's a good thing that the railways in Africa develop into a network instead of transporting goods to the shore, but it will take a long time before the full economic potential can be exploited.

乐于见到非洲的铁路渐渐发展成了一个有效的网络而不是单单只是往海岸运送货物而已，但是要全面发掘其经济潜力还要很长的一段时间。

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#23         01-22-2012
delft
Senior Member
When oil was discovered in the Central African Republic the question was do you take it to the Atlantic Ocean by rail or by pipe line. The second is cheaper if it is only about the transport of oil. So a pipe line was built. But the first stimulates the economies of the countries much more. The Chinese not only want oil, but also other minerals and they want to export lots of things to these countries, which presupposes the kind of economic growth that results from that railway network we want to see.

当中非共和国发现石油的时候面临一个问题，就是你到底是用铁路还是用管道把石油运到大西洋去。如果只是为了运油，后者比较便宜。于是一条石油管道就建起来了。但是前者（建铁路）更加刺激整个国家的经济发展。中国人不仅想要石油，而且也想要很多其他的矿产资源，同时也希望向这些国家出口大量货物，而建铁路网络来带动我们希望看到的这所有的一切，是一个先决条件。

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#25          01-22-2012
AssassinsMace 撒手锏
Senior Member Join Date Aug 2005
Posts 3,053
You can spin it that way. I thought the propaganda is that China trades for resources to pay off loans. So how is that a bad loan? China frequently write off loans as aid gestures. So when Bono cries for Western loans to Africa to be written off, is it because of bad loans?

（回楼上）你可以那么唱戏。我以为通常的 propaganda 洗脑宣传是说中国以资源来抵消借贷坏账呢。（回楼上话茬）那算什么坏账？中国经常取消债务以作为一种援助姿态。所以当 Bono 博诺（另一个意思就是服装品牌报喜鸟）哭着跑到西方要求贷款给非洲时，那也是因为坏账吗？

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#27          01-22-2012
Equation 等式
Senior Member Join Date May 2011
Posts 1,691
Maybe perhaps because Africa took to spending habits like the West?

（回楼上）也许是因为非洲学会了西方的花钱习惯？

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#29          01-23-2012
Equation
Senior Member
以下引用 #28.：
Good try but im not sure if theyre on the same page when it comes to profligate spending

手段耍得不错，但是我不认为他们在肆意挥霍上是同一种样式。

All you do is look at the cheque book diplomacy the China has engaged in with those tiny Southpacific nations. It wouldnt even make pocket change for the Chinese but those island nations would not have a ghostly at paying back the money. It wouldnt surprise me in the least if they were engaged in doing the .same thing in Africa.Zimbabwe comes to mind until Mugabe outlived his usefulness.

你所需要做的就是去看看中国花在那些蕞耳南太平洋小国身上的金元外交的支票簿。那些钱对于中国来说甚至不会 make pocket change （让口袋改变，指找零钱，形容小钱而已），但是对于那些岛国来说还钱时不用面无血色了。如果他们在非洲做同样的事情一点都不会让我吃惊。（提到金元外交）想到了津巴布韦，除非穆加比（津巴布韦总统）活的比他的用处要长寿（除非穆加比老不死成累赘）。

以上引用 #28. 完毕

Yeah that's nothing compare to US cheque book diplomacy on the Southeast Asian nations, the Marshal Islands, Samoan Island, Philippine, and Guam. And that's just in the Pacific alone, imagine the rest of the world.

嗯哪，跟美国的在东南亚国家，马绍尔群岛，所罗门群岛，菲律宾，关岛等的金元外交比起来根本就算不上什么，那还仅仅只是太平洋一个地方而已，想想全世界范围吧。

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#30         01-29-2012
delft
Senior Member
An article by Peter Lee in Asia Times on line about the parlous position of South Sudan:
Asia Times Online :: Will China help out the West in Sudan?
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NA28Ad01.html

一篇李皮特的亚洲时代在线上面的关于南苏丹的险恶处境的文章：
亚洲时代在线：中国会在苏丹拉西方一把吗？

Jan 28, 2012
2012年1月28日

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NA28Ad01.html

以下引用亚洲时代在线文章：

Will China help out the West in Sudan?
By Peter Lee

中国会在苏丹拉西方一把吗？
李皮特

China, which purchases much of the oil from East Africa and provides investment and armaments to the Sudanese government in return, has suffered abuse and derision for its engagement with Khartoum.
But perhaps only China has the deep pockets and appetite for risk to buy the world's way out of its Sudan problem: a problem created largely by Western fecklessness.

中国，大多数石油从非东进口而以投资和武装苏丹政府以回报，因为与喀土穆（苏丹首都）的交往而受到打击和嘲笑。
但是也许只有中国才有这个口袋与胃口来把世界从苏丹问题的深渊中买通道路给捞出来——一个基本上因为西方的低效与不负责而引发的苏丹问题。

Sudan and newly independent South Sudan are sliding towards war because these are two countries that hate each other; because Sudan lost 75% of its oil fields when the South split off; and the regime of President Omar al-Bashir in Khartoum is fighting for its survival.
Kind or stern words from Beijing will have minimal effect on Bashir, whose decision to pursue a Muammar Gaddafi-style rapprochement with the United States (yes, before the Libyan war, Gaddafi's abandonment of his weapons of mass destruction programs and normalization of relations with the West was seen as a victory of George W Bush-era big-stick diplomacy and a model for other anxious strongmen) now looks more like assisted suicide.

苏丹与新近独立出来的南苏丹因为痛恨彼此而正滑向战争的边缘；因为苏丹在南苏丹独立时丢失了 75% 的在它原来南部的石油产量；而且在苏丹首都喀土穆的 Omar al-Bashir 奥马尔·巴什尔总统正在为他的政权的生存而战。

北京的好话重话对于巴什尔都效果有限，巴什尔的与联合国的 “穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲式样的” 重新接触现在看上去更像是协助自杀。（是的，利比亚战争以前，卡扎菲放弃了他的大规模杀伤武器计划以及与西方关系的正常化被视作是 乔治·W·布什 的大棒外交的对于他和其他周边强人的胜利）

Bashir is looking at drastic curtailment of government revenues, inflation, burgeoning popular discontent, and prospects of Arab-Spring type unrest. To add to his woes, he is under indictment by the International Criminal Court for his brutal anti-insurgency operations in Darfur.
In response, Bashir is desperately cleaving to the Islamic governments of north Africa and seizing oil fields on the border with South Sudan. He is also fiddling with the passage of South Sudan crude in the pipeline crossing Sudan to Port Sudan for export (to China and elsewhere).

巴什尔面临政府收入大幅减少，通货膨胀，迅速发酵的民众不满，以及阿拉伯之春式样的骚乱。伤口上撒盐的是，因为他在达尔富尔的强力镇压叛乱，而遭到国际法庭的控诉。
他的回应——绝望的与非北伊斯兰政府割裂，以及在与南苏丹的边境线上夺取油田。他同时也在“摆弄”着南苏丹跨越苏丹境内的去往苏丹港出口的石油管道（出口中国以及别处）

He's also on a search for hard cash and leverage. The fact that South Sudan's only export pipeline traverses Sudan to Port Sudan on the Red Sea gives him both.
As was typical of the haste and "hope is not a plan" lack of forethought surrounding the push for independence, the fact that South Sudan was 100% reliant on the good offices of Sudan to get its crude to market (and relies on oil for 98% of its non-non-governmental government revenues) was seen to be something that could be comfortably addressed after partition.

他同时也在寻找硬通货币与可以利用的杠杆。南苏丹仅有的去往红海的苏丹港以供出口的输油管道横跨苏丹境内的事实，给了他想要的。

典型的“希望并不是计划”类型的缺乏考虑的急忙独立，南苏丹要100%依靠（看不顺眼的）苏丹来把石油送到海外的事实（以及南苏丹98%的非政府收入都依赖于此），使得南北苏丹的分裂能“舒适的”得到解决。

【红剑注，文章的意思是北苏丹不想分裂但是没钱，南苏丹想分裂但是有钱，而且钱还只能交给北苏丹，双方互相看不顺眼但是可以一拍即合】

The most recent crisis was triggered by Sudan's demand that South Sudan pay exorbitant transit fees to move its crude through Sudan for export; and the pre-emptive seizure of crude as assessment for unpaid (exorbitant) transit fees. In response, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) is shutting down the output of its oil wells.

最近的危机是，苏丹要求南苏丹额外付一笔高价的石油过路费，并且先发制人的夺取（扣留）了一批原油作为未付的过路费用。作为回应，南苏丹政府(GoSS)关闭了它的油井。

Maybe this intractable problem will be worked out when the presidents of Sudan and South Sudan meet this week. But perhaps not, especially if the Khartoum regime decides the best solution to its domestic problems lies in a satisfying war with the South. Eric Reeves, the dean of Sudan-watchers, wrote in a gloomy and indignant op-ed, Sudan's Obstructionism Threatens War:

也许这个棘手的问题在苏丹与南苏丹的总统在本周的会面后最后可以解决。也可能不会，尤其是当苏丹喀土穆政权认为解决它的国内问题的方法是跟南苏丹来个了断的时候。Eric Reeves， 苏丹问题专家，写了一篇沮丧和义愤的专栏，《苏丹的蓄意阻挠危及战火》：

But without a fundamental shift in the negotiating posture of Khartoum ... the talks in Addis will break down on Friday (January 27) when Presidents Salva Kiir and Omar al-Bashir are scheduled to meet. But we should keep in mind the clear possibility that a collapse of these talks is in fact deliberate on Khartoum's part: since an already highly distressed northern economy would implode with the precipitous loss of all oil revenues from the South, economic woes of all sorts could be collectively blamed on a hostile and "belligerent" South.
The regime would blame this implosion not on its own gross mismanagement of the economy, its vastly excessive military and security expenditures, or its accrual of an unsustainable external debt of more than $38 billion - but rather on the South. The generals in Khartoum who now make decisions about war and peace will have their pretext for war - a war that will be justified, in a grim irony, as punishing the South for its "economic warfare" against the north. [1]

如果喀土穆政权没有一个基本的谈判态度的改变……周五（2012年1月27日） 在 Addis 的南苏丹总统 萨尔瓦·基尔 与苏丹总统 奥马尔·巴什尔 的谈判将崩裂。但是我们要保持清醒的是，谈判的崩裂是喀土穆方面的有意为之：鉴于一个高度紧张和陷入困境的北方经济因为失掉所有南方石油而全盘崩溃的可能，可以把所有的经济问题一股脑的都扔到一个“好战的”南方的头上。

这个政权（北苏丹）不把责任归结于自己累积的经济管理问题，自己的超高军事与安全开销，或者其不可持续的一笔超过 380亿 美元的外部债务 —— 而归咎于南方。在喀土穆的掌握战和大权的将军们现在有了一个战争借口——具有残酷的讽刺意味的，一场理由正当的，惩罚南方对于北方的“经济战”的，战争。[1]

Reeves recites a grim litany of Sudanese bad faith and malfeasance and concludes:

Reeves还列举了一长串（北）苏丹人的无信与坏事，最后总结：

If war comes - and it almost daily appears more likely - it will be a war emerging from the indifference, foolishness, and cowardice of an international community that refuses to see the Khartoum regime for what it is, or even to speak honestly about what it has done and continues to ... We have reached the "brink of war" ... not because of what South Sudan has done, but because of what the international community has not done.

如果战争来临——而且几乎每天都看上去更加有可能——将是一场因为国际社会的不合、愚蠢以及怯懦而不敢于承认（北苏丹）喀土穆政权到底是个什么样的政权，甚至诚实的说出这个政权都干了些什么，而引发的战争…… 我们已经到了“战争的边缘”…… 不是因为南苏丹做了什么，而是因为国际社会没有做什么。

Dr Reeves has previously advocated a blockade of Port Sudan to improve Bashir's behavior.

Reeves 博士之前一直在倡议对苏丹港进行封锁以端正巴什尔的行为。

However, an aggressive international response to pressure Bashir and avoid a humanitarian catastrophe in the region appears unlikely. The centripetal forces that the West set in motion with its support of South Sudanese self-determination are too powerful, politically and economically, to be undone.
A confrontation will probably be driven by economic and strategic objectives, at the expense of the humanitarian goals Reeves advocates.

然而，指望一场由国际社会的对于巴什尔的强力反应以及避免一场人道主义灾难是不太可能的。西方对于期望支持南苏丹的自立的那种向心力，政治上和经济上的，是如此的强，不可被动摇【也就是说西方即使明知这会引发一场“人道主义灾难”也坚持要支持南苏丹独立，红剑注】

一场因为经济与战略考量而引发的实质对抗很可能被引发——以Reeves 博士所倡导的人道主义为牺牲品。

The dream of shared economic interests has been pretty much undone by Khartoum's intransigence and abuse of its control over the pipeline to Port Sudan.
Pointedly responding to Khartoum's interference with the existing pipeline, the government of South Sudan concluded a much-anticipated deal with Kenya to build a new pipeline south from its capital of Juba to the planned Kenyan megaport of Lamu. When completed, it will remove much of the incentive for civil economic and diplomatic relations between Sudan and Southern Sudan.

分享经济利益的梦想基本上被喀土穆政权的不妥协以及对于通往苏丹港的油管的滥用而吹破。

尖锐地针对喀土穆政权对于现有管道的干涉，南苏丹政府与肯尼亚订结了一个大家都不出意外的协议，从南苏丹首都 朱巴 往南向正在筹划中的肯尼亚超大港口 拉姆港 修建一条崭新的石油管道。 当完工以后，苏丹与南苏丹之间仅有的一点民事以及外交关系，也就到头了。

The government of South Sudan is also less likely to respond to Sudanese petro-coercion and an economic crisis prompted by cessation of oil revenues by rolling over militarily.

Thanks to assistance from its allies Kenya and Uganda and a blind eye from the United States, South Sudan muscled up during the truce with Sudan (when import of military materiel was supposedly prohibited), and has acquired an estimated arsenal of 100 battle tanks, among other things. [2]

南苏丹政府也更加不可能对北苏丹的【石油强权】以及因为石油收入的断绝而引发的经济危及而军事回应了。

多亏它（南苏丹）的盟友——肯尼亚，乌干达，以及美国的闭一只眼，南苏丹在与苏丹停火期搞到了大约100辆坦克和其他物资的军力强化。（进口武器理论上应该是被禁止的——所以要感谢美国的闭一只眼）[2]

【红剑注：肯尼亚，乌干达，美国……这几个名字怎么这么眼熟呢？——见1号帖子里面 SDF原帖 的5楼和17楼。】

On January 6, United States President Barack Obama lifted restrictions on sales of defense articles and defense services to South Sudan because doing so "will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace." [3]

在（2012年）1月6日，美国总统奥巴马解除了对于南苏丹的防务销售与服务的禁止条款，声称这么做“可以加强美国的安保以及维护世界和平”。[3]

In response to the oil transshipment crisis, South Sudan has put its army on "maximum alert".
There is ample national unity and belligerence in South Sudan against Sudan, and a willingness to pay the price to get out from under Khartoum's thumb. But the price will be pretty steep if the confrontation escalates.

为应对石油转运危及，南苏丹已经把其部队“置于最高警戒”。
南苏丹国内有对苏丹强烈的“斗争性”【作者对“南苏丹恨北苏丹”的比较文艺的写法，红剑】和团结性，以及为了从北苏丹的压榨下脱离出来而愿意付出代价的意愿。但是一旦冲突升级，这个代价可能会陡增。

When South Sudan's President Salvo Kiir briefed parliament on the oil crisis, he stated:
H E the President instructed the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning to initiate contingency plans for revenue collection and allocation and accelerate the increase of non-oil revenues. He also said that safely, security and health of the citizens of South Sudan remain top priorities. [4]
Good luck with that.

当南苏丹总统 萨尔瓦·基尔 向议会汇报石油危机时，他说：
总统命令财政部与经济计划部展开一项财政收集与分配的紧急计划并增加非石油收入。他还强调南苏丹人民的安全、健康依然是政府的首要优先。[4]
祝好运。

Since the government relies almost entirely on oil revenues for 98% of its non-aid funding, if its exports cease the West will find itself with a significant and unwelcome financial responsibility to keep the government and economy humming in Southern Sudan ... unless China steps in.
Zhang Jun, China's economic counselor in South Sudan, reportedly stated last year that China could provide loans secured by resources to keep South Sudan afloat while the pipeline to Lamu is built. That might take a while.

因为（南苏丹）政府98%的非援助财政都几乎完全依赖于石油收入，西方国家会发现自己将要面临在（南苏丹）出口停滞的时候保持一个重要但经济一团糟的政府及其经济继续运行，非常困难……除非中国加入进来。

张军（音译），中国在南苏丹的经济顾问，曾经在去年提到中国可以以资源为抵押提供贷款，保持南苏丹一边修建通往（肯尼亚）拉姆港的管道，一边还“浮着”（还活着，还没垮）。——那可需要点儿时间。

Optimists in Juba declare the pipeline to Lamu, the perceived magic bullet for South Sudanese security and economic independence, can be built in 10 months in a crash program. Experts aren't so sure, per Reuters:

（南苏丹首都）朱巴的乐观者们宣称去往拉姆港的管道，传说中的南苏丹安全与经济独立的回魂丹，可以在紧急措施下10个月就建成。专家们可不这么肯定，如路透社说：

Analysts said a Kenya pipeline would be difficult to build across rough terrain hit by tribal violence and also passing through bandit-stricken regions in western Kenya.
South Sudan has said it would cost around US$1.5 billion, but analysts say a hefty insurance premium would have to be added because of the security concerns.
"It would be really difficult," said Dana Wilkins at Global Witness. "We're looking at least a year or two because of the length of the pipeline, the terrain it has to cover and security concerns in the region." [5]

分析家们说肯尼亚管道很难在地形艰难、部族纷争、盗匪出没的西部肯尼亚山区修建。
南苏丹说这工程大约花费15亿美元，但是分析家们说基于安全考量，应该还要再加上一笔不菲的保险费用才行。

“这将真的很难，”全球目击（一个媒体）的 Dana Wilkins 说，“我们要面对至少一年到两年的工期，因为管道长度，要克服的地形，以及要考虑的区域安全形式。”[5]

If, in addition to advancing the direct cost of building the pipeline, tensions with Sudan shut off the export pipeline to Port Sudan and required that China front South Sudan's lost oil revenues for two years, China's total exposure would approach $10 billion. It would take over 100 million barrels of oil to pay that back - over two years' production ... during which time the GoSS would still be relying on outside support to finance its operations, so the bill would keep rising.
It would appear that the only way to get the pipeline built and get South Sudanese oil out would be for China to obtain the forbearance of the Sudanese regime, and keep South Sudanese oil and revenue flowing through Port Sudan until the Luma pipeline is completed.

如果，在促使建造管道的开销以外，与（北）苏丹的矛盾使得通往苏丹港的管线完全关闭而中国必须预先支付南苏丹因此损失的石油财政收入至少两年，中国的总开销将接近 100亿 美元。这将需要 1亿 桶石油来偿还——超两年的产量……产量期间南苏丹政府将依然要持续依赖外部经济援助支持其运作，所以开销还要再滚雪球。

这样看来唯一可行的使得管道可以顺利修建的，以及把南苏丹石油弄出去的方式，就是通过中国获得（北）苏丹政权的谅解，使得南苏丹在修建通往拉姆港的管道工程期间，保持通过北苏丹的南苏丹管道石油的流通。

Khartoum, which presumably has been looking at the same figures as everybody else and figured out what its control of the current pipeline is worth, has apparently put a price on its forbearance: $15 billion over seven years (plus, one would expect, a healthy amount of debt forgiveness from the West). [6]

（北苏丹首都）喀土穆政权，可以想象他们也在看着同样的数据和报告，得到了自己手里控制的管道到底多值钱的概念，给自己的“气度”开了个价：七年 150亿 美元（另外，可以预料得到，从西方国家得到不菲的债务减免）[6]

【非洲人民很行啊】

No wonder China is considered the key to successful resolution of the crisis.
The West probably lacks the stomach to sit down with Bashir and offer him $15 billion to assure the survival of South Sudan. So let China do it.
However, there's apparently not some huge bonanza of South Sudanese crude waiting for China, as the Reuters article points out.

难怪中国被认为是成功解决这个危机的关键。
西方国家估计没有跟巴什尔坐下来谈判并给他发 150亿 美元以确保南苏丹存活下去，的胃口。那就让中国去做吧！
然而，就如路透社文章指出来的，可没有什么南苏丹原油大肥肉坐等着给中国送上门。

Oil experts have questioned the economic viability of a pipeline in the medium-term as output is expected to fall sharply in coming years because some fields were overpumped by Khartoum in the run-up to South Sudan's independence.

石油专家们质疑是否有足够的经济可行性从中期管道里泵出来，随着喀土穆政权在南苏丹独立预备期间超额产出，接下来年份里产量预期将极具下滑。

South Sudan output will decline to 200,000 barrels per day (bpd) by 2016, to 160,000 by 2018 and further thereafter, according to estimates by the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, which is comprised of research groups, non-governmental organizations and activists.

到2016年南苏丹产量将减少至20万桶每天（bpd），到2018年16万桶每天，以及其后递减更多——根据由研究团队，非政府组织和活动人士组成的 European Coalition on Oil in Sudan “苏丹石油欧洲联合体” 的估算。

Some analysts say a pipeline would be viable only if new finds were made, but exploration in the vast Jonglei state have been hampered by tribal violence. France's Total holds a concession in Jonglei which is largely unused due to violence.

一些分析家说除非发现新的油田，新管道建设不具备可行性。但是在广袤的 Jonglei 州进行的探测活动被部族纷争给阻碍了。法国在 Jonglei 州的全面让步（concession 还可以作为“租界”的意思）也很大程度上是基于这种暴力纷争。

"Production in Upper Nile peaked in 2010, Unity in 2005. Even if major new fields were discovered today, it could be years before they come online in a real way," Wilkins said.

“尼罗河上游的产量在2010年冲顶，2005年达到协调。即使今天发现了大型新油田，也要多年后才能事实上产出。”Wilkins  说道。

Another wrinkle is that if/when the pipeline to Lamu is built, apparently at Kenya's insistence it will supply a 120,000 bpd refinery whose output will serve the East African market.
In this case Sudan/South Sudanese crude will dwindle from an already less-than-critical 5% to an insignificant share of China's import slate.

另一件扯皮的事就是如果以及当通往拉姆港的管道建成以后，显然肯尼亚坚持其将为一个 12万桶每天 产量的提炼厂服务，供应非东市场。
这样，苏丹/南苏丹 的原油将进一步从中国原来就已经 “非显著” 的5% 份额而进一步缩减为无关紧要的份额。

【真正输往海外的原油并不多，都出口转内销了。红剑注】

For China, it boils down to a multi-billion dollar, multi-decade bet on South Sudan, a failed state in ovo in the middle of a war zone - with dwindling crude export capabilities.
Therefore, a unilateral Chinese bailout of the West's recklessly exposed position in South Sudan is unlikely. All-out war between Sudan and South Sudan also appears unlikely, at least for now.

对于中国来说，所有一切都归根到底为 百亿美元，数十年，在 战火荼毒区域，缩减的原油出口能力，失败国家 南苏丹身上豪赌。
因此，一场中国舍生取义独自飞身拯救鲁莽闯入南苏丹泥潭的西方国家们的大戏基本不会上演。苏丹与南苏丹之间的全面战争也大概不会发生，至少现在不会。

As Reeves points out, the West has adopted the rhetoric of "moral equivalence", wrongly implying that South Sudanese instransigence is as much to blame for the crisis as Sudan's excessive demands.
This is presumably a signal that the South is being encouraged to knuckle under and swallow the medicine Bashir's regime has prepared (perhaps sweetened by concurrent subsidies to Juba by the West and China), so that the peace process can continue to limp on.

正如 Reeves 博士指出的，西方套用“道德等值”的老调子，错误指责南苏丹的固执【固执的要独立】与北苏丹的狮子大开口一样值得谴责。
这推测起来可以看作是一个鼓励南苏丹屈从于（北苏丹的）巴什尔政权开出的药方（也许裹了一层被西方与中国的同时赞助（南苏丹首都）朱巴的糖衣），所以和平近程才可以蹒跚的走下去的信号。

The prognosis for South Sudan appears to be of a landlocked, weak state whose overmatched government will serve as an arena for Western fantasies of "capacity building" as a social and economic panacea; and, if it actually overcomes its daunting security and economic problems and builds its pipeline to Lamu, will primarily benefit Kenya, East Africa's leading power, as a buffer state and source of raw materials and markets.
China may decide to minimize its exposure to Sudan and Southern Sudan in its Africa portfolio accordingly.

对于南苏丹的预测是个死结，朝小野大的局面可以当作西方国家幻想的“能力构建”社会与经济万灵药的角斗试验场；而且，如果它真的克服了它令人气馁的安全与经济问题而真的建成了通往（肯尼亚）拉姆港的石油管道，也基本（只）将惠及肯尼亚，非东的领头羊，作为一个原材料资源市场的缓冲地。

中国也许需要决定在苏丹与南苏丹的投资组合管理中对应减少其暴露率。

Notes 注解
1. Oil Revenues Controversy: Sudan's obstructionism threatens war, Sudan Tribune, January 25.

石油受益辩战：苏丹的蓄意阻挠威胁战火，苏丹论坛报，1月25日。

2. US, China brace for Sudan trainwreck Asia Times Online, September 21, 2010.

美国中国准备迎接苏丹灾难，亚洲时报在线，2010年9月21日。

3. Obama lifts ban on U.S. defense exports to South Sudan al-Arabiya, January 6.

奥巴马解除美国对南苏丹防务出口禁令，阿拉伯人（一个媒体），1月6日。

4. President's Speech On Oil Crisis Tabled in Parliament allAfrica.com, January 25.

总统议会公开演讲，allAfrica.com， 1月25日。

5. S. Sudan halves oil output, signs pipeline deal Teuters, January 25.

南苏丹减半石油量产，签订管道协议，Teuters（估计是拼写错误，路透社），1月25日

6. Sudan Demands $15 Billion in Compensation for Lost Southern Oil.Bloomberg, November 23, 2011.

苏丹要求 150亿 美元作为失去南部石油的补偿。 彭博社，2011年11月23日。

Peter Lee writes on East and South Asian affairs and their intersection with US foreign policy.

李皮特著写东亚和南亚事务以及其与美国外交政策的交集。

以上引用亚洲时代在线文章。

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#31          01-29-2012
Equation
Senior Member
South Sudan may hold 75% of Sudan's oil but a lot of it are owned by the Sudanese enterprises. And what use of oil if you can't ship it to your customers? That's where South Sudan are in trouble, because right now they depend on Sudan harbors and ports to ship all those oil.

南苏丹也许握有（北）苏丹75%的石油但是产权大多数都是归苏丹的公司所有。而且如果你不能运给你的顾客，手里有油又有什么用呢？这就是南苏丹陷入困境的地方，因为他们现在依赖苏丹的海港和港口来把油运出去。

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#32         02-07-2012
Red___Sword
Junior Member
引用 #31.

“南苏丹也许握有（北）苏丹75%的石油但是产权大多数都是归苏丹的公司所有。而且如果你不能运给你的顾客，手里有油又有什么用呢？这就是南苏丹陷入困境的地方，因为他们现在依赖苏丹的海港和港口来把油运出去。”

"Don't ask, don't tell." - How the major powers of the world is going to "solve" this?

“不问，不说”【红剑注，建议扩展阅读，了解这个说法的来历】——世界强权们将怎样来“解决”这个问题呢？

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#33         02-07-2012
delft
Senior Member


引用 #32.

“不问，不说”——世界强权们将怎样来“解决”这个问题呢？

Some of this we know. There was the matter that ship with tanks for the South Sudan army that was, Oh Horror, taken by Somali pirates. Some of the major powers are trying to encourage a new war between Sudan and South Sudan in order to squeeze China out. But supplying South Sudan with the necessary supplies through Kenya will be problematical. South Sudan paying for those supplies through exporting oil through a pipe line through Kenya that might need much more than the talked about 18 months ( the terrain is very difficult ) is another question. But this is no doubt part of the background of the capture of 29 Chinese workers in North Kordofan.


有一些我们都知道。有这么一件事，给南苏丹军队运坦克的船被，哦可怕呀——被索马里海盗给抢走了。一些强权为了把中国挤走正在鼓励一场苏丹与南苏丹之间的新的战争。但是通过肯尼亚给南苏丹提供必要的供给问题很多。南苏丹为了支付这笔供应的钱要从一条通过肯尼亚的石油管道里面来，而远比这（上面 #30 引用的文章）里面提到的18个月要长的多的时间（因为地形非常复杂）是另一个问题。但这毫无疑问就是当时29个中国工人在苏丹北科尔多凡省被劫持的一部分背景啦。