中国，你无法扮演全球所有的角色

诺基亚

-------------译者：loriana777-审核者：寒灯独夜人------------

The Rise of China vs The Logic of Strategy. By Edward N. Luttwak. Belknap Press of Harvard Univeristy; 268 pages; ￡19.95

《中国崛起VS战略逻辑》，Edward N. Luttwak 著。哈佛大学 Belknap 出版社；268页；19.95英镑。

MANY aspire to it, but few succeed. Any modern parent juggling the demands of a job and a family knows all too well how difficult it can be to "have it all". But what about a certain emerging Asian superpower?

许多人追求，但鲜有成功。任何尽力应付工作需求的现代家长和深知世事艰难的家庭就能够”拥有一切“。但对于一个毫无疑问正在崛起的亚洲超级大国会怎样？

Edward Luttwak, an American military strategist, argues in his new book that China’s simultaneous pursuit of three strategic goals is untenable. In his view, it must soon choose between them if it is to avert catastrophe.

Edward Luttwak是一位美国军事战略家，他在新书中表示中国同时追求三个战略目标并非长远之计。在他看来，为了避免灾难，中国必须马上做出抉择。

Mr Luttwak’s fundamental contention is “the inherent incompatibility between the concurrently rapid growth of China’s economic capacity and military strength and diplomatic influence”. He acknowledges plainly that he is no China specialist, but just as plainly he believes that his “logic of strategy” applies as rigidly to China’s geopolitics as does Newton’s law of gravity to any apple falling anywhere in the world.

Luttwak 先生的基本观点是“中国经济实力、军事力量和外交影响一起高速增长的同时，三者内在却互不相容”。他坦率地承认自己并非“中国通”，但他也直截了当地相信自己的“战略逻辑”严格地适用于中国的地缘政治，就像牛顿的万有引力定律适用于世界上任何地方的苹果下落。

-------------译者：ksaMask-审核者：寒灯独夜人------------

According to this immutable logic, China’s drive towards military aggrandisement will push other countries towards anti-China coalitions that reduce rather than enhance China’s diplomatic clout. And because China can effectively deter direct military action, nations seeking to counter its rise will be bound to choose “eco-strategic containment” strategies that slow, rather than enhance, the growth China needs so desperately to maintain.
Mr Luttwak catalogues ways in which other regional powers, each with its own twist, have already begun forming new linkages to counter growing Chinese might. This sped up significantly since 2008, he writes, when the world financial crisis “unleashed Chinese triumphalism” and triggered a phase of “feckless and reckless” foreign-policy conduct. Current events continue feeding grist to Mr Luttwak’s mill. China last month announced a significant new advance in military capabilities, reporting a fighter jet’s successful landing on China’s new aircraft-carrier. Also in November, Myanmar’s played host to a visit by the American president, Barack Obama, which marked a dramatic shift in policy for a strategically important neighbour that had long been considered to be aligned reliably with China.
Mr Luttwak regards the logic of strategy as being more pertinent to China’s situation than the ancient writings and traditions that inform so much of the leadership’s thinking. He offers harsh and colourful criticism of the gaps in knowledge and creativity among Chinese policymakers, attributing to them such afflictions as “Great-state autism,” and “acquired strategic deficiency syndrome.”

根据这条不变的逻辑，中国的军力扩张将会迫使其他国家组成旨在对抗中国的联盟，这对中国外交影响力的负面作用明显更大于正面作用。由于中国可以有效地制止直接的军事行动， 设法对付中国崛起的其他国家将必然会选择“生态战略遏制”战略，这将遏制中国拼命保持的崛起速度。

Mr.Luttwak 列举了其他几个地区大国，虽然他们都有自己的问题，但他们已经开始建立新的共同关系以应对中国不断增长的实力。他在书中写到， 自2008年以来， 当世界经济危机“释放出了中国必胜的信念”，并且引发了一段时间的“既不负责任也不顾后果”的外交政策行为后， 这个值得注目的趋势越发地加快。而当前发生的各种事件越发有力地证明了Mr. Luttwak的观点。中国在上个月宣布了一个意义深远的军力新突破 ------ 一架喷气式战斗机成功地在中国的新航母上完成了着舰。同样是在11月，缅甸接待了美国总统奥巴马的来访，这是一个在政治上富有戏剧性的转变，因为长期以来，缅甸一直被认为是中国的一个具有重要战略地位的可靠邻国。

Mr. Luttwak认为，相对于先前那些反应国家领导层意志的文章和传统手段，战略逻辑对于目前中国的处境有着更中肯的定位。他严厉地批评了中国的决策者们在知识与创造力上的缺失，并且把这归咎于“以自我为中心的大国主义”和“现有战略缺乏症”。

-------------译者：monkbobby-审核者：tvenana------------

Coming in for criticism by name is Sun Tzu, whose writings of 2,500 years ago, including "The Art of War", are the main source of what Mr Luttwak calls “the flawed principles of ancient unwisdom”. He grants that the cunning statecraft, stratagems for deception and diplomatic finesse advocated by Sun Tzu may have worked when used by one warring Chinese state against another. But he argues that these doctrines have served China poorly in fending off other adversaries.

下一个被指名道姓进行评论的是孙子。他在2500年前写的著作，包括《孙子兵法》，成为Luttwak先生评论的主要依据。Luttwak先生称这些著作为”古人的愚昧，瑕疵的原则”。他承认，孙子所倡导的治国经略，以及诡道和外交策略等谋略，在处理中国战国时代的国与国之间的关系时是行之有效的。但是他同时指出，这些兵法在抵挡外敌时几乎没什么效果。

With a quick pass through the history of China’s engagement with Jurchens, Khitans, Mongols, Manchus and other Asiatic nomads, he notes that China has been ruled by Hans, its ethnic majority, for only about a third of the past millennium. “While Han generals in charge of large armies were busy quoting Sun Tzu to each other, relatively small numbers of mounted warriors schooled in the rudely effective strategy and tactics of the steppe outmanoeuvred and defeated their forces,” he writes.

他注意到，综观中国与女真、契丹、蒙古、满人和其他亚洲游牧民族对峙的历史，过去千年中国在其主要民族汉族的统治下的时间只占了三分之一。他写到：“统帅大军的汉族将军还在忙着引经据典来印证《孙子兵法》的时候，人数处劣势的（游牧民族）骑兵运用他们从西伯利亚大草原的严酷环境学来的直接有效的战略和战术，出奇制胜汉族大军“。

He is convincing (and highly entertaining) on this point. But there remains something jarring about Mr Luttwak’s broader insistence on the utter inviolability of his own logic; and also a sense that he has cherrypicked quotations and events to support his arguments. Such overreach notwithstanding, his thesis is sensible and not to be discounted lightly. It cannot of course be tested as easily as Newton’s laws. But given that Chinese generals likely still quote Sun Tzu to each other, there should yet be opportunities to see how it holds up.

他的这个论点有些说服力（也很有娱乐性）。不过Luttwak先生对他自己的逻辑那种自大的不容质疑的口气似乎让人接受不了。另外给人一种感觉，为支持他的观点，他所引用的典故有断文取义之嫌。尽管有些过了头，但他的文章也不容小视。当然它不能像牛顿定律那般容易被证实。不过似乎目前中国的军队将领们还是喜欢引经据典，互相印证《孙子兵法》，估计还是有机会去证明他的说法是否正确的。

诺基亚

-------------译者：北极燕鸥-审核者：tvenana------------
optimal_R Dec 20th, 10:40
Is this book really worth to be featured here?
All "logic of strategy" I see is the authors contradictory views - behind rosy, USA tinted glasses.

有必要在这里推荐这本书吗？我认为这些所谓“战略逻辑”都是作者矛盾的观点，他戴着盲目乐观的美国版有色眼镜。

New Conservative Dec 20th, 11:20
The disparagement of Sun Tzu is in no way warranted and the way it's cited in this article betrays either the reporter's or the author's bias.
The "rudely effective strategy and tactics of the steppe" is Sun Tzu.
Mongols and Manchus fought based on deception and elaborate diplomacy. They did not attack enemy strong points or throw strength against strength. They were outnumbered and thus used deception, terror, and surprise to overwhelm their enemies. Discounting Sun Tzu because Han's got beaten by Mongols is like discounting Brusilov because the Russians were defeated by the Germans in WW1.
The Manchu conquest of China started when the Ming general Wu Sangui requested Manchu aide to put down a local rebel army, the Manchus accepted and waited for Wu Sangui to vacate Beijing, at which point, the Manchus seized Beijing, destroyed the rebels and declared their intention to claim the mandate of heaven. Just the sort of "diplomatic finesse and deception" that the author implies is an inferior Han trait attributable to Sun Tzu.

这篇文章对孙子兵法的轻视是毋庸置疑的，其引证方法显露出了记者和作者的成见。
孙子兵法是一种“针对游牧民族残酷而有效地战略和战术”。
蒙古人和满人依赖诡计和缜密的外交手段进行攻击。他们从不进攻敌人的强处也从不硬碰硬。他们会利用诡计、恐吓和奇袭以压倒性优势战胜敌人。因为汉朝被蒙古人侵略而轻视孙子兵法就像是因为俄国在一战中被德国打败而轻视布鲁西洛夫一样。（译者注：布鲁西洛夫是一战中俄国的著名将领，以其在1916年组织的布鲁西洛夫攻势闻名。该攻势虽在后期功亏一篑，但却重创了德国和奥匈帝国，并且开创了若干战法的先河。）
满人趁明朝将军吴三桂请求入关协助剿灭国内叛军的机会开始征服中国。满人答应了派兵入关的请求，并等待吴三桂离开北京之时趁机将其占领。随后满人清除掉反抗者并宣布自己受命于天。这正是作者所说的“外交技巧和诡计”之类源于孙子兵法的汉人的卑劣品性。

Sherbrooke in reply to New Conservative Dec 20th, 14:47
The entire Mongol conquest started with more or less unification of Mongols, something that's hard to envision in Sun Wu's scenario.
Sun Wu is remarkably shallow on diplomacy (in fact, more often than not it gives bad advices), and completely ignores the effects that military actions have on the bargaining table.

（回复New Conservative）
每一次蒙古人的征服行动都多少始于蒙古自身的统一，这在孙子那个时代是很难发生的。
孙武在外交方面显然很浅薄（事实上，他在这方面的建议往往都很糟糕），并且完全无视了军事行动在谈判桌上的作用。

-------------译者：疯坦克-审核者：tvenana------------

Jean Michel Dec 20th, 12:34
After reading this article, it seems that the book written by Luttwak is not worth reading.
Either the author of the article has not understood the book or the author of the book does not understand China and the world geopolitics.

在读了这篇文章后，看起来Luttwak写的这本书并不值得读。
而且这篇文章的作者没有理解这本书，或着这本书的作者不理解中国和世界地缘政治。

lpc1998 Dec 20th, 12:40
The Economist:
“Mr Luttwak’s fundamental contention is “the inherent incompatibility between the concurrently rapid growth of China’s economic capacity and military strength and diplomatic influence”.”
In other words, rising “economic capacity and military strength” would lead to inevitable diplomatic disaster?
This “logic of strategy” has already been disapproved by the rise of the US both in economic capacity and military strength and diplomatic influence. It may be true for the Europeans.

经济学人：
“Luttwak 先生的基本观点是“中国经济容量、军事实力和外交影响一起高速增长的同时，三者内在却互不相容”。”
换句话说，增长“经济实力和军事实力”会导致不可避免的外交灾难？

Artevelde in reply to lpc1998 Dec 20th, 13:35
The US entered the ranks of the economic Great Powers before WW1, and did this without much of a land army (it had a good navy though). It rose to political and military prominence after WW2 when the civilized parts of the world were mostly shot to rubble and the nations divided into two camps. A pretty unique situation.
compare the rise of China with the rise of Germany before WW1 and the similarities are unsettling.

美国在一战之前进入经济大国的行列，并且在没有太多陆军的情况下（虽然有一个很好的海军）。他上升成为军事强国是在大部分文明国家被二战夷为平地并分成两个阵营之后。一个非常独特的情况。
对比一战前德国的崛起，中国的崛起令人不安的相似。

hamilton 2.0 Dec 20th, 13:08
I must point out that if one considers the US a likely opponent for China (I would presume the author does), US military officers are also in the habit of reading Sun Tzu (though perhaps not quoting his wisdom to one another quite as often)...

我必须指出如果有人认为美国的对手是中国（我会相信作者是这样的），美国的军事人员也一样在学习孙子兵法的智慧（尽管他们之间并不是经常的引用他们）。。。

-------------译者：熊猫nara-审核者：tvenana------------

Curate's Egg Dec 20th, 14:01
Luttwak has a point, but for the wrong reasons.
There's nothing inevitable about a growing military/economic clout harming your diplomatic persuasiveness. That's total think-tank bullshit - I can't believe he gets paid to write stuff like that.
What is inevitable, however, is that China's rise does scare its neighbours. And more importantly, China's own behaviour does not make it look any less threatening. And more importantly, her neighbours (principally Japan and South Korea) yet have the resources to at least avoid crushing military inferiority. And even more importantly, the United States has their back.
So no, there is nothing inevitable about China's hard power increasing at the expense of its soft power. But for the reasons noted above (which bring to mind the conditions of Imperial Germany's rise before the WW1, as 'Artevelde' noted), Luttwak happens to be right.
Or at least right until China grows so strong, that it can overwhelm all opposition in Asia and force the US to retreat behind Australia and Hawaii. Then Luttwak would be wrong about China's diplomacy not being aided by its military and economic hardware.

Luttwak观点是对的，但是理由是错的。什么中国不断变强的军事和经济力量会不可避免的损害外交说服力。这完全是胡扯——我不能相信他写这种东西居然还有稿费拿。真正不可避免的是，中国的崛起会让邻国害怕。而且，中国自身的行为并没有让外界对它的恐惧降低半分。还有她的邻国（主要是日本和韩国）在军事上还有点底子，不至于一击即溃。而最为重要的是，它们还有美国这个后盾。
所以，不存在中国硬实力的增长一定要以牺牲软实力为代价这种事情。但是出于以上的种种理由（让人联想到第一次世界大战前德国的情况，如'Artevelde'指出的一样），Luttwak的结论凑巧是对的。或者至少到中国变得非常强大，能够消除亚洲的反对之声，迫使美国退回澳大利亚和夏威夷之前是对的。如果这一天到来，Luttwak认为中国的外交被其军事和经济实力所害的观点才会站得住脚。

Michael Dunne in reply to Curate's Egg Dec 20th, 17:06
"Or at least right until China grows so strong, that it can overwhelm all opposition in Asia and force the US to retreat behind Australia and Hawaii. "
I don't see the US abandoning Guam without a nuclear war. So, could probably say this very unlikely to happen (unless the CHinese buy off Guam and N. Mariannas to leave/change arrangements)...
Luttwak gets a little too wrapped up with strategy at times. He sponsored a book on the Roman Empire where it seems like its was attributing ideas on strategy to different periods without much evidence to bolster points, or recognition of compllications of succession crises and revolts that afflicted the imperium from 190 AD to 450 AD.

引用前一位网友“或者至少到中国变得非常强大，能够消除亚洲的反对之声，迫使美国退回澳大利亚和夏威夷之前是对的。”
美国不惜扔原子弹也不愿意放弃关岛。所以，我觉得这不会发生的（除非中国买下关岛和北马里亚纳群岛）
Luttwak有时候太过于注重战略以至于有点搞脑子了。他赞助的有关罗马帝国的一本书把有关战略的一些观点和不同的时期对应起来但是又没有很多证据来支持这种做法，也没有承认公元190到公元450年之后一系列危机和叛乱带来的复杂混乱状况。

-------------译者：相马非马-审核者：tvenana------------

Knownoth Dec 20th, 14:02
The Chinese state was run by scholars in past 2 thousand years. Scholars were all following Confucius teaching. They don't follow sun tzu. Only generals read sun tzu. But generals were controlled by the scholarly officials. The author needs to read 101 introduction to history of china before he talks about china.

中国的政府在过去的两千年都是由学者统治的（译注：西方卢梭认为由工程师和学者掌控的政府是最理想的政府）。这些学者都追随儒家的教育理念。他们不推崇孙子。只有将军们才看孙子兵法。但将军们是由哪些学者官僚控制的。 在他谈论中国之前，这文章的作者需要去上中国历史的入门课程。

Sherbrooke
in reply to Knownoth Dec 20th, 14:50
What those Chinese scholars studied could classify them as poets, philosophers, priests or parrots, but hardly scholars in modern sense.

那些中国学者研究的东西可以使他们成为诗人，哲学家，牧师 或者是学舌的鹦鹉，但从不是现代意义上的学者。

Sherbrooke Dec 20th, 14:31
Sun Wu is long overdue for knocking down a few notches. It is ridiculously useless, as it assumes that a number of states can't make alliances against you, and that once the enemy is defeated it is gone for good - or the strategems there would not have been so bent on backstabbing and mistreating the enemy.
Like it or not, but The Prince is a lot closer to how politics actually operate, and what's feasible and what's not.

孙武（的学说）早已经过时了。它假设许多国家是无法组成一个对抗你的联盟的，这使它变的可笑且无用。 此外，一旦敌人被击败，敌人不知为何就被一劳永逸的解决了。三十六计里也不会这样的偏爱乘人不备的偷袭和虐待敌人。
无论你是否喜欢，君主论所描述的更接近现实里政治的运作，还有什么是可行的和不可行的。

Concur Dec 20th, 16:05
“the inherent incompatibility between the concurrently rapid growth of China’s economic capacity and military strength and diplomatic influence”
May be true if you consider China to be a force for bad, as the author and 'America' likely do. If this fundamental assumption isn't true the whole thesis breaks down.
And many countries see China's economic strength as a positive for the global economy....which undoubtedly it is. Countries benefit from a large and rapidly growing China. Its true that America and some of its close allies are wary of China's military strength (e.g. India, Korea, Australia, Japan, Vietnam, Philippines). But most everyone else Europe, Latin America, Africa, and its immediate neighbours in Asia (Laos, Cambodia, Pakistan, Russia) are less anxious than the US, a paranoid 'security state'. And I would wager that most countries would welcome China playing a greater diplomatic influence as a counter-weight to the US self-interest which dominates today.

“中国经济实力、军事力量和外交影响一起高速增长的同时，三者内在却互不相容”
也许是真的如果你认为中国是一股邪恶的力量，就像作者和‘美国’。如果这最根本的假设不是真实的那么整个论点就不存在了。
许多国家把中国的经济力量看做一股对世界经济有利的力量...毫无疑问它是的。许许多多国家从庞大且快速增长的中国经济中获利。 美国及其盟友（印度，南韩，澳大利亚，日本，越南，菲律宾）对中国的军事实力感到担忧也是真实的。但欧洲、拉美、非洲和中国的邻居如老挝、柬埔寨、巴基斯坦、俄罗斯相对于美国这个“安全幻想症国家”，则没那么担心。我可以打赌大部分国家会欢迎中国在对抗当前美国利益统治的世界里扮演一个更有影响力的角色。

thrawn999 Dec 20th, 16:54
Once someone so adamently believing in his own (western) logic is so right about China, it is highly likely to be hugely flawed. Just from his understanding of Sun Tzu and his non-understanding how different people applies Sun Tzu's principles, you can see this whole book as too flawed to describe China's problems or solutions

一旦有人如此坚定的相信他自己的西方逻辑在关于中国的问题上也是无比正确的，那他的理念就非常有可能是有纰漏的。 仅仅看到他对孙子的理解，和他对人们应用孙子理念的无知，你就可以看到这本书对于描述中国今天的问题或是这些问题的解决方案是有缺陷的。