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【中文标题】穆巴拉克眼中的埃及革命
【原文标题】The Egyptian Revolution Through Mubarak's Eyes
【登载媒体】外交政策
【原文作者】DAVID KENNER
【原文链接】http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/24/the_egyptian_revolution_through_hosni_mubarak_s_eyes
内部人士讲述法老下台前的18天。
2011年1月19日，胡斯尼•穆巴拉克依然稳坐一个强大、自信的政权。这位埃及总统正在海滨度假胜地沙姆沙伊赫接待一队阿拉伯国家的总统。数百名建筑工人被赶出这个地区，唯恐他们污染景观。
但是一些敏感的人已经听到了遥远传来的民众积怨隆隆声。突尼斯外交部长在峰会开始前几个小时匆匆赶回国内，一场革命已经把长期盘踞的独裁者推翻，他的国家正在应付革命后的混乱局面。埃及人的Facebook网页正在传播1月25日发起行走的宣传，其目的是在开罗的街道上复制突尼斯的革命现场。
峰会结束之后，穆巴拉克到机场为外国显要送行。紧跟在他后面的是埃及外交部长艾哈迈德•阿布•盖特和穆巴拉克国内政策的强力推行者奥马尔•苏莱曼。阿布•盖特问苏莱曼是否和总统提起过有关示威行走的事情。这位情报局长说他在峰会期间没有打扰过总统，但这个问题早该摆在桌面上了。
显要们离开之后，苏莱曼找到总统，说出现了一个重要的问题。穆巴拉克这才知道起义的事情，这时离他下台只有短短的几个星期了。
然而在当时，穆巴拉克有些不知所措。阿布•盖特在他最新出版的回忆录《我的证词》中写道：“总统并未表现出吃惊。”苏莱曼建议与高层官员召开会议，讨论如何应对即将发生的行走，穆巴拉克“没有回应这个提议，也没有表现出担心的样子”。
1月25日行走的两年之后，穆巴拉克身边的一小派官员终于开始揭露，在革命发生期间，埃及政府内部的一些争论。除了阿布•盖特的回忆录，埃及高等官员还在记者Bradley Hope的《暴君的最后一天》里，讲述了有关动乱的事情。这些内容都让我们有机会看到穆巴拉克政权内部的紧张局势，以及政府未能扑灭革命火焰的原因。
在这些埃及前官员的口中，穆巴拉克一律被描述为负面形象——一个任由别人摆布的领导人。阿布•盖特写道：“总统已经年逾古稀，因此非常依赖贾迈勒的主意。”他指的是穆巴拉克的次子，在起义发生之后，这个人在总统宫殿中相当活跃。他还说，贾迈勒“无论在总统办公室和住所，一直和总统在一起。”
这样的说法似乎是那些高官用来把针对埃及国家的指责转移给他们的政治反对派。但这些措辞似乎颇为一致：前统治党高官霍山•巴达维告诉Hope，他曾经在2月9日说服穆巴拉克放弃权力，但是总统在与贾迈勒和内部小圈子的其他成员之后，又改变了主意。再过两天，他可能又变得优柔寡断。
巴拉克•奥巴马政府在不同场合都与阿布•盖特有过接触，表达他们对穆巴拉克政权该如何应对危机的看法。埃及外交部长认为美国政府同时在唱红脸和白脸，他对苏莱曼说：“白宫似乎一直在坚决反对埃及政府，但是国务卿希拉里•克林顿和国务院却表现出一些政策的弹性。”
情报局长回答：“他们在传统上的角色分配就是这样。”
在革命迅速蔓延的时候，阿布•盖特发现政府在内讧中几乎瘫痪。1月31日，他出席了新总理艾哈迈德•沙菲克的就职典礼。这是一位军事铁腕人物，启用他的目的是让国家恢复秩序。他说，穆巴拉克对此显得既平静又厌烦，“他假装忙于阅读一些文件。”
然而，其他人已经在想方设法保护自己的利益了。当时的国防部长是穆罕默德•侯赛因•坦塔维，他是即将取代穆巴拉克的下一任军政府首领。在就职仪式上，他告诉阿布•盖特，军方不会为保存穆巴拉克的职位而牺牲名誉。据阿布•盖特的描述，坦塔维严肃地说：“有人告诉我，人们在考虑动用军队控制局势。我说，从我自己的角度来看，军队不应以人民为敌，否则它就丧失了合法性。”
与此同时，贾迈勒主张不惜代价地保护穆巴拉克的位置。很多人都认为贾迈勒在为自己谋划总统的职位，而年老体衰的独裁者却坚决否认会帮助贾迈勒继承职位。阿布•盖特写道，穆巴拉克对他说：“你觉得我疯了吗？让我儿子……我的儿子……忍受这种牢笼般的生活？绝不！”
尽管贾迈勒在幕后不遗余力地做了许多事情，穆巴拉克一直拒绝让他出现在公众面前。阿布•盖特在书中写道，他曾经在2010年建议总统让贾迈勒参选议会。那时候，反对派穆斯林兄弟会占据了议会中20％的席位。当然后来在2010年的选举中，他们的比例被大幅度削减，据称有人操纵选举结果。
穆巴拉克的反应很激动：“胡说八道！他们会把他撕成碎片，你难道不知道议会里发生了些什么吗？”
2月1日，当警方已经无力控制示威局势的时候，穆巴拉克在深夜发表讲话，宣布他将不参加下一届政府选举。阿布•盖特写道：“他的讲话太晚了……太晚了……我已经睡觉了。”这也反映出许多抗议者的沮丧心情。外交部长后来被贾迈勒的一通电话吵醒，他在电话里说，总统的讲话引发了一种“新的情绪”，民众对穆巴拉克表示同情。
然而，贾迈勒高估了局势的转变。2月2日，阿布•盖特舒服地坐在外交部的办公室中。窗外大批民众走向塔利尔广场，其中夹杂着马匹和骆驼。他的电话响起，一个亲戚喊道：“他们要烧了这个国家，统一的埃及已经完蛋了。”
这就是“骆驼之战”的开端——政权死忠分子用尽手段也未能把民众清理出广场。骑兵队用马匹和骆驼冲锋，向人群投掷石块和燃烧弹，导致11名埃及人死亡，600多人受伤。
但是这场攻击也标志着穆巴拉克政权的倾覆。阿布•盖特疯狂地拨打苏莱曼的电话，讨论塔利尔的流血事件。两位官员一致认为，总统目前已经没有其它选择，只能下台。苏莱曼说他不能公开宣布这个消息，因为这会被误解为他为了登上总统宝座而迫使穆巴拉克下台。
从那以后，埃及政府内部的分裂越来越严重。阿布•盖特详细记叙了他与苏莱曼的一次对话。情报局长说，已经制定出让贾迈勒继承总统职位的“详细计划”，但是“国家安全机构似乎并不赞同这个计划”，而且他自己也不会为贾迈勒工作。苏莱曼还说：“他们想干掉我，他们已经为此做好了准备。”阿布•盖特认为苏莱曼指的是穆巴拉克的妻子苏姗。
这次谈话还暗示出，苏莱曼为什么被穆巴拉克下台后的军政府所弃用的原因。情报局长说他与坦塔维对贾迈勒的问题持不同意见，如果穆巴拉克的儿子成为总统，“只有坦塔维会为他工作”。无论如何，苏莱曼谴责外国人在起义中所扮演的角色，以及埃及尚未做好全面推行民主制度的准备等言论，让他非常不受起义者的欢迎，同时也成为了转型政府的一个累赘。
2月9日，穆巴拉克的地位已经明显不保了。这时，巴达维在苏莱曼的协助下，得到了一次与穆巴拉克面对面交谈的集会。巴达维说：“总统先生，我看到的是齐奥塞斯库的样子。”他指的是罗马尼亚独裁者、穆巴拉克的好友，在这个国家的反共产主义革命中被枪决。
穆巴拉克说：“你是说他们会杀掉我？”
巴达维说：“或许是的。”
总统说：“我已经准备好为国家而死。”
据巴达维所说，穆巴拉克随后选择了一条更好的道路：他同意把权力交给苏莱曼，并且为早期总统选举铺平了道路。然而，这个有可能消除危机的方法，很快遭到贾迈勒和总统内部圈子里的死忠分子们的破坏。
即使在政权崩溃之际，贾迈勒还在着手修建保护父亲统治地位的最后防线。2月10日，穆巴拉克宣布他会再做一次公开讲话，公众普遍认为他将宣布辞职的决定。
阿布•盖特写道：“已经很晚很晚了……穆巴拉克终于出现，但是讲话中没有任何人们希望听到的内容。我知道，总统的儿子试图左右讲话内容来取悦所有的人。”
埃及抗议者被穆巴拉克依然紧握权力不放的表态所激怒，大批民众在2月11日走上街头，高呼“周五下台日”。阿布•盖特说他那一天整个上午都在与苏莱曼和沙菲克通电话，讨论穆巴拉克下台的细节。苏莱曼告诉他，总统可能会在午间祷告之前回到沙姆沙伊赫的家中——就是在那里，他首次听说抗议活动。
为了挽救危急的局势，苏莱曼在下午1点召集阿布•盖特到开罗的伊塔哈迪亚行宫开会。那里已经被抗议者包围，军队说随时可能被攻陷，于是官员们不得不把会议改在临近的一个军事基地里。阿布•盖特写道：“最后我终于有了一个符合逻辑的结论：世界已经变化了。”
穆巴拉克、苏莱曼和坦塔维的三方会谈，揭露出曾经紧密团结的埃及政府高官中出现了不和谐的声音。苏莱曼首先接到了穆巴拉克的电话，穆巴拉克已经被转移到沙姆沙伊赫，总统在电话中命令他告诉坦塔维，他已经被授权管理这个国家。然而，国防部长在听到这个消息时，有些犹豫不决。阿布•盖特写道：“我从电话中了解到，坦塔维不想让军队进驻政府。”
苏莱曼于是告诉穆巴拉克，他需要直接与坦塔维沟通。最后，他与沙菲克共同面对这位国防部长，告知他的新角色。在完成了这项任务之后，苏莱曼公开宣布了埃及在后穆巴拉克时代小心翼翼迈出的第一步。
曾经只手遮天的情报局长宣布：“以仁慈的上帝、同情和内心，以及民众的名义，在埃及所经历的困苦环境中，胡斯尼•穆巴拉克总统决定辞职。愿上帝保佑我们每一个人。”
原文：
Insider accounts are shedding new light on the 18 days that brought down a pharaoh.
CAIRO - It was Jan. 19, 2011, and Hosni Mubarak's regime was strong and confident. The Egyptian president was playing host to an array of Arab presidents at his beachside resort in Sharm el-Sheikh. Hundreds of construction workers had been evacuated from the area, lest they mar the spectacle.
But those listening carefully could make out the first rumblings of discontent. The Tunisian foreign minister had to scramble back to Tunis hours before the summit's opening, as his country dealt with the fallout of a revolution that had already toppled its long-serving dictator. And Egyptian Facebook pages were spreading news of demonstrations on Jan. 25, which would seek to replicate the drama of the Tunisian revolution on the streets of Cairo.
As the summit drew to a close, Mubarak headed to the airport to see the foreign dignitaries off. Trailing closely behind him were Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit and Omar Suleiman, Mubarak's feared domestic enforcer. Aboul Gheit asked Suleiman if he had raised the potential protests with the president; the intelligence chief replied that he had left Mubarak alone during the summit, but that it was high time to discuss the issue.
When the last dignitary had left, Suleiman approached the president and told him that he had a very important topic to discuss. It was then that Mubarak learned of the uprising that would sweep him from power in a few short weeks.
At the time, however, Mubarak was nonplussed. "The president didn't show much interest," Aboul Gheit wrote in his recently published memoir, My Testimony. When Suleiman suggested a meeting with top officials to coordinate responses to potential protests, Mubarak "didn't respond, and didn't react in a way that we understood as suggesting he was worried."
Two years after the Jan. 25 protests, the small clique of officials around Mubarak is finally starting to go public about the debates within the Egyptian government as the revolution unfolded around them. In addition to Aboul Gheit's account, top Egyptian officials gave their account of the unrest in journalist Bradley Hope's Last Day of the Pharaoh. Both tales provide a glimpse into the tensions at the very top of the Mubarak regime and the reason it failed to crush the protest movement.
Mubarak, in all these former officials' stories, is portrayed as a largely passive figure -- a leader who was at the mercy of the last person to offer his advice. "The president is very old, and consequently he is dependent on the vision of Gamal Mubarak," Aboul Gheit wrote, referring to Mubarak's younger son, who had been conspicuously active in the presidential palace since the beginning of the uprising. Gamal, he added, "stays with [the president] all the time in the palace or in the house."
Such explanations could be an effort by high-ranking officials to deflect blame away from the Egyptian state and on to their bureaucratic rivals. But the accounts are remarkably consistent: Hossam Badrawi, then the top official of the ruling political party, told Hope he had convinced Mubarak to relinquish power on Feb. 9 -- but the president then reversed his decision after being confronted by Gamal and other members of his inner circle. He would relent two days later.
President Barack Obama's administration reached out to Aboul Gheit on several occasions to express its views on how the Mubarak regime should handle the crisis. The Egyptian foreign minister believed the U.S. government was attempting a good cop-bad cop approach: "The White House appears very strict against the government, while [Secretary of State Hillary] Clinton and the State Department show some flexibility," he told Suleiman.
The intelligence chief replied, "It is the traditional distribution of roles."
As the revolution gained momentum, Aboul Gheit describes a regime paralyzed by infighting. On Jan. 31, he attended the swearing-in of the new prime minister, Ahmed Shafiq, a career military man brought in to restore order. Mubarak, he says, was bored and quiet: "He pretended to be very busy reading some papers."
Other players, however, were already maneuvering to protect their interests. Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, then defense minister and the future head of the military junta that would replace Mubarak, informed Aboul Gheit at the ceremony that the military would not sacrifice its reputation to preserve Mubarak's rule. "Some told me that people are talking about using the army to control the situation by force," Tantawi said sternly, according to Aboul Gheit. "And I said from my side the army doesn't strike people at all, or else it will lose its legitimacy."
Gamal, meanwhile, was intent on protecting Mubarak's hold on power, whatever the cost. Gamal was widely believed to have designs on the presidency himself -- though the aging dictator denied that he would orchestrate Gamal's inheritance of power. "Do you think I'm crazy?" Aboul Gheit wrote that Mubarak told him. "To put my son ... my son ... in this jail? Impossible."
While Gamal indisputably played a powerful behind-the-scenes role, Mubarak resisted efforts to place him in the public eye. Aboul Gheit wrote that he suggested to the president in 2010 that Gamal run for a seat in parliament. At the time, the opposition Muslim Brotherhood held nearly 20 percent of parliament, though their presence would be decimated in the 2010 election, which was widely viewed as rigged.
"This is nonsense," Mubarak responded sharply. "They will cut him into pieces. Don't you know what is happening in parliament?"
On Feb. 1, with the police forces helpless to control the swelling protests, Mubarak delivered a late-night speech announcing that he would not run for another term in office. "[The speech] was late ... it was late ... and then I fell asleep," Aboul Gheit writes, mirroring the frustrations of many protesters. The foreign minister was awakened afterwards by a phone call from Gamal, who said that the speech had sparked a "new spirit" and popular sympathy for Mubarak.
Gamal, however, had overestimated the sea change. On Feb. 2, Aboul Gheit was ensconced in his office in the Foreign Ministry when he looked out the window to see a crowd, interspersed with horses and camels, moving toward Tahrir Square. His phone rang: "They are going to burn the country." shouted a relative. "The unity of Egypt will be gone!"
It was the beginning of the Battle of the Camel - a failed attempt by regime loyalists to clear the square by any means necessary. The cavalry charge with horses and camels, as well as attacks with stones and Molotov cocktails, left 11 Egyptians dead and more than 600 injured.
But the attack also marked the beginning of the end for the Mubarak regime. Aboul Gheit frantically called Suleiman to discuss the bloodshed in Tahrir: The two officials agreed that the president now had no choice but to step down. Suleiman, however, said that he could not say this publicly -- he would be accused of forcing Mubarak out in order to ascend to the presidency himself.
From this point, the fractures within Egyptian regime widened quickly. Aboul Gheit recounted a conversation with Suleiman, in which the intelligence chief said "there was a real plan" to make Gamal as president, but that "the national security apparatus will not agree on this" and that he would not work for Gamal. "They want to get rid of me, and they exerted a lot of effort in this respect," Suleiman added. Aboul Gheit added that he believed Suleiman was referring to Mubarak's wife, Suzanne.
This conversation may also contain a hint for understanding why Suleiman was shunted aside by the military establishment after Mubarak's fall. The intelligence chief suggested that there was a disagreement between him and Tantawi over Gamal, saying that in the event Mubarak's son became president, "it is only Tantawi who will work with him." In any event, Suleiman's bombastic statements blaming foreigners for the uprising and claiming that Egypt was not ready for democracy had made him extremely unpopular among the protesters - and a liability to any transitional government.
By Feb. 9, Mubarak's position was clearly untenable. At this point, Badrawi -- after receiving Suleiman's blessing -- was granted a one-on-one meeting with Mubarak. "Mr. President, I see in front of me an image of [Nicolae] Ceaucescu," Badrawi said, referring to the Romanian dictator, a former friend of Mubarak's, who had been executed by firing squad during the country's anti-Communist revolution.
"You mean they are going to kill me?" Mubarak asked.
"Probably, yes." Badrawi responded.
"I am ready to die for my country," the president said.
According to Badrawi, Mubarak soon opted for a better course: He agreed to delegate power to Suleiman and pave the way for early presidential elections. This path out of the crisis, however, was quickly undermined by Gamal and other loyalists in the president's inner circle.
Even as the regime crumbled, Gamal embarked on a last-ditch attempt to preserve his father's rule. On Feb. 10, Mubarak announced that he would give another speech, in which he was widely expected to announce his resignation.
"It was late ... it was late," Aboul Gheit wrote. "And then the statement came, but it did not have anything good in it. And I understood then that the son of the president was trying to shape the statement so that it pleased everyone."
Egyptian protesters, shocked that Mubarak was attempting to cling to power, took to the streets in huge numbers on Feb. 11, dubbed the "Friday of Departure." Aboul Gheit said that he spent the morning working the phones between Suleiman and Shafiq, trying to negotiate Mubarak's exit. Suleiman told him that the president would retreat to his home at Sharm el-Sheikh -- where he had first learned of the protest movement -- that day, before noon prayers.
In an attempt to salvage the situation, Suleiman summoned Aboul Gheit to a meeting at Cairo's Ittahadeya Palace at 1 pm. The palace, however, was besieged by protesters -- the army warned that it could be stormed at any moment, and the officials had to relocate to a nearby military base. "And finally I came to the logical conclusion: The world has changed," wrote Aboul Gheit.
A three-way conversation between Mubarak, Suleiman, and Tantawi laid bare the disagreements between the formerly tightly knit officials at the top of the Egyptian government. Suleiman first received a call from Mubarak, who had by then relocated to Sharm el-Sheikh, in which the president ordered him to tell Tantawi that he had been granted the power to oversee the administration of the country. When informed of the order, however, the defense minister balked: "I understood from the phone call that Tantawi doesn't want to put the army in office," Aboul Gheit wrote.
Suleiman then told Mubarak that he needed to appeal directly to Tantawi. In the end, he and Shafiq headed in person to the Defense Ministry to inform the military chief of his new role. His job done, Suleiman delivered the announcement that charted the first, tentative steps of Egypt's post-Mubarak future.
"In the name of God the merciful, the compassionate, citizens, during these very difficult circumstances Egypt is going through, President Hosni Mubarak has decided to step down," the once all-powerful intelligence chief declared. "May God help everybody."
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