|
|
本帖最后由 满仓 于 2013-2-4 14:36 编辑
【中文标题】从法律上讲，美国可以击落朝鲜的导弹吗？
【原文标题】Can the U.S. Legally Shoot Down A North Korean Rocket?
【登载媒体】外交家
【原文作者】Lucas Bento、Daniel Firger
【原文链接】http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/29/can-the-us-legally-shoot-down-a-dprk-rocket/?all=true
或许可以，但是美国必须考虑好这样做的后果。
2012年12月12日，在经过了14年的尝试和失败之后，朝鲜终于把一颗卫星送入地球轨道。虽然表面上的用意是气象监测，但用来搭载卫星的银河三号运载火箭其性能等同于弹道导弹。韩国立即表态，称卫星发射的成功证明平壤有能力攻击1万公里（6200英里）以内的目标，美国西海岸大部分地区都在此范围内。
2013年1月22日，联合国安理会迅速通过了2087号决议，谴责发射火箭的举措。朝鲜于是愈加坚定了进行核试验的决心。
有些专家警告，朝鲜只需花费几年时间就可以给导弹装配上核弹头。另外一些人则质疑朝鲜的技术水平。实际上，银河三号运载火箭发射之后不到一个星期，美国宇航员声称这个著名的卫星似乎是“死了”，在轨道上“转来转去”。
尽管银河三号卫星自身并没有直接的威胁，但它似乎是平壤发展长期弹道导弹计划中的一步。如果朝鲜在未来继续发射改良后的银行三号、四号、五号火箭，美国能否先发制人地将它击落呢？美国会这么做吗？
尽管美国具有毋庸赘言的技术能力摧毁朝鲜的卫星，但在法律上可行吗？如果参考相关的国际法律，这个问题恐怕没有一个直接的答案。
平壤已经违犯了联合国安理会的1718和1874号决议，这两项决议在最大程度上要求朝鲜必须停止发射弹道导弹。2006年，朝鲜进行了一次核试验。同年10月，联合国安理会全体成员一致通过1718号协议。其内容提到，朝鲜“必须停止进一步的核试验以及弹道导弹的发射”。2009年5月平壤再次进行核试验，6月份全体一致通过的1874号决议给予朝鲜进一步的制裁。决议授权其它国家检查朝鲜陆运、海运和空运的货物，并且可以销毁任何被怀疑与核项目有关的货物。
但是，我们不知道1874号决议在外层空间是否有效。如果有效，那么美国就具备了法律依据来“抢夺并处理掉”一个可疑的朝鲜卫星。如果无效，平壤未来的太空发射活动就是一条坦途。
摧毁朝鲜太空科技或许可以依赖一项更有争议的事前自卫条款。联合国宪章第51款限制（大部分情况下是禁止）使用武力造成国际冲突，强调“单一或多个国家在联合国成员国遭到武装进攻时，有权自卫”。与其它很多国家不一样，美国一直认为，第51款和国际惯例法都授权一个国家在遭受武装攻击，或者合理预期即将发生武装攻击时，使用武力自卫。
可惜，“即将发生”是一个令人伤脑筋的概念。
看过电影《奇爱博士》的人都知道，一旦核战爆发，任何自我防范措施都来不及了。但是如果没有即将发生的威胁，一个国家该怎样界定以下两者的界限呢：一个可以采取预先防备措施以应对所谓的合理预期的威胁，以及仅仅是为了预防一个可能的，但无法确认的威胁而采取的非法行动。近期发生的一些有关武力预防措施的讨论，对这个话题恐怕没有什么贡献。支持美国在2003年入侵伊拉克的人刻意回避了第51条款，而是把伊拉克违犯了若干项安理会决议作为战争的借口。有关对伊朗核设施进行打击的合法性的讨论，或许更切题一些。但是，按照美国自己的说法，伊朗既没有核武器，也无法在近期建造核设施，甚至没有计划这样做。
朝鲜与此不同。这个国家已经测试了核武器，拥有了一颗理论上可以搭载核弹头的弹道导弹，发射范围笼罩了美国本土和韩国、日本等盟国。在这样的前提下，奥巴马总统即使没有收到核弹进攻的准确情报，他有击落朝鲜卫星的法律依据吗？或许吧。
但是，他会这么做吗？
无论是1874号决议明确的表白，还是预先自卫条款含混的暗示，摧毁朝鲜的卫星都应该是合法行为。但是奥巴马总统必须要考虑，这种鲁莽行为所带来的更深层次的地缘政治、外交和军事后果。
美国已经因其美化自身军事行动而饱受批评，从2003年入侵伊拉克、无限期关押疑似恐怖分子，到近期无人机的轰炸和定点清除行动，都没有足够的法律依据。如果把这种不光彩的前科延伸到外太空，必将煽动其它国家的军事化和太空探索野心。这不但会造成危险的新型国际冲突，还会让美国变成吃力不讨好的角色，花费大笔金钱，被迫在外太空巡逻，就像它目前在全球海域所做的事情一样。利用国际法律斡旋是外交上一块难啃的骨头，尽管它的过程漫长得令人绝望，结果又充满未知数，但这个选择毕竟要好一些。
原文：
Maybe. But the United States would need to consider the consequences...and what happens next.
On December 12, 2012, after 14 years of trials and failures, North Korea finally put a satellite into orbit around the Earth. The Unha-3 rocket used to deliver this payload—which was ostensibly launched for weather tracking purposes—is functionally equivalent to a ballistic missile, and South Korea was quick to note that its successful launch proves that Pyongyang can now reach targets at a distance exceeding 10,000 km (6,200 miles), putting much of the western coast of the continental United States within striking distance.
On January 22, 2013, the UN Security Council swiftly passed Resolution 2087, which condemned the launch. North Korea has since expressed its firm determination to continue pursuing its nuclear program.
Some experts warn that North Korea is only a few years away from mounting a nuclear warhead on a missile. Others doubt its technological capabilities. Indeed, less than a week after the launch of the Unha-3, U.S. astronomers pointed out that the celebrated satellite appeared to be “dead” and “tumbling” through its orbit.
Although the Unha-3 satellite itself may pose no direct threat, it is likely part of a long-term strategy to further develop Pyongyang's ballistic missile capabilities. If North Korea launches an improved Unha-3, -4 or -5 rocket later this year, could the U.S. preemptively shoot it out of the skies? Would it?
While the U.S. undoubtedly has the capacity to destroy a North Korean satellite, may it legally do so? Under international law, the answer is less than straightforward.
Pyongyang is already in breach of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, which broadly provide that North Korea must refrain from launching ballistic missiles. Adopted unanimously in October 2006, Resolution 1718 imposed sanctions on North Korea following its nuclear test earlier that year. The Resolution states that North Korea “must not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile.” Resolution 1874, adopted unanimously in June 2009, imposed further sanctions and obligations on Pyongyang following another nuclear test in May 2009. That resolution authorizes states to inspect North Korean cargo on land, sea and air, and to destroy any goods suspected of being connected to its nuclear program.
But it’s not clear whether Resolution 1874 extends to outer space. If so, it could provide a legal basis for the U.S. to "seize and dispose of" a suspicious North Korean satellite. If not, Pyongyang may get a free pass for future space launches.
A more controversial legal justification for the destruction of North Korean space technology is the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense. Article 51 of the UN Charter, which governs (and largely prohibits) the use of force to settle international conflicts, affirms the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations." Unlike many other nations, the U.S. has long held that, consistent with Article 51 and customary international law, a state may use force in self-defense if it has been attacked or if an armed attack is legitimately deemed to be imminent.
Imminence is a thorny concept, however.
As anyone who has seen "Dr. Strangelove" can grasp, once a nuclear attack is underway, it may be too late to take effective self-defense measures. But short of an immediate threat, where should a state draw the line between so-called legitimate anticipatory self-defense, which seeks to preempt a truly imminent attack, and illegitimate measures that merely seek to prevent a possible—but by no means certain—threat? Recent debates about the preemptive use of force are not much help. Advocates of the 2003 invasion of Iraq studiously avoided Article 51, relying instead on Iraq's violation of several Security Council Resolutions as grounds for war. Current discussions about the murky legality of an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities are more on point, although, according to the U.S. itself, Iran does not have nuclear weapons, could not build a nuclear weapon anytime soon, and is not currently trying to do so.
North Korea is different. The country has already tested nuclear weapons, and now has a ballistic missile at least theoretically capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, if it were ever to acquire one, to U.S. soil and some of its allies, such as South Korea and Japan. With these facts in mind, could President Obama legally shoot down a North Korean satellite even if he lacked intelligence that conclusively demonstrated a nuclear payload? Perhaps.
But should he?
Destroying a North Korean satellite may be explicitly legal under certain readings of Resolution 1874 or implicitly authorized by the controversial doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, but President Obama must nevertheless consider the wider geopolitical, diplomatic and military consequences of such a brazen act.
The U.S. has been widely criticized for justifying its military operations, from the 2003 Iraq invasion and the indefinite detention of terror suspects to recent drone attacks and targeted killings, on shaky legal foundations. To extend such precedents to outer space could inadvertently encourage other nations to militarize and accelerate their space programs, inviting new and dangerous forms of international conflict while saddling the U.S. with the largely thankless and extremely costly task of patrolling the outer boundaries of the exosphere, as it now does the world's major sea lanes. The tough work of diplomacy and international law, though frustratingly slow and fraught with uncertainty, is a far better way forward
|
评分
-
1
查看全部评分
-
|
狗仔卡
发表于 2013-2-4 10:26
提升卡
变色卡
抢沙发
千斤顶
显身卡
发表于 2013-2-4 11:11
楼主
