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http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/15/the_real_reason_the_us_failed_in_afghanistan?wp_login_redirect=0
Why did the U.S. fail in Afghanistan? (I know we are pretending to have succeeded, but that's just camouflage to disguise what is in fact an embarrassing if predictable defeat). The reasons for our failure are now being debated by people like Vali Nasr and Sarah Chayes, who have offered contrasting insider accounts of what went wrong.
Both Nasr and Chayes make useful points about the dysfunction that undermined the AfPak effort, and I'm not going to try to adjudicate between them. Rather, I think both of them miss the more fundamental contradiction that bedeviled the entire U.S./NATO effort, especially after the diversion to Iraq allowed the Taliban to re-emerge. The key problem was essentially structural: US. objectives in Afghanistan could not be achieved without a much larger commitment of resources, but the stakes there simply weren't worth that level of commitment. In other words, winning wasn't worth the effort it would have taken, and the real failure was not to recognize that fact much earlier and to draw the appropriate policy conclusions.
斯蒂芬·M.沃尔特,哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院罗伯特和雷内·贝尔弗(Robert and Renee Belfer)国际事务教授在其博克中这样说:
为什么美国在阿富汗失败?
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补充内容 (2013-3-20 14:25):
美国受挫阿富汗的原因:过晚觉悟产值不抵投入 |
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