本帖最后由 下个月 于 2014-2-4 23:17 编辑
【中文标题】中国军队败絮其中（但仍然危险）
【原文标题】China’s Deceptively Weak (and Dangerous) Military
【登载媒体】外交家杂志
【原文作者】Ian Easton
【原文链接】http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/chinas-deceptively-weak-and-dangerous-military/
【译者】nanotube
【翻译方式】人工
【声明】本翻译供Anti-CNN使用，未经AC或译者许可，不得转载。
【译文】
2003年4月，中国海军一艘最先进的潜艇上聚集了一大群最优秀的潜艇人才，用来实验其海军精英部队的协同运作。结果呢？离开港口没几个小时，这艘035明III级潜艇就沉没了，所有人员无一幸免。中国一直没有从这个海上灾难完全恢复过来，也是联合国安理会常任理事国里面从未用核潜艇进行作战巡逻的唯一一个国家。
中国也是联合国的“五常”里面从没有兴建和运行航空母舰的唯一成员。虽然2012年9月其在一片锣鼓声中下水了一艘乌克兰建造的、经过翻新过的航母 - 当时的国家主席胡锦涛和所有的高层领导人都出面了- 下水没多久该航母就因为怀疑发动机故障不得不返回到码头进行大修; 这对中国刚刚起步的“蓝水”海军不是一个好兆头，而这在这个试图搞 军事现代化却没法掌握上个世纪的技术的军队里面远远不是第一次。
看看吧，今天解放军（ PLA）长途机动训练的速度还在局限于下一列能调运坦克和大炮的货物列车能多快赶到。如果用铁路调运军队听起来有点过时，在这个全球空运的时代，这不怪你– 因为这是第一次世界大战时候的技术。
比起常规陆军，中国强大的战略火箭兵也不甘示弱，第二炮兵部队，仍然在用骑马的骑兵来巡逻其在中国内陆的导弹基地。为什么呢？因为它没有直升机。同样稀缺的是现代固定翼飞机。空军仍然在延用上世纪50年代苏联设计的机身，图波列夫Tu- 16 ，用来作为轰炸机（其原设计的任务） ，作一个战场侦察飞机，作电子战飞机，作预警机和空中加油机。解放军靠改装苏联安东诺夫设计的安-12军用运输机来完成ELINT （电子情报）任务， ASW （反潜）的任务，地质调查任务，空中预警任务。他们还有一种安-12专门用来运牲口的，让绵羊和山羊飞到远程季节性牧场【注：嘲笑的口吻】。
但是，听过北京的大规模军事现代化的炒作以后，如果中国缺乏像样的硬件让人举得有一点奇怪的话，“软件”（军事训练和战备）的现状则绝对让你开眼。在2012年的夏天的一次军事演习上，解放军某战略导弹部队，在地下掩体运作弹头搞得太辛苦了，竟然不得不在为期15天的演习中间抽出时间搞电影之夜和卡拉OK派对。到了第九天，一个“文工团” （解放军对唱歌和舞蹈的女孩子们的委婉称呼）竟然被派到与世隔绝的战备设施里面用来娱乐想家的士兵。
解放军从此明显的开始怀疑男人的情感在高压的情况下扛不住，于是在2013年5月举行的同样一个演习里面转而引入了一个实验性的全女性部队，做了一个简短的72小时试运行。不幸的是，结果更糟。演习的第二天结束时，地下战备隧道里面的心理咨询室充斥着病人，据说很多过于伤心过度吃不下东西，有一个人甚至因为密闭的环境患上严重的恶心。
虽然近几年目睹了中国的巨大宣传攻势旨在说服世界，中国是值得尊重的、认真的军事势力，外面的人常常忘记，中国甚至没有一个职业军人队伍。解放军，不像美国，日本，韩国，台湾等地区重量级的军队，从定义上讲不是职业的战斗力量。相反，它是一个“党的军队，”中国共产党（中共）的武装。事实上，所有解放军的列职军官都是中共党员，而连以上的机构都配有政委来执行党的控制。同样，解放军的所有重要决定都是由党内搞政治的文官主导，而不是由一线人员来做。这个体系保证了党的文职和军事领导人的权利被合并成一个，基于这个原因，解放军的新兵要宣誓效忠中共，而不是效忠中国宪法和中国人民。
这可能解释了为什么中国的海军陆战队员（或“海军陆战队”解放军说法）和其他两栖战部队训练的时候找的是大片白色的沙滩来登陆，看起来一点也不像台湾的西海岸（或任何东海或南海他们可能会被派去攻打的地方）。这也可能解释了为什么解放军空军飞行员仍通常一个月只有（远低于区域标准）不到十小时的飞行时间，只有在2012年开始才有提交自己的飞行计划的能力（以前，霸道的参谋人员直接配给飞行员飞行计划，甚至不给他们自己滑行和起飞的自由）。
激烈和真实的训练是危险的，美国有一句格言训练时多流血，打仗时少流血，但这句话在列宁主义的军事体系中失去了意义。正相反。中国军队的领导故意的官僚性的组织让他们规避风险的行为，因为花费太多时间来训练的军队就没有足够的时间做政治灌输。北京最可怕的噩梦，是解放军有一天会忘记它的首要使命是保护共产党的领导人、打击其所有的敌人- 尤其是当中共的“敌人”是国内学生或各社争取民主权利，就像发生在1989年和1999年的事件一样。
出于这个原因，解放军拥有以减少作战训练为代价的“政治学习”。这意味着，一个军官的工作的30 ％到40％（或每40小时工作周中的约15小时）被浪费在研究中共的宣传，唱爱国歌曲，并进行马克思列宁主义的理论小组讨论。而当解放军指战员真正训练的时候，几乎总是在一个谨慎的场景，很少涉及风险（即接近现实）。
亚伯拉罕·林肯曾经说过，如果他有六个小时砍倒一棵树，他会花头四个小时里磨他的斧头。显然，这样的解放军不是在磨斧头。他也没有办法磨斧头。相反，它选择投资于一个更大的斧头，虽然仍然是很钝的斧头。讽刺的是，这破坏了北京自己的建设一个真正强大的21世纪军事力量的愿望。
然而，这一切都不是在安慰中国的潜在军事对手。正是中国的军事弱点，使得它如此危险。就拿解放军缺乏实战经验来说。除开一些小的边界争端，解放军自朝鲜战争以来从没有见过真正的战斗。这似乎是导致其如此肆无忌惮地在东海和南海行事的一个主要因素。事实上，中国海军现在看来是摩拳擦掌的想找仗打，哪儿都行。实战经验丰富的老兵几乎从来不会这样干。事实上， 历史表明，经历过战争洗礼的军事指挥官跟缺乏经验的相比远不会那么强硬。现实的智慧来源于实战经验，缺乏这些，今天的解放军是鹰得很，没有鸽派。
中国军队在另一方面也很危险。认识到它将永远无法与美国及其盟友打赢一场传统战争，解放军已经转向非传统的“非对称”第一次打击武器和能力来弥补其传统火力、专业和经验的不足。这些武器包括1600多枚弹道导弹和巡航导弹，其本质是造成地区不稳定，而美国和俄罗斯在约25年前就已经决定通过反导条约决定取缔这些武力。
发展战略导弹部队的同时，中国还研制了一大系列太空武器，旨在破坏军控条约执行的验证，保障军事通信，并预警敌人的攻击。中国还建造了世界上最大的网络部队，和地球上第二大无人机部队，以利用美国及其盟国不设防的部位。所有这些能力使中国更有可能有一天会主动发动战争，而其没有克制战争升级的内部机制。
然而，尽管有充足的和越来越多的证据表明，中国可以通过恶意或失误，在太平洋发起一场毁灭性的战争，解放军的战略想打赢一场战争是极不可能的。就拿入侵台湾来说，这应该是解放军的顶级攻打计划。尽管近年来很多人抱怨台海两岸的军事平衡早已打破，至今没有人能够解释入侵的解放军部队将怎么样能够横跨100海里的浪涛，然后登陆世界上最险恶难攻的海滩，更别说占领首都和安抚地形崎岖的台湾岛了。
解放军根本没有足够的运输船只，就算它有的那些个也是台湾反舰巡航导弹、制导火箭弹、智能集束弹药、自行火炮和先进的水雷的炮灰 - 更不用提面对台湾的精英部队，美国训练的战斗机和直升机飞行员。即使一些幸运的部队能够活着渡海（不是一个有把握的假设），他们会迅速被小但专业，并且已经为了这一刻准备几十年的台湾部队瞬间压垮。
展望未来，美国及其盟国应该意识到中国的军事在很多方面金玉其外败絮其中，这是非常重要的一点。然而，中国也变得越来越有能力通过利用第一次打击武器来给敌人造成毁灭。为了缓解解放军的战略的不稳定影响，美国及其盟友应该更加努力，以维持目前的（虽然在衰弱）的军事硬件优势。但更重要的是，他们必须继续投资在作训上面使他们保持真正的专业军队。虽然人力资源数量很可能在未来几年由于国防预算削减有所下降，亚太区域的民主国家们如果把他们的斧头磨锋利了，就不用为来自中国的软弱、但危险的军事力量而担心。
伊恩·伊斯顿位于美国弗吉尼亚州阿灵顿的2049项目研究所的研究员。日本东京国际事务研究所访问学者。此前，他是美国海军战略分析中心的一个中国分析师。
In April 2003, the Chinese Navy decided to put a large group of its best submarine talent on the same boat as part of an experiment to synergize its naval elite. The result? Within hours of leaving port, the Type 035 Ming III class submarine sank with all hands lost. Never having fully recovered from this maritime disaster, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is still the only permanent member of the United Nations Security Councilnever to have conducted an operational patrol with a nuclear missile submarine.
China is also the only member of the UN’s “Big Five” never to have built and operated an aircraft carrier. While it launched a refurbished Ukrainian built carrier amidst much fanfare in September 2012 – then-President Hu Jintao and all the top brass showed up – soon afterward the big ship had to return to the docks for extensive overhauls because of suspected engine failure; not the most auspicious of starts for China’s fledgling “blue water” navy, and not the least example of a modernizing military that has yet to master last century’s technology.
Indeed, today the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) still conducts long-distance maneuver training at speeds measured by how fast the next available cargo train can transport its tanks and guns forward. And if mobilizing and moving armies around on railway tracks sounds a bit antiquated in an era of global airlift, it should – that was how it was done in the First World War.
Not to be outdone by the conventional army, China’s powerful strategic rocket troops, the Second Artillery Force, still uses cavalry units to patrol its sprawling missile bases deep within China’s vast interior. Why? Because it doesn’t have any helicopters. Equally scarce in China are modern fixed-wing military aircraft. So the Air Force continues to use a 1950s Soviet designed airframe, the Tupolev Tu-16, as a bomber (its original intended mission), a battlefield reconnaissance aircraft, an electronic warfare aircraft, a target spotting aircraft, and an aerial refueling tanker. Likewise, the PLA uses the Soviet designed Antonov An-12 military cargo aircraft for ELINT (electronic intelligence) missions, ASW (anti-submarine warfare) missions, geological survey missions, and airborne early warning missions. It also has an An-12 variant specially modified for transporting livestock, allowing sheep and goats access to remote seasonal pastures.
But if China’s lack of decent hardware is somewhat surprising given all the hype surrounding Beijing’s massive military modernization program, the state of “software” (military training and readiness) is truly astounding. At one military exercise in the summer of 2012, a strategic PLA unit, stressed out by the hard work of handling warheads in an underground bunker complex, actually had to take time out of a 15-day wartime simulation for movie nights and karaoke parties. In fact, by day nine of the exercise, a “cultural performance troupe” (common PLA euphemism for song-and-dance girls) had to be brought into the otherwise sealed facility to entertain the homesick soldiers.
Apparently becoming suspicious that men might not have the emotional fortitude to hack it in high-pressure situations, an experimental all-female unit was then brought in for the 2013 iteration of the war games, held in May, for an abbreviated 72-hour trial run. Unfortunately for the PLA, the results were even worse. By the end of the second day of the exercise, the hardened tunnel facility’s psychological counseling office was overrun with patients, many reportedly too upset to eat and one even suffering with severe nausea because of the unpleasant conditions.
While recent years have witnessed a tremendous Chinese propaganda effort aimed at convincing the world that the PRC is a serious military player that is owed respect, outsiders often forget that China does not even have a professional military. The PLA, unlike the armed forces of the United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and other regional heavyweights, is by definition not a professional fighting force. Rather, it is a “party army,” the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Indeed, all career officers in the PLA are members of the CCP and all units at the company level and above have political officers assigned to enforce party control. Likewise, all important decisions in the PLA are made by Communist Party committees that are dominated by political officers, not by operators. This system ensures that the interests of the party’s civilian and military leaders are merged, and for this reason new Chinese soldiers entering into the PLA swear their allegiance to the CCP, not to the PRC constitution or the people of China.
This may be one reason why China’s marines (or “naval infantry” in PLA parlance) and other amphibious warfare units train by landing on big white sandy beaches that look nothing like the west coast of Taiwan (or for that matter anyplace else they could conceivably be sent in the East China Sea or South China Sea). It could also be why PLA Air Force pilots still typically get less than ten hours of flight time a month (well below regional standards), and only in 2012 began to have the ability to submit their own flight plans (previously, overbearing staff officers assigned pilots their flight plans and would not even allow them to taxi and take-off on the runways by themselves).
Intense and realistic training is dangerous business, and the American maxim that the more you bleed during training the less you bleed during combat doesn’t translate well in a Leninist military system. Just the opposite.China’s military is intentionally organized to bureaucratically enforce risk-averse behavior, because an army that spends too much time training is an army that is not engaging in enough political indoctrination. Beijing’s worst nightmare is that the PLA could one day forget that its number one mission is protecting the Communist Party’s civilian leaders against all its enemies – especially when the CCP’s “enemies” are domestic student or religious groups campaigning for democratic rights, as happened in 1989 and 1999, respectively.
For that reason, the PLA has to engage in constant “political work” at the expense of training for combat. This means that 30 to 40 percent of an officer’s career (or roughly 15 hours per 40-hour work week) is wasted studying CCP propaganda, singing patriotic songs, and conducting small group discussions on Marxist-Leninist theory. And when PLA officers do train, it is almost always a cautious affair that rarely involves risky (i.e., realistic) training scenarios.
Abraham Lincoln once observed that if he had six hours to chop down a tree he would spend the first four hours sharpening his axe. Clearly the PLA is not sharpening its proverbial axe. Nor can it. Rather, it has opted to invest in a bigger axe, albeit one that is still dull. Ironically, this undermines Beijing’s own aspirations for building a truly powerful 21st century military.
Yet none of this should be comforting to China’s potential military adversaries. It is precisely China’s military weakness that makes it so dangerous. Take the PLA’s lack of combat experience, for example. A few minor border scraps aside, the PLA hasn’t seen real combat since the Korean War. This appears to be a major factor leading it to act so brazenly in the East and South China Seas. Indeed, China’s navy now appears to be itching for a fight anywhere it can find one. Experienced combat veterans almost never act this way. Indeed, history shows that military commanders that have gone to war are significantly less hawkish than their inexperienced counterparts. Lacking the somber wisdom that comes from combat experience, today’s PLA is all hawk and no dove.
The Chinese military is dangerous in another way as well. Recognizing that it will never be able to compete with the U.S. and its allies using traditional methods of war fighting, the PLA has turned to unconventional “asymmetric” first-strike weapons and capabilities to make up for its lack of conventional firepower, professionalism and experience. These weapons include more than 1,600 offensive ballistic and cruise missiles, whose very nature is so strategically destabilizing that the U.S. and Russia decided to outlaw them with the INF Treaty some 25 years ago.
In concert with its strategic missile forces, China has also developed a broad array of space weapons designed to destroy satellites used to verify arms control treaties, provide military communications, and warn of enemy attacks. China has also built the world’s largest army of cyber warriors, and the planet’s second largest fleet of drones, to exploit areas where the U.S. and its allies are under-defended. All of these capabilities make it more likely that China could one day be tempted to start a war, and none come with any built in escalation control.
Yet while there is ample and growing evidence to suggest China could, through malice or mistake, start a devastating war in the Pacific, it is highly improbable that the PLA’s strategy could actually win a war. Take a Taiwan invasion scenario, which is the PLA’s top operational planning priority. While much hand-wringing has been done in recent years about the shifting military balance in the Taiwan Strait, so far no one has been able to explain how any invading PLA force would be able to cross over 100 nautical miles of exceedingly rough water and successfully land on the world’s most inhospitable beaches, let alone capture the capital and pacify the rest of the rugged island.
The PLA simply does not have enough transport ships to make the crossing, and those it does have are remarkably vulnerable to Taiwanese anti-ship cruise missiles, guided rockets, smart cluster munitions, mobile artillery and advanced sea mines – not to mention its elite corps of American-trained fighter and helicopter pilots. Even if some lucky PLA units could survive the trip (not at all a safe assumption), they would be rapidly overwhelmed by a small but professional Taiwan military that has been thinking about and preparing for this fight for decades.
Going forward it will be important for the U.S. and its allies to recognize that China’s military is in many waysmuch weaker than it looks. However, it is also growing more capable of inflicting destruction on its enemies through the use of first-strike weapons. To mitigate the destabilizing effects of the PLA’s strategy, the U.S. and its allies should try harder to maintain their current (if eroding) leads in military hardware. But more importantly, they must continue investing in the training that makes them true professionals. While manpower numbers are likely to come down in the years ahead due to defense budget cuts, regional democracies will have less to fear from China’s weak but dangerous military if their axes stay sharp.
Ian Easton is a research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute in Arlington, VA. He was also a recent visiting fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo. Previously, he was a China analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses.
|
狗仔卡
发表于 2014-2-3 02:04
提升卡
变色卡
抢沙发
千斤顶
显身卡
楼主
