本帖最后由 满仓 于 2014-9-11 09:09 编辑
【中文标题】中国是历史上发展最快的国家吗？
【原文标题】Is China the Fastest-Rising Power in History?
【登载媒体】外交政策
【原文作者】Daniel M. Kliman
【原文链接】http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/16/china_graphs_fastest_rising_power_in_history
中国的确正在崛起，但是到什么程度？有多快？世界银行新发布的数据显示，中国将很快取代美国成为世界最大的经济体。随之而来的声音是，一些中国观察人士对此不屑一顾，说这是“数字游戏”，另一些人认为这是一记“警钟”。但是喧嚣声模糊了一个更基本的问题：中国崛起的规模和速度在历史上属于独一无二，还仅仅是复制了其它大国的崛起之路？分析的结果是，中国在前者上的表现平平，但在后者上的表现突出。
尽管几千年来出现了无数的新兴势力——希腊在公元前479年战胜波斯之后雅典的兴旺、罗马在公元前264年与迦太基开战之后的发展——但衡量一个国家崛起的规模和速度的全面数据，只在19世纪中期之后才可以得到。在这个时期里，有5个国家成为了全球超级势力。
－ 美国，1870年左右：从内战的疮痍中恢复之后，它进入了一个高速的工业成长和海外扩张期。
－ 德国，1870年左右：奥托•冯•俾斯麦打败了法国人，建立了统一的国家。
－ 苏联，1945年左右：二战之后，苏联迅速成长为全球的超级势力。
－ 日本，1960年左右：一个高速增长的时期，让日本迅速占领全球经济的至高点。
－ 中国，1982年左右：开始于共产党完成第六个五年计划之后，这份文件依然被用来指导全国经济，开启了经济改革和对外开放的新时代。
当然，任何一个国家的崛起都没有一个单一的、无可争议的起点。但我们有必要确定一个起始时间来衡量国家的发展和衰落，上面所列举的时间是相对合理的国家发展拐点。下面是中国与其它4个国家相比，发展了30年之后，全球GDP占比、全球贸易额占比和军费支出占比的数据。
从绝对数值来看，中国在若干个指标上排名靠前，但还算不上一个突出的领跑者。在发展了30年之后，中国的经济实力与1900年的美国相当。中国目前占全球GDP总量的14.6％，美国在1900年的GDP占比为15.9％。中国的全球贸易占比为14.3％，只比1900年的美国高出一个百分点。军事方面，中国在凭借雄厚财力发展海军强力武器之前，与德国相类似。30年来，中国的全球军费支出占比为9.2％，低于1900年的德国。在5个国家中，苏联的崛起模式与中国明显不同。从数据中可以看出，苏联把军事力量的发展放在经济振兴之前。1975年，苏联的全球军费支出占比约为三分之一，但全球GDP和贸易占比分别仅为9.4％和3.9％，主要原因是被全球经济所孤立。
速度是中国最大的优势。发展30年来，它从一个相当低的基础迸发出超过其它所有国家的发展速度。下面是历史上GDP的增长趋势。
（由于缺少部分数据，德国和美国的趋势线被人为补齐。苏联的全球GDP数据开始于1950年。）
从1870年到今天，中国的GDP增长速度比其它国家都要快。当前领导人邓小平在1982年采取了一系列风卷残云的经济改革措施时，中国只占全球GDP的2.2％。三十年之后的2012年，中国占全球GDP的14.6％，几乎增长了7倍。当然，其它大国在发展初期就已经有雄厚的GDP家底：德国在1870年占6.5％；日本在1960年占7.1％；美国在1870年占8.9％；苏联在1950年占9.6％。这4个国家中，只有美国在30年里把GDP占比将近翻了一番。德国尽管被认为是当时世界的工业引擎，但GDP只有几个百分点的增长。而苏联在1975年之后的30年里基本没有任何变化。
中国的贸易额增长幅度更加明显。
（日本1970年以前的参照数据无法得到。苏联趋势线中的断点原因是超常规的数据表现，而且没有明确的历史原因。）
中国的全球贸易增长速度远远超过其它任何一个超级大国。在30年里，中国的全球贸易占比增长了22倍。发展初期，中国只占全球贸易额的0.6％，而美国在发展初期就已经占据了全球贸易额的9.3％，德国在最开始也占据了全球贸易额的10.7％。只有苏联在二战结束之后比中国发展初期的国际贸易份额更低。
另一张图表显示出中国军事力量增长的速度。从邓的观点出发，中国应当“韬光养晦”，这句话的部分含义是先致富，后发展军事力量。中国军费在全世界所占的比例增长速度明显慢于它的GDP和贸易增长速度。
（1989年之前和1991年，中国的军费支出没有可比较数据。）
中国的军费支出全球占比有明显的上升，尽管这并不能和它的经济发展步伐相提并论。在90年代和21世纪前十年，中国几乎把它的全球军费支出占比翻了三倍。五角大楼对中国军费支出的描述与此大致吻合，它在2013年向美国国会提交的白皮书提到，中国在未来有“财力和政治动力来确保国防支出达到一个更高的水平”，而且“中国发布的军费预算遗漏了几个重要的部分”，包括海外军购，很难给出准确数字。国防部估算，中国在2012年与军事有关的花费在1350亿美元到2150亿美元之间，但同时表示准确的数字很难确定。五角大楼的下一份报告将在下周发布。
按时间点来看，中国的军费支出全球占比显示出指数增长的趋势，至少按历史数据标准来看是如此。苏联的份额在二战之后迅速上升，之后保持在全球军费支出的三分之一水平。美国的份额依不同的历史事件变化明显——德国在1870年之后进入和平时期，使美国的份额暂时上升，1898年的美西战争期间有明显增长，之后迅速下降。德国的军费支出全球占比也呈现大起大落的趋势，但基本维持在10％到15％的水平。日本的全球军费支出占比一直在上升，但速度远远低于中国。
中国的增长速度快过其它强权国家，但并不离谱——目前还算不上。预测永远有风险。中国适龄劳动力数量的缩水、大范围的环境恶化、无处不在的腐败，以及触目惊心的收入不平等所带来的风险，这些因素的任意组合都可能会拖慢、甚至逆转这个国家的崛起之路。但如果中国得以全身而退，保守的预测它的GDP全球占比将在2030年达到28％。如果这个预测是正确的，中国的经济实力在理论上相当于美国在1951年的水平，二战造成的创伤极大地提升了美国经济的全球占比。
但即使这些预测都是准确的，中国也难以游刃有余从容不迫地把玩整个世界。美国历经两次世界大战，战争的巨变改变了美国人对世界的态度，一系列军事联盟所塑造出来的新的全球秩序把美国的实力有效转化成全球霸主的地位。中国的经济规模或许在今年会超越美国，但纸上谈兵并不能很快转化成真正的海外影响力。
原文：
China is rising; but how far, and how fast? After the release of projections based on new World Bank data showing that China will soon overtake the United States as the world's largest national economy, a debate has quickly ensued, with some China-watchers dismissing the new figures as an "accounting exercise" and others calling the revised data a "wake-up call." But the hue and cry obscures a more fundamental question: whether the scale and speed of China's ascendance is truly unique, or whether it resembles the emergence of earlier powers. China, it turns out, scores moderately on the first metric, and very highly on the second.
Although new powers have emerged for millennia -- think Athens after the Greek victory over Persia in 479 B.C. and Rome in 264 B.C. at the start of its wars with Carthage -- extensive data measuring the scale and speed of a nation's rise only extend from the mid-19th century to the present. During this period, five states have emerged as global powers:
•The United States, circa 1870: Having recovered from a devastating civil war, it entered a period of rapid industrial growth and overseas expansion.
•Germany, circa 1870: Otto von Bismarck defeated France and established a unified nation.
•The Soviet Union, circa 1945: The USSR grew into a superpower in the aftermath of World War II.
•Japan, circa 1960: A high-growth era dawned that took Japan to the commanding heights of the global economy.
•China, circa 1982: Its rise began after the ruling Communist Party completed its sixth five-year plan, a document the party still uses to help guide the economy, inaugurating a new era of economic reform and opening to foreign trade.
Of course, no country's ascent had a single, undisputed starting point. But cutoffs are necessary to gauge a rise or a fall, and the above inflection points are apt candidates. Here's how China's shares of global GDP, trade, and military spending compare with that of the other four powers, 30 years into their respective ascents (click any image below to enlarge):
In sheer scale, China remains near the head of the pack on several measures, but it is not yet a clear front-runner. After three decades of ascent, China's economic footprint is comparable to that of the United States in 1900. China currently accounts for 14.6 percent of world output, while the U.S. share of global GDP in 1900 was 15.9 percent. At 14.3 percent, China's share of global commerce is about a percentage point higher than the United States' at the same stage of its rise. Militarily, China resembles Germany before it developed the powerful navy that new wealth afforded. Thirty years in, China's share of global military spending -- 9.2 percent -- is just behind Germany's share in 1900, at 10.5 percent. Of the comparison group, the Soviet Union's rise differs most from China's. The USSR prioritized military strength over economic prosperity, and the numbers show it. In 1975, the Soviet Union accounted for about a third of international military spending, but only 9.4 percent of global output and a measly 3.9 percent of world trade, due to its isolation from the global economy.
Speed is where China stands out. In 30 years of ascent, starting from a low base, it has come farther, faster than any of the other rising powers in the comparison group. Here's a look at its GDP growth, in historical context:
(Trend lines for Germany and the United States are interpolated due to limited GDP data. Data for the USSR's share of global GDP begins in 1950.)
China has expanded its share of world GDP faster than any other rising state from 1870 to today. When then-leader Deng Xiaoping inaugurated a series of sweeping economic reforms in 1982, China accounted for a mere 2.2 percent of global output. Thirty years later, in 2012, China produced 14.6 percent of the world's GDP, a roughly sevenfold increase. Notably, other powers at the start of their rise began with a much more substantial share of world GDP: 6.5 percent for Germany in 1870, 7.1 percent for Japan in 1960, 8.9 percent for the United States in 1870, and 9.6 percent for the Soviet Union in 1950. Of those four, only the United States nearly doubled its share of global output during three decades of ascent. Although considered an industrial powerhouse at the time, Germany only managed to increase its share of world GDP by a few percentage points, while the Soviet Union's 30-year share remained virtually unchanged through 1975.
The speed of China's ascent as a trading power is even more impressive:
(Comparable trade data is unavailable for Japan before 1970. Gaps in the USSR trend line are where outlier data points exist without any clear historical cause.)
China's share of global trade has exploded faster than that of any other rising power in the comparison group. In 30 years, China has expanded its share by a staggering multiple of more than 22. At the dawn of its reform period, China accounted for only 0.6 percent of world commerce; by comparison, the United States at year zero of its rise already conducted 9.3 percent of the world's trade. Germany at the start of its ascent accounted for 10.7 percent of international commerce. Only the Soviet Union at the close of World War II had less of a presence in global trade than China at the outset of its rise.
A different picture emerges when examining the speed of China's military ascent. In line with Deng's belief that China should "hide [its] capacities" and "bide [its] time" -- which meant, in part, getting rich first before building up its military -- China's share of world arms spending has advanced slower than its share of global GDP and trade:
(No comparable data is available for Chinese military expenditures before 1989, or for 1991.)
China's proportion of world military spending has expanded at an objectively rapid clip, even if it has not ballooned as fast as its economic footprint. During the 1990s, and then again during the 2000s, China nearly tripled its share of global military outlays. Pentagon data on China's military spending paints a similar picture, and its 2013 white paper to the U.S. Congress notes that China has the "fiscal strength and political will to support defense spending growth at comparable levels" in the future, though given that "China's published military budget omits several major categories of expenditure," including foreign arms purchases, it's hard to know for sure. The Defense Department estimated that China's total military-related expenditures for 2012 fell between $135 billion and $215 billion, though it cautioned that it didn't know for sure. The next Pentagon white paper is scheduled to be released next week.
Mapped over time, China's share of global military spending has charted an exponential growth path, unusual by historical standards. The Soviet share spiked after World War II and then plateaued at around one-third of global military spending. The U.S. share fluctuated around specific events -- Germany's return to peacetime footing after 1870 caused a temporary increase, while the Spanish-American War of 1898 produced a sharp peak leading into a rapid decline. Germany's share of global military spending expanded and contracted over time, generally remaining between 10 and 15 percent of world spending on arms. Japan increased its share of global military spending throughout, but at a much slower pace than China.
China has risen faster than other powers, but not farther -- yet. Prediction is a risky business. A decline in China's working-age population, widespread environmental degradation, endemic corruption, and risks associated with staggering income inequality -- or some combination of those factors -- could slow or derail the country's rise. But if China can muddle through, conservative estimates put its share of global GDP at 28 percent by 2030. If this forecast is correct, China's economic dominance will, on paper, equal that of the United States in 1951, a peak year in which the residual devastation wrought by World War II significantly boosted America's share of global output.
Yet China will likely punch below its weight even if these forecasts prove accurate. It took the United States two world wars, a sea change in how the U.S. public viewed the world, and the creation of a new international order backed by a set of military alliances to fully translate its size into global dominance. China's economy may become larger than the United States' this year, but parity on paper will not quickly yield equal influence abroad.
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