【国家利益 20150331】别犹豫了，美国应该加入亚投行

满仓

【中文标题】别犹豫了，美国应该加入亚投行
【原文标题】No Escape: America Should Join China's New Bank
【登载媒体】国家利益
【原文作者】Greg Moore
【原文链接】http://nationalinterest.org/feature/no-escape-america-should-join-chinas-new-bank-12508


加入亚洲基础设施投资银行或许是美国最好的选择。



中国的亚洲基础设施投资银行在过去的一个星期里广受关注，英国、德国、法国、意大利、土耳其和韩国先后宣布计划加入，再加上印度和已经成为创始成员国的其它国家。美国盟友一窝蜂地加入中国领导的金融机构，说明华盛顿对其盟友的影响力颇为有限，至少在金融层面上，毕竟美国外交人员在近几个月一直在试图阻挠盟友加入亚投行。

美国对于新银行合理性的担忧是有道理的，而不仅仅是为了挥舞美国权力的大棒打压中国的影响力。美国财政部长雅各布•卢和其它人曾经警告，目前这家银行看起来远低于国际上的管理、透明、环境、用人标准和其它国际通行的标准。中国国有的公司和机构在历史上还没有过理想的透明、脱离政府政治影响力，以及准寻客观标准的表现，所以对于亚投行潜在问题的顾虑并非没有依据。

但是，问题在于，美国目前奉行的孤立新兴机构的策略，是否是解决这些问题的最好方法？我的结论是，很明显（尤其是在目前）不是这样的。美国应当在3月31日之前痛快地加入亚投行创始国，原因如下。

首先，也是最重要的，加入亚投行让美国可以与它的盟友和其它有同样目标的国家一起来修正这个新机构的方向，确保银行的领导层采取全球通行的标准。

其次，《华尔街日报》报道，中国放弃了自己在亚投行的否决权，作为吸引西欧国家加入的一种表态。这或许会减轻美国的一些顾虑，比如担心北京利用亚投行的借贷来延伸它的政治意图。放弃否决权是一个重大的让步，似乎北京愿意在某种程度上对国际社会担责。

第三，美国一直主张中国应当成为国际舞台上“一个负责任的承担者”。这是一个合理的要求，中国自己也对此表示认同，而且逐渐开始扮演这个角色（或许它的南海政策和韩国天安号战舰沉没之后对平壤政权的支持等行为，我们暂且不谈）。中国成立亚投行，是它真正想要成为负责任的承担者的一步重要举措，因为这个地区必然有巨额的贷款需求，而这家银行可以令人信服地提供贷款。

第四，很明显，美国试图在中国建立这家银行的举措上对其孤立，以及劝说盟友们不要加入的努力已经失败了。而且这家银行必将按部就班地成立，无论有没有美国。所以美国必须要表明态度，接下来该怎么办。目前，加入银行是最合理的选择，尤其是美国可以在银行内部得到盟友的大力支持，确保它是一家高标准的机构。

第五，就目前趋势来看，这家银行必然会成功启动。把自己置身事外显得像个老古板，而且这么做所造成的中美关系的伤害，要比美国期望所得到的收益（如果有的话）要多得多。

最后，加入亚投行之后，当美国（也包括西方）的顾虑没有被充分打消的时候，美国可以退出以示抗议。这要比置身事外有更大的影响力。

美国的政策制定者应当对于自由政策倾向报有信心。整个世界都知道，这种机构的全球标准需要每个成员国的“自律”，这其中就包括了自由和人道价值观。如果中国蔑视这些价值观，把亚投行当作政治工具，所有人都会遭受损失，其它国家必然对中国群起而攻之。就目前中国对世界的依赖性来看，它无力承受错误行为带来的国际压力。不如让我们给中国一个机会，证明它自己究竟是不是一个负责任的承担者。

和丹尼尔•德瑞兹纳一样，雅各布•卢与其他一些人指出，美国本应在早期支持布雷顿森林体系改革。如果美国这样做了，或许现在就没有亚投行了，或者至少没有那么多人支持它了。但是，事已至此，如果美国继续在亚投行问题上孤立北京，那么只会让华盛顿孤立。而且华盛顿对银行合理性的顾虑不会得到满意的答复，还不如成为其中的一员。



原文：

The AIIB might be Washington's best option.

China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) got several major boosts this past week, when the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Turkey and South Korea all announced plans to join, in addition to India and others already on board. This wave of U.S. allies flocking to join the China-led financial institution demonstrates the limits of Washington’s influence over its allies, at least in financial matters, for U.S. diplomats have been working overtime in recent months to discourage its allies from joining the AIIB.

The United States’ concerns about the new bank are legitimate. This is not just a U.S. power play to keep China’s influence down. U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew and others have warned that at present the bank appears to be well below international standards in governance, transparency, environmental/labor safeguards and other global lending norms. Chinese state-run corporations and institutions have not scored high historically on issues of transparency, insulation from partisan Chinese governmental political machinations or adherence to objective rules-based governance, among other things, and so concerns about the potential for problems regarding the AIIB are not unfounded.

However, the question raised here is whether or not the United States’ extant strategy of trying to isolate the new institution is really the best strategy for addressing these concerns. My conclusion is that it is clear (especially now) that it is not, and the United States should simply sign on to the AIIB prior to the March 31 deadline for founding members for the following reasons.

First and foremost, doing so would allow it to work with its allies and other like-minded partners to help shape the new institution and hold the bank’s leadership accountable to global standards.

Second, the Wall Street Journal reported that China has relinquished its veto at the AIIB as a condition to the accession of a number of Western European partners, and this should allay some concerns the United States has had that Beijing would be able to use the bank to forward its (sometimes alternative) political agenda via AIIB lending, for example. Relinquishing the veto is a major concession, and appears to be a sign of Beijing’s willingness to be accountable to the international community to some degree.

Third, the United States has argued for some time that it desires to see China become “a responsible stakeholder” in the international system. This is a reasonable and rational request, and one that the Chinese themselves have found agreeable and have generally embraced (perhaps its maritime policies and things like its support for the Pyongyang regime following the sinking of South Korea’s Cheonan aside). China’s establishment of the AIIB could be a significant way for China to demonstrate it is indeed serious about becoming a responsible stakeholder, for surely there is a need for more loans in the region of the sort the bank could conceivably offer.

Fourth, it is clear the U.S. policy of attempting to isolate the Chinese in their establishment of the bank, and to encourage U.S. allies not to join, has failed, and it appears certain that the bank will move forward with or without the United States’ blessing. The United States must now move on, in search of a “what next” strategy. Joining the bank is the most reasonable choice at this point, particularly since the United States could have significant help from its allies in working inside the new bank to make sure it maintains high standards.

Fifth, and related, now that the bank appears poised to move forward with a successful launch, the United States would truly look like a stick in the mud by staying out, and doing so might cost the United States more in damaged relations with Beijing in the long run than whatever the United States might hope to gain (if anything at this point) by staying out.

Last, by joining the AIIB as a founding member, the United States could reserve the right to withdraw from membership in protest down the road if U.S. (and general Western) concerns are not adequately addressed. The United States would have greater leverage in this sense by being in the bank than by remaining outside it.

American policy makers should have more confidence in their liberal policy proclivities than their current policy demonstrates. The rest of the world knows that global standards for such institutions are everyone’s “best practices” currently, and these standards reflect cherished liberal (and humanitarian) values. If China chooses to flout these values and practices, and instead chooses to use the AIIB for partisan political gain, it will be painfully obvious to everyone, and the other members would likely criticize Beijing for this. Given its level of interdependence with the rest of the world, China is highly accountable and vulnerable to international pressure if it misbehaves. Let us give China the benefit of the doubt for now, and let’s allow them the chance to prove they are responsible stakeholders (or not).

As Daniel Drezner, Jack Lew himself and others have pointed out, the United States should have supported reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions earlier. If it had, perhaps there would have been no market for the AIIB, or at least less support for its establishment. As things currently stand, however, a continued U.S. policy of trying to isolate Beijing over the AIIB only serves to isolate Washington, and does less to address Washington’s legitimate concerns about the bank than becoming a member likely would.

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