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【中文标题】美国敢就台湾问题与中国动武吗？
【原文标题】Would America Risk a Nuclear War with China over Taiwan?
【登载媒体】国家利益
【原文作者】Hugh White
【原文链接】http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-risk-nuclear-war-china-over-taiwan-12808
在经历了十年的相对稳定期之后，台北与北京的关系再一次紧张。台湾领导人和选民面临未来与中国形成何种关系的重大选择，此时，美国必须仔细斟酌针对台湾的评论。
美国会对中国诉诸武力，以阻止台湾被迫与大陆统一吗？J•迈克尔•科尔在接受《国家利益》有关我在新加坡《海峡时报》上的一片评论员文章的采访时，非常肯定地说美国愿意，而且会这么做。
对很多人来说，美国当然会遵守“台湾关系法案”中所许下的承诺。但是在通过台湾安全法案的1979年，中国的GDP只有美国的二十分之一，它的经济规模小得可怜，海军和空军实力可以忽略不计，这个国家未来的发展完全取决于美国的意愿。
所在那个时期，中美冲突给中国带来的经济影响和军事风险远远大于美国，这让台湾安全法案既受到了高度保护，又未经受测试。华盛顿可以放心大胆地假设北京会老老实实地让步，因为中国在面对美国时输不起。
但是今天，情况完全不同了。
中国的经济规模已经非常大，并且成为了世界贸易和资本流动的中心，任何对其干扰所带来的后果对美国和中国都是同样严重的。军事方面，美国已经不能再期望获得一场压倒性胜利的台湾战争。中国的区域封锁武器将会阻止美国的直接干涉，除非这些武器在早期被大规模针对中国军事基地的进攻中被摧毁。
中国回应这种进攻的方式，很有可能是攻击美国本土和美国亚洲盟友的军事基地。美国难以控制事态的发展，谁也不能肯定这种规模的冲突不会跨过动用核武器的底线。因此必须要考虑美国城市受到核武器攻击的可能性。
新的实力对比意味着今天的中美冲突会让双方面临同样的风险和代价。既然代价和风险相同，那么相对具有优势的就是认为自身更加危险，因此有更强决断力的一方。中国今天的领导人似乎认为他们手中握有优势，他们或许说对了。因此像很多人持有的想法那样，继续认为中国在台湾危机爆发时会退缩，那就大错特错了。
美国领导人因此必须要考虑，如果事态升级之后北京不退却将会如何？什么情况下他们才会退却？如果华盛顿直视中国的双眼，而且还先眨眼了，那么美国在全球的领导力将会受到什么样的影响？如果华盛顿坚持不眨眼将会如何？维持台湾的现状值得付出全球经济崩溃的代价吗？为这件事值得与中国展开核战吗？
在考虑为保护台湾而采取军事行动时，美国领导人必须要面对这些问题，而答案，很可能是台湾的身份不值得用核战争和经济危机来交换。也就是说，美国领导人和政策分析人士现在就要回答这些问题，因为他们正在考虑是否要遵守那份颇为古老的承诺。美国在1979年愿意并且有能力遵守的承诺，或许现在既没有能力也不愿继续遵守了。
美国在亚洲的盟友和朋友们呢？他们是否愿意帮助美国保护台湾，因为自己也会面临唇亡齿寒的危险？很多美国人或许认为他们会的，但是即使澳大利亚——美国在亚洲最可靠的盟友——也对此表示不确定。如果连澳大利亚都举棋不定，那么期望印度、新加坡、越南，甚至菲律宾就台湾问题做一些除了温和的外交辞令之外支持美国的举动，就纯粹是一厢情愿了。
唯一的例外是日本，或许可以期望安倍晋三的政府加入战斗，尤其是他上个星期刚刚访问了华盛顿。但是安倍先生真的能代表日本吗？未来日本领导人也和他持相同的观点吗？即使他们有意奉迎，究竟怎样才能帮到美国？日本的支持可以改变上面那些硬性问题的答案，并且增加美国愿意就台湾问题开战的可能性吗？
所以，没有人可以轻松断言美国及其盟友会帮助台湾抵抗中国。那么他们是否应该这么做？这是一个很大的问题，简单地说，这个问题不能简单地使用“绥靖政策”这种能让人们回忆起慕尼黑的词语来回答。
更艰难的一个问题是，我们究竟愿意在多大程度上纵容（或者你也可以说安抚）中国的野心，它的力量增长必然让它期待更强大的地区领导身份。任何实质性的纵容都意味着偏美国在过去几十年里建立起来的地区秩序，这是危险、混乱的趋势。似乎最简单的方式是回避这些问题，拒绝考虑任何纵容的可能性。但这其中蕴含着巨大的代价。
那些认为值得付出一些代价的人或许并不了解代价会高到什么程度。那些认为对中国决不能退让——因为历史已经证明希特勒是无法安抚的——的人，或许认为1938年欧洲的局势与今天亚洲的局势没有什么不同，或者觉得今天的中国是纳粹德国的翻版。他们或许还觉得，除了美国领导的亚洲秩序和中国称霸之外，再没有其它的选择了。这些问题的重要程度——其中也包括台湾人民的意愿——证明以上那些假设都需要进一步的过滤。
原文：
Would America Risk a Nuclear War with China over Taiwan?
After a decade of relative harmony, tensions between Beijing and Taipei are rising again. As Taiwan's leaders and voters face big choices about their future relations with China, America must think carefully about its commitments to Taiwan.
Would America be willing go to war with China to prevent Taiwan being forcibly united with the mainland? J. Michael Cole, responding in The National Interest to a recent op-ed of mine in Singapore's Straits Times, expresses a widely held assumption that it would, and should.
To many people it seems self-evident that America would honor the commitments enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act. But the TRA was passed in 1979, when China's GDP was 1/20th the size of America's, its place in the global economy was miniscule, its navy and air force were negligible, and its prospects for progress depended completely on America's goodwill.
So back then a US-China conflict carried much bigger economic and military risks for China than for America. That made the TRA's commitments both highly credible and very unlikely to be tested. Washington could safely assume that Beijing would back off to avoid a conflict in which China had so much more to lose than America.
Things are different today.
China's economy is now so big and so central to global trade and capital flows that the consequences of any disruption would be just as serious for America as for China. Militarily, America can no longer expect a swift and certain victory in a war over Taiwan. China's anti-access/area-denial capabilities would preclude direct US intervention unless those capabilities had first been degraded by a sustained and wide-ranging strike campaign against Chinese bases and forces.
China would very likely respond to such a campaign with attacks on US and allied bases throughout Asia. The US has no evident means to cap the resulting escalation spiral, and no one could be sure it would stop below the nuclear threshold. The possibility of nuclear attacks on US cities would have to be considered.
These new realities of power mean that today a US-China conflict would impose equal risks and costs on both sides. And where costs and risks are equal, the advantage lies with those who have more at stake, and hence greater resolve. China's leaders today seem to think they hold this advantage, and they are probably right. It is therefore a big mistake to keep assuming, as many people seem to do, that China would be sure to back off before a crisis over Taiwan became a conflict.
US leaders must therefore ask what happens if Beijing does not back down as a crisis escalates. At what point would they back down instead? What would be the damage to US global leadership if Washington brought on a confrontation with China and then blinked first? What could happen if Washington didn't blink first? Is Taiwan's status quo worth a global economic collapse? It is worth a real risk of nuclear war with China?
These are the questions America's leaders would have to confront in considering military action to defend Taiwan, and their answer would very likely be that the status of Taiwan is not worth risking nuclear war or economic collapse over. And that means American leaders and policy analysts must confront these questions now, as they decide whether to maintain the old commitments to defend Taiwan. The promises that America was willing and able to keep in 1979 might not be ones it is willing or able to keep now.
What about America's allies and friends in Asia? Wouldn't they help America defend Taiwan, if only because they are so worried themselves about China? Many Americans seem to assume they would. But even Australia, America's most reliable ally in Asia, is uncertain about this. And if Australia is uncertain, it is pure wishful thinking to expect the likes of India, Singapore, Vietnam or even the Philippines to offer anything more than mild diplomatic support to America over Taiwan.
The exception is Japan, which under Shinzo Abe might be expected to join the fight, especially after last week's visit to Washington. But does Mr. Abe really speak for Japan? Will future Japanese leaders take the same view? And even if they did, how exactly would that help America? How would Japan's support change the answers to the hard questions posed above, and increase the chances that America would indeed come to Taiwan's aid?
So no one should lightly assert that America or its allies would help defend Taiwan from China. But should they? This is a big subject. Suffice to say here that the question is not answered simply by using the word “appeasement” to invoke the memory of Munich.
There are hard questions to be answered about how far we should be willing to go to accommodate (or, if you prefer, to appease) China's ambitions for a bigger regional leadership role as its power grows. Any substantial accommodation would mean a shift away from the US-led order of recent decades, which would be risky and unsettling. It seems much easier to evade these questions by refusing to contemplate any accommodation at all. But that would carry high costs.
There are hard questions to be answered about how far we should be willing to go to accommodate (or, if you prefer, to appease) China's ambitions for a bigger regional leadership role as its power grows. Any substantial accommodation would mean a shift away from the US-led order of recent decades, which would be risky and unsettling. It seems much easier to evade these questions by refusing to contemplate any accommodation at all. But that would carry high costs.
Those who assume that those costs must be worth paying might not have thought carefully enough about just how high the price could go. And those who assume that it will be impossible to accommodate China because it proved impossible to appease Hitler perhaps assume that there are no material differences between the situations in Europe in 1938 and in Asia now, or between Nazi Germany and today's China. They perhaps also assume that there are no alternatives to the old US-led order in Asia except Chinese hegemony. The magnitude of the issues at stake – including for the people of Taiwan – suggest that these assumptions need more careful scrutiny.
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