【新闻周刊 20150508】美国可以赢得一场战争吗？

满仓

【中文标题】美国可以赢得一场战争吗？
【原文标题】Can America Win a War?
【登载媒体】新闻周刊
【原文作者】JEFF STEIN、JONATHAN BRODER
【原文链接】http://www.newsweek.com/2015/05/08/can-america-win-war-326812.html




整整两个军团，2.2万人，聚集在河东岸。由于充分占据了人数、装备、指挥和作战经验的压倒性优势，他们有足够的信心把盘踞在对岸树林中乌合之众的叛军一举歼灭。

进攻的命令下达了，群炮齐射，士兵跨过河流——他们进入了军事的历史。三天之后，两个军团的士兵被全歼，指挥官的头颅被砍下送回，这是一条非常明确的消息：不要再回来。

这并不是发生在阿富汗和伊拉克的一场恶战，而是在基督出生9年之后的条顿堡森林战役，战场就是如今德国的西北部。这场战役被称为“改变历史进程之战”，因为它标志着罗马帝国的失败。罗马人永远不能踏足莱茵河东岸。

将近2000年之后，美国在越南也跨国了它的莱茵河。和罗马人一样，美国军队看起来无坚不摧，野心勃勃地进入东南亚。与公元9年的罗马军团一样，美国军队或许可以从印度支那的惨败中重新集结力量，再次出征。但是政治领导人未能从越南代价昂贵的失败中吸取足够的教训，很快，失败与代价昂贵的胜利远远超过了决定性胜利的次数。

坦率地说，美国的确在不与苏联正面交锋的情况下赢得了冷战。但是在越南颜面扫地的失败之后，美国参与了一系列重大的军事冲突，却只打了两场胜仗——1991年把萨达姆•侯赛因赶出科威特；1995年轰炸塞尔维亚让对方回到谈判桌。把时间拉近一些，即使干净利落、速战速决的伊拉克和阿富汗战争也最终转化成拖延时日的游击战，这些战争所播下的种子繁衍成伊斯兰国。那么，在西贡解体40年纪念日的今天，我们似乎应该问：美国可以赢得一场战争吗？在混乱的镇压叛乱、持有核武器的流氓国家、俄罗斯的阴谋诡计和中国的蚕食侵犯背景下，究竟什么才叫战争胜利？

在与《新闻周刊》面谈的过程中，军事专家、战略分析师、历史学家和前政府官员认为，如果对俄罗斯、中国和伊朗未来战略的估算无误，美国在可预见的未来所参与战争将会是缓慢的、低强度的，没有明确的胜利标志。美国的国旗不会在一个被征服的国家首都升起，也不会有夹道欢迎的人群。在华盛顿目前面临的一个烂摊子中提取出一个类似于胜利的概念，需要美国人改变对战争的传统观念。

对于一个吹嘘拥有全球最强军事力量的国家，把“遏制”作为自身的目标似乎是一个自相矛盾、甚至具有失败主义色彩的思想。美国在911事件之后，年度军费预算均超过5000亿美元，规模超过任何一个国家，美国军队在全球作战范围、技术先进的程度和打击力度方面无与伦比。美国的隐形轰炸机和网络作战队伍无论从哪个角度来说，都可以致任何一个对手于死地。但是在美国目前陷入的几个战争中，似乎无比尖端的武器还比不上富有创意的想法。空袭和无人机，更不用提国家安全局所具备的电子监控能力，并没有让美国战胜塔利班和伊斯兰国。实际上，坐拥现代最高科技的美国军队甚至还不知道如何拆解一个临时拼凑出来的土炸弹——这种最没有技术含量的东西恰恰是美军在战场上遭遇的最致命威胁。

民调结果显示，华盛顿早已对境外战争感到厌倦，美国的战略家现在必须用新的方法找到可以替代传统上胜利概念的东西。正如前陆军上校、越南战争退伍老兵、波士顿大学常驻军事专家安德鲁•巴彻维其所说，是时候“承认强权的局限性，承认使用武力的局限性了”。


2014年9月10日，美国国务卿约翰•克里在直升飞机上俯瞰巴格达。克里中东之行的目的是与当地建立军事、政治和经济合作关系，击败控制部分伊拉克和叙利亚领土的伊斯兰国军事力量。

“漫长而又举棋不定的挣扎过程”

当约翰•史威默中校在今年回到伊拉克训练与伊斯兰国作战的当地军队时，眼前的现象让他震惊。史威默和最后一名美军士兵在2011年撤离，他和其它美国顾问都认为当时的伊拉克军队状态良好。但是去年夏天有消息传来，两个伊拉克师在与伊斯兰国的第一次“交战”中被击败，肯定是什么地方出了问题。但是当史威默和另外300名美国军事顾问在几个月前抵达距巴格达20英里处的塔基营地之后，他们才发现情况究竟有多糟。

他在4月份接受《纽约时报》的采访时说：“简直难以相信，我很吃惊，我们离开之后他们究竟是怎么训练的？”事实是，根本没什么训练。伊拉克军队只在纸面上表现良好。在美国及其盟军承担正面战争压力，CIA动员逊尼派部落与基地组织对抗的情况下，伊拉克军就不会暴露其败絮其中的本质。但是在美军离开之后，伊拉克军官的腐败行为，包括盗窃军粮和军饷，让他们身陷泥潭。当伊斯兰国在去年横扫伊拉克南部时，几乎没有一支部队愿意或者有能力与之作战。

听起来熟悉吗？的确，这与美国顾问在越战之后参与的镇压叛乱战争中遇到的问题如出一辙。美国“代理人”作战疲软，但是敌人英勇无比，越共和塔利班似乎根本不需要外国顾问就可以打胜仗。

无论是伊拉克和叙利亚，还是目前依然战火纷飞的阿富汗，美国重新调整了自身的策略。当前的目标包括保护美国本土免受恐怖分子袭击、组织伊朗开发核武器、帮助伊斯兰和沙特阿拉伯之类的地区盟友抵御外敌、确保石油可以自由进出该地区。对巴拉克•奥巴马总统来说，这些目标的达成并不需要大批的地面部队，因此他采取了“浅脚印”的做法——空中打击伊斯兰国位于伊拉克和叙利亚的军事目标，派遣数千名军事顾问帮助伊拉克军队和叙利亚叛军应对民兵的地面进攻。奥巴马的中东战略需要准确的情报、坚持不懈的外交努力和展示美国海军和空军武装力量，还需要忍受矛盾心理的能力，比如在为伊朗代理军队打击位于伊拉克的伊斯兰国武装力量做空中掩护的同时，支持沙特在也门对抗伊朗支持的胡塞武装组织。

这些足以实现美国在当地的目的了吗？在两党鹰派人士看来，还远远不够，他们主张美国在伊拉克布署更多的地面部队，包括引导美国空中打击伊斯兰国军事目标的作战人员。他们还希望奥巴马宣布叙利亚大部分领空为禁飞区，以阻止巴沙尔•阿萨德总统利用空军镇压反政府叛军。


2014年12月8日，朝鲜领导人金正恩在平壤视察朝鲜人民军和地对空防御部队。

国会山里这些敏感的鹰派咄咄逼人，但声势没有盖过军事专家。一些前任和现任的军事指挥官在接受《新闻周刊》的采访时说，奥巴马恰到好处地分配军事力量的组合，确保美国在中东的利益得到保护。他们说，针对伊斯兰国的空中打击遏制了他们对伊拉克的攻势，已经杀死了6000名武装人员，摧毁了大部分伊拉克军队在6月份撤退时丢下的美国提供的坦克、大炮和其它装备。

专家们提醒，奥巴马的策略是漫长、渐进式的，不会有立竿见影的效果。他们认为，所谓取胜就是让伊斯兰国远离巴格达，同时不会针对美国本土实施大规模的恐怖袭击。推移中将丹尼尔博尔格曾经在伊拉克和阿富汗指挥作战，他说：“我们在当地的行为恰好可以让伊拉克人牵制住伊斯兰国，但是在近期毁灭伊斯兰国的想法太过乐观了。这将是一个漫长、反复的过程。”

前国家安全局和中央情报局局长、推移空军上将迈克尔•V•海登在接受《新闻周刊》采访时说，打击伊斯兰国和基地组织恐怖分子的行动“都是战术方面的，没有战略统筹”。“精确打击仅仅是临时性的方案，你必须永远保持这种力度，除非有充足的时间让你”寻找政治解决方案。

巴彻维其的儿子在伊拉克牺牲，他认为胜利就是让支离破碎的中东和东南亚在一定程度上恢复“稳定”，这样美国就不会永久陷入战争的泥潭。但是美军在缺少对当地语言、文化、地理和历史的了解的情况下，长时间占领伊斯兰国家的年代已经一去不返了。巴彻维其说：“我并不是说胜利就是民主，就是保护女性的权利，让我们成为以色列军事力量的守护神。我认为我们可以期待的最好结果就是达成一个温和的解决方案。”

这种做法或许需要对美国的现行政策进行根本性的调整，并且重新思考究竟是谁应该得到美国数十亿美元的援助。调整方案之一就是接受伊拉克和叙利亚不可挽回的命运，他们的什叶派政府已经无力控制逊尼派，后者占据了面积相当于得克萨斯州大小的、横跨两个国家的土地。即使未来有可能，巴格达和大马士革也不大可能在短期内收复这些土地。伊朗目前控制着伊拉克的什叶派地区，随着伊斯兰国的壮大和库尔德斯坦越来越独立，黎凡特地区正在形成一幅新的地图。海登指着一幅由英格兰和法国在一战期间绘制的地图说：“这些边界再也不会存在了。”

也就是说，美国必须要接受伊斯兰国存在的现实，就像它在冷战期间必须要应对拉丁美洲、亚洲和非洲的冲突，它的代理人，有时甚至是它自己不得不在那些地区与苏联的影响力相对抗。这些冲突的胜家并不总是美国，充其量我们可以说美国设法得到了一些自己勉强可以接受的结果。正如华盛顿在面对其冷战时的代理人滥杀无辜时不闻不问的姿态一样，当它的盟友——无论是伊拉克什叶派武装力量，还是沙特阿拉伯驻扎在也门的军队——杀害平民时，美国需要找到一个心理上的慰藉点。美国人所吸取的一个教训就是，对中东和其它地区盟友的依赖局限于美国自身的道德观念对对方的影响力。


1991年2月24日，距沙特阿拉伯边境23公里处的米纳阿尔左尔，盟军士兵在看守伊拉克战俘。

“我们要大开杀戒！”

对于阿富汗、伊拉克和叙利亚战争所带来的血腥、财富和痛苦来说，这些冲突仅仅是该地区最重大事件的序幕——对付伊朗。巴彻维其说，阻止德黑兰研制核武器仅仅是奥巴马的众多战略之一。“他在试图寻找让伊朗归顺国际秩序的办法，这样伊朗才能在地缘政治中扮演恰当的角色。我们寄希望于——仅仅是希望——伊朗可以更负责任地采取行动，而不是成为伊斯兰革命的帮凶。”

但是如果核谈判破裂，或者伊朗在其中耍诈，爆发大规模武装冲突的可能性就会上升。以色列总理本杰明•内塔尼亚胡多次威胁要单挑伊朗，但是国防专家说这不大可能。国防分析人士认为，以色列没有足够的空军力量摧毁伊朗所有的核设施，德黑兰会用导弹向特拉维夫还击，动员黎巴嫩的真主党武装力量，派遣自杀式炸弹袭击国内外的犹太人目标。以色列会付出惨重的代价。

国际社会普遍认为，美国在这种情况下必然会支持以色列。但是前美国海军驻扎在波斯湾的第五舰队指挥官、海军上将帕特里克•沃尔什说，支持与否取决于冲突是如何开始的。如果伊朗首先挑衅，以色列应该可以期待美国的帮助。但是如果内塔尼亚胡先动手，华盛顿或许会放弃他。沃尔什在接受《新闻周刊》的采访时说：“你不能期望美国无条件地支持你的任何语言和行为。”

他认为，国际社会对于伊朗耍诈比较可能的回应是再次进行经济制裁，但也要准备好经济制裁作用有限的后备计划。尽管这依然是高度保密的信息，但一份似乎是美国对伊朗开战的计划在2012年被华盛顿特区一家智囊团国际战略研究中心所披露，这家机构与国家安全机构有特殊的信息往来渠道。

这份报告的作者之一是颇具影响力的国防分析人士安东尼•科德斯曼，他说这份计划需要投入巨大的空中作战力量。首先是10架可以携带核弹头的B-2轰炸机和保护它们的90架战斗机群，绕过敌人的防空系统，阻塞伊朗的雷达和通讯网络，同时还需要空中加油机。之后投入战斗的是航空母舰战斗群、特种部队、无人机、导弹防御系统、监察机和卫星，这是自2003年轰炸伊拉克的“震慑行动”之后从未出现过的盛大战斗场景。

从印度洋岛屿迭戈加西亚起飞的每架美国轰炸机都携带两枚重达3万磅的GBU057“碉堡克星”，它可以穿透200英尺的钢筋混凝土，摧毁深埋在地下的目标。科德斯曼说，为了防止伊朗先发制人，或者对以色列和美国的阿拉伯国家盟友进行报复性打击，美国战斗机必须摧毁伊朗的8个弹道导弹基地、15个导弹工厂和22个发射场。同时军方还要布署特种部队进行敌后干扰、破坏行动，为空中打击指明目标，比如炼油厂、军事基地、道路和桥梁。

完成这样的作战计划并不容易，尤其是俄罗斯放开了S-300型防空导弹对伊朗的禁售令。伊朗革命卫队或许会在屡次威胁之后，真的封锁了霍尔穆兹海峡，这个宽度为21英里的海峡是波斯湾的咽喉要道，承担着全球20％的石油和天然气运输任务。科德斯曼写到，而且，伊朗“可以采取零散的消耗战策略，用小型攻击舰‘包围’美国和海外地区的海军力量”。已经混乱不堪的中东地区可能会进一步动荡，威胁到当地稳定的石油供应。

科德斯曼说，最终，美国的战争或许会让伊朗的核计划推迟5到10年。沃尔什和其它观察人士认为，那些反对德黑兰宗教极权政府的普通伊朗民众将会团结起来，保护自己的国家，对美国的仇恨心理将延续到下一代人身上。

这算得上是胜利吗？

博尔格说：“在对伊朗开战之前我们必须要想清楚。我们会让他们没有还手之力，无论是在空中、海上还是地面，必将是压倒性的胜利。但是我们还会杀死很多的人，伊朗人必将不顾一切地反击。”


2015年4月1日，在洛桑美岸皇宫酒店举行的新一轮谈判中，伊朗外交部长贾瓦德•扎里夫在庭院散步时与媒体记者交谈。

普京的蘑菇云

4月7日，一架苏-27战斗机在波罗的海国际领空高速逼近一架美国侦察机，最近距离只有20英尺，险些发生空中碰撞。这起事件是近期北约与俄罗斯一系列挑衅性——甚至是危险的——遭遇之一。

这种挑衅行为的背景，是俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔普京对北约和欧盟掀起的一股全面对抗行动，其目标是那些他认为隶属于俄罗斯历史影响力范围内的国家。自从他在2000年掌权之后，这位前克格勃特工采取了一系列的行动来破坏——并最终降服——亲西方的前苏维埃成员国，同时离间欧盟与北约成员国之间的关系。所谓的“混合战争”包括了特工的暗中颠覆、拒绝承认动用没有身份标记的俄罗斯特种部队、把俄罗斯天然气供应作为经济武器、持续反对西方的宣传、向经济摇摇欲坠的西欧国家提供经济援助。

普京已经开始重新施划前苏联的地图。他的军队现在已经占领了格鲁吉亚的南奥塞梯和阿伯卡茨地区、摩尔多瓦的顿涅茨克，以及最近的乌克兰克里米亚半岛。过去一年里，普京还在暗中支持东乌克兰的分裂势力，后者正在蠢蠢欲动地要发动新一轮进攻。

美国战略分析人士已经接受了克里米亚沦陷的事实，就像俄罗斯在2008年吞噬掉的格鲁吉亚大片土地。前北约指挥官韦斯利•克拉克将军和其他一些人担心，西方并没有一个强有力的计划来阻止普京。美国所主导的经济制裁俄罗斯行动，加上帮助训练乌克兰军队的努力并不奏效。克拉克说，普京对乌克兰的野心只能通过提高他冒然行动的代价的方式来阻止，美国应当准备好给乌克兰提供关键性的支持，包括反坦克导弹和特殊制导雷达，并且放出明确的信息，如果俄罗斯再次发动进攻，这些武器将被交付给基辅。克拉克说：“问题在于，我们还来得及这么做吗？现在立即采取行动，遏制普京对乌克兰的野心，要比让他吞并了乌克兰更多土地之后野心进一步膨胀，来得容易一些。”

但是很多分析人士认为，普京的目标没有那么嚣张，他仅仅是想抵制北约在苏联解体之后东扩的意图，扩大俄罗斯对其边境国家的影响力，让莫斯科的国际地位有提升的机会。爱沙尼亚驻美国大使埃里克•马敏说：“拉脱维亚是下一个吗？什么时候轮到爱沙尼亚？这样的问题有些杞人忧天了。”

最终，美国在乌克兰这个尚且不是北约国家所取得的胜利，看起来就像是一个平衡了西方和俄罗斯利益的协定。海登说：“我制导，这里的胜利并不是要消灭敌人，而是营造一种平衡、可持续的结果。”海登和其他人期望乌克兰出现一种新的联邦管理体制，其多样化的结构包括国家东部与俄罗斯达成协议，同时保证基辅不会加入北约。他认为，这样的方案可以形成一个“稳定、适度繁荣、适度民主的乌克兰”，当然不包括克里米亚和其它东部地区。


2015年4月1日，伊拉克安全部队和什叶派战士在提克里特州政府外举起一面缴获的伊斯兰国旗帜。

但是普京的计划显然不仅仅是乌克兰，他试图把欧盟与北约之间的间隙演化成深层次的分裂。他设法让德国人感受到经济制裁所带来的天然气供应问题。他给希腊提供的贷款所附带的条件比欧元区所有的紧急援助计划更加优厚，并且包括廉价的天然气供应、更多的俄罗斯投资和游客。他甚至还与法国、瑞典、芬兰、匈牙利和保加利亚的右翼民族主义反欧盟党派取得联系。

与俄罗斯发生正面冲突所隐含的后果，无疑是核战争的阴影，普京把他的影响力发挥到了极致。3月，俄罗斯威胁要对丹麦动用核武器，如果这个斯堪的纳维亚国家成为北约导弹防御计划的保护对象。这样的行为让西欧国家进一步意识到，任何阻止他实现乌克兰计划的企图都存在着核末日的风险。

但是海登认为这是虚张声势：“俄罗斯帝国并没有复兴，他们没有企业、没有民主、没有多元化的社会、没有石油、没有天然气、甚至没有俄罗斯人——出生率一直在下降。我并不担心10到15年之后的俄罗斯，我担心的是未来3年的俄罗斯。”

除了制裁威胁和对乌克兰进行军事援助，应对俄罗斯的唯一手段是北约。尽管美国在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之后强化了自身在波罗的海的存在感，但奥巴马的很多批判者更希望看到他亲临爱沙尼亚与俄罗斯边境的纳尔瓦，宣布：“到此为止！”鉴于美国军费的削减趋势，包括很多北约成员国并没有履行把2％GDP投入国防预算的承诺，这种里根式的行为恐怕不会出现。即使奥巴马真的做出这样的表态，普京也不会当作一回事。


俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔•普京在莫斯科郊外的新奥加廖沃官邸主持政府会议。

即使赢家失败

几乎每一天，中国的海洋监视船和拖网渔船都会聚集在尖阁列岛附近的海域，彰显北京对中国东海的领土主权。每一次，日本海岸警卫队的快艇都会命令他们离开，东京也同样认为对这里拥有主权。中国人从不听从命令。

这种与美国在亚洲的盟友所进行的碰碰车游戏，加上中国军事力量的迅速崛起，让华盛顿和北京的一些人相信，战争已经不可避免。评论人士不这么认为，双方在和平竞争的环境下受益良多，军事冲突带来的损失惨重，战争难以想象。不管怎样，美国怀着警惕和忧虑的心情密切关注着中国的实力变化。

二十年前，中国与美国进行武力对抗的说法似乎是不可思议的。当时中国公开抗议美国对台军售，台湾依然被视为中国叛逃的一个省，但自己内心承认，除了抗议之外，别无他法。今天，北京不但宣称对南中国海和东中国海拥有主权，而且背后有足够的实力支持。美国海军情报机构判定，中国有足够强大的所谓“区域封锁武器“，包括可以炸沉航母的超音速东风21导弹。中国的军备积累还包括一系列中远程导弹，前所未有的海军实力、可以躲过美国太空监视网络的卫星系统，以及无比强大的网络作战能力，它有可能让美国的指挥控制网络彻底陷入瘫痪。曾经指挥美国太平洋舰队的沃尔什说：“这种实力已经积累多年，他们有能力改写美国统治太平洋的历史。”

作为回应，奥巴马的所谓“亚洲轴心计划”包括重新布署美国军力，把60％的海军舰艇和潜艇放在太平洋。美国还会向该地区投放更加先进的战斗机，比如F-22和F-35战斗机、B-2和B-52远程轰炸机，还包括装备了宙斯盾导弹防御系统的战斗舰。国防部长埃斯顿•卡特说，为了对抗中国的军力，美国正在研制新型的科技，包括远程隐形轰炸机、远程反舰巡航导弹，以及利用电磁力推动子弹以达到比传统火药爆炸更高速度的电磁轨道炮。卡特还说五角大楼正在努力提升太空和电子战争的作战能力。在4月份与亚洲盟友会面之前，他说：“任何人如果想拥有美国目前所掌握的军事力量，都需要花费几十年的时间，我再重复一遍，几十年的时间。”

北京对此了然于胸，小心翼翼地避免与美国发生正面的军事冲突，毕竟它与日本、韩国和菲律宾都有防卫互助协定。它尽量低调行事，用船只包围有争议的岛屿，阻止其他人靠近，在部分岛屿上修建跑道。一个昨天还是海面上荒无人烟的礁石群，今天就变成了北京的领土。

这样的行为掺杂着误判和事态升级的风险。大部分军事分析人士认为，美国携其传统的战略军事实力，可以在正面对抗中让中国一败涂地。但是美国同样也会遭受巨大的损失。中国早已不是朝鲜战争期间只会动用人海战术的国家，它现在手中握有航母杀手级导弹和间谍卫星。假以时日，中国的科技实力——有些是从美国窃取来——会让美国的优势逐渐缩水。中国同时还具备现金和数量的优势，这个国家有能力建造的船只和飞机数量远远超过美国。

巴彻维其说，鉴于和平共处给双方带来的好处，战争所造成的重大伤亡、破坏、以及对世界秩序的冲击，美中开战是“荒唐的设想”。但是这并不是说小型摩擦绝对不会发生。中国在几个世纪里遭到西方的剥削和排挤之后，再一次感受到了自身的强大，民族主义自豪感让它期望在那些自认为拥有主权的领土上插满国旗。

我们如果借鉴历史，和平似乎并不那么乐观。哈佛大学贝尔弗科学与国际事务研究中心主任格拉汉姆•埃利森指出，自1500年以来，15个刚刚崛起的新兴力量挑战占有统治地位的强权的事例中，有11次是以战争结束。但即使是胜者，在大多数情况下，也损失惨重。

巴彻维其和其它分析人士认为，西方所面临的挑战，是要采取比他们在20世纪上半叶应对德国更好的办法处理中国的崛起。“从1900年到1905年，法国人、英国人和俄罗斯人无法找到好的方法来调和德国力量的崛起，结果就是1914年爆发的大灾难，30年代又一次爆发。”

因此，美国在西太平洋的胜利就是维持和平的状态，就像美国在冷战期间既遏制了苏联，又避免了核战争一样。与对付苏联的手段一样，维持和平稳定的手段就是要创造更多的经济、文化和政治机会，深化中国与美国的关系。其次，要让北京真的表现出能反映出中国领导人对自身定义的行为方式，毕竟，成为世界强国要比剥削苏丹的自然资源更加重要。海登说：“他们说：‘我们是大人物。’我们说：‘那就做出大人物的样子。’作为强国，你必须要承担责任、维护国际秩序。”

当然，北京对此肯定不加理会。海登说，华盛顿有足够的理由让自己做好（用武力）保护盟友的准备。关键在于“不要与这些人打仗，而是要确保他们不会做出傻事。”


2012年2月4日，在顿涅茨克的乌格列戈尔斯克一座与乌克兰军队战斗中被摧毁的建筑物旁边，自称顿涅茨克人民共和国的一名分裂分子在瞭望。

“整个地区是黑暗中的一点光亮。”

朝鲜半岛是中国和美国的利益一致之处。朝鲜战争结束之后，北京和华盛顿努力维持半岛的和平。目前形成了一个多赢的格局，尤其是韩国，在30多年前推翻了军事独裁政府之后，它已经变成了世界工业和科技发展引擎。

但是朝鲜的金正恩——金氏流氓独裁家庭的最新继承人——反复无常的性格与他的父亲和祖父如出一辙。他像炫耀塑料玩具一样吹嘘自己手中的核武器和导弹，时不时在韩国内陆丢下炸弹，威胁让南方变成一片“火海”。

金真的敢对南方动武吗？或者向阿拉斯加发射核导弹？一位美国政府朝鲜问题的高级顾问在接受《新闻周刊》的采访时说：“这不大可能，”由于讨论的是敏感问题，他要求保持匿名，“在目前情况下，他不大可能对南部发动全面进攻。他关注的是生活标准和经济问题，一场战争，即使他真的获胜，会让国内情况全面倒退，或许需要十年、二十年、三十年才能恢复。”

罗伯特•A•曼宁是国防部和国家情报办公室的前朝鲜问题和核武器专家，他说：“威胁的行为在朝鲜半岛依然会起到一定的作用。”如果金正恩在边境大批集结部队，美国有足够的时间警告他入侵韩国的后果。曼宁说：“一个好消息是，朝鲜并不是基地组织，不会为72处女自杀，”曼宁现在是华盛顿特区大西洋委员会的资深合伙人，“金氏家族和他的朋友们最在乎的是政权的生存力。他们知道，如果发动任何大规模的攻击，整个地区将成为黑暗中的一点光亮。”

但是在平壤丢下核弹也会产生副作用，曼宁在接受《新闻周刊》采访时说：“在一种情况下，震慑和威胁失去了作用，那就是国家崩溃。如果他们灭亡，会拉我们一起下水。”他认为，无论目前的状态多么令人沮丧，遏制对方或许是我们能期望的最好策略。北京似乎下定决心要支持金氏政权，主要的目的是确保数百万朝鲜难民不会涌入中国。只要维持目前的状态，金就不会有太大作为。他说：“有人预测朝鲜会在25年内灭亡，别吃惊。”


2015年3月5日，北京天安门广场，军方代表参加这个国家一年一度的议会——人民代表大会——的开幕式。

永远的战争

除中国、俄罗斯、伊朗和朝鲜之外的所有冲突（包括与伊斯兰国的矛盾）都像是美国的家务事。美国特种部队针对恐怖分子所发动的影子战争——从西非的利比亚、埃及、叙利亚和伊拉克，到索马里，跨越也门，到阿富汗和巴基斯坦，一直到菲律宾——都不需要布署大规模的地面部队，也没有潜在的大国冲突。这些摩擦，就像是500年前罗马为了扩张和保护它的帝国所不停发动的那些小规模战争。

中央情报局局长约翰•布伦南4月份在哈佛大学发表的一次讲话中，并没有提到罗马帝国的历史，但是他或许应该这么做。在谈到如何“挫败”基地组织、伊斯兰国和它们的附属机构时，他说：“这是一场漫长的战争，这样的战争已经持续了几千年……我认为，这是需要我们保持长期警惕的问题。”

永远警惕，当然意味着“长期、低强度的战争”。获得这种战争的胜利，意味着避免下一次911袭击，当然还包括不让脏弹或者核弹在西方国家领土上引爆。其它类型的进攻，比如由极端伊斯兰分子自发采取的波士顿马拉松爆炸，恐怕难以彻底根除，情报官员认为这将是一个常态。同样，大规模的电子监控和没有任何手续的官方搜查在可预见的未来还会长期存在，尽管这种具有争议的手段激怒了民权主义者。美国在海外采取的两项策略也会长期贯彻：无人机，和与当地政权、部落联合的反恐行动（尽管合作对方往往并不可靠，效果也并不理想）。

军事分析家安德鲁•考克伯恩在他的书《杀戮链条：高科技暗杀的崛起》中，提到了一位越南战争时代的老兵雷克斯•罗菲洛，他后来成为了顶尖太空科学家和国防专家。罗菲洛长期以来怀疑高科技是否会成为战场上制胜的一股力量，他目前在巴格达的美军总部从事一项秘密的情报研究。在分析了各国的资料之后，他发现利用无人机和特种部队摧毁所谓的高价值目标，会让对方对美国和盟友军队采取更暴力的手段。罗菲洛对考克伯恩说：“当我们问到高价值目标和重要人物被干掉之后，出现了什么状况，他们会说：‘嗯是的，我们上个月干掉了那个家伙，之后汽车炸弹越来越多。’他们都直言了当地说了同一件事：‘一旦你把他们干掉，一天之后就出现了更聪明、更年轻、更激进的人给他们报仇。’”

巴基斯坦、也门和现在的伊拉克和叙利亚北部这些全球恐怖组织的孵化地带，普遍体现了这样的趋势。海登坚持认为，利用无人机对基地组织的打击在阻止针对美国本土的袭击方面是至关重要的。但是，尽管奥萨马•本•拉登组织中的高层领导者都以被消灭——他本人也在2011年被干掉，但其它人坐上了他们的位子，并让组织发生了改变。基地组织和伊斯兰国在利比亚和阿富汗争夺追随者，这绝算不上是一个“胜利”。

被迫投身于这些战争的人们都会说，我们可以继续杀死更多的人，但到何时为止？在这场永远不会结束的战争中，美国最理想的结果就是有效地管理这些风险，这意味着阿富汗政权的重大调整即将到来。乐观地说，它会不断面临塔利班起义的骚扰；从悲观角度来看，塔利班不但会获胜，南方的普什图族和北方的塔吉克族将会再次爆发内战。无论出现什么局面，中央政府的权力似乎都无法延伸到首都以外。从某种程度上说，美国官员必须问自己一个问题，为什么还要给一个不可救药的国家撒下大笔金钱。

这同时还意味着，华盛顿在进行人道主义军事援助之前应该更加谨慎。2011年它在利比亚的干涉行为，让这个国家陷入混乱，各股军阀势力占领了这个国家多个城市和地区。巴彻维其说：“这些问题是当地人要仔细考虑如何解决的，他们或许不会很快解决、不会轻松地解决、不会不付出血的代价解决。但是无论如何，他们自己的解决方案要比我们强加给他们的更好。”

这就是罗马帝国在条顿堡森林战役中学到的教训。罗马军团在莱茵河东岸遭受了若干次重大的打击，直到他们的领导人发现，降低日耳曼部落的威胁的最好方法，就是让他们解决自己的问题。正如罗马历史学家塔西佗所说：“如果让日耳曼部落自生自灭，他们或许会各自为战，但不会对周边形成威胁。”

这或许也是美国不得不看清的现实。




原文：

The two divisions, totaling nearly 22,000 men, were massed on the east bank of the river. With their superior numbers, arms and veteran officers, not to mention a long tradition of battlefield triumphs, they were confident of routing the ragtag band of rebels hiding in the woods and marshes on the other bank.

The signal was given, and the first artillery volley fired. The soldiers moved out, crossed the river—and marched into military history. Within three days, the two divisions were annihilated, and their commander’s head was severed and sent back across the lines as a message: Don’t come back.

This was not a battle from the worst days of the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq. It was the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, nine years after the birth of Christ, in what is now northwestern Germany. It has been called “the battle that changed the course of history,” because it marked forever the limits of the Roman Empire. Latin would never take root east of the Rhine.

Nearly 2,000 years later, America crossed its own Rhine of sorts, in Vietnam. Like the Romans, the U.S. military seemed virtually unbeatable, until it ventured into Southeast Asia. And like Rome’s legions after 9 A.D., the U.S. Army would recover from the Indochina debacle, retool and fight again. But its political leaders failed to learn much from the expensive overreach in Vietnam, and soon losses and costly wins became more common than decisive victories.

To be sure, the United States won the Cold War without battling Soviet troops. But since its humiliating defeat in Vietnam, America has engaged in a string of significant military conflicts and emerged the clear winner in only two—ousting Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991 and bombing Serbia to the negotiating table in 1995. More recently, even quick, dramatic triumphs in Iraq and Afghanistan have turned into grinding guerrilla wars, the seeds of which sprouted into the Islamic State, or ISIS. So on the 40th anniversary of Saigon’s collapse, it seems timely to ask: Can America win a war? And what does winning look like in this seemingly endless era of murky counterinsurgencies, rogue nuclear states, Russian intrigues and Chinese encroachments?

In interviews with Newsweek, military experts, strategists, historians and former government officials say that absent some major miscalculation on the part of Russia, China or Iran, the wars America will fight in the foreseeable future will be protracted, low-intensity struggles with no clear victories. There will be no raising American flags over a vanquished enemy’s capital, no parades. Wringing something resembling victory from the messes Washington is in now will require Americans to accept a new way of thinking about conflict.

For a country that boasts the best military in the world, the goal of containment may seem paradoxical or even defeatist. With annual defense budgets topping $500 billion since 9/11—more than any other country—the American military is unrivaled in its global reach, technological sophistication and destructive power. America’s stealth bombers and cyberwarriors, by most accounts, can paralyze a major adversary. But in the kinds of wars the United States is now fighting, badass new weapons may be less important than creative thinking. Airstrikes and drones, not to mention the powerful electronic surveillance capabilities of the National Security Agency (NSA), haven’t delivered victories over the Taliban or ISIS. Indeed, for all its technological know-how, the U.S. military hasn’t even figured out how to neutralize improvised explosive devices—one of the least sophisticated yet deadliest weapons U.S. troops have faced on the battlefield.

Washington is tired of these foreign conflicts, the polls say. And U.S. strategists must now use other means to find something resembling victory. As Andrew Bacevich, a former Army colonel, Vietnam veteran and the resident military sage at Boston University, says, it’s time to “acknowledge the limits of our power, to acknowledge the limited utility of force.”

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry looks out over Baghdad from a helicopter September 10, 2014. Kerry arrived in Baghdad as he began a tour of the Middle East to build military, political and financial support to defeat Islamic State militants controlling parts of Iraq and Syria.

‘A LONG, INDECISIVE STRUGGLE’

Lieutenant Colonel John Schwemmer was shocked when he returned to Iraq this year to train local troops for the fight against ISIS. When Schwemmer and the last American soldiers withdrew in 2011, the Iraqi army was in pretty good shape, he and other U.S. advisers thought. But when news came last summer that two Iraqi divisions collapsed in their first “battles” with ISIS, it was clear something was wrong. Only when Schwemmer and some 300 other U.S. trainer-advisers arrived a few months ago at Camp Taji, 20 miles north of Baghdad, did they realize how bad it was.

“It’s pretty incredible,” he told The New York Times in April. “I was kind of surprised. What training did they have after we left?” Not much, as it turned out. The Iraqi army looked good only on paper. As long as American and allied troops carried the brunt of the battle and the CIA mobilized Sunni tribes against Al-Qaeda, the Iraqi army’s brittle core was largely unexposed. But after the Americans left, the endemic corruption of Iraq’s officer corps, who stole food and pay from their troops, caught up with them. Few units were willing or able to fight when ISIS swept south last year.

If that sounds familiar, it should. It’s the same situation American advisers have faced in counterinsurgency wars since Vietnam: U.S. proxies don’t fight very well—but their enemies do. Neither the Viet Cong nor the Taliban needed foreign advisers to keep them in the battle.  

In Iraq and Syria, as well as with the ongoing war in Afghanistan, the U.S. has dialed back its strategy. The objectives include protecting the U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks; preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon; defending long standing allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia; and ensuring the free flow of oil from the region. For President Barack Obama, those goals do not require large numbers of ground forces. Instead, he’s adopted a light-footprint approach, hitting ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria from the air and contributing a few thousand military advisers to prepare Iraqi forces and Syrian rebels for ground action against the militants. Obama’s Middle East strategy requires good intelligence, dogged diplomacy and a forward presence of U.S. naval and air forces. It also requires an ability to live with contradictions, such as providing air cover for Iranian proxies fighting ISIS in Iraq while supporting the Saudi campaign in Yemen against the Iranian-backed Houthis.

Is this enough to achieve U.S. goals in the region? Not according to hawks in both parties, who insist more U.S. ground troops are needed in Iraq, including those who would guide U.S. airstrikes against ISIS targets. They also want Obama to declare a no-fly zone over much of Syria to deny President Bashar Assad the use of his air force against anti-government rebels.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspects KPA Air and Anti-Air Force Unit, in Pyongyang December 8, 2014.

These defense hawks on Capitol Hill have made a lot of noise, but they haven’t won over many military experts. Some current and former military commanders tell Newsweek Obama has roughly the right mix of military power to attain U.S. goals in the Middle East. The air campaign against ISIS, they say, has stalled its advance into Iraq, killed more than 6,000 militants and destroyed a significant portion of the U.S.-supplied tanks, artillery and other equipment that Iraqi troops left behind last June when they fled.

These experts caution that Obama’s strategy is a long-term approach that will not produce quick, decisive results. Victory, they say, will be keeping ISIS out of Baghdad and preventing the group from launching a big terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland. “We’re doing just enough to allow the Iraqis to keep ISIS engaged,” says retired Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger, who commanded troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. “But this talk of destroying ISIS in the near term is wildly optimistic. This will be a long, indecisive struggle.”

In an interview with Newsweek, former NSA and CIA Director and retired Air Force General Michael V. Hayden calls the campaign against terrorists, whether ISIS or Al-Qaeda, “all tactics, no strategy.” “Targeted killings are a stopgap measure,” Hayden says. “And you have to do them forever, unless you take advantage of the time and space they give you” for a political solution.

Bacevich, who lost a son in Iraq, defines victory as the restoration of “some reasonable stability” in the fractured Middle East and South Asia, so the United States doesn’t have to be permanently mired in fighting there. But the days of lengthy occupations of tribal Muslim nations by overstretched U.S. forces, who have little familiarity with the local languages, culture, geography and history, are over. “Notice I didn’t say a win is democracy, protecting women’s rights or making ourselves the guarantor of Israeli military supremacy in the region,” Bacevich adds. “I think that the best we can hope to get is a fairly modest solution.”

That approach may require some radical adjustments in U.S. policy and rethinking who will receive billions of dollars in American aid. One such adjustment would be accepting that Iraq and Syria are failed states, and their Shiite governments no longer control the Sunnis, who occupy the Texas-sized tract of territory straddling those two countries. Baghdad and Damascus are unlikely to regain lost territory anytime soon—if ever. Iran now controls Iraq’s Shiite areas, and with the entrenchment of ISIS and an increasingly independent Kurdistan, a new map of the Levant is taking shape. “Ain’t coming back,” Hayden says of the old borders, drawn in secret by England and France during World War I.  

This means the U.S. may have to learn to live with ISIS in the same way it learned to deal with Cold War conflicts in Latin America, Asia and Africa, where proxies and occasionally U.S. forces fought to contain Soviet influence. The United States didn’t win most of those conflicts; at best, it managed them to an acceptable conclusion. And just as Washington looked the other way when its Cold War proxies murdered innocents, it may need to find a level of comfort when its allies—whether it’s Iraqi Shiite forces or Saudi Arabian forces in Yemen—kill civilians. One of the lessons of relying on allies in the Middle East and beyond is the limits of American power to mold their behavior according to our moral code.  

Allied soldiers guard Iraqi prisoners, 23 km from the Saudi Arabian border, near Mina Al Zour, on February 24, 1991.

‘WE’RE GOING TO KILL A LOT OF PEOPLE’

For all the blood, treasure and agony generated by the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, these conflicts are undercards for the main event in the region: dealing with Iran. Stopping Tehran from developing nuclear weapons, Bacevich says, is just one part of Obama’s strategy. “He is seeking a way to bring Iran back into the international order, so that Iran will play its proper role in regional politics, with the hope—and it’s only a hope—that Iran will behave more or less responsibly, rather than trying to be a sponsor of Islamic revolution.”

But should the nuclear negotiations fail—or Iran get caught cheating—the chances of a big-scale military showdown increase. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has often threatened to go it alone on Iran, but defense experts say this is unlikely. Israel couldn’t carry out enough airstrikes to destroy all Iran’s nuclear sites, defense analysts say, and Tehran could strike back by raining missiles on Tel Aviv, unleashing Hezbollah in Lebanon and dispatching suicide bombers to hit Jewish targets in and outside the country. The price for Israel would be very high.

It’s been broadly assumed the United States would come to Israel’s aid in any such conflict, but Admiral Patrick Walsh, a former commander of the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, says support would depend on how the fight started. If Iran were the aggressor, Israel could count on America’s help. But if Netanyahu mobilized for a preemptive attack, Washington might well disassociate itself from him. “You just can’t presume unequivocal U.S. support for anything you say or do and [that] we’ll always be there by your side,” Walsh tells Newsweek.

He thinks the more likely international response to Iranian cheating would be a resumption of economic sanctions. But rainy-day plans are ready if sanctions are considered insufficient. While such plans remain highly classified, a blueprint for what a U.S. war against Iran might look like was published in 2012 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, D.C., think tank with a pipeline into the capital’s national security establishment.

Anthony Cordesman, an influential defense analyst who co-authored the report, says the plan would entail an enormous air campaign, led by a strike force of 10 nuclear-capable B-2 bombers, as well as 90 advanced warplanes to protect the bombers, suppress enemy air defenses and jam Iranian radar and communications. The U.S. would also deploy tanker aircraft for midair refueling, he says. Then there are the aircraft carrier battle groups, special operations forces, drones, missile defense systems and surveillance aircraft and satellites the military would hurl into the offensive. In other words, it would be a big-time war, the likes of which have not been seen since the 2003 “shock and awe” bombing of Iraq.

Flying from the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, every U.S. bomber would carry two 30,000-pound GBU-57 bunker busters, which can penetrate 200 feet of reinforced concrete to pulverize a deeply buried target. To prevent any preemptive or retaliatory fire against Israeli and American Arab allies in the Gulf, U.S. warplanes would have to take out Iran’s eight ballistic missile bases, 15 missile production factories and 22 launch sites, Cordesman says. And the military would have to deploy special operations forces for behind-the-lines sabotage missions, reconnaissance and forward guidance for airstrikes against targets such as oil refineries, military bases, roads and bridges.

None of this would be easy, especially since Russia has lifted its self-imposed ban on the delivery of its powerful S-300 air defense missile system to Iran. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard might carry out its repeated threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic 21-mile-wide channel at the mouth of the Persian Gulf that controls the flow of 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas supplies. Plus, Iran “can attack sporadically and unpredictably in a war of attrition or attempt to ‘swarm’ U.S. and Gulf naval forces” with small attack boats, Cordesman writes. As a consequence, the already chaotic Middle East could become even more destabilized, endangering the flow of oil from the region.

In the end, Cordesman says, the U.S. war effort would set back Iran’s nuclear bomb program only by five to 10 years. And ordinary Iranians who oppose Tehran’s extremist religious figures, Walsh and other authorities say, would rally to their nation’s defense, ensuring a new generation’s hatred of the United States.

How does that add up to a win?

“We had better think long and hard before going to war with Iran,” says Bolger. “We could beat the hell out of them—in the air, on the sea and on the ground, and our war effort would be overwhelming and brutal. But we’re going to kill a lot of people, and the Iranians will fight back desperately.”

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif talks to members of the media while walking through a courtyard at the Beau Rivage Palace Hotel during an extended round of talks in Lausanne April 1, 2015.

PUTIN’S MUSHROOM CLOUD

On April 7, a Russian Su-27 fighter jet buzzed a U.S. spy plane in international airspace over the Baltic Sea, coming within 20 feet and nearly causing a midair collision. The incident was the latest in a series of provocative—and increasingly dangerous—encounters between NATO and Russian forces.

Such confrontations are part of a broader campaign by Russian President Vladimir Putin to challenge NATO and the European Union in countries he regards as part of Russia’s historic sphere of influence. Since he came to power in 2000, the former KGB agent has deployed an arsenal of new tactics to destabilize—and ultimately neutralize—once-Western-leaning former Soviet Republics and drive a wedge between EU and NATO members. The so-called hybrid war includes subversion by covert agents, the unacknowledged use of unmarked Russian special forces, the denial of Russian gas supplies as an economic weapon, a relentless propaganda campaign against the West and loan offers to economically strapped western European countries.

Putin already has begun to redraw the map of post-Soviet Russia. His troops now occupy Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions, the Transnistria region of Moldova and, most recently, Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula. For the past year, Putin also has been covertly supporting a separatist war in eastern Ukraine, where preparations appear to be under way for a new offensive.

Crimea is gone, U.S. strategists concede, just like the chunks of Georgia that Russia bit off in 2008. And General Wesley Clark, a former NATO commander, and many others worry that there’s no cohesive Western plan to stop Putin. The U.S.-led policy of slapping Russia with economic sanctions and helping train Ukrainian forces hasn’t worked. Putin’s ambitions in Ukraine, Clark says, can be curbed only by raising the cost of his aggression. The United States should ready a package of lethal aid to Ukraine, he says, including anti-tank missiles and special targeting radar, and then make it clear the weapons will be delivered to Kiev if Russia launches another offensive. “The question is, Will we do it in time?” Clark says. “It’s much easier for us if we can support Ukraine now and check the growth of Putin’s ambition in Ukraine than allow that ambition to swell after he’s digested some more of Ukraine and turned to other targets.”

Many analysts, however, think Putin’s goals are more modest: to push back against NATO’s aggressive eastward expansion after the collapse of the Soviet Union, to broaden Russia’s sphere of influence on its borders and to recapture some of Moscow’s standing in the world. “These questions of, Is Latvia next? Estonia next? are kind of overblown and overhyped,” says Eerik Marmei, the Estonian ambassador to the United States.

Ultimately, the outline of a U.S. victory in Ukraine, which is not a member of NATO, looks like a political settlement that balances both Western and Russian interests. “I know what victory looks like there, and it’s not the annihilation of the enemy,” Hayden says. “The objective is to create an equilibrium that truly is sustainable.” Hayden and others envision a new federal system of governance for Ukraine, one with broad provisions that would allow the eastern part of the country to align with Russia, as well as guarantees that Kiev won’t join NATO. The goal, he says, is a “stable, modestly prosperous, modestly democratic Ukraine” devoid of Crimea and other eastern areas.

Iraqi security forces and Shiite fighters from the Popular Mobilisation units hold up a captured ISIS flag as they gather outside the provincial council building in Tikrit, on April 1, 2015.

Yet Putin clearly has designs beyond Ukraine. He’s been exploiting rifts within the European Union and NATO to create even deeper divisions. He’s encouraged German worries about Russian gas supplies if sanctions continue. He’s offered Greece loans on terms far more favorable than any eurozone bailout, as well as cheaper gas supplies, more Russian investment and tourism. He’s even reached out to right-wing, nationalist, anti-European Union parties in France, Sweden, Finland, Hungary and Bulgaria.

Hovering over any direct clash with the Russians, of course, is the dark cloud of a nuclear conflict, and Putin has put those fears to good use. In March, Russia threatened to target Denmark with nukes if the Scandinavian nation became a member of NATO’s missile-defense shield. Such threats only reinforce Putin’s effort to make western Europeans believe that any attempt to blunt his designs on Ukraine risks a nuclear apocalypse.

Hayden, however, believes this is bluster. “Russia is not resurgent,” he says. “They’re running out of entrepreneurship, running out of democracy, running out of pluralism, running out of oil, running out of gas, running out of Russians—their birth rate is falling. I’m not worried about Russia in 10 to 15 years, I’m worried about Russia in zero to three years.”

Other than sanctions and the threat of military aid to Ukraine, the only other answer to Russia is NATO. While the U.S. beefed up its presence in the Baltics after Russia’s advance on Ukraine, many of Obama’s critics would like to see him go to Narva, a city on Estonia’s frontier with Russia, and declare, “It stops here.” But with the U.S. military cutting back and many NATO members failing to meet pledges to devote 2 percent of their gross domestic product to defense spending, such a Reaganesque gesture seems unlikely. Even if Obama were to make such a demand, Putin might not take it seriously.

Russian President Vladimir Putin chairs a meeting with members of the government at the Novo-Ogaryovo state residence outside Moscow.

EVEN THE WINNERS LOSE

Just about every day now, fleets of Chinese marine surveillance ships and fishing trawlers swarm the waters near the Senkaku islands to underscore Beijing’s territorial claims in the East China Sea. And each time, Japanese coast guard cutters try to order them out of the area, which Tokyo also claims. The Chinese rarely comply.

These bumper-car clashes with American allies in Asia, along with China’s dramatic military buildup, have led some in Washington and Beijing to believe that war is inevitable. Critics counter that each side has so much to gain from peaceful competition, and so much to lose in an armed conflict, that war is unthinkable. Either way, the U.S. is watching China’s muscle-flexing with caution and concern.

Twenty years ago, the idea that China might confront the United States militarily was outlandish. Back then, China publicly protested U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which Beijing still claims as a renegade province, but privately acknowledged it was too weak to do anything about them. Today, Beijing not only has staked its claim to the South China and East China seas but also has the strength to back it up. U.S. naval intelligence has determined that China has formidable so-called area-denial weapons, including the hypersonic Dong Feng 21 missile, which is built to sink aircraft carriers. China’s military buildup also includes a broad array of other medium- and long-range missiles, the unprecedented projection of naval power far from its coast, satellites that can blind America’s space-based surveillance capabilities and a formidable cyberwar capacity that could wreak havoc on U.S. command-and-control networks. “They have come of age,” says Walsh, who also commanded the U.S. Pacific fleet. In China’s view, “they can rewrite the framework for a [U.S.] rules-based system in the Pacific.”

In response, Obama’s so-called Asia pivot includes a major realignment of U.S. military power that will eventually put 60 percent of the Navy’s ships and submarines in the Pacific. The U.S. is also sending advanced warplanes like the F-22, the F-35 and long-range B-2 and B-52 bombers to the region, as well as additional warships equipped with Aegis missile defense systems. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter says new technologies are being developed to counter the Chinese buildup, including a long-range stealth bomber, a long-range anti-ship cruise missile and a rail gun that uses electromagnetic force to propel shells at higher speeds and greater effectiveness than conventional high explosives. Carter also says the Pentagon is developing new military capabilities for space and electronic warfare. “It will take decades—and let me repeat that: decades—for anyone to build the kind of military capability the United States possesses today,” he said on the eve of his April trip to meet with allies in Asia.

Beijing has taken note and appears to be trying not to provoke a direct military confrontation with the United States, which has defense treaties with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. Instead, it creeps up on cat’s paws, surrounding disputed islands with its ships, keeping others at bay and in some territories building landing pads and strips. One day, there’s just a lonely pile of rocks in the blue waters. The next, Beijing effectively controls it.

Such moves are fraught with the risks of miscalculation and swift escalation. Most military analysts agree that the United States, with its superior conventional and strategic forces, could send China reeling in a major military clash. But U.S. forces would also suffer significant losses. With its ship-killer missiles and spy satellites, China has come a long way from the human wave infantry attacks it used against U.S. forces during the Korean War. Over time, China’s technological advances—some gained by stealing U.S. secrets—keep narrowing the gap in military superiority. China also has the advantage of cash and quantity. The country has greater capacity to build ever more ships and planes than the U.S.  

Bacevich says a war between the U.S. and China would be “absurd,” given the benefits of continued peaceful coexistence, not to mention the catastrophic death, destruction and jolt to the world order that a large-scale military clash would cause. But that doesn’t mean friction can be avoided. After centuries of exploitation and marginalization by the West, China once again feels strong, and it has shown a nationalistic determination to plant its flag on the outer reaches of what it sees as its rightful defense zone.

If history is any guide, the prospects for peace don’t look promising. Graham Allison, director of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, notes that in 11 of 15 major cases since the year 1500 that involved a rising power emerging to challenge a ruling power, war was the result. But even the winners, in many cases, suffered cataclysmic losses.

The challenge for the West, Bacevich and others say, is to do a better job managing China’s rise than it did Germany’s in the first half of the 20th century. “Back in 1900 to 1905, the French, the Brits and the Russians failed to find the formula that would accommodate this rising German power,” Bacevich says. “And the result was the catastrophe that exploded in 1914.” And again in the 1930s.

A win for America in the western Pacific, therefore, would be managing the peace, much the same way the U.S. contained the Soviet Union and avoided a nuclear exchange in the Cold War. And as with the USSR, one tool for maintaining equilibrium is creating more economic, cultural and political ties to deepen China’s relations with the United States. Another is to challenge Beijing to behave in ways that reflect what Chinese leaders say about themselves. After all, there’s more to becoming a global power than exploiting resources in places like Sudan. “They say, ‘We are somebody.’ We say, ‘Then act like somebody,’” says Hayden. “As a great power, you have to take some responsibility for sustaining the international system.”

Beijing, of course, may ignore such lecturing. All the more reason, Hayden says, for Washington to underscore its readiness to defend it allies—with force. The point is “not to go to war with these people, but to make it harder for them to do something dumb.”

A member of the armed forces of the separatist self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic looks on near a building destroyed during battles with the Ukrainian armed forces in Vuhlehirsk, Donetsk region, February 4, 2015.

‘THE WHOLE PLACE WILL GLOW IN THE DARK’

One place where Chinese and American interests have coincided is Korea. Ever since the end of the Korean War, both Beijing and Washington have worked hard to keep the peace on the peninsula. That’s been a win for everybody, but especially South Korea, which has morphed into an industrial and technological powerhouse, especially since it threw off a military dictatorship more than 30 years ago.

But North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, the latest Kim to run the family kleptocracy, is as volatile as his father and grandfather, brandishing nukes and missiles like plastic toys, flinging artillery shells at South Korean islands and periodically threatening to set the South “on fire.”

Would Kim really dare to strike South Korea? Or launch a nuclear missile at Alaska? “Nothing is inconceivable,” says a top consultant to the U.S. government on the Koreas, speaking to Newsweek on condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive situation. “Under present circumstances, however, it’s very unlikely [he] would want to launch an all-out attack on the South. He’s concentrating on living standards and improving the economy. A war would be a huge setback, and it would take them another decade or two or three to dig out, even if they won.”

“Deterrence still works in Korea,” says Robert A. Manning, a former specialist on Korea and nuclear weapons in the State and Defense departments and office of the director of national intelligence. If Kim Jong Un massed troops on the border, he says, the U.S. would have plenty of time to warn him of the dire consequences of invading South Korea. “The bit of good news on North Korea is that they are not Al-Qaeda, not suicidal [and] hoping for 72 virgins,” says Manning, now a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. “The Kimster and friends value regime survival above all. They know that if they start any major conflict, the whole place will glow in the dark.”

But loading our nukes to hit Pyongyang could also backfire. “The one scenario in which deterrence may not hold is a collapse scenario,” Manning tells Newsweek. “If they are going down, they may want to take us with them.” However unsatisfactory the status quo, he says, containment is probably the best we can hope for. Beijing seems determined to keep propping up the Kims, mainly to prevent millions of Korean refugees from flooding China. And as long as that remains unchanged, the Kims aren’t going anywhere. “People have been predicting North Korea’s collapse for 25 years,” he says. “Don’t hold your breath.”

Military delegates arrive for the opening of the annual full session of the National People's Congress, the country's parliament, at Tiananmen Square in Beijing March 5, 2015.

THE FOREVER WAR

After China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, everything else (including the tangle with ISIS) seems like housekeeping for the U.S. The shadow wars American special forces are waging against terrorists—from West Africa across Libya, Egypt, Syria and Iraq, down to Somalia, across Yemen to Afghanistan and Pakistan and all the way to the Philippines—involve no major ground units or potential big-power confrontations. They are the same kind of skirmishes Rome constantly fought to expand and protect its empire for 500 years.

In an April lecture at Harvard, CIA Director John Brennan didn’t invoke the history of Rome, but he might as well have. “It’s a long war, unfortunately,” he said of the struggles to “degrade” Al-Qaeda, ISIS and their offshoots. “But it’s been a war that has been in existence for millennia…and so this is going to be something, I think, that we’re always going to have to be vigilant about.”

Always vigilant, of course, translates as “permanent war, mostly at a low boil.” Winning in this context means just staving off another major airline hijacking or 9/11-like attack—and certainly preventing a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon exploding on Western soil. Other attacks, such as the one on the Boston Marathon, launched by self-starting Islamic radicals, are difficult to prevent and may become the norm, intelligence officials acknowledge. Likewise, mass electronic surveillance and warrantless police searches will undoubtedly be with us for the foreseeable future, despite their debatable utility and the anger they provoke from civil libertarians. The same goes for the twin prongs of U.S. strategy abroad: drone strikes and partnering in counterterror missions with local regimes and tribal groups, which are often unreliable, discredited or unsavory.

In his book, Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins, military analyst Andrew Cockburn highlights the career of Rex Rivolo, a Vietnam-era fighter pilot who became a leading space scientist and defense intellectual. A longtime skeptic of high technology’s promise to deliver victory on the battlefield, Rivolo ended up working in a secret intelligence cell inside U.S. military headquarters in Baghdad. Drilling down into the stats, he discovered that knocking off so-called high-value targets using drone strikes and hunter-killer teams led to increased violence against U.S. and allied troops. “When we asked about going after the high-value individuals and what effect it was having, they’d say, ‘Oh yeah, we killed that guy last month, and we’re getting more IEDs than ever,’” Rivolo told Cockburn. “They all said the same thing, point-blank: ‘Once you knock them off, a day later you have a new guy who’s smarter, younger, more aggressive and is out for revenge.’”

The same is true in Pakistan, Yemen and now northern Iraq and Syria, the leading incubators of global terrorism. Hayden insists that drone strikes on Al-Qaeda were crucial in preventing another big attack on the United States. But while the top tiers of Osama bin Laden’s group were decimated—and the leader himself eliminated in 2011—others took their places while the organization metastasized. Al-Qaeda and its ISIS rivals now compete for followers from Libya to Afghanistan. This cannot be considered a “win.”

Talk to the men and women who have to fight these wars, and they all say the same thing: We can keep killing people, but to what end? In this forever war, the best the United States can hope for is the effective management of threats. That means a major adjustment involving Afghanistan may be looming. With U.S. forces slated to withdraw by the end of 2016, the future of the Kabul regime looks grim. At best, it faces a continued Taliban insurgency; at worst, a Taliban victory and a new civil war between Pashtuns in the south and ethnic Tajiks in the north. In either case, the central government’s authority is unlikely to extend much beyond the capital. At some point, U.S. officials will be forced to question the wisdom of pouring more dollars into yet another failed state.

It also means Washington is likely to think twice before it intervenes militarily on humanitarian grounds, as it did in Libya in 2011. That intervention plunged the country into chaos, and a mosaic of militias now control different cities and regions. “These are problems that the people in the region are going to have to figure out how to solve,” says Bacevich. “And they’re not going to do it quickly; they’re not going to do it easily; they are probably not going to do it without considerable bloodshed. But at the end of the day, they will have a better chance of solving their own problems than we will have a chance of imposing a solution on them.”

Such was the lesson Rome eventually learned from its defeat in the Teutoburg Forest. Rome’s legions took several more beatings east of the Rhine before their leaders decided the best way to reduce the threat of the Germanic tribes was to leave them to themselves. As the Roman historian Tacitus wrote, according to an analysis by the Dutch scholar Jona Lendering: “The Germanic tribes, left alone, would become divided again and cease to be dangerous.”

That might well be the hard lesson America has to learn.

每天的晨吟

美若存和中、俄任一家开片会赢的念头，那便是真疯了！