【08.12.12 BBC】民族主义会让中国当局骑虎难下－中国崛起与民族主义
【链接】http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/simp/hi/newsid_7770000/newsid_7777700/7777739.stm
【原文题目】
何晓清：中国崛起与民族主义
http://news.bbc.co.uk/media/images/45289000/jpg/_45289124_hxq300.jpg
何晓清：民族主义到一定程度会让中国当局骑虎难下。
三十年的改革和发展提高了中国的经济实力和国际地位，同时中国人的民族主义情绪也引起了外界的注意。
从早些年的"中国可以说不"民族主义言论到中国国内一系列反美、反日示威，再到今年围绕奥运、火炬和西藏问题在中国国内外发生的各种抗议与反抗议，中国民族主义可以说一浪高过一浪，而且蔓延到了国外大学的校园。
美国哈佛大学费正清中心研究员何晓清博士目前的研究课题就是"崛起的中国与海外中国留学生的民族主义情绪"。
今天的"中国改革开放30周年"系列专访就推出BBC中文部资深制作人乐安前不久在纽约对何晓清博士所做的采访。
答：我觉得当前的民族主义和1989年后中国政权对自己合法性的担忧有很大关系。当时为了提高合法性开始了所谓的"爱国主义教育"，其中一是官方的、正式的、教科书里的爱国主义教育，比如历史课、思想品德课的教科书都强调爱国主义主题；另外就是反日、反美情绪和"中国人可以说不"这些非官方民族主义话语的发展。
这两条线基本是平行发展的，中国驻南斯拉夫使馆被炸事件引发的反美抗议等现象也使研究中国的学者注意到了民族主义的问题。但是从2006年开始，在西方的校园里出现了一系列中国留学生在学术讨论中攻击那些批评中国的看法和学术观点；抨击那些批评中国的华人学者"不爱国"，认为他们的观点是"对中国人民的伤害和侮辱"等等。
西方社会的公民教育，重要的一点就是批判性思维，第二就是民众的知情权。反观中国这些年，谁有批判性思维，谁说真话，谁就要付出代价。在没有言论自由的环境下，批判性思维是不可能出现的，大家都倾向于自律、自保。
我观察到的这一代中国年轻人就是在没有知情权的情况下成长起来的。他们对文革、对"八九"这些历史没有了解，同时他们也没有批判能力，往往把对中国的批评看成是对中国、对中国人民的伤害。
问：您看到的这些海外中国留学生一般来说都是改革的受益者，他们持这样的立场似乎并不奇怪，奇怪的是改革的受害者，比如国内的下岗工人，也同样表现出强烈的民族主义情绪，这又是为什么呢？
答：我觉得这跟整个的宣传有关系。长期的宣传使人们相信那些官方灌输的价值是最重要的，也据此判断什么可以牺牲、什么不可以牺牲。
改革开放这么多年经济上好像很成功，但是中国也付出了很大代价。这个代价对很多中国人来说就是我刚才说的那个"价值"，他们愿意付出。
比如"911"事件发生时，那么多中国年轻人看着电视欢呼，认为美国人活该。他们的价值就是只要为了一个大的名义，不管是共产主义的名义还是别的什么名义，他们都愿意付出。我们从小受的就是这种教育。为了国家、为了人民，个人自由、生命、下岗、没钱这些就不重要了。
问：这种教育出来的民族主义当然也会有它的负面作用，我们也看到官方对这种民族主义也是有利的时候就利用，担心伤及政权的时候就控制。您觉得民族主义对中国现存体制的潜在破坏力在哪里？
答：我觉得除了对国内的宣传教育，现在对西方说的汉语、儒学也都是整个民族主义的一部分，目的是向西方展示中国文化的优越。但到一定程度的时候当局会骑虎难下。
‘八九’一代和‘后八九’一代，或者说，异议人士和所谓民意之间的最大的区别也就在于对‘忠诚’、‘爱国’的定义。一个说，你爱它，就要批评它；另一个说，你爱它，你就不能批评它。
当这些有着强烈民族主义情绪的年轻一代觉得政府在保护民族利益方面做得不够的时候，政府就会很难办。
因为整个这一套东西都是欺骗性的，是政府一直在告诉他们没有什么比民族、国家更重要。
我们看到不止一次游行的时候，如果一失控这些人很容易就去自己采取行动，去"献身"，而且很容易转向针对政府。因为他们会根据受的教育得出结论，认为政府没有尽到保护国家民族利益的职责。这时当局就要收获自己种下的苦果。
问：我们经常也可以从这一代人身上看到这样的史观，那就是一提到中国和西方的关系就要提起1840年、提起鸦片战争。您觉得，是近代史本身，还是对历史的官方解读，导致了这种民族主义？
答：我觉得很大程度上还在于如何解读历史和全面了解历史。比如对纳粹，欧洲国家都清楚知道纳粹历史是怎么回事。中国却只片面地强调某一部分，比如鸦片战争，强调西方列强如何欺负我们。而让年轻一代对"六四"、对"文革"、对"反右"这些一无所知，其实这是一个如何解读历史的问题。
问：但强烈的民族主义无论和中国国内讲的"和谐社会"还是对外讲的"和平崛起"都是有矛盾之处的，是吗？
答：对。我们刚刚谈到了对国内的危害，对外也是一样。比如这些中国留学生，他们一般都是最上层家庭出来的。他们如果回国，可能继续参与政治。如果留在西方也会继续以他们的观念投入到有关中国的事务中去。这对世界和平和以后的国际关系都会产生深远的影响。
问：在中国改革开放过程中曾有过一句著名的口号："振兴中华"。有意思的是这个口号在八十年代并没有带来民族主义，而九十年代后的民族主义恰是在没有什么口号下产生的。您觉得，这个时期的民族主义有什么内在的规律、特点?
答：我觉得八十年代的爱国是不一样的一种爱国。"八九天安门"一代的学生他们也被灌输了爱国、忠诚、没有什么不可以牺牲这些观念。但那时候的爱国是要有批评的声音，是要走上街头要求政治改革。
而"后八九"的民族主义则是"国"与"政权"不分。对他们来说， 爱国就是要爱共产党，爱这个政权。如果批评共产党，你就不爱国、不忠心。
"八九"一代和"后八九"一代，或者说，异议人士和所谓民意之间的最大的区别也就在于对"忠诚"、"爱国"的定义。一个说，你爱它，就要批评它；另一个说，你爱它，你就不能批评它。
她上述的观点很危险，很有害。
她的矛头直接指向我们AC，说明我们AC说到了反华势力的痛楚。 现在外媒开始掀起针对AC的批判潮了，说明AC做得很成功 为此我们必须更加成熟和团结，以便有能力朝着我们的既定目标前进。 嘴巴生她的頭上,由她胡說八道, 我們只要做好自己的事情, National leaders in big countries like China (and the United States) useforeign policy to show domestic audiences what strong, capable leaders
they are. They sometimes also use an assertive foreign policy to divert
attention from domestic problems, a tactic that has become known in the
West as “wag the dog.” Chinese leaders are prone to public muscle flexing
because they feel the need to stay out in front of a growing tide of
popular nationalism. What the Chinese leaders fear most is a national
movement that fuses various discontented groups—such as unemployed
workers, farmers, and students—under the banner of nationalism. The
lessons they learned in school about the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911
and of the Republic of China in 1949 have stayed with them. Any Chinese
government that looks weak in the face of foreign pressure is likely to
be overthrown.
The leaders recognize that popular nationalism is intensifying as the
country grows stronger. In fact, they have been largely responsible for this
trend. In schools and the mass media, they have promoted nationalist
themes as a way to bolster the legitimacy of the Communist Party, now
that almost no one believes in Communist ideology anymore.
After Tiananmen, the CCP launched a nationwide “patriotic education
campaign” in schools and the mass media. Scholar Zhao Suisheng
describes it as the CCP’s “rediscovery of nationalism.”72 The CCP began
to tout its patriotic credentials as a way to rally popular support. As Jiang
Zemin said in a 1997 speech to the CCP Central Committee, “The Chinese
Communists are the staunchest and most thorough patriots. The
patriotism of the CCP is the supreme example of the patriotism of the
Chinese nation and the Chinese people.”73 The press was filled with articles
about the importance of cultivating patriotism for maintaining social
stability.74
Beginning in 1994, schools added new courses to stimulate patriotic
loyalty, and students won awards for reading the one hundred patriotic
books and seeing the one hundred patriotic movies chosen by the Party.
Patriotic songs, patriotic books, and patriotic versions of history became
the steady diet of schoolchildren. School tours crowded historical sites
established earlier, now called “patriotic education bases.” The Museum
of Testimony to the Crimes of Japanese Army Unit 731, the Japanese unit
that experimented with chemical weapons on Chinese citizens, located
in the northeastern city of Harbin, received more than three million visitors
a year.75
To Jiang Zemin and his colleagues trying to bolster the Communist
Party’s popularity after the Tiananmen crackdown, it seemed like a good
Domestic Threats 63
idea to bind people to the Party through nationalism now that Communist
ideals had lost their luster. The military and the propaganda bureaucracy
were particularly keen on nationalism because it enhanced their
roles and potentially, their budgets. (The Foreign Ministry was most dubious
because as one diplomat put it, “Those who handle foreign relations
are always suspect as traitors.”)
Nationalism did not have to be entirely “constructed” by the state.76 As
China grew economically and militarily more powerful, nationalist emotions
were spontaneously bubbling up in the popular psyche. All the school
curriculum, media, and billboards had to do was reinforce these emotions
by attaching them to the common script of China’s triumph under
Communist leadership after the “century of humiliation” at the hands of
foreign enemies. The main themes of the story are the atrocities committed
by Japan during its occupation of China, the loss of Taiwan inflicted
by Japanese and American military forces, and America’s hegemonic interest
in keeping China weak and overthrowing Communist rule through
“peaceful evolution.” The century of humiliation will end only when Japan
apologizes sincerely for its wartime atrocities, Taiwan is brought back
into the fold, and America treats China as an equal. Patriotic education
nurtured popular resentments against Japan and America and an expectation
that Taiwan would soon be reunified as a way of strengthening
public identification with the Communist Party.
Once the official line on issues like Japan, Taiwan, and the United
States became assertively nationalistic, ambitious individuals competed
with one another by talking the patriotic talk. “A lot of Chinese nationalism
is just a show that people put on for one another, a kind of political
correctness,” said a Chinese journalist. “But some of it is real.”
Some Chinese intellectuals—and many foreign observers—view contemporary
Chinese nationalism as something “imposed upon the people
representing the will of the leader.”77 But, for most Chinese, nationalism
feels like a healthy act of self-assertion, as Sinologist Edward Friedman
says, “Chinese nationalists experience themselves not as victims manipulated
by political interests at the state center but as pure patriots who
know the truth and will not be fooled.”78
As a U.S. State Department official, I frequently encountered aggressive
questioning about American foreign policy from Chinese students—one of
my roughest goings-over was by a gathering of Chinese students studying at
Harvard who went after me about America’s bombing of Kosovo, arms sales
to Taiwan, and alliance with Japan. President Clinton received similar treatment
from the student audience at Beijing University when he spoke on
campus in 1998. Communist Party members—even at Harvard—prepared
the students to show their patriotism in this manner.
64 china: fragile superpower
But I also have felt the chill of genuine nationalist resentment of America
in spontaneous interactions with Chinese friends. I found myself dining
with a dozen university faculty in Shanghai immediately following the
collision of the Chinese fighter jet and the U.S. EP-3 spy plane. One
professor, a longtime friend who has visited me in my California home,
couldn’t bring himself to utter a word to me, so full of anger at America
was he. The students I talk with express their hatred of Japan, their readiness
to shed blood to keep Taiwan, and their gripes against America with
proud heads held high. Patriotic passions help fill the spiritual void left by
the loss of faith in communism and offer an idealistic alternative to the
commercialism of Chinese society today.
The nationalist mobilization of the 1990s has boxed the CCP and its
leaders into a corner. Once the authorities allow students to demonstrate
outside the Japanese and American embassies, it is a struggle to restore
order without the students turning on them. “The government knows that
demonstrations against Japan can escalate into antigovernment demonstrations,”
one student told me. And if they allow people to trash the Japanese
and American embassies, how can they stabilize relations with these important
countries on which China’s economic growth, and its political stability,
depend? Once people have gotten a taste of freely protesting against
the approved targets of Japan and the United States, how do you contain
their demands to participate in politics? As one PLA colonel said, “Sometimes
people express their domestic dissatisfactions by criticizing foreign
policy. You see that a lot in China.” A Beijing student observed that his
classmates joined in anti-Japanese protests “because they want to participate
politically.” He went on to say, “It’s a way of demanding rights.” Nationalism
could be the one issue that could unite disparate groups like laid-off
workers, farmers, and students in a national movement against the regime. 既然西方坚持批判的思想，为什么就不接受我们的批评呢？虚伪啊 放屁。。。 “你爱它，就要批评它”
-----这是什么NC逻辑， 批评不能是盲目的，做错了事情应该批评，难道做对的事情也要批评？批评不是目的，批评是为了促其改正，而不能为了批评而批评！如果按照此君的论断，本.拉登命令飞机去撞击世贸大厦这样对美国严厉的批评方式，看来可以解释为是对美国的“爱之深，责之切”了。Q7) 作者已经NC,鉴定完毕. 答：我觉得很大程度上还在于如何解读历史和全面了解历史。比如对纳粹，欧洲国家都清楚知道纳粹历史是怎么回事。中国却只片面地强调某一部分，比如鸦片战争，强调西方列强如何欺负我们。而让年轻一代对"六四"、对"文革"、对"反右"这些一无所知，其实这是一个如何解读历史的问题。废话，难道还强调八国联军如何“帮助”我们吗？列强希望看到的“中国新政府”是只宣传"六四"、"文革"、"反右"，决口不提1840到1949之间的历史。忘记国耻的政府才该下台！ 一个说， 对共产党的爱应该是这样的：你爱它，就要批评它，但决不可污蔑它。 这个人是不是也是搞颜色革命的传销者？ 何小清？？？
谁？？？人肉他！！！！ 我觉得这个作者绝对不太正常，谁说的爱他就不能批评了，我们也批评，但你们那是批评吗。直接就是赤裸裸的污蔑，爱国主义怎么了，中国人几千年来都被告知“食肉者谋之”，老百姓都没有什么国家兴亡匹夫有责的观念，现在政府大力宣传也是希望百姓能够真实的感受到国家的重要性，能不重要吗？看看以前在国外的中国人是什么地位。
更何况美国的民族主义也属于一流的，多少个州立法禁止反战？她怎么不说。看到不好的，我们当然会抗议，一种痛心疾首的抗议，而不是他们那种幸灾乐祸的教训。 我想，是因為大家對中文的理解不同，
對於這些個走狗，
言論自由、批判政府的自由，
等於是「造謠自由」、「顛覆自由」。
我所了解的言論自由，和他們了解的不一致，
不過，大多數時候，
這些人對於言論自由的定義，還是和我差不多，
只要是對著西方的政府，西方國家而言，他們也都遵守同樣的準則，
當對著中國時，
他們對「言論自由」的定義，就和我所認知的有著很大的不同了，
「造謠自由」=「言論自由」；
「顛覆政府」=「批判政府」。
對著西方政府，他們就遵守著「普世價值」，世界各國對言論自由的定義；
但只要是對著中國，中國共產黨，就是另一套「普世價值」，
古今中外，走狗們共通的「普世價值」。
回复 14楼 爱米粒儿 的帖子
文章中提到她是美国哈佛大学费正清中心研究员何晓清博士 原帖由 popomook 于 2008-12-12 13:48 发表 http://bbs.m4.cn/images/common/back.gif我想，是因為大家對中文的理解不同，
對於這些個走狗，
言論自由、批判政府的自由，
等於是「造謠自由」、「顛覆自由」。
我所了解的言論自由，和他們了解的不一致，
不過，大多數時候，
這些人對於言論自由的定義，還是和我差不 ...
双重标准让他们自己不值钱也就算了可他们也拖累了自由民主~支持他们的西方政客和政府也更加深了我对此的鄙视Q74) Q74) Q74) 不是不能批评，关键很多所谓的**在激动批评政府的同时，也出卖了民族利益。中国人对文革的了解程度，只需要到美国对朝鲜战争的那种了解程度就够了。 我对这个mm没性趣
它的言论俺就不看了