【09.10.07 新闻周刊】你所知道的关于中国的事情全是错误的
【中文标题】你所知道的关于中国的事情全是错误的【原文标题】Everything You Know About China Is Wrong
【登载媒体】新闻周刊
【原文作者】Rana Foroohar
【原文链接】http://www.newsweek.com/id/218290/page/1
比较流行的观点认为，中国30年来的兴旺和繁荣，让它在这次经济危机中借助这股势头迅猛发展。实际上，自从中国在10年前顺利度过亚洲金融风暴，北京就因其特有的稳健掌控方式获得了多方的侧目。所以，或许一些预测专家会自然而然地认为中国这艘超级巨轮不会掉头而行，主要是因为其它国家的经济相继沉没，而自己依然在保持增长的趋势。但是这次的经济危机与以往不同——范围更广、更具有破坏性、上百年未遇到过。它让中国模式中的每一个关键点都暴露出受到束缚和必须变化的必要，包括一党执政、睿智的经济管理制度、出口型经济增长模式、消费群体的出现、迅速发展的私人经济体、不考虑环境成本的草率增长模式，以及对创办世界级大型公司的渴望。接下来我们要看一看，为什么这些对中国的常规看法越来越不准确，或者完全是错误的。
错误之一：共产党是铁板一块
不对，金融危机让党内产生了分裂，让农村的平民主义者开始反对城市的快速发展论者。平民主义者包括了目前在朝的两个顶级人物：胡锦涛主席和温家宝总理，他们更倾向于缓慢发展；财富被平均分配到西部地区的贫困农村；采用更谨慎地保护环境的管理模式，以及对自由市场经济的少量投入。与他们对立的是来自沿海城市的精英派，以上海为首。他们希望经济高速增长；更加自由的市场经济；给予企业家和私人经济体更多的支持。目前判断哪一方会最终胜出还为时尚早，但是可以明确的一点是，新的领导层会把中国引向一个崭新的、无法预料的方向。华盛顿布鲁金斯学会的中国问题专家李成（音译）说：“或许对中国最大的一个误解是他们只会发展经济。实际上，它的政治也在进步。”
错误之二：共产党员是聪明的经济管理者
2008年9月雷曼兄弟破产的当天，中国就开始计划实施一项金额达6000亿美元的刺激方案。这被证明是金额最大（按占GDP百分比计算）、反应最迅速，并且被某些人认为是世界上最有效的经济刺激方案。结果是，中国继续以征服世界的步伐在前进，今年GDP的增长为8％，这让党内元老获得了宏观经济大师的称号。大部分经济学家都认为北京出色地完成了一项艰巨的任务，解决了如何利用保持高速增长来抵消失业和随之而来的政治不安因素这一短期问题。尽管如此，对于大规模的经济刺激资金是否会在未来扭曲国家经济走向的担心也逐渐浮出水面。中国已经变成了一个纯粹依靠国家投资驱动的经济体，这方面的GDP贡献在2009年上半年达到了88％——这在任何国家、任何时期都是绝无仅有的。
这种不平衡性所蕴含的危险是现实存在的。亲市场派担心，对“绝路桥”（译者注：指没有实际意义，仅仅是为了拉动内需而开展的工程。）类型项目的倾斜，会让人们把解放金融市场和战略部门私有化等事情抛在脑后，而这其中包括了最富有的行业，比如银行、电信和建筑业。政府官员承认，60％或更多的刺激资金最终被投放在股票和房地产市场中，这滋长了公众担心资产泡沫的情绪。在一些沿海城市，房地产销售率是去年同期的三倍，上海证券市场的股票指数在今年上升了60％。中国独立的经济学家Andy Xie说：“这仅仅是一个临时性的方案，所有刺激资金都集中在基础设施的建设方面，房地产行业因此而复苏。”
这对胡和温来说意味着不小的麻烦。曾经一度被忽略不计的中国政府债务，在最近的官方数据中占据了GDP的30％，一些西方经济学家甚至认为真实的数据应当是70％。尽管这个数字相比于西方国家还不算高（美国政府债务占GDP的比例在明年将达到100％），但已经足够让中国的政客们烦躁了。上个月，温家宝在大连举行的世界经济论坛中对与会人员说，中国的增长存在着“不稳定、不平衡、不扎实”的因素。一个星期之前，中国政协成员迟富伦（音译）在接受一次采访时直言：“中国领导人应当重新思考改革的整体布局。”
看好中国的人会说，中国40％的村庄到临近的市场都没有正式的公路，因此会产生巨大的道路施工建设需求。而卖空者会问，用公路连接贫困的农村和市场会给中国带来多少收益？（中国的人均GDP只有2000美元，农村地区还要少很多。）北京长江商学院和康奈尔大学的金融教授黄明（音译）说：“在新修建的乡村高速公路上驾驶，你看不到很多的车辆。这种投资要在很长一段时间之后才会得到消费提升的回报。”与此同时，刺激资金就像是给政府部门注入了激素。据哈德森学院的研究员John Lee说，这些政府部门目前已经得到了刺激资金的95％。如果他们犹豫不决，胡和温要为此承担责任，而不是被捧为聪明的经济管理者。
错误之三：资本主义正在兴起
到今年为止，这个观点还算部分正确。中国私有经济体的数量从1990年的2000万家，到2008年的4000万家翻了一番。但是根据Lee的预测，这个数字在今年将会下降到3800万，原因是很多私有生产商退出了市场。国有企业享有巨大的优势，即使是在北京让大部分刺激资金流向他们之前也是如此。国有企业轻松占有了国有银行3％的贷款份额，而私有企业因不堪支付两位数的贷款利息而不得不转向求助于地下钱庄。从1992年开始，私有经济体的固定资产投资每年大约增长10％，而国有企业增长幅度为20％到50％。从90年代开始，中国成功的私有企业平均规模一直保持在30人左右，主要原因就是在筹集资金方面遇到的困难。所以，最近的市场调查显示国有企业将继续高歌猛进，而私有企业没有一点类似的迹象。这是不足为奇的。
最近几年经济的蓬勃增长更加让中国没有理由放弃那些利润丰厚的产业，即使是经济危机也没有强大到让其松手的地步。黄说：“我们遇到了一个瓶颈，如果你想进一步改革，必定会触及经济核心产业的既得利益，比如金融、电信、能源、政府部门等。”中国政府拥有全国三分之二的固定资产，包括通信线路、电厂、房地产，政府控制的公司占上市股票总金额的70％。尽管私有企业仍然掌控经济总量的一半多一点，但是大部分中国观察家认为经济刺激方案会扭转这个局面。中国财经杂志的编辑王硕（音译）说：“我毫不怀疑在经济危机之后，国家将掌握经济总量的大部分。这对于内部需求来说不是一个好消息，因为这表示个人掌握的经济量会变小。家庭收入已经在通过储蓄的方式来支撑这些国有企业，这些储蓄被国有银行用极低的利率借给效率低下的企业。”
这次经济危机让中国“看不见的手”现出原形。2007年，政府在香港证券所挂牌上市了国内4家最大银行中的3家，当时据称的理由是努力让它们更加商业化，减少政治色彩。但是，经济危机甫一爆发，北京立即向银行管理层发布了一项指示，说明何时以及如何开始发放借贷。这个行为有效防止了西方国家遭受到的信贷市场致命打击，但是很多分析人士担心这同时也为明年不良贷款的出现埋下了隐患。北京现在在用各种手段干预市场：在一家澳大利亚矿业公司抛弃了中国合伙人后将其高层逮捕；支持国有企业试图逃避西方派生合同的行为；允许国家收购高利润率的私有企业。王说，中国在80年代的邓小平时代向资本主义敞开大门，但是现在“这扇门失去的继续敞开的动力”。
错误之四：中国是出口导向型经济
如果这个说法没有错，那么为什么出口量在今年下滑20％的情况下，中国经济还能保持8％的增长？上海金融服务办公室主任方兴海（音译）说：“出口对中国是重要的，同样也对日本和德国是重要的，这不仅仅是出口的问题。”
当我们仔细观察中国的出口增长引擎时，它的光环就会消退。中国的出口总额占经济总量的将近40％，CLSA策略专家Andy Rothman说这其实是一个有误导的数字，因为它高估了中国在印有“中国制造”的商品上所获取的收入份额。这些商品中大部分只不过是在中国组装，零配件都来自韩国、台湾和其它富裕的国家。比如一个价值299美元的iPod，中国组装厂卖给批发商的价格是150美元，这其中只有5％，即7.5美元由中国出产的零配件和劳动力所贡献的。所以净出口额以及对中国经济的实际贡献就是这7.5美元。以此来看，净出口额只占中国GDP总额的7％多一点。这就可以解释为什么西方主要出口市场陷入危机时中国还能保持增长。
如上所述，中国所依靠的是国家消费。包括摩根士丹利亚洲主席Stephen Roach在内的很多经济学家说，消费者的消费能力的确是在增长，但是被夸大了。中国人的消费只占经济总量的37％，与其它大国的情况比较起来少得可怜。至于说中国消费者更加乐观、负债压力更小，这也和国家补贴有密切的关系。受惠于银行借贷在过去几年里在政府操控下大幅度的增长，中产阶级在近期纷纷抢购北京和上海的房产、家具和大型家电。经历了过去几个月的增长之后，存款比例在9月份达到了32％。Rothman的观点得到了越来越多的中国和西方经济学家的支持，即中国在“净出口额没有任何增长”的前提下，仍会依靠国家和人民消费获得每年6％到9％的增长。中国依赖出口的观点可以叫停了。
错误之五：中国的公司将会统治世界。
没错，很多中国国家性质的公司正在席卷全球，猎取破败的产业，创造出经济危机正在帮助中国公司实现全球化野心的假象。但是收购者主要是政府控制的石油和矿产大鳄，所捕获的对象都是其它发展中国家的廉价资源，它们基本不具备成为全球化品牌的潜质。北京大学教授Michael Pettis说：“很简单，中国几乎没有真正的创新和品牌管理能力。”全球化道路上的障碍包括对知识产权脆弱的法律保护和合同约束，以及注重机械式学习和推演公式而不是创造性能力的教育体系。典型的中国方式是，经济危机促使北京发布法令，要求公司努力创新，政府为新的专利技术发放少量津贴。然而，就像经济学家和投资者会和你说的那样，专利极少直接转化成具有专业技术的公司。自上而下发布成立新公司的命令，永远无法和遍布矽谷和剑桥的那种自发性的创新想法相提并论。
与此同时，中国荒蛮的环境并不鼓励人们为建立全球性企业和世界级研究开发中心做长远性考虑。黄说：“模糊的法律条款和腐败滋长了这里鼠目寸光的习性。企业家没有安全感，有太多的例子讲述政府如何接管私人企业，如何更改法律条款，所以他们尽可能地攫取短期利益。”同时，富有的国有企业（中国石化或中国铝业）用他们巨额的筹备资金获取资源来满足国内需求，而不是去从事研究和品牌发展工作。当你在一个世界上人口最密集的国家占有垄断地位的时候，为什么还要花钱来介入国际竞争呢？结果是，中国800磅重的大猩猩永远无法取代西方蓝筹股的地位。
错误之六：中国认为挣钱比环境更重要
中国忽视自由市场规律的态度在一个领域却起到了令人吃惊的作用：清洁能源。若干年来，中国一直拒绝承担控制碳排放的压力，它坚持认为发展是首要的，它的人均排放量远远低于西方国家。现在，中国逐渐认识到它的人民可能是全球气候变暖最严重的受害者，北京因此而调动起所有的资源，也许只有中国能做到这点。在政府慷慨的津贴补助下，中国的公司已经在很多领域领跑全世界，比如太阳能电池制造业。今年秋天，中国领导人宣布了降低碳排放的新目标。如果达成这个目标，中国将在2020年成为阻止环境变化的领导者。
中国已经把绿色科技摆在全国工作的首位，它在太阳能电池和风力科技方面实施了重大的科研项目。中国为刺激绿色科技发展所投入的总金额为2180亿美元，居全球之首，全国在去年因此而成立了数十家替代能源公司。中国已经是世界上最大的可再生能源生产地。与此同时，石油价格的疲软和不确定因素使西方国家减缓了绿色科技的投资步伐。这并不意味着中国将会很快完成内部的清理，它仍然在以每周一家的速度修建老式的燃煤工厂。但是它很有可能成为世界领先的清洁能源生产基地。
深入了解之后就会发现，所有这些变化都不会真正令人惊讶。在以往的危机中，中国总是表现出勇敢、愿意去改变的姿态。最开始的时候，它向国际市场敞开大门是源于文化大革命的混乱。最近一次的开放行为是在2001年加入了WTO，当时的背景是亚洲金融危机。现在，改变似乎是来自一个相反的方向，它退回到一个更加封闭的经济体，由国家运作，不欢迎私有企业和外国企业，而且还制造了一个惊喜。如果当权派失败，幕后还有一个后备在等着。
原文：
The conventional wisdom is that China is steaming through the global financial crisis by building on the momentum generated by its 30-year boom. Indeed, ever since it sailed through the last big global crisis—the Asian contagion 10 years ago—Beijing has been feted for uniquely steady helmsmanship in financial storms. So perhaps it's natural for forecasters to assume that the Chinese supertanker of state is not turning sharply now, particularly since it continues to grow rapidly even as other economies sink in the recession. Yet this crisis is different—bigger and more damaging than any seen in generations—and it is exposing limits and forcing change in just about every key piece of the China model: the supremacy of the one-party state, the smart economic management, the export-driven growth, the emerging consumer class, the burgeoning private sector, the headlong focus on growth at any environmental cost, and the drive to build world-class companies. What follows is a look at why these common assumptions about China are increasingly inaccurate or just plain wrong.
Myth No. 1: THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS A MONOLITH.
No, the financial crisis is splitting the party, pitting the rural populists against the urban growth-firsters. The populists include the current top two, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, who favor slower growth, distributed more evenly to poorer rural Western regions, governed with a more careful eye to protecting the environment and less devotion to the free market. Opposed to them are the elite factions based in urban coastal cities, led by Shanghai, who want high-speed growth, more freedom for the free market, and greater support for entrepreneurs and the private sector. While it's too early to tell which faction will win out, it's clear that the new leadership will take China in new and possibly unexpected directions. "Perhaps the biggest myth about China is that it is only developing economically," says Cheng Li, a China expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington. "In fact, it's also evolving politically."
Myth No. 2: THE COMMUNISTS ARE BRILLIANT ECONOMIC MANAGERS.
On the day in September 2008 when Lehman Brothers fell, China began planning the swift rollout of a $600 billion stimulus that would prove to be the largest (as a share of GDP), swiftest, and, many say, most effective in the world. The results—China continues to grow at a world-beating pace, now 8 percent—have confirmed the reputation of the party elders as macro maestros. While most economists agree that Beijing has done a strong job of solving the short-term problem, which was how to keep growth high enough to offset massive unemployment and subsequent political unrest, there is growing unease about how the massive stimulus could distort the economy in the long term. China has become an economy driven almost entirely by state investment, which in the first half of 2009 accounted for 88 percent of GDP growth—a share for which it is hard to find any parallel, in any country, at any time.
The dangers of this lopsided boom are real. The pro-market faction worries that the liberalization of financial markets and the privatization of strategic sectors (which include most of the richest industries such as banking, telecoms, and construction) are being forgotten in favor of "bridge to nowhere"–style projects. Even government officials now admit that 60 percent or more of the stimulus money has ended up in stock and real-estate markets, fueling worries about dangerous new asset bubbles. In some coastal cities, property sales are three times what they were last year; the Shanghai stock market is up over 60 percent this year. "It's just a stopgap measure—all the stimulus has been concentrated in building new infrastructure and reheating the property sector," says Chinese independent economist Andy Xie.
This could spell trouble for Hu and Wen. The Chinese government debt, once negligible, is now officially about 30 percent of GDP, but some Western economists put the real figure as high as 70 percent. While these figures are still low compared with Western nations (the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio will reach about 100 percent next year), they have Chinese politicians fretting. Last month Wen told a group of VIPs at the World Economic Forum in Dalian that China's rebound was "unstable, unbalanced, and unconsolidated." A week earlier Chi Fulun, a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference was blunter: "Chinese leaders," he said in an interview, "should rethink the country's reform package."
China bulls would argue that China, where 40 percent of villages still have no paved roads to the nearest market, has a huge demand for more paving projects. Yet bears would ask how much China gains from connecting poor villagers (China's per capita GDP is still only $2,000, and much less in rural areas) to the market. "Take a drive on one of those new rural highways; you won't see many cars," says Ming Huang, a finance professor at Beijing's Cheung Kong business school and Cornell University. "It's going to take a long time for this sort of investment to result in any kind of consumption boost." Meanwhile, the stimulus is like steroids for the dominant state sector, which, according to Hudson Institute fellow John Lee, has received some 95 percent of the stimulus capital so far. If it falters, Hu and Wen will be held to account, not held up as brilliant managers.
Myth No. 3: CAPITALISM IS FLOURISHING.
That was partly true until this year. The number of private enterprises in China doubled from 20 million in 1990 to 40 million in 2008. Yet, according to Lee, that number will likely be down to about 38 million by the end of this year, as many private manufacturers go out of business. State enterprises enjoyed huge advantages, even before Beijing's stimulus started shifting more funds their way. State companies have easy access to 3 percent loans from state-owned banks, while private companies pay double-digit rates and are often forced to tap underground markets for funding. Since 1992, growth in private-sector fixed asset investment has been rising at about 10 percent per year, compared with state-sector growth of between 20 and 50 percent. Since the 1990s, the average size of a successful private business in China has flatlined at about 30 employees, due mainly to their difficulties raising capital. It's no surprise that recent market surveys show state companies are bullish on the future, while private-sector businesspeople are decidedly less so.
The last several years of boom growth have given the state little reason to ease its grip on the most lucrative industries, and the crisis may not be enough to force its hand. "Unfortunately, the low hanging fruit has been plucked," says Huang. "We've now hit a point where if you want to do more reform, you are going to have to really hurt some vested interests in the key parts of the economy—finance, telecoms, energy, government bodies, etc." The Chinese state owns more than two thirds of all fixed assets like telecommunications lines, power plants, and real estate in the country. State-controlled companies represent some 70 percent of the major stock markets. And while the private sector still controls a little more than half the total economy, most China watchers believe the stimulus package will turn the tables. "I have no doubt that after this crisis, the state will control a larger share of the overall economy," says Wang Shuo, managing editor of China's Caijing economic journal. "That's bad news for domestic demand, because it means that individuals will control a smaller share of the economy. Households are already supporting state-owned enterprises with their savings, which are given to these mostly inefficient businesses via state-owned banks at very low interest rates."
The crisis is exposing the hidden hand of the state. Back in 2007, the government listed three of its largest four banks on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in what was described at the time as an effort to make them more commercial, less political. Yet as soon as the crisis hit, Beijing issued instructions to bank heads on how and when to start lending. That prevented the kind of credit-market heart attack that hit the West, but many analysts fear it will lead to a spike in nonperforming loans next year. Now Beijing is meddling in the market in all manner of ways—arresting executives of an Australian mining company after it jilted a Chinese merger partner, supporting state-owned firms that want to walk away from Western derivatives contracts, allowing state takeovers of more efficient private firms. China threw open its doors to capitalism under Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s, but now "the open door has lost its momentum," says Wang.
Myth No. 4: CHINA IS AN EXPORT-DRIVEN ECONOMY.
If that really were true, why is it that exports are down 20 percent this year, but the economy is still up by 8 percent? "While exports are important to China, in the same way that they are important to Japan or Germany, it's not the only thing going on here," says Fang Xinghai, director of the Shanghai Financial Services Office.
Take a close look at Chinese exports as a growth engine, and they begin to fall apart. While gross exports make up a bit less than 40 percent of the economy, that figure is misleading, says CLSA strategist Andy Rothman, because it overestimates the Chinese take on goods stamped made in china. Most of those goods are merely assembled in China from parts made in South Korea, Taiwan, and other richer countries. Consider a $299 iPod that sells wholesale from the Chinese assembly plant for $150. Only about 5 percent, or $7.50, of that wholesale price comes from Chinese parts and labor. That $7.50 is the net export value, and the real contribution to China's economy. Net exports account for just over 7 percent of China's GDP. That explains why China can still grow when its key Western export markets are in a deep recession.
China depends, as we've seen above, on state spending. The contribution of a growing consumer is real but widely overstated, as Morgan Stanley Asia chair Stephen Roach and many others like to point out. Chinese consumption makes up only 37 percent of the economy, the smallest share of any major nation. And to the extent that Chinese consumers are still more optimistic, and less heavily in debt than Western counterparts, that too has much to do with heavy state subsidies. Lately the middle class has been snapping up flats in Beijing and Shanghai, as well as furnishings and white goods, thanks to the massive, government-mandated increases in bank lending over the past year. Credit was up 32 percent in September, after similar rises over the past several months. Rothman's conclusion, which is increasingly supported by a number of other Chinese and Western economists, is that China can continue to grow at a 6 to 9 percent annual pace based on state and consumer spending "without any contribution from net exports." So much for China's export dependence.
Myth No. 5: CHINESE COMPANIES WILL RULE THE WORLD.
True, many big Chinese state companies are scouring the world, hunting for distressed properties, creating the illusion that the crisis is advancing China Inc.'s global ambition. But the buyers are mainly government-run oil and mining behemoths, seeking out cheap resources in other developing nations, and they have little potential to become global brands. "Quite simply, there is little real innovation or branding ability in China," says Beijing University professor Michael Pettis. The obstacles include weak legal protection for intellectual property and contracts, and an educational system focused on rote learning and metrics rather than creativity and innovation. In typical Chinese fashion, the financial crisis prompted edicts from Beijing that firms should go forth and innovate—subsidies are now being doled out for new patents filed. Yet as any economist or investor will tell you, patents rarely translate directly into real companies with new and unique technologies, and top-down efforts at creating startup companies can't compete with the sort of spontaneous germination of ideas that happens in places like Silicon Valley or Cambridge.
Meanwhile, China's Wild West atmosphere doesn't encourage the long-term thinking necessary for building global businesses and world-class research and development. "Blurry rules and corruption fosters short-term thinking here," says Huang. "Entrepreneurs don't feel safe—there are many examples of the government taking over private businesses or changing the legal landscape—so they take their profits as quickly as they can." Meanwhile, richer state companies (think Sinopec or Chinalco) use their giant war chests to make acquisitions to feed domestic demand, rather than investing in research or branding. Why spend money to become more globally competitive when you have a monopoly in the world's most populous country? Result: even China's 800-pound gorillas won't replace Western blue chips any time soon.
Myth No. 6: CHINA PUTS MONEY BEFORE THE ENVIRONMENT.
China's growing tendency to ignore market forces is working in one surprising field: clean technology. For years China has resisted pressure to help control carbon emissions, insisting that it needs to develop first, and that its per capita emissions are far below those of the West. Now, as China has come to realize that its people could be among the hardest-hit victims of global warming, Beijing has mobilized its resources, as perhaps only China can. With the help of generous state subsidies, Chinese companies have, for example, taken the lead in solar cell production, and are powering ahead in many other areas. This fall Chinese leaders announced new targets for reducing carbon emissions, which, if met, would put the nation in the lead on combating climate change by 2020.
China has made green technology a national priority, launching major research initiatives on solar-powered batteries and wind technology. Its green stimulus package amounts to $218 billion, the largest in the world, resulting in the founding of dozens of alternative energy companies within the last year. China already produces more power from renewable energy than any other nation in the world. Meanwhile, the recession and uncertainty about the direction of oil prices has slowed the momentum of green investing in the West. This doesn't mean that China can clean up its own act soon: to meet energy demand, it continues to build old-fashioned coal-fired plants at the rate of one a week. But it may become the leading manufacturer of clean energy technology for the rest of the world.
None of these changes should come as a real surprise, on closer look. In past crises, China has always shown a bold willingness to adapt. Its original opening to global markets emerged from the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. Its last big opening emerged from the Asian crisis, when it joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. Now the changes seem to be moving in the opposite direction, back toward a more insular economy, run by the state, less welcome to private and foreign business, and with one big surprise. If the ruling faction fails, there is an alternative waiting in the wings.
看起来很有趣，签名 飘过 是吗？ 值得耐心一看，谢谢楼主 Q69)Q69) Q20)分析得很有原创性！值得一读。特别是文章最后一句话，让人浮想联翩。 很有意思，西方可能搞乱中国，但很难理解。 拜读勒。谢谢楼主。问下是楼主自己翻译的麽？ 貌似很有意思的样子。
d内有争论是好事。从第一点看来，公平和效率确实成了矛盾啊，既得利益者和后来者的矛盾。。 对于把伟大领袖毛主席头朝下感到纳闷。胆子忒大 感谢翻译！ 感谢翻译。 错误之七，作者以为自己是个中国通，实际并不是。 拜读勒。谢谢楼主。问下是楼主自己翻译的麽？
黑瞳2 发表于 2010-1-29 00:46 http://bbs.m4.cn/images/common/back.gif
是的，我发的所有帖子全部是原创手工翻译。 无论如何，西方人的理性是值得学习的，其实美国严肃的媒体是很有水平的，能够去分析，愿意去分析，而不是诉诸情绪化和表面化，对不对另说，中文媒体包括港台还都不太能做到。 是的，我发的所有帖子全部是原创手工翻译。
满仓 发表于 2010-1-29 09:41 http://bbs.m4.cn/images/common/back.gif
辛苦叻！
希望我也能有这水平。
会常来看贴的 对于把伟大领袖毛主席头朝下感到纳闷。胆子忒大 一切的一切，半真半假 非常有意思的分析
为楼主击节 很高兴又看到楼主的翻译，同时提个小小的建议（算是有点吹毛求疵吧^^）：
...
这次经济危机让中国“看不见的手”现出原形。（原文：The crisis is exposing the hidden hand of the state.）
满仓 发表于 2010-1-28 22:53 http://bbs.m4.cn/images/common/back.gif
“看不见的手”（invisible hand）在经济里边一般是指市场（调节作用）；此处hidden hand of the state若说成“政府藏在背后的手”之类的或许更好些，不会引起歧义。