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看完前面后，着重看第9段，XXX是那个集团的谁呢？ACers进来看看，真的假的？
翻译来源：http://xinu.jinbushe.org/index.php?doc-view-3145.html
该电文发于2008年4月16日，，由美国驻华大使Clark T. Randt签署发出。内容如下：
1. 胡锦涛跟整个中共领导层一起，继续执行对西藏问题的强硬路线。尽管中共领导人对西藏问题的看法可能有些差异，但没有本质上的区别。中共受到西方"持偏见" 的媒体报导和对奥运相关的抗议活动激起的国内民族主义感情的支持。至少在奥运结束之前，中共高层不会修订其西藏政策。
2. 上周，若干大使馆的关系告知，胡锦涛在中国对西藏政策方面态度坚定，北京高层立场一致。关系们称，基于胡锦涛自己的西藏经历（他在80年代末任那里的党委书记），加上西藏问题"极大的" 重要性和敏感性，看来不会有任何高层领导人在西藏问题上向胡锦涛发起挑战。一名长期的大使馆关系说，象西藏这样敏感的问题是由9人构成的政治局常委决定的，无法得知他们具体的讨论情况。"始终相当清楚"，胡锦涛"完全控制了对西藏问题的决策，党内高层谁要敢在这个问题上发起挑战，无异是"政治自杀"，或被称为"太软"，或被认为是"卖国贼"，甚至可能象胡耀邦在1987年那样被清除。
3. XXX说，在这个问题上"绝对不存在观点分歧"，对中国领导人来说，西藏甚至比台湾更重要。在西藏问题上，政治局9名常委中没有任何人有胡锦涛这样的经历和权威。XXX说，1987年和 1989年对抗议活动的镇压，使胡锦涛获得了邓小平"高度的赞扬"，这是使他1992年得以进入中常委的一个重要因素。其他领导人可以就台湾、经济发展或政治改革提出与胡不同的意见，但这种情况不适用于西藏。
4. 一些关系承认，党内和社会中坚对西藏问题有各种不同的观点，但没有任何人认为高层有着意见分裂现象。比如，XXX承认，党内有人提出对西藏发出更"温和"的声音，但持这种观点的绝不是胡锦涛。而胡对西藏政策握有"完全的"控制。北京事实上接受了美国对台湾的插手，但中国绝不会接受境外势力对西藏的"干涉" 。
胡锦涛采取"强硬路线"引起了一些批评。XXX说，他"个人"倾向于"有节有度地"接近西藏，包括跟达赖喇嘛对话，他承认，"只有达赖喇嘛"能够团结中国境内外的大多数藏人。
5- 6. XXX称，"许多中坚人士"倡议重审对达赖喇嘛的政策，对妖魔化达赖喇嘛和反对与之对话的立场提出质疑。但是，除了"少数中坚人士和知识分子"，普通党员的大多数，以及"98％"的民众支持党的现行西藏政策。XXX认为，党内对西藏问题有重大意见分歧"根本是不可想象的"。
比如，XXX说，他不相信胡锦涛和温家宝对西藏问题持有不同的立场，尽管有人以温家宝对英国首相布朗"温和的"说法以及他3月30日在老挝对媒体说的关于达赖喇嘛的话为依据，认为温家宝有所不同。他说胡和温相当于一块双色果糖，一面黑，一面白，但两面却是一个整体。XXX认为，温家宝在西藏问题上"略为温和一些"，但在他看来这是温的风格，并不能表明对官定政策的异见。XXX同意这种看法，认为"温就是温"，他几乎在任何问题上都表现得更温，但他的观点跟官方路线没有显示出重大的区别来。
7- 10. "南方都市报"4月3日发表了一篇博文，对党在西藏事件报导方面的严格管制提出了批评，"南方周末"发表的一篇文章要求与达赖喇嘛对话。
最近的党报们发出不同的声音，标志着党内领导者们之间的争论或分歧，反而折射出党的媒体政策的某种调整。两篇广东党报上的报道都在推挤中宣部指导方针的底线。第一篇出现在南方都市报运营的一个博客上，内容是对党在报道西藏问题上各种限制的批评，认为直接放外国记者入藏报道会有助于展示各事件的真相。第二篇则出现在南方周末上，声称大部分的藏人不是分裂分子，也并不参与或支持暴力行动，应该区别对待这样的人。这篇东西也呼吁和dalai喇嘛的会谈。
但 PolOffs（注：估计是大使馆政治处官员或政情官员的缩写）交谈过的"关系"们普遍认为这并不表明南方这两个媒体在西藏问题上跟中央唱反调。
XXX 认为，这两篇文章确实反映了一些中坚人士重审西藏政策的愿望，他指出，其中一篇文章受到了党内许多人的批评。XXX说，这两篇文章只不过反映了这两家报纸"传统的自由特色"。XXX说，这两家报纸过去都没有在宣传部官员那儿遭遇麻烦。
令人惊讶的是，甚至XXX都没有读过他的集团里的报纸发表的这两篇文章。
在PolOffs介绍了文章内容后，他对这两篇文章具有政治重要性表示强烈怀疑。他说，这些文章也许是反映了对党修订媒体战略的愿望。 XXX估计，南方周末总编肯定得到了党的宣传机关的批准才会发表那篇文章，否则，一个编辑如果敢自作主张发表这样敏感话题的文章，他会被"立即解职"的。 XXX反问道，胡锦涛亲自主持着关于西藏问题的报导，哪个报纸编辑敢公然挑战官方的路线，哪怕是含沙射影的？XXX估计，由于党对西藏问题的宣传政策"略有失误"，因此允许南方周末就此作出"有更多细微差别"的报导。 在上周会见的PolOff们没有读过或者听说过两篇里的哪一篇，而他们的解释是这两篇的意义没那么明显。xxx特别指出了一点：南方都市报上的那篇文章除了南方报业集团和“自由南方记者”那种标准的“挺西方的倾向性内容”以外没有别的什么内容哦你。除非被更权威的媒体发布，这篇东西没什么意义。xxx认为这篇东西代表了一些精英对西藏政策的看法，但是也提到了很多党内人士对这篇东西的批评。xxx指出这篇东西不过是这两份报纸“一贯以来的自由立场”的一种体现，并认为这是一种“越过底线”（“打擦边球”）。
XXX指出，这体现了宣传部门最近允许有"差异空间"的精神。但他同时说明，但是，西藏问题"太敏感"了，宣传部门反而规定了"非常严格"的报导方针。
11. 几乎所有XXX都认为，民族情绪的上涨给党添了翼。他们都对PolOffs强调道，中国人对西方对西藏问题"扭曲事实"的愤怒是真实的，广泛的，会产生长时间的效应。关系们自己似乎也都对西方媒体的报导感到愤怒。XXX强调说，他所认识的"每一个人"都对西方的报导和抵制奥运开幕式的呼吁和一些人要求西藏独立感 到愤怒。民众的感觉是，西方要"让中国倒下"。 XXX则认为，民族主义确实在蔓延 和燃烧，但他认为主要集中在25到35岁的年龄群里。
12. 关系们说，不管民族主义燃烧的原因是什么，它极大地增大了民众对党的西藏政策的支持度。XXX认为，这是一个自然的结果，中国人的民族主义近年来增强了，基于中国的迅速发展。XXX认为，党的宣传机器有目的地增强着中国人的民族感情，以换取民众对中央西藏政策的更大支持，这方面他们获得了非常大的成功。西藏事件把民众"完全团结"到了党和政府的身后，XXX说，这样的事情在整个80 年代和90年代都是"不可想象的"。
13. XXX警告道，尽管当前对党的西藏政策的支持度相当高，但公众的感情也会限制领导人的行动。XXX说，民族主义始终是党的统治" 支柱"之一，但中央领导人不希望它"失控"。也许出于这个原因，中国宣传机构已下令减少对西方媒体的攻击
原文在此http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable /2008/04/08BEIJING1454.html （现在已被美国政府查封）
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 001454
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2033
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KOLY CH
SUBJECT: HU JINTAO IN CHARGE OF TIBET POLICY; LEADERSHIP
UNIFIED, BUOYED AND CONSTRAINED BY NATIONALIST SENTIMENT
REF: A. OSC cpp20080407530001
¶B. OSC cpp20080408507001
¶C. OSC fea20080407617427
Classified By: Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) President Hu Jintao remains firmly in charge of
China’s policy on Tibet, with the leadership unified over
Beijing’s current hard-line stance and buoyed by rising PRC
nationalist sentiment, xxxxx.
Given Hu’s background and experience in Tibet, as well as
the "extremely sensitive" nature of the issue, no one would
"dare" challenge Hu or the Party line, contacts say. While
there may be differences in how various leaders publicly
articulate China’s Tibet policy, there are no substantive
differences among the top leadership. Similarly, Embassy
sources do not believe that two recent articles in
Party-controlled southern newspapers signaled leadership
debate or a review of policy, instead arguing the pieces
perhaps reflect an adjustment in the Party’s media strategy.
The Party has been buoyed by rising nationalist sentiment,
fueled in part by anger at the West over "biased" media
reporting on Tibet and Olympic-related protests, but this
nationalistic fervor also constrains future policy choices.
Regardless, any modification of Tibet policy is unlikely in
the short term, at least until after the Olympics, contacts
say. End Summary.
Hu Jintao Firmly in Charge, Leadership Unified
--------------------------------------------- -
¶2. (C) President Hu Jintao is firmly in charge of the PRC’s
Tibet policy, with the leadership unified over Beijing’s
current hard-line stance, several Embassy contacts told
PolOffs over the past week. Sources argued that given Hu
Jintao’s own expertise and experience regarding Tibet (Hu was
provincial party secretary in Tibet in the late 1980s), as
well as the "extreme" importance and sensitivity of the Tibet
issue, it would be virtually "impossible" for any leader to
challenge Hu on Tibet. An issue as sensitive as Tibet policy
would be controlled by a small group of top leaders, limited
primarily to the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee
(PBSC), meaning it is difficult to know precisely the content
of leadership discussions on Tibet, longtime Embassy contact
xxxxx.
Nevertheless, "it is still quite clear," xxxxx argued, that Hu
Jintao is "completely" in charge of the Tibet issue, and no
other leader would "dare" confront Hu or the Party line over
such a critical issue. Doing so would be "political suicide"
and would make any leader vulnerable to charges of being
"soft," or even being a "traitor," risking eventual removal,
a la the ouster of former Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang
in 1987, xxxxx averred.
¶3. (C) There is "absolutely no division" within the
leadership on Tibet, xxxxx. For the
Chinese leadership, Tibet is even more sensitive than Taiwan.
Among the nine members of the PBSC who are controlling
China’s Tibet policy, no one has the stature or experience to
challenge Hu, xxxxx said, noting that four are brand new
members of the PBSC, and no one on the PBSC other than Hu has
direct experience in Tibet. It was Hu Jintao, as then-Party
Secretary in Tibet, who oversaw the "quick and effective
Sipdis
suppression" of protests there in 1987 and 1989, which earned
him "great praise" from then-paramount leader Deng Xiaoping
and which was an important factor in his elevation to the
PBSC in 1992, xxxxx recalled. Thus, Hu has "great confidence"
when it comes to Tibet, putting him in a virtually
unassailable position. There may be room within the
leadership for expressing differences with Hu on issues such
as Taiwan, economic development or political reform, but not
on Tibet, xxxxx asserted.
Different Views Exist in Party, but No Disagreement at Top
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶4. (C) A range of contacts have acknowledged that there are
differences of opinion within the Party and among elites
regarding Tibet, though none believed this reflected any
disagreement among the top leadership. For example,xxxxx acknowledged
the presence of
more "moderate" voices on Tibet within the Party, but he
nevertheless stressed that it is Hu Jintao who is
"completely" in charge of China’s Tibet policy. Moreover, it
Beijing 00001454 002 of 004
is clear that those such as Hu favoring a "hard line" are
calling the shots. (Note:xxxxx view
that Tibet policy is more sensitive for China’s leadership
than even Taiwan, noting that despite its rhetoric, Beijing
has de facto accepted the involvement of the United States in
Taiwan, but China can never accept the "interference" of
foreign powers in Tibet.)xxxxx,
confessed that he "personally" favors a more "measured"
approach to Tibet, to include dialogue with the Dalai Lama,
given that "only the Dalai Lama" can unify the majority of
the Tibetan community both within China and abroad.
¶5. (C) Separately, xxxxx "many elites" are advocating
a reassessment of policy toward the Dalai Lama, questioning
the wisdom of demonizing and refusing to negotiate with him.
According to xxxxx however, apart from a "minority" of
"elites" and "intellectuals," the majority of the Party
rank-and-file, as well as "98 percent" of the public, support
the current policy. Any serious disagreement over Tibet
among the Party leadership is "simply unimaginable," xxxxx
stated, a view separately shared xxxxx.
Public Statements: Difference in Nuance, not Substance
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶6. (C) While there may be differences in how various leaders
have publicly articulated China’s Tibet policy, there are no
substantive differences among the top leadership, contacts
asserted. For example, xxxxx said he
does not believe there is disagreement between President Hu
Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao over Tibet, as some have
speculated based on Wen’s purportedly more "moderate"
comments to UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown and his statement
to the media in Laos on March 30 regarding the Dalai Lama.
xxxx asserted that, on Tibet, Hu and Wen are like a
"restaurant sugar packet," black on one side and white on the
other, but still part of the same whole. In other words, Hu
and Wen merely emphasize different aspects of the same
policy. xxxxx said xxxxx"sensed" Wen may be
"slightly more moderate" on Tibet than some other leaders,
but he thought that represents Wen’s style and does not imply
a disagreement over official policy. xxxxx shared this view,
attributing the Prime Minister’s March 30 remarks to "Wen
simply being Wen" and appearing more "moderate and
reasonable" on almost every issue, even though his comments
represented no serious departure from the official line.
Southern Media Pieces Reflect No Division over Policy
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶7. (C) xxxxx did not think that two
recent articles in Party-controlled southern newspapers
signaled leadership debate or divisions, instead offering
that the articles perhaps reflected an adjustment in the
Party’s media strategy. Both articles appeared on April 3 in
Guangdong Provincial Party papers that have a reputation for
pushing the limits of Central Propaganda Department (CPD)
guidelines. The first, which appeared in a blog run by
Southern Metropolis (Nanfang Dushibao), was critical of the
Party’s restrictions on reporting in Tibet, arguing that
allowing foreign reporters to cover the story directly would
provide a more accurate picture of events. The second,
published in Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumou), argued that
most Tibetans are not separatists and do not support or
participate in the unrest or advocate violence, and that such
distinctions should be made when responding to the issue.
The article also called for talks with the Dalai Lama. (See
refs A-C.)
¶8. (C) xxxxx with whom
PolOffs met in the last week had not read or heard of either
article, which PolOffs interpreted as a sign that the pieces
are not terribly significant. xxxxx, explicitly made
this point, arguing that the article in the Southern
Metropolis did not represent anything other than the
"pro-Western slant" of the Southern Daily Media Group and
"liberal southern journalists." The piece would only be
significant if more "authoritative" media outlets had picked
it up. xxxxx, thought it represented a desire among some
elites for a review of Tibet policy but also noted that the
piece was criticized by many internally in the Party. xxxxx, saying
that
the articles merely reflected the "traditionally liberal"
stances of both newspapers, which are noted for "pushing the
envelope" ("da cabianqiu," literally "playing edge ball").
Beijing 00001454 003 of 004
It is too early to tell whether these pieces have crossed a
red line, xxxxx said, noting that both papers have often
gotten into trouble with propaganda officials in the past.
¶9. (C) Surprisingly, even the xxxxx had
not read either article that appeared in his group’s
newspapers. In response to PolOff’s summary of the pieces,
he strongly doubted they carried any political significance.
Perhaps, he said, they represent an adjustment in the Party’s
media strategy. The Southern Weekend editor-in-chief must
have had prior approval from Party authorities to publish the
piece, xxxxx surmised, otherwise the editor would have been
"dismissed immediately" for publishing such a sensitive
article on his own. With Hu Jintao himself in charge of the
media response to Tibet, xxxxx asked rhetorically, what
newspaper editor would dare challenge the official media
line, even implicitly? Therefore, the article’s import, xxxxx
claimed, is that it demonstrates the "slight loosening" of
Party propaganda guidance on Tibet coverage beginning in late
March, which purportedly allows for the "more nuanced"
reporting advocated in the Southern Weekend article itself.
¶10. (C) Similarly, xxxxx was not aware of the articles. After
listening to PolOff’s explanation of them, however, xxxxx
commented that the pieces likely represent the fact that
there is "room for diversity" under the Propaganda
Department’s latest guidance. (Note: Despite this supposed
"room" for more nuanced reporting on Tibet, xxxxx
said Tibet is "far too sensitive" and his magazine has
therefore decided "not to touch" the story for now.xxxxx,
reportedly have been "ordered" to produce cover stories on
Tibet under "very strict" guidelines from the Propaganda
Department.)
Party Buoyed by Nationalist Sentiment...
----------------------------------------
¶11. (C) Almost all of xxxxx the Party has been
buoyed by rising nationalist sentiment, fueled in part by
anger at the West over "biased" media reporting on Tibet and
Olympic-related protests.xxxxx all emphasized to
PolOff that Chinese "anger" over the West’s "bias" on Tibet
is real, widespread and will have long-term effects. xxxxx
them seemed themselves to be angry over Western
media reporting, refusing to recognize the irony that for
most Chinese, their only access to this "biased Western
reporting" is through the official PRC press agency Xinhua’s
characterization of it. xxxxx emphasized that virtually
"everyone" he knows is angry and believes that Western
reporting, together with calls for boycotting the Olympic
opening ceremony, implies support for Tibetan independence
and makes the public feel that the West is trying to "keep
China down." xxxxx, meanwhile, said
nationalism is definitely surging, but he thought this
sentiment is largely concentrated in the 25-35-year-old age
group among both Hans and Tibetans.
¶12. (C) Whatever the causes of the surge in nationalism, the
result has been a dramatic increase in support for the
Party’s policy on Tibet, contacts say. xxxxx said this outcome is
partly a "natural"
reaction to the fact that Chinese have in recent years become
more nationalistic as a result of growing pride over China’s
rapid development, with the Tibet furor merely providing the
most recent "spark" to inflame passions. xxxx separately acknowledged,
however, that the Party’s
propaganda line has also purposefully stoked nationalistic
feelings in order to rally the public in support of the
Center’s Tibet policy, and so far, it has been very
successful in doing so. The recent Tibet crisis has
"completely unified" the people behind the Party and
Government, something that had been "unthinkable" throughout
most of the 1980s and 1990s,xxxxx asserted.
...But Also Constrained by Popular Passions
-------------------------------------------
¶13. (C) Although support for the Party over Tibet is
currently quite high, popular passions also serve to
constrain the leadership’s options, xxxxx
warned. Nationalism remains one "pillar" of Party rule, but
central leaders do not want to let these feelings "spin out
of control," xxxxx said. Perhaps reflecting these concerns,
the Propaganda Department earlier this month reportedly
directed that attacks on the Western press in China’s
official media be curtailed, according xxxxx
Beijing 00001454 004 of 004
xxxxx. That has not, however, stopped Chinese bloggers
from continuing their attacks via the Internet, xxxxx
observed.xxxxx also expressed concern about the
long-term implications of the surge in nationalism, noting
that "nothing is ever completely good." At any rate, there
is "virtually no way" the Center could initiate a change in
policy toward Tibet and the Dalai Lama, at least in the short
term, given the popular anger over such issues, xxxxx said.
Policy Change Unlikely in the Short Term
----------------------------------------
¶14. (C) Major policy adjustment on Tibet is highly unlikely
for the foreseeable future for a host of reasons other than
popular sentiment, at least until after the Olympics,
contacts say. Given Hu’s own legacy in Tibet, where he
cracked down on similar demonstrations in 1987 and 1989, Hu
Jintao will likely be loath to adopt a "softer" line, lest
his own policies and past actions come under criticism,
xxxxx argued. Moreover, it will be
almost "impossible" for Chinese leaders to reorient policy if
they look like they are doing so under international
pressure, xxxxx assessed. Moreover,
xxxxx observed, domestic stability remains the
leadership’s top priority above all else, meaning there will
"almost surely" be no relaxation of the current hard line on
Tibet or in places like Xinjiang. xxxxx said he sensed
Chinese leaders worry they could lose control of Tibet if
they do not maintain tight control there, which would have
both domestic consequences and could invite "unwanted
interference" from India.
¶15. (C) While staging a successful Olympics is also a
priority, xxxxx said he senses the leadership has
assessed that at a minimum, athletes will show up to the
Games. As a result, the Center is starting to adjust public
expectations about the Games by saying that, even if there is
a "boycott" of the opening ceremony, that is not important,
given that it is the IOC and respective National Olympic
Committees, not the Chinese Government, hat decide whether
to invite national leaders. (Note: xxxxx disagreed,
saying that, in his view, the success of the Games for
Chinese leaders hinges on whether President Bush attends the
opening ceremonies.) xxxxx said
that Hu Jintao’s comments on April 12 to Australian PM Rudd
on the margins of the Bo’ao Forum, which were reported via
Xinhua and reflected China’s hard-line stance on Tibet to
date, signaled that domestically there is "no room for
debate" on the Tibet issue. Only after Tibetan areas have
"settled down" and the Olympics have concluded, will there be
any chance for a possible review of Tibet policy, he asserted.
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发表于 2011-4-12 12:21
