【08.10.23 美国传统基金会】继续抗击恐怖主义威胁

lcd6382

【08.10.23 】继续抗击恐怖主义威胁：继续抗击和面对未来的挑战
【原文标题】Protecting Against the Terrorist Threat: Continuing the Fight and Confronting the Challenges Ahead
【标题】继续抗击恐怖主义威胁：继续抗击和面对未来的挑战
【来源】http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/hl1100.cfm
【翻译】lcd6382
【原文/译文】

Protecting Against the Terrorist Threat: Continuing the Fight and Confronting the Challenges Ahead

On September 11th of this year, President Bush spoke at the dedication of the new 9/11 Memorial at the Pentagon, and he discussed our military war on terror since 2001. Today, I will focus my remarks on the non–military part of that war—in particular, on the agencies in the law enforcement, homeland security, and intelligence communities and how they have responded to the 9/11 attacks.

In describing our country's response to those attacks, I hark back 60 years or so to December 1941 and to the words that have been attributed to Admiral Yamamoto, the commander of the Japanese battle fleet, as he sailed back from the surprise attack against Pearl Harbor. While his sailors and officers were cele brating their success, the Admiral remained somber. He recognized that, by provoking a country of such size and power, Japan had actually just sealed its fate. And he reportedly rendered that prediction by saying that they had “awakened a sleeping giant."

As we all know, Admiral Yamamoto was right. Once awakened to the true threat of Japanese and Nazi tyranny, America summoned her resolve, mobi lized her resources, built a dominant military machine, and fought with grim determination until the Axis Powers surrendered.

Al–Qaeda's attacks on September 11, 2001, similar ly awakened our country to a totalitarian threat—this time to the threat of violent Islamic extremism. And it similarly stirred us to mobilize our will and our resources to build the capacity to defeat that threat.

We are seven years into that building process now, and under President Bush's leadership we have seen some concrete results:

• We and our foreign partners have disrupted a number of high–profile terrorist plots, including a plot to destroy the Library Tower in Los Angeles, an attempt to blow up British airliners over the Atlantic Ocean, and a planned attack on Ramstein Air Base and Frankfurt International Airport.
• We and our allies have removed dozens of senior terrorist leaders from the battlefield, including the architect of the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaida, and Abu Musab al–Zarqawi.
• We are seeing hopeful signs in Muslim commu nities around the world, with mainstream Mus lim voices speaking out against al–Qaeda and recent polling showing Muslims increasingly rejecting al–Qaeda's vision and its campaign of indiscriminate violence—attacking mosques, bombing girls' schools and wedding ceremo nies, and killing the innocent.
• We have succeeded in making it harder, cost lier, and riskier for terrorists to raise and move money around the world, which is complicat ing al–Qaeda's daily operations and hampering its global reach.
• And most importantly, we have prevented another attack on our homeland for more than seven years.

Nature of the Enemy

While we are making progress against the terror ists, this war on terror is far from over. This war is not like World War II or any of this nation's previous wars; it will not end at some defined time with the passing of a sword or the signing of surrender on the deck of battleship.

This war is different because al–Qaeda is differ ent. Al–Qaeda is not like a nation–state whose power is defined by its armies, its land, or its industry— tangible national assets that are subject to destruc tion or capture by traditional military conquest. Al–Qaeda's power is much more diffuse, much less tan gible, and therefore much more difficult to destroy.

Their power is in their message of hate and the alluring but false narrative that they are the defend ers of a religion under assault from the West—a message that resonates among some of the desper ate and misguided throughout the world.

It is in their clever use of modern communica tions, with which they spread that message of hate and mobilize the operations that turn that message into violence.

It is in the financial support systems through which they receive funding from extremist support ers and corrupted charities.

It is in their network of cells and trained person nel that gives them a presence and an operational footprint throughout the world.

It is in their demonstrated ability to take advan tage of weakly governed areas of the world to estab lish safe havens and operational bases—just as they did in the 1990s in Afghanistan; as they have done over the past few years in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan; and as they are now try ing to do in Yemen and the Horn of Africa.

It is in their strategic affiliation with regional terrorist groups such as al–Qaeda in Iraq, al–Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and potentially others— a strategy that expands the group's reach into dif ferent regions of the world and helps to ensure their survival.

And finally, I would submit that the power of al–Qaeda lies largely in their patience. Al–Qaeda and its affiliated networks are not fighting for short–term political gains. They are prosecuting a long–term war to eradicate values such as freedom of religion and freedom of speech. They want to remove Western influence and institutions from the Muslim world and re–establish a totalitarian seventh–century caliphate from Spain to Indonesia. And they plan to carry out this war over the course of generations and centuries. For that reason, they can be patient, methodical, and brutally precise in their operations, and that makes them all the more dangerous.

For all these reasons, we long ago recognized that al–Qaeda would not be defeated overnight. We also recognized that this war would require build ing a new counterterrorism apparatus with new approaches and relationships, new authorities and tools, and a new organizational structure—in short, a fundamental transformation of the government's counterterrorism architecture. The 9/11 attacks, and the horrific impact they had on our entire coun try, produced a clear mandate for the government to undertake this transformation and to build a whole new operational paradigm. That building effort started while the fires were still burning on Septem ber 11th, and it continues to this day.

The Counterterrorism Transformation

We are seven years into that effort now, and great progress has been made. As we prepare for transi tion here in Washington, I would like to take a few moments to step back, take stock of these changes, and assess how they will equip the next President to carry on the fight.

1. Strategy of Prevention

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, a first order of business was to articulate the strategy that would guide this transformation. It was clear once the tow ers were attacked that we were at war and that our paradigm had to change.

The President established the core principles to ensure that we were preventing further attacks on the homeland. Faced with fanatics who were willing to die for their perverted cause, we could no longer rely on the traditional enforcement paradigm of deterring terrorism largely through prosecution and punishment after an attack. Instead, we had to focus all our national assets and international relation ships to detect and neutralize threats abroad before they matured into terrorist attacks at home. The President also called on all countries to counter the hateful ideology of our enemy with a message of tol erance and liberty, and he declared that those who harbored or supported terrorists would be treated as enemies. The President's message was clear: We were facing a new type of enemy that required a new type of counterterrorism.

2. Transformation of the Counterterrorism  Architecture

In pursuit of that mission, we have overhauled our nation's counterterrorism architecture to a point that it is virtually unrecognizable from that which governed our operations for decades prior to 9/11.

a) New Organizations and Agencies

First, we have stood up a number of new de partments and agencies, each representing a new or enhanced counterterrorism capability. These include:

• The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which integrated 22 agencies that have a role in the protection and defense of our homeland and our people.
• The position of the Director of National Intelligence, who is responsible for leading a more closely integrated intelligence commu nity and ensuring that the President has the most timely and accurate intelligence.
• The National Counter Terrorism Center, which serves as the government's primary agency for integrating and analyzing intelligence on terrorism, and also conducts strategic planning to better integrate our counterter rorism efforts.
• The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), which was established in DHS to coordinate our nuclear detection architec ture, and is part of a broader mosaic of orga nizations and programs across government designed to build a layered defense to pre vent al–Qaeda and like–minded terrorists from acquiring, developing, or deploying weapons of mass destruction.
• NORTHCOM (Northern Command), which was established as a new Combatant Com mand to focus military resources on the homeland defense mission.
• The Homeland Security Council at the White House, which was created to coordi nate the homeland security policy function.
• The Terrorist Screening Center, which is the joint FBI/DHS entity that consolidates the various terrorist watch lists and provides 24–hour information and guidance to police officers, consular officials, and other govern ment personnel for use when they encounter potential terrorist suspects.
• The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelli gence, which is a new division in the Trea sury Department that spearheads the effort to deny terrorists the financing they need to run their operations.
• These new entities, along with the numerous other counterterrorism offices and agencies that have been established since 2001, have gone a long way toward institutionalizing our critical counterterrorism functions.

b) Improved Capacities in Existing Agencies

In addition to establishing new counterterror ism institutions, we have worked hard to strengthen existing ones.

• The Federal Bureau of Investigation has undergone a fundamental overhaul and re–orientation of its operations. In addition to investigating and prosecuting terrorists after the fact—as it has historically done quite well—the FBI is developing into a true national security organization that uses its investigative and intelligence assets to detect and disrupt terrorist plots before they hap pen. The FBI has vastly improved its preven tive capacity with establishment of a National Security Branch; development of an intelligence process that has greatly increased its capabilities to collect, analyze, and report intelligence; and its implementa tion of recruitment criteria, training pro grams, and career tracks that are designed to build a strong intelligence–focused work force. While Director Robert Mueller and the FBI are the first to say there is more work to be done, the Bureau has clearly made signifi cant strides toward its goal of building a fully matured intelligence capacity.
• The Central Intelligence Agency has restored operational and analytical cadres and capa bilities that were depleted after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and has effectively pri oritized the mission of collecting intelligence on the plans and intentions of al–Qaeda and other global terror organizations.
• Even the U.S. Attorneys' Offices—which is where I spent much of my career—have re–oriented their outlook and their operations to support the prevention strategy. Each office has specially trained national security prosecutors, and they now recognize that prosecution is no longer the be–all and end–all of any investigation, but is rather simply one tool among many tools that can be deployed in the effort to neutralize terrorist threats.

c) New Authorities and Investigative Tools

We have also worked with Congress to devel op new statutory and regulatory authorities that give our operators the tools and capabilities they need to investigate and neutralize terrorists. There are a number of new authorities, including:

• First and foremost, the Patriot Act, which was passed only six weeks after 9/11 and reauthorized in 2006. That statute provided a number of critical investigative tools and it lowered—once and for all—the legal “wall" that had prevented our intelligence and law enforcement personnel from sharing infor mation and coordinating operations against terrorist suspects.
• The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, which allows us to monitor communi cations between terrorist suspects overseas and here at home. We are very grateful to Congress for revising the FISA statute earlier this year and bringing it into line with mod ern communication technologies and with the threat we face from terrorists who make use of those technologies.
• Executive Order 12333, which was first issued by President Reagan, spells out the priorities and the lanes in the road for the intelligence agencies. This summer, Presi dent Bush amended that order to reflect the new responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence and to emphasize the priority of prevention through integrated and collaborative intelligence work.
• Finally, there are the new Attorney General Guidelines that are scheduled to be issued in the near future. These guidelines will harmo nize and consolidate the internal rules for the FBI's intelligence and criminal investiga tions, and they will clearly articulate both the investigative authorities and the civil lib erties limitations that govern the FBI's intelli gence operations.
• These guidelines are an important step in the evolution of the FBI. To date, FBI agents have had to learn and operate under a complicated set of five different guidelines that provided different rules for intelligence investigations and for criminal investigations. This was a leg acy of the wall that had cleaved the FBI in two between intelligence and criminal operations.
• I applaud the FBI and the Department of Jus tice for their ongoing efforts to merge the two sides of the Bureau and for getting these guidelines done. With these guidelines in place, the FBI will be much better positioned to maximize its operational advantage as a counterterrorism agency that can bring to bear both intelligence authorities and tradi tional law enforcement tools in the effort to investigate and disrupt terrorist plots.   

d)Improved Integration Among all Counter terrorism Partners

In addition to working on the institutions and the authorities, we have also taken important steps to integrate our efforts across the federal government and beyond. As we all know, terror ism prevention requires the full participation of everybody in the national security apparatus— from the cop on the streets to the FBI analyst at Headquarters to the CIA officer overseas. We have pushed hard to foster coordination among all these players, and we can see it taking hold across the spectrum of counterterrorism activities.

We see it in the coordination we now have between our intelligence and law enforcement professionals:

• For example, in the way that the FBI, the CIA and the other intelligence agencies now work threat investigations jointly, fusing information collected overseas with that col lected in the United States.
• In the fact that the CIA and the FBI—which had previously limited the flow of informa tion to each other for legal, operational, and cultural reasons—are now sharing threat information on a real–time basis through daily threat briefings, more extensive co–location of personnel, and joint participation in the NCTC and other fusion centers.
• In the way that the FBI and federal prosecu tors are now sharing with the Intelligence Community that gold mine of intelligence that resides in their criminal investigations and criminal case files—information that had historically been utilized primarily for evidence in criminal prosecutions and underutilized as intelligence about the plans and capabilities of our enemies.

We also see this integrated approach in our partnership with the roughly 700,000 state and local police officers, who are our eyes and ears on the street. By tripling the number of the Joint Terrorist Task Forces—which are the FBI's feder al–state operational task forces around the coun try—and establishing 66 fusion centers in 48 states, we have gone a long way toward integrat ing our state and local partners into the national security effort.

We see this integration in our enhanced coor dination with our international partners. This international coordination includes taking new approaches like the Proliferation Security Initia tive and its cooperative effort among 90 or so countries to mount a global program to interdict the shipment of weapons of mass destruction. It involves using existing mechanisms like the U.N. Security Council and the Financial Action Task Force to focus attention on shared responsibili ties to address terrorism. Finally, it involves enhancing the mechanisms for regular opera tional coordination with our international part ners, as reflected by the increase in the number of FBI Legal Attaché offices in foreign countries.

This enhanced coordination is helping to gen erate strong counterterrorism efforts around the globe. In addition to the stalwart support and cooperation of our traditional counterterrorism allies, we have seen a number of other foreign partners step up their efforts against terrorism over the past few years—including the Saudis, who have developed a comprehensive and effec tive counterterrorism program; the Filipinos, who have waged an aggressive campaign against terrorists in the southern part of the archipelago; and the Indonesians, who have brought to justice more than 100 members of Jemaah Islamiya and other groups since the Bali bombings in 2002.

Finally, we see this integration in our growing partnership with the private sector—a partner ship that is best exemplified by the important and patriotic role that a number of companies in the communications sector have played in the government's effort to monitor terrorist commu nications over the past seven years.

The importance of this integrated approach cannot be overstated. In fact, I can actually speak personally to this integration—and particularly to the integration of law enforcement and intelli gence operations—from my experience in my previous position as the first Assistant Attorney General at the newly formed National Security Division in the Department of Justice. Congress established this new division to take advantage of the Patriot Act provision that lowered the wall that had kept criminal terrorism investigations completely separate from intelligence counter terrorism operations. This division institutional ized the end of the wall by consolidating the criminal attorneys who prosecute terrorists with the intelligence attorneys who help the Intelli gence Community get the authority to surveil and collect intelligence about terrorists.

That consolidation means that we can now take a coordinated and comprehensive approach to every investigation and every terrorist suspect. It means that every morning, I was able to sit down with my chief prosecuting attorney and my chief intelligence attorney and we could look at each terrorist suspect from every angle—as a focus of surveillance so that we can collect intel ligence about him and his plans and confeder ates, but also as a potential criminal defendant who could be arrested and prosecuted. This allows us to pursue intelligence collection against a target while at the same time building the criminal case that we may well need in the event we learn he is getting ready to strike and we need an arrest warrant to take him off the street. This is the kind of real–time coordination that allows us to be quick, agile, and effective in our threat investigations, and it is exactly what we need if we are going to prevail in today's war against terrorism.

I have watched this integrated approach play out in any number of threat investigations over the past few years. It gives me no small satisfaction and pride to see agencies buck the turf–conscious, territorial stereotype and work as a team for the common goal of countering the terrorist threat.

It is also worth noting that, while this coordi nation is most evident in the investigative and threat disruption stages of our prevention effort—which is the primary focus of my remarks here today—it has also extended into the defensive, homeland–protection side of our operations. The best illustration of this is the suc cessful disruption of al–Qaeda's plot to blow up transatlantic flights with liquid explosives in August of 2006. After we obtained the intelli gence about the liquid explosives plot, it was shared among our agencies and our British and Pakistani counterparts, who then used it to orchestrate the plot disruption. At the same time, that intelligence was also channeled to the Trans portation Security Administration, which used it to devise new security measures to thwart the use of liquid explosives. Once the plot was disrupt ed, TSA was then prepared to act immediately— to educate and sensitize the public, to work with the airlines and the airports, and to implement those measures literally overnight. All in all, this was an exceptional example of preventive action across the spectrum of government operations, and one that simply would not have been possi ble a few years ago.

e)Protection of Civil Liberties

In discussing this transformation, it is worth noting that the innovations and reforms I have just described have all been subject to a fairly intense national debate about the civil liberties implications of their implementation. This debate has been healthy, and it has helped to ensure that the reforms were designed with ample civil liber ties safeguards—from the privacy protections built into the Patriot Act and the updated FISA statute, to the limitations imposed on govern ment officials and agencies by the Attorney Gen eral Guidelines and Executive Order 12333, and to the new privacy watchdog entities like the evolving Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board and the new FBI Oversight Office at the Department of Justice. We welcome such mea sures, as we recognize that meaningful safeguards and oversight are critical to the continuing legiti macy of our counterterrorism efforts.

The Upcoming Transition

So that completes my overview of the counter terrorism changes we have implemented under the President's strong leadership over the past seven years. These changes have been comprehensive and deep, and they have established a firm foundation for our ongoing counterterrorism efforts, one that is strong and lasting but also flexible enough to allow our successors to adapt and meet the constantly changing terrorist threat.

While I am very proud—and America can be proud—of the effort that led to these changes, we all recognize that there is more work to be done. I also recognize that we are approaching a time of transi tion, which carries with it an additional responsi bility: the responsibility to make sure that the functions of government, and particularly those relating to our national security, are passed along to the next Administration with a minimum of opera tional disruption.

As the 9/11 Commission concluded, it is critical that all parties focus on an orderly and expeditious transition: that the new Administration plan ahead to ensure that candidates for critical positions are quickly identified and up to speed; that the Senate quickly proceed through the confirmation process for the national security positions; and that we, the outgoing Administration, make sure that our suc cessors have a clear–eyed view of the terrorist threat and a comprehensive understanding of our capacity to meet that threat. As part of that understanding, it is important that they appreciate the thinking that went into the counterterrorism infrastructure that has been established over the past seven years, so that they can continue the process of building and strengthening our defenses against the terrorist threat. It is my hope that these remarks will, in some small way, assist in that transition process.

I can assure you that, from now through the bal ance of the transition, my colleagues and I will do everything we can to ensure that our successors are fully equipped to accept the responsibility of pro tecting our country and our citizens when they walk into the halls of government on January 20, 2009. It is a responsibility that I have been honored to share these past seven years, and one that I know our successors—whoever they are—will shoulder with pride and with honor.

继续抗击恐怖主义威胁：继续抗击和面对未来的挑战

2008年10月2日

今年9月11日，总统布什在五角大楼新建的9 / 11纪念馆讲话，他讨论了自2001年以来我军在反恐战争中的贡献。今天，我特别的将我的观点放在非武装非军事方面，特别是对执法机构，国土安全和情报以及他们如何应对9 / 11恐怖袭击。
在介绍我国应对这些攻击，我回到60年前也就是1941年12月，与日本海军的指挥官的对话，因为他反对袭击珍珠港。虽然他的水兵和军官庆祝他们的成功，但是他觉得不是这样。他承认，挑战一个实力强大的国家，日本实际上已是在改变未知的命运。他曾经作出这一预测说，偷袭珍珠港已经在“唤醒一个沉睡的巨人”。
我们都知道，海军指挥官说对了。一旦意识到真正的威胁，日本和纳粹的暴政，美国鼓起了她的决心，动员了她所有的资源，建立了一个主导的军事机器并斗争的决心，直到轴心国投降。
基地组织2001年9月11日的袭击，同样唤起我们的国家收到的极权主义的威胁，这一次的威胁来自暴力的伊斯兰极端主义。它同样激起我们动员我们的意志和我们的资源建设能力，以战胜这一威胁。
7年来，在布什总统的领导下，我们看到了一些具体成果：
我们和我们的合作伙伴，瓦解了一些恐怖袭击的阴谋，包括破坏了洛杉矶图书馆大楼的阴谋，破坏了企图在大西洋上空炸毁英国客机的阴谋，破坏了攻击拉姆斯坦空军基地和法兰克福国际机场的阴谋。
我们和我们的盟友已消灭了几十名恐怖主义的高级领导人，包括9 / 11恐怖袭击的策划者哈立德谢赫穆罕默德，阿布Zubaida ，以及扎卡维。
我们看到了穆斯林世界的希望，主流穆斯林团体对基地组织的反对，投票显示越来越多的穆斯林拒绝基地组织和反对基地组织不分青红皂白暴力袭击清真寺，爆炸学校和婚礼，并杀害无辜的人。
我们已经成功地使恐怖分子在世界各地筹集和转移资金变得更难更复杂，并使基地组织的日常运作更麻烦，并妨碍其全球范围的活动联系。
最重要的是，我们必须防止再次发生恐怖袭击事件。
敌人的本质
虽然我们在打击恐怖分子的战场上取得了进展，但是打赢这场反恐战争还未结束。这场战争不是二战或任何国家以往的战争，这场战争没有确定的结束的时间。
这场战争是不同的，因为基地组织是不同于其他的组织。基地组织不像其他国家一样，他的权力不是由军队，土地，或其行业有形的国家资产，基地组织的力量更加分散，更具体，因此更难以摧毁。
他们的力量是仇恨和诱人的，但错误的叙述描述他们成为宗教的捍卫者，他们是捍卫宗教而受到攻击从而误导整个世界。他们利用现代通信，使他们传播这一信息，并把消息成暴力。 他们有强大财政支持，他们从极端主义支持者和腐败的慈善机构获得财产。 他们的网络和训练有素的人员，使他们的存在和业务遍及全球。
正是在他们的表现能力，充分利用军事能力较弱的国家建立安全避难所和业务基地，就像他们在上世纪90年代在阿富汗的作为一样，过去几年在阿富汗和巴基斯坦边境地区也是这样做的;他们现在正在也门和非洲发展也是这样的思路。 他们的战略关系拉拢区域的恐怖组织，如伊拉克的基地组织，伊斯兰的基地组织，和其他有潜力的组织，使他们的力量渗透到各个国家以帮助他们生存。
最后，我想提出的是基地组织主要在于他们的耐心。基地组织和与其有联系的网络不为短期的政治利益。他们要的是一个长期的战争，消除价值观，如宗教自由和言论自由。他们想消除西方的影响，消除来自穆斯林世界的观念，他们想重新建立一个极权主义的第七世纪的政权，从西班牙到印度尼西亚遍及世界。他们计划进行这场战争历经几代人甚至几世纪。由于这个原因，他们能保持耐心，有条理的，准确的和残酷的，这使得它们更加危险。
出于所有这些原因，我们早就认识到，基地组织将不会在一夜之间被打败的。我们也认识到，这场战争将需要建立新的反恐机制与新的办法和关系，总之，从根本上转变政府的反恐架构。 9 / 11恐怖袭击和恐怖袭击的影响，他们为我们整个国家，制作了一个明确的任务，为政府进行这种转变，并建立一个全新的业务模式。这种工作从9月11日开始并一直持续到今天。
反恐的转变
我们历经七年到现在一直在努力，并取得了很大进展。我们准备过渡，我要抽出时间审视这些变化，并策划下届总统将如何进行反恐斗争。
1 预防策略
在9 / 11恐怖袭击之后，我们需要一个清晰的战略思路来引导这一转变。很显然，一旦遭到攻击我们将处于战争状态，我们的模式已经改变。总统建立的核心原则，以确保我们能够防止恐怖组织袭击我们的家园。没有人会为了变态的事业去死，我们可以不再依靠传统的模式去威慑恐怖主义。相反，我们必须集中我们所有的国家资产和国际关系，在恐怖组织成熟之前吧他们消灭在萌芽阶段。总统还呼吁所有国家来对付可恶的意识形态与我们的敌人的信息宽容和自由，他宣布，谁支持恐怖分子将被视为敌人。总统的信息是明确的：我们正面临着一种新的敌人，需要一种新型的反恐意识。
2 改造反恐体系
为了实现这一使命，我们必须全面检查我们国家的反恐架构。
a ）新的组织和机构
首先，我们已经建立起来了一些新的部门和机构，每个代表一个新的反恐力量。这些措施包括：
美国国土安全部（国土安全部） ，其中集成的22个机构已经发挥作用，保护和捍卫我们的祖国和人民。
国家情报局局长，负责更紧密地情报，并确保总统拥有最及时和准确的情报。
国家反恐怖主义中心，作为政府的首要机构的整合和分析有关恐怖主义的情报，并进行了战略规划，以更好地整合我们的反恐努力。
国内核探测办公室（ DNDO ） ，成立于美国国土安全部协调我们的核探测架构，是一个更广泛的组织和整个政府计划旨在建立多层次防御，以防止基地组织和志同道合的恐怖分子获取，开发，或部署大规模杀伤性武器。
北方司令部（北方司令部） ，这是建立一个新的战斗司令部，以集中军事资源的本土防御任务。
白宫的美国国土安全委员会，这是建立协调的国土安全政策。
恐怖筛选中心，这是联合美国联邦调查局/美国国土安全部实体，巩固了各种恐怖分子名单，并提供24小时的信息和指导，警官，领事官员和其他政府工作人员使用时，他们遇到潜在的恐怖嫌疑人。 该办公室的恐怖主义事务和金融情报，这是一个新的部门在财政部的带头努力，不让恐怖分子的融资，他们需要运行其业务。 这些新的实体，连同许多其他反恐部门和机构已经建立自2001年以来，已经很长的路要走，我们关键是反恐职能。
b ）提高现有机构的能力
除了建立新的反恐机构，我们要努力加强现有的机构的能力。
在联邦调查局经历了一个根本的改革和重新定位其业务。除了调查和起诉后，恐怖分子的事实，因为它在历史上做得相当不错，美国联邦调查局正在发展成为一个真正的国家安全组织，利用其调查和情报资产来检测和恐怖阴谋破坏之前发生。美国联邦调查局已大大改善其预防能力，建立一个国家安全处;发展的一个情报的进程，也大大增加其能力，以收集，分析和报告情报;及其执行情况的招募标准，培训项目和职业曲目旨在建立一个强大的智力为重点的队伍。虽然主任罗伯特米勒和美国联邦调查局是第一个说，有更多的工作要做，该局已明确作出了重大大步走向它的目标是建立一个完全成熟的情报能力。
在中央情报局已恢复业务和分析干部队伍和能力有枯竭后，苏联的解体，有力地列为优先事项的任务搜集情报的计划和意图，基地组织和其他全球性的恐怖组织。 连美国律师办公室，这是我花了许多时间我的职业生涯中，已重新导向他们的世界观和他们的行动，以支持预防战略。每个办事处有受过专门训练的国家安全检察官，他们现在认识到，检察机关已不再是将全部结束，所有的任何调查，而是简单的工具之一许多工具，可以将部署在努力消除恐怖威胁
c ）新的当局和调查工具
我们还与国会合作，制定新的法规来监管当局，使我们的运营商的工具和能力，他们需要调查和制止恐怖分子。有一些新的当局，其中包括：
首先，爱国者法案，这是在9 / 11六个星期后，并在2006年授权开展**。该章程规定了一些重要的调查手段和降至一次和所有的法律“墙”的阻碍了我们的情报人员和执法人员从信息交流和协调行动，打击恐怖主义嫌疑人。
外国情报监视法案，或FISA ，这使我们能够监测之间的通讯海外的恐怖主义嫌疑人，并在国内。我们非常感谢美国国会修改章程FISA今年早些时候，使之符合现代通信技术与我们所面临的威胁来自恐怖分子谁使用这些技术。
行政命令，第一次发表的是里根总统，阐述了优先事项和车道的公路的情报机构。今年夏天，美国总统布什修正的以反映新的责任的国家情报局局长，并强调预防优先通过综合和
协作的情报工作。
最后，还有一些新的总检察长的指导方针将在不久的将来实行。这些准则将统一和巩固内部规则的美国联邦调查局的情报和刑事调查，他们将清楚地阐明了调查当局和公民自由的限制，制约美国联邦调查局的情报行动。 这些指导方针的一个重要步骤演变的联邦调查局。迄今为止，美国联邦调查局不得不学习和下运作一个复杂的一套五种不同的指导方针，提供了不同的规则，情报调查，并进行刑事调查。这是一个遗留下来的墙裂了美国联邦调查局在两个之间的情报和犯罪活动。
我赞扬美国联邦调查局和司法部的不断努力，以合并双方主席团和获取这些准则去做。这些准则的地方，美国联邦调查局将更好地定位于最大限度地发挥其业务优势作为一个反恐机构，可以承担这两个情报部门和传统的执法工具的努力，调查和破坏恐怖袭击阴谋。
d ）提高集成所有的反恐伙伴
除了工作的机构和有关当局，我们还采取了重要步骤，把我们的努力，联邦政府和超越。我们都知道，预防恐怖主义需要充分参与的每个人都在国家安全机构，由警察在街头向联邦调查局总部分析师的中央情报局官员海外。我们已经把艰苦，以促进之间的协调，所有这些球员，我们可以看到它正在举行的各种反恐活动。 我们看到它在协调我们现在已经有了我们之间的情报和执法专业人员：
例如，在道路，联邦调查局，中央情报局和其他情报机构现在调查工作的威胁，共同融合在海外收集的资料收集与在美国。 在一个事实，即美国中央情报局和联邦调查局，原先有限的信息流通彼此法律，业务和文化方面的原因，现在的威胁共享信息实时通过每日简报的威胁，更广泛的合作位置的人员，并共同参与反恐中心和其他融合中心。联邦调查局和联邦检察官正在分享情报界的黄金矿山的情报，在其居住的刑事调查和刑事案件的档案，资料，历史上一直使用的证据主要是在刑事诉讼和情报不足有关计划和能力，我们的敌人。我们也看到这种做法在我们的合作伙伴关系的大约70.0万州和地方警察，谁是我们的眼睛和耳朵在街头。到三倍的联合反恐特遣部队，这是美国联邦调查局的联邦国家的业务工作队，在全国各地，并建立66个融合中心的48个州，我们已经很长的路要走整合我们对国家和地方的合作伙伴纳入国家安全的努力。 我们认为，这在我们的一体化加强协调与我们的国际伙伴。这种国际协调包括采取新的办法一样扩散安全倡议和其之间的合作努力，使90个国家或装入一个全球性计划，拦截运送大规模杀伤性武器。它涉及利用现有机制，如联合国安理会和金融行动特别工作组将注意力集中于共同的责任，以对付恐怖主义。最后，它涉及到加强经常性机制，业务协调与我们的国际伙伴，这反映了在国外有越来越多的美国联邦调查局办事处的法律随员。
这是加强协调帮助产生很强的反恐努力，遍布世界各地。除了坚定的支持与合作，我们传统的反恐盟友，我们已经看到了一些其他外国合作伙伴加紧打击恐怖主义的努力在过去几年里，包括沙特，谁制定了一项全面和有效的反恐计划;的菲律宾人，谁也进行了积极打击恐怖分子在南部的一部分，该群岛和印尼人，谁也绳之以法100多个成员的伊斯兰祈祷团和其他团体，因为2002年的巴厘岛爆炸案。
最后，我们看到这个一体化的不断增加与私营部门合作，建立伙伴关系是最好的例子是重要的和爱国的作用，一些公司在通讯业中发挥政府的努力，在过去七年里监测恐怖通讯。
这一点的重要性综合办法怎么强调也不过分。事实上，我能亲自讲这种一体化，特别是一体化的执法和情报行动，从我的经验，我在以前的立场作为第一助理总检察长在新成立的国家安全司在律政司的代表。美国国会设立这一新部门，充分利用爱国者法案规定，降低了墙，一直恐怖主义犯罪的调查完全分开的情报反恐行动。这种分工制度化结束在墙上的巩固律师刑事起诉恐怖分子谁与谁的情报律师帮助社区获得情报的权力收集情报的恐怖分子。
这意味着，巩固我们现在可以采取协调的和全面的方法对每个调查和每一个恐怖嫌疑人。这意味着，每天早上，我能够坐下来与我的首席检察官和我的首席情报律师和我们可以在每一个恐怖嫌疑人从各个角度，作为重点监控，以使我们能够搜集情报对他和他的计划 ，而且还作为一个潜在的刑事被告谁是逮捕和起诉。这使我们能够继续对情报收集的目标，同时建设的刑事案件，我们很可能需要在事件我们学习，他正准备进行罢工，我们需要逮捕令，把他从街头。这是一种实时协调，使我们能够快速，灵活，有效的威胁在我们的调查，正是我们需要的东西如果我们要优先在今天的打击恐怖主义的战争。
我看着这一综合办法中发挥任何数目的威胁调查，在过去几年中。它给了我不小的满意和自豪地看到机构降压的草坪意识，领土刻板印象，并作为一个团队工作的共同目标是打击恐怖主义的威胁。
还值得注意的是，尽管这种协调是最明显的调查和威胁破坏阶段的预防工作，这是首要重点发言今天，它也扩展到防御性的，国土保护方面的行动。最好的例子，这是成功的中断，基地组织的阴谋炸毁跨大西洋航班的液体炸药在2006年8月。在我们获得的情报的液体炸药的阴谋，这是我们的共同机构和我们的英国和巴基斯坦对口，谁然后用它来策划的阴谋破坏。与此同时，这一情报还输送到美国运输安全管理局，它用它来设计新的保安措施，以阻止使用液体炸药。一旦阴谋破坏，交通安全管理局，然后准备立即采取行动，教育和公众宣传，同航空公司和机场，以及执行这些措施在一夜之间。总之，这是一个特殊的例子预防性行动的各种政府业务。

e ）保护公民自由
在讨论这一转变，值得指出的是，创新和改革，我刚才所描述的都受到了相当激烈的全国辩论，对公民自由的影响及其执行情况。本次辩论一直健康，而且有助于确保改革的目的有充分的公民自由保障的隐私权的保护纳入爱国者法案和更新FISA法规，以限制政府官员和机构的检察长一般准则和行政命令，并在新的隐私一样监督实体不断变化的隐私和公民自由监督委员会和新的联邦调查局监督办公室在律政司的代表。我们欢迎这样的措施，因为我们认识到有意义的保障和监督是关键，持续的合法性是我们反恐的努力方向。
即将转型
因此，我概述了反恐的变化，我们在过去七年里执行总统的强有力的领导。这些变化已经全面和深刻，他们已经建立了坚实的基础，我们正在进行的反恐努力，一个强大和持久，而且具有足够的灵活性，以使我们的接班人以适应和满足不断变化的恐怖威胁。 虽然我感到非常自豪和美国可以引为自豪的努力，导致这些变化，我们都承认，有更多工作要做。我也承认，我们正在接近一个过渡时期，它带有一个额外的责任，以确保政府职能，特别是那些与我们的国家安全。
由于9 / 11委员会的结论，关键是各方关注的有序和迅速过渡：新政府提前计划，以确保人选的关键职位，迅速查明和行动速度，参议院尽快着手通过确认过程中的国家安全的立场，而我们，即将离任的行政，确保我们的继任者有一个明确的眼睛鉴于恐怖主义的威胁和全面的了解我们的能力，以应付这一威胁。但重要的是，他们欣赏的思想，走进了反恐的基础设施，在过去七年里建立的以使他们能够继续进行建设和加强我们的防御恐怖主义的威胁。我希望这些言论会，在一些小的方式，协助这一过渡的进程。
我可以向你保证，从现在起，我和我的同事将尽我们所能，以确保我们的继任者在2009年1月20日走进政府大厅的时候完全有能力保护我们的国家和我们的公民。这是一种责任，我非常荣幸能够分享这些过去七年来的反恐经验，我知道我们的继任者，不管是谁，将承担自豪与荣誉。