|
【福布斯】改革30年之后的中国（第四部分）
【原文标题】China After 30 Years of Reform（Four-Part Series）
【原文】
China After 30 Years Of Reform, IV
Gordon G. Chang, 12.19.08, 04:00 PM EST
Beijing's military might.
Mao Zedong exported revolution. Thirty years ago, his successor, Deng Xiaoping, reversed course. Where is Beijing's foreign policy headed now?
First, we need a little background. Deng, who presided over the initial stages of China's reform era, wanted his country to "bide time" and keep a low profile, at least until it could develop its economy and get stronger. His general policy was to "seek cooperation and avoid confrontation." Jiang Zemin, Deng's handpicked successor, adhered to this constructive approach even though he desired recognition for China's growing status. Jiang saw his nation working cooperatively with the U.S. and its partners in a Congress-of-Vienna-like atmosphere.
However, Hu Jintao, the current supremo, has shifted China in a new direction. Like Jiang, Hu believes the country should assert itself. Unlike his predecessor, he thinks China should take advantage of newfound strength and actively work to restructure the international system so that it will be more to Beijing's liking. This change of thinking has had consequences, occasionally taking China in adversarial directions.
This decade, for example, the Chinese have fired lasers to blind American satellites, actions that can be considered direct attacks on the U.S. In October 2006, a Chinese submarine for the first time surfaced in the middle of an American carrier group. This episode, which occurred in the Philippine Sea southeast of Okinawa, was an obvious warning to the U.S. Navy to stay away from Asian waters.
Then, in January 2007, the People's Liberation Army, in what was an unmistakable display of military power, destroyed one of China's old weather satellites with a ground-launched missile. During Hu's tenure there has been a noticeable increase in cyber
intrusions and attacks on defense and civilian networks in the U.S., Europe and Japan.
Why is Hu Jintao pushing his country down a path of high_profile force projection? There are two main reasons. First, there is the inevitable change in outlook when a nation goes from poor and weak to rich and strong. So it is natural that this rising power is thinking about how to exercise newfound strength. Although not everyone in Beijing believes the bloated claims aired in the West about China's future, most Chinese officials nonetheless feel they will profoundly change geopolitics in the coming years. In any event, more and more of them see this moment as the time for China to reassert itself.
The second reason for China's new assertiveness is political. Hu Jintao, an insecure leader, relies on the more hawkish elements in the Communist Party and in the People's Liberation Army to consolidate his political position in his ongoing struggles with the leaders of other factions inside the ruling group. Moreover, the PLA has appeared to gain political ground because the civilian leadership is increasingly dependent on its armed might to control a society transformed by 30 years of economic reform.
Hu Jintao's courting of senior generals has been especially evident since the middle of 2004. The price for Hu has been even larger: increases in military spending and promotions for favored flag officers, such as Gen. Chen Bingde, now chief of general staff. All of this has created a dynamic in which nationalistic officers and civilians have gained influence on certain issues, such as Taiwan and Japan.
Each year the Chinese pour about $85 billion to $125 billion into their armed forces, maybe more because the buildup is secret. Yet we do know, from what China's military officials write and say, that they are configuring their military to fight the U.S. There will soon be two navies with opposing missions, with the same force structure, with ships occupying the same seas. And the skies in the same corridors will be filled with both Chinese and American planes.
Of course, it is only natural for a large continental nation like China to want to possess a military with global reach. Therefore, one of the greatest challenges for Washington is to steer Chinese ambitions in cooperative directions. So far, America has attempted to do this with a set of so_called "engagement" policies. "Engagement" assumes that an authoritarian China can be integrated into a liberal international system, which it had no hand in creating, as what the U.S. State Department calls a "responsible stakeholder." In one sense, the U.S. and the West have no alternative but to engage Beijing, yet Washington's policies are often tolerant of behavior that it would not accept from any nation other than China.
For example, American administrations, both Republican and Democratic, have failed to speak out about Beijing's proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies to Pakistan, Iran, North Korea and undoubtedly other states, and Washington has adopted an amazingly indulgent approach to China's commercial and diplomatic support of the world's nuclear rogues. By continuing to assist China while ignoring deeply irresponsible behavior, the U.S. has unwittingly created perverse incentives for conduct that impedes, not advances, American goals and global stability.
Washington's generous but misguided policies could cause problems in the future. Beijing, knowing that it has gotten away with unacceptable conduct in the past, will naturally think it will be able to do so in the future. Chinese leaders, during a time of intense domestic turmoil-three decades of reform has made China unstable, after all_may be tempted to raise the flag of nationalism even higher as a means of keeping themselves in power, and that could mean acting belligerently toward neighbors such as Taiwan or Japan.The relationship between Washington and Beijing can be described as "interdependent," but that does not mean they are equal. Americans assume they need the Chinese more than they need us--a common theme of op-eds and sound bites these days--but the truth is the other way around. Even if China can sustain its spectacular rise--and there is considerable debate on this point--it is rising inside an American_led international system, and Washington needs to do a better job of persuading Beijing to accept its obligations as a member of that system.
改革30年之后的中国（第四部分）
Gordon G. Chang美国东部时间下午4：00
毛泽东输出革命；30年前，他的继承者邓小平逆转了这种进程。现在北京的外交方向是哪里呢？
首先我们先回顾一下邓小平——他掌管着中国改革初期的方向——想要他的国家“等待时机”，保持低姿态，至少到她发展经济并且变得更加强大时。他的基本的政策是“寻求合作，避免对抗”。邓小平挑选的继承人——江泽民，尽管期望中国不断增长的地位得到承认，但仍然继续这种政策。江看到他的国家和美国及其伙伴在一种维也纳式国会的气氛中合作。
但是，现在掌权的胡锦涛却把中国引向一个新的方向。像江那样，胡认为中国要维护自己。不像他的前任，胡认为中国应该利用自己新的力量和积极的努力来调整国际体系，这是北京更加乐意看到的。思维的改变已经产生了作用，偶尔中国会在对抗的方向采取行动。
例如过去的十年，中国使用激光武器致盲美国的卫星，这是一种可以看作是对美国的直接攻击。在2006年十月，中国一艘潜艇首次在美国航母战斗群附近上浮。这个插曲发生在冲绳岛东南的菲律宾海域，这是一个明显的警告：美国海军滚出亚洲水域！
然后是在2007年一月，中国人民解放军，作为一种展示军力的手段，用地空导弹摧毁了一枚在轨的中国气象卫星。在胡的任期期间，对美国、日本和欧洲的民用或军用网络系统的入侵和攻击明显增多了。
为什么胡锦涛高姿态地展现国家的军力？主要有两个原因。第一，一个国家从贫弱到富强的改变，必然会引起她观点的改变。所以，这个上升的大国在思考怎么使用自己的力量。尽管在北京不是每一个人都相信西方对中国未来的断言，但是官方人士依然认为在若干年后，他们将深刻改变地缘政治。在任何情况下，他们认为这是一个中国重新展示自我的时刻。
中国自信的第二个原因是政治。胡锦涛作为一个地位不太稳定的领导人，他必须借助共产党和解放军内部的鹰派力量，来巩固自己的政治地位。此外，中国人民解放军已经出现获得政治地位的迹象，因为文职领导越来越需要军队的武装来掌控经过30年经济改革的社会。
胡锦涛自2004年以来笼络将领就是一个明显的例子。胡锦涛的价码抬得很高：增加军费，提升军阶，比如陈炳德上将，现在是总参谋长。所有的这些使得民族主义军官和文职官员得到了在特定事件，比如台湾和日本问题的影响力。中国每年投入到她的武装力量的资金在850——1250亿美元之间，也许更多，因为投入是秘密的。然而我们知道，从中国军方所写、所说的来看，他们的军力是冲着美国来的。不久就会有两支海军舰队，担负着相反的任务，有一样的军力构成，都想用军舰占领同一片海域。天空中将会被中美两国的飞机填满。
当然，这只是一个中国这样的大陆上大国想要建立一个具有全球影响力的军事体系。所以，对华盛顿的挑战就是如何让中国的野心朝着合作的方向发展。到目前为止，美国试图以所谓的“接触”政策来实现这样的目标。“接触”是假想专制的中国可以完全融入到一个开放的国际体系中，这没有什么新的，就像美国国务院说的那样“一个负责任的利益相关者”。从某种意义上讲，美国和欧洲没有选择，只能和北京打交道，因此华盛顿的政策对中国的容忍度要比对其他国家大。
因此美国当局，民主党也好，共和党也罢，都没有大声疾呼中国向巴基斯坦、伊朗、朝鲜和其他国家的核扩散。并且华盛顿对中国向有核的混蛋国家提供外交和经济上的支持也采取放纵的态度。一边继续帮助中国，一边忽视中国极不负责的行为，美国建立了一个反常的奖励机制，不是促进，而是阻碍美国的目标和全球的稳定。
华盛顿的大方，但却不明智的政策会在将来带来麻烦。北京在过去得到了不可接受的行为，将会在未来变本加厉。中国领导人，经历一段国内混乱的时期——30年的改革使得中国变得不稳定了——也许会把民族主义推向一个更高的高度来维持他们的统治，那就意味着向她的邻居，比如台湾和日本开战。华盛顿和北京的关系可以描述为“相互依存”，但是这不意味着他们是平等的。美国认为自己更加需要中国，而不是我们这些编辑；但是，事实是相反的。即使中国能够继续她那壮观的增长——对于这一点是有争议的——这种增长是在美国领导的国际体系中完成的，华盛顿需要更加努力地说服中国履行自己在这个体系中的义务。
更多阅读：
【美国福布斯】《中国即将崩溃》一书作者看改革30年之后的中国(1)
【美国福布斯】《中国即将崩溃》一书作者看改革30年之后的中国(2)
【美国福布斯】《中国即将崩溃》一书作者看改革30年之后的中国(3)
|
狗仔卡
发表于 2008-12-21 15:28
提升卡
变色卡
抢沙发
千斤顶
显身卡
发表于 2008-12-21 15:51
