虽然中印边界还没有被确定下来，而实际控制线却划分的十分明显，双方都知道实际控制线在哪？这可以防止对印控领土的严重袭击。
But the problem is that Chinese incursions have been rather aggressive in recent times.
但问题是中国的袭击在最近一段时间内变得相当具有侵略性。
The incursions are happening in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border -- in Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand -- and appear to be aimed at extending Chinese territorial claims.
发生在HIMACHAL邦和Uttarakhand 的Ladakh,SINO-INDIAN边界发生的侵入时间，显示其目的在于扩张中国的领土要求。
Sporadic incursions in the western sector, the middle sector and the eastern sector have been going on for years, even as the Indian Government periodically protests.
在西段、中段和东段偶发的入侵事件已经持续了好几年，虽然印度政府周期性地抗议。
As of July this year, there has been a qualitative change in the type of Chinese violation of Indian Territory. Piling up of rocks well inside Indian territory and painting Chinese characters on them, the incursion of two Chinese helicopters into Indian airspace, the dropping of Chinese manufactured food cans, and a second reported violation of the Indian airspace by three Chinese F-7 fighter aircraft, all in the western sector, is something to be taken note of.
在今年的七月，中国在印度领土上的暴行有了性质上的转变。在印度领土上用石头堆成一堆，并在上面喷涂中文字，中国两架直升机侵入印度领空，空投中国制造的食品罐头，第二件对印度领空的入侵是三架F-7战机闯入了印度领空，值得注意的是这些入侵行为都发生在西段。
Reports in a section of the Indian media that Chinese troops fired on and injured two Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) soldiers appear uncorroborated and have been denied by both countries. The free Indian media, therefore, has to be more responsible.
截取一段印度媒体的报道说中国军队开火并击伤了2名印度-西藏边界警察（ITBP），该消息未被证实，且被双方否认。自由的印度媒体，显然更值得信赖。
A long held Chinese position, aired mainly through their official media and think tank experts, has been that “If India makes concessions in the western sector, China would consider making concessions in the eastern sector.”
长久以来中国的立场，主要是一些官方媒体和智库的专家，一直说：“如果印度在西线让步，中国就会考虑在东线做出让步。
This, naturally, has never been elaborated. The exchange maps of the two sectors between the two sides remains pending, preventing clarification on where the LAC actually starts and ends.
这，当然，没有正式的被宣布。双方的东西线的交换地图仍然是未定的，防止对LAC实际控制线的起点和终点的澄清。
The western sector has become increasing important to China in the context of its southwestern strategic thrust. It occupies 38000 square kilometers in the western sector known as Aksai Chin, but claimed by India. The trans-national Karakoram Highway from China into Pakistan also enters Pakistan through Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) which is claimed by India.
西段正因它是中国在其西南部的战略重点方向变得日益重要。它的3800平方公里的西段被成为市阿克赛钦，但印度声称有主权。从中国到巴基斯坦的跨国喀喇昆仑公路还通过了巴基斯坦所占领的克什米尔，印度也声称有主权。
In an agreement in 1963, Pakistan ceded over 5000 square kilometers of PoK territory to China in violation to Indian claims.
Aksai Chin also provides surface transport access to China through Tibet to Xinjiang, currently in the news for the Uighurs Muslim protest against Chinese occupation. This road is important from the point of facilitating movement of Chinese troops into Xinjiang and to the country’s borders with Central Asia.
在1963年的一份协议中，巴基斯坦暴力地割让了超过5000平方公里的巴基斯坦所占印度的领土给中国。阿克赛钦也提供了给中国贯穿西藏到新疆的地面公路，目前所发生的新疆维吾尔族人反抗中国占领。这条路对中国军队到新疆的调动起到重要作用，并解决中亚国家的边界问题。
There are two other very important reasons for China to seek to expand its territory in the western sector. One is to use the Karakoram Highway as an artery to cut short its access to the Persian Gulf through Pakistan.
还有两个非常重要的原因促使中国寻求扩张其在西线的领土，一个原因是使用喀喇昆仑公路作为通过巴基斯坦到达波斯湾的快捷通道。
China has already built a deep seaport at Gwadar in Pakistan and the Karakoram Highway is connected to it. It also plans to construct twin oil and gas pipelines from Gwadar to Western China. This is a great challenge and once achieved, will be an engineering feat similar to the building of the railway across hostile terrain in the Tibetan Plateau.
中国已经在巴基斯坦的GWADAR 瓜瓦达建立了深水港，喀喇昆仑公路正是通向它的。中国也计划从GWADAR深水港到中国西部建设石油和油气输送管道。这是一个伟大的挑战，一旦完成, 将是一个和青藏高原铁路一样的引擎一样的壮举。
There are two other objectives of strategic importance -- One is to push the Chinese border as far as possible into India and second is to bring the Chinese army as close to the Indian land route as possible, making Ladakh vulnerable by cutting its south eastern side from the rest of India. It is something like what Pakistan tried to do in Kargil in 1999 -- cutting off the land route to Kashmir.
还有两个目标具有重要战略意义，第一是推动中国边界尽快向印度深入，第二是尽快接近印度陆地交通线， 通过削弱LADAKH的东南段来使它变得更脆弱。这和巴基斯坦在1999年在KARGIL做的一样，切断了通向克什米尔的交通线。
China has started incursions along the border with Sikkim. The “Finger Point” area where Chinese troops are probing is of military importance to both sides, though it is within the borders of Sikkim and Tibet.
中国在锡金已经开始了入侵。在手指点区域，中国军队正在考察它对双方的军事重要性，虽然它是在西藏和锡金的边界内。
Although the Chinese have made a pretence of accepting Sikkim as part of Indian territory during Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003, they never actually did. Prime Minister Vajpayee and the Indian Government fell for the trick that if India fully recognized Tibet as a part of China, the latter would accord recognition to India’s sovereignty over Sikkim.
虽然中国在印度总理瓦杰帕伊2003年访华的时候承认了锡金是印度的领土，但他们从来没有用实际行动承认过。瓦杰帕伊总理和印度政府被中国人的把戏耍倒了，如果印度充分地承认西藏是中国领土，那么后者会相应地承认锡金是印度的领土作为交换。
India did sign on the Tibet issue, but China did not honour its end of the bargain on Sikkim. China gave an impression that there was no border dispute insofar as Sikkim is concerned. The Sikkim issue is a pressure tactic and has the potential of becoming a burning issue further. To open new pockets of contention is a dangerous move by Beijing.
印度在西藏问题上做了表示，但是中国不履行锡金问题谈判的决议。中国给印度一个印象是在锡金问题上没有领土争端。锡金问题只是一个施压手段，并且有潜力成为一个导火索。开始一个新争端，这是北京的一个危险举动。
In the eastern sector, China’s claim of 90,000 square kilometers of territory, that is the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh, can be used by it to keep boundary and territorial disputes with India alive, and take it into the international arena. This is what Beijing exactly did when trying to block an Asian Development Bank (ADB) loan to India for development work in Arunachal Pradesh.
在东线，中国有90，000平方公里的领土要求，那是整个的阿鲁纳洽尔邦，她可以用来保证和印度的领土和边界安全，并带到国际舞台上。这就是北京真正所做的
New Delhi has made it abundantly clear that Arunachal Pradesh is Indian Territory and non-negotiable. Small adjustments, however, can be made along the border without disturbing the settled population.
新德里已经清楚地表示阿鲁纳恰尔邦是印度不可分割的领土，没有商量的余地。
然而微小调整，也要再不干扰边界居民的情况下。
The 2005 India-China agreement on modalities to resolve the boundary issue has a clause that settled populations would not be disturbed. Although the agreement was jointly formulated, the Chinese are reneging on the clause.
2005年中印达成的解决边界问题的协议中有一个条款是不可干扰当地居民的。虽然协议是共同制定的，但中方违背了该条款。
The Chinese target is to get Tawang, which it sees as being of great strategic importance. One Chinese argument is that since the sixth Dalai Lama was born in Tawang and is dear to the sentiments of the Tibetans, Tawang must be incorporated in Tibet. This is a specious argument. Throughout history, the holy man has moved elsewhere from their birthplace and settled.
中国的目标是得到达旺，极具有战略重要性。中方的一个理由是，达赖喇嘛出生在达旺，达旺更亲近藏民，所以达旺必然是包含在西藏的。这是一个似是而非的理由，纵观历史，圣人都会从出生地搬到别的地方定居。
Tawang is situated at the tri-junction of India, Bhutan and Tibet. The occupation of Tawang by the Chinese will bring their forces not only on Bhutan’s eastern border, but on the shoulders of a strip of land known as Chicken Neck in Siliguri, which joins north-east India to the rest of the country.
达旺处于印度、不丹、西藏的三方交接之处。占领了达旺的中国不仅仅在不丹的东边国境上驻扎军队，也威胁到在西里古里被称为鸡脖子的地方，它是连接东北部印度和其余国土的咽喉。
In a time of war, this strip of land could be cut-off by Chinese troops in no time especially since the vulnerable corridor is downhill.
一旦发生战争，这个地带很快就会被中国军队切断，特别是因为这个脆弱的走廊是下坡的。
Overall, China seems to be pursuing a line to push and create an overwhelming military fortified border with India.
总体而言，中国似乎是在寻找一条能够完全在边境上压制印度的线。
It plans to extend the Tibet railway to the Indian border in the Eastern sector, at Xigatse, which will greatly help troop mobilization. One can imagine the Indo-Himalayan belt being pushed southward, according to Beijing ‘forward defence’ doctrine.
她计划延伸西藏铁路到印度边界的东段，到日喀则，这可以极大地增强军队的机动性。可以想象到，基于北京的“防御推进学说”印度-喜马拉雅带会被朝南推进。
While China has been fortifying its borders with India, the same cannot be said of India.
显然中国已经加强了对应印度的边界，但印度却没有。
The Indian side has built hardly any permanent structure. In some areas, Indian patrols do not go even up to the area of Indian claims, in some parts they go unarmed, and at some other portions there are only civilian patrols. This reportedly is a government decision not to provoke the Chinese. The Indians have shown a weakness, which the Chinese have been quick to grab.
印度基本在那没有任何常驻机构（永久工事）。在一些区域，印度巡逻甚至不去印度有领土要求的区域， 在一些地方，巡逻队甚至没有武装，某些巡逻队只是使用平民。据说这是印度政府的决定，不要激怒中国。印度表现的软弱已经被中国迅速抓住了。
As to the question of a Chinese attack being imminent or by 2012, the answer at the moment is no. There is, however, a possibility that a spark in one place could light up the entire length of the border.
对于中国的袭击问题或许会在2012年变得迫在眉睫，在当下这个问题的答案是否定的。但仍然有可能，一个地方的擦枪走火会导致整个边境线的交战。
Despite India’s vacillations over the fortifying of its borders, the situation is not similar to what prevailed in 1962. Unlike in 1962, the Indian Air Force will now also join the action if Chinese troops move into Indian Territory. The Chinese Air Force is not yet ready for a combat along the borders, though there are reports that they are moving medium or intermediate range missiles into Tibet.
尽管印度在加强边界的问题上摇摆不定，但现在已经和1962年动摇占了上风的情况大不相同了。不像1962年，如果中国军队进入印度领土，印度空军现在可以加入到反击的行动当中了。中国空军还没有对在整条边境线上的战斗作好准备，虽然据报道他们正在西藏部署中程导弹。
Having said that, nothing in military preparedness can be left to chance. If Indian strategists think that the 60 billion dollars bilateral trade with China is an insurance against a Chinese surge along the borders, they are mistaken.
话虽如此，在军事准备上没有什么东西看见留给机会。如果印度战略家认为和中国的600亿美元的双边贸易额是一个对抗边境冲突的保险，他们是错误的。
The Chinese are preparing to fight what they call “local wars” which may not lead to snapping of diplomatic relations. Military preparedness for India is the only insurance against a Chinese attack.
中国正在准备他们所谓的可能不会导致外交关系破裂的局部战争。
对于印度，军事准备是唯一可以对抗中国攻击的保险。
(The writer is a New Delhi based strategic analys
作者是新德里的战略分析家。
狗仔卡
发表于 2009-9-21 17:35
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楼主
发表于 2009-9-23 03:38
