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本帖最后由 rhapsody 于 2009-9-28 20:40 编辑
【中文标题】世界经济增长的黯淡前景
【原文标题】The Gloomy Prospects for World Growth
【作者简介】Steven Dunaway（斯蒂文·唐纳维）：曾任国际货币基金组织（IMF）亚太局副局长，同时兼任IMF中国特使团团长
【原文链接】http://www.cfr.org/publication/2 ... type%2Fother_report
【译者】rhapsody
【声明】本译文供Anti-CNN使用，未经AC或译者许可，谢绝转载，谢谢合作
【前言】这篇文章发表于2009年9月初，观点属于现时美国乃至西方都比较流行的“再平衡”论 （作者今年3月就发过这样观点的文章）；这里先摘译了序言以及有关中国的部分（这部分在原文中占了很大篇幅；其他部分暂缓翻译），有些观点还是有一定借鉴的作用（比如作者认为最大的问题之一在于生产环节过于资金密集，与其他一些人不一样）。
INTRODUCTION
序言
The seeds of the current economic and financial crisis were sown by economic policies of the major countries that fostered the growth of global imbalances during the 2000s. Consequently, an essential element in any assessment of prospects for world economic recovery and the pace of future growth has to factor in exactly how these imbalances are likely to unwind—or fail to be resolved—in the period immediately ahead.
现今的经济和金融危机植根于各主要国家奉行的经济政策，自2000年以来这些政策助长了全球经济的不平衡。因此，任何对于世界经济复苏前景以及未来增长速度的预测都应基于这样一个基本因素：在接下来的这段时期中，这些不平衡问题要怎样解决——抑或是不能解决。
Since the onset of the crisis, current account imbalances among the major economies in the world have declined, leading some analysts to think that imbalances were starting to unwind. Unfortunately, however, changes in current account imbalances have largely reflected the effects of the economic downturn. To address the underlying imbalances in savings and investment behavior that continue to exist, major economies will need to make some important changes in economic policies.
自从危机爆发以来，世界各大经济体的经常账户不平衡现象已经出现缓解，这使得一些分析师认为不平衡问题开始得到了解决。但不幸的是，经常账户不平衡现象的改观在很大程度上反映的是经济的下滑。为解决储蓄和投资行为中深层次的不平衡问题，各大经济体需要对经济政策作出一些重要转变。
Understandably, the focus of economic policy up until now has been on tackling the immediate problems of dealing with major financial disruptions, stabilizing the world’s major economies, and trying to restart growth. Any thinking beyond these initial challenges has been directed at addressing the significant failures in regulation and supervision of the financial sector that contributed to the severity of the crisis. Increasingly, light is being seen at the end of the tunnel, the beginnings of economic recovery are being proclaimed, and exit strategies from economic stimulus are being discussed. Some of the stimulus policies that have been pursued will facilitate the adjustment of global imbalances; however, actions in many countries appear likely to add to imbalances over time, and the lack of needed policy actions—especially structural reforms—in other countries will delay adjustment as well.
迄今为止经济政策的重点在于应付当务之急：解决金融大动荡、稳定世界主要经济体，以及力求重启增长，这是可以理解的。除了这些艰巨的任务以外，思路的导向放在了强化金融领域的监督和管理上——正是监管不力造成了这场危机的严重性。越来越多的人们看到了曙光，宣布经济复苏的开始，并讨论撤除经济刺激的策略。业已实行的一些刺激政策有利于校正全球经济的不平衡；但是，许多国家的措施随着时间增长反而可能加重不平衡，而必要政策举措的缺失——尤其是结构性改革——亦将拖慢其他一些国家的调整进程。
As a result, the outlook for recovery and growth in the world economy at this juncture appears rather gloomy. Lasting adjustment in imbalances is taking place only in the United States, and this will continue over the medium term. The result will be significantly slower growth in U.S. demand in the next several years. Hence, the main factor determining growth in the world economy will be whether other sources of demand will arise to take up the slack left by slower U.S. growth. At the moment, prospects do not look good. None of the other major economies appear inclined to make the necessary changes in policies to deal with their imbalances and raise their demand. Therefore, the world economy faces the prospect of a prolonged period of slower growth and greater volatility than it has known for several decades.
因而，世界经济复苏和增长的前景在当下这个关头显得相当黯淡。只有美国在持续对不平衡现象进行调节，而这也需要一个中等长度的时期。接下来几年里美国需求的增长因而将明显放缓。因此，决定世界经济增长的主要因素将在于其他地区的需求能否上升，从而弥补美国增长缓慢带来的萧条。而现在来看，前景并不乐观。其他主要经济体都没有显示出在政策上为调节不平衡和扩大内需而作出一些必要转变的意向。所以，世界经济面临的将是长时间的缓慢增长和较之过去几十年更剧烈的波动这样的前景。
（中间关于美国、欧洲和日本的部分暂缺翻译）
WHAT ABOUT ASIAN ECONOMIES?
关于亚洲经济体
Asia is considered to be the bright spot in the world economy at the moment. On the whole, the emerging market economies of the region have been judged to have weathered the economic and financial crisis better than the advanced countries and better than expected in late 2008 and early 2009.[1] Growth in many of these countries is seen as picking up after sharp slumps. This has prompted some renewed discussion about decoupling of Asian economies from advanced country growth and suggestions that major countries in the region—particularly China—could be engines of growth for the world economy. Unfortunately, this prospect is highly unlikely.[2] The perceived strength in economic activity in Asia at present looks to be associated with a temporary recovery in growth largely owing to a slowing of the rate of inventory decumulation or shifts to small inventory accumulation and to continued effects of fiscal and monetary stimulus measures. While Asia may be looking better than expected in 2009, economic prospects for the region in 2010 and beyond, in the absence of major changes in economic policies, will remain heavily dependent on recovery and growth in the advanced countries.
亚洲被认为是现时世界经济的亮点。总体上而言，该地区的新兴市场经济体被认定比发达国家更好地渡过了经济和金融危机，而且要好于2008年底、2009年初的预期[1]。许多这类国家在经历了剧烈的下滑后看起来又恢复了增长。这引发了一些新讨论，认为应把把亚洲经济体同发达国家的经济增长区分开来的；亦有人提议该地区的主要国家——尤其是中国——可以成为世界经济增长的引擎。不幸的是，这种预期是非常不可能实现的[2]。现时观察到的亚洲经济活动的强势似乎是与暂时性的增长复苏相关，而这种复苏相当大程度上要归结于存货缩减速度的减缓或者是存货变得小有增加了，也归结于财政和货币刺激措施的持续效应。虽然亚洲在2009年看起来可能要好于预期，但其经济政策缺少大的转变，该地区在2010年及以后的经济前景，仍将相当依赖于发达国家的复苏和增长。
China, in particular, appears to be doing rather well, thanks to quick government policy actions to stimulate the economy. The authorities will achieve their 8 percent target for GDP growth in 2009. But relatively strong growth in China is not providing much stimulus for the rest of the world, as China’s trade and current account surpluses remain large. Moreover, without a significant revival in external demand, it will be difficult for China to achieve its 8 percent GDP growth objective in 2010 and succeeding years, unless the government continues to supply substantial stimulus to the economy, especially given continuing policy biases that favor investment.
特别是中国，多亏了政府迅速出台的经济刺激政策，看起来做得很不错。中国当局将完成他们在2009年GDP增长保八的目标。但中国相对强势的增长并未给世界其他地区带来多少刺激，因为中国仍维持着大额的贸易顺差和经常账户盈余。此外，外需没有显著复苏的话，中国在2010年和接下来几年将难以达成GDP增长8%的目标，除非政府能继续给经济提供足够的刺激，尤其是考虑到其一贯偏向投资的政策倾向。
Since the mid-1980s, China’s economic development has been driven by investment growth. In the early years of economic reform in China (which began in 1978), consumption rose strongly and was the major factor in China’s growth. As economic reforms in the urban areas began in earnest in the mid-1980s, however, there was a distinct shift in growth back toward the kind of investment-driven model that dominated China’s development in the pre-reform era. This shift accelerated after the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. A basic flaw in this development model became evident in the early 1990s as rapid investment growth led to increases in the production of goods that out-stripped domestic demand. Mountains of “unsellable” goods built up as the government sought to maintain relatively rapid growth.
自上世纪80年代中期以来，中国经济发展是靠投资拉动。在中国经济改革的早期（始于1978年），消费曾强劲地增长，这也曾是中国经济增长的主要因素。但上世纪80年代中期，经济改革在城镇地区全面开展的时候，又转回到了截然不同的、在改革前的年代占据中国主导地位的投资拉动增长模式。这种转变在1989年天安门抗议活动后得到了加速。这种发展模式的一个主要弊端在90年代早期显露了出来，即投资的迅速增长导致商品生产超出了国内需求。政府想要维持相对快速的增长，而“卖不出去的”商品堆积成山。
To resolve the problem, the Chinese authorities decided to find new external sources of demand for Chinese goods. They chose to stick to the investment-driven growth model and rely on exports and substitution of domestic production for imported goods to fully utilize the excess in productive capacity over domestic consumption that continued rapid investment generated. Major reforms launched in 1994-95 opened up China’s economy and served to shift production toward exports and import substitution.[3] Also set in place were significant price distortions—namely a low cost of capital and an undervalued exchange rate—that supported this investment-driven/export-led growth model.
为解决这个问题，中国当局决定为中国商品寻求新的外来需求源头。他们选择坚持投资拉动增长模式，依靠出口以及用国内生产代替进口商品来充分释放持续快速投资产生的、超出国内消费的富余生产能力。1994到95年间的大幅度改革开放了中国经济，为的是将生产转向出口导向和进口替代模式[3]。同时出台的还有明显的价格扭曲——即低成本的资本运作和被低估的汇率，来支持这个投资拉动、出口导向的增长模式。
Policies that have maintained a low cost of capital in China have contributed to stunting the growth of consumption. Households over most of the past two decades have experienced a significant decline in personal income relative to GDP owing largely to a decline in investment income. Despite large savings, households’ investment income has fallen relative to GDP because the major investment vehicle available for these savings are bank deposits and a low ceiling has been set by the government for the interest rates paid on these deposits. In turn, the low deposit rate permits the banks to lend to enterprises at relatively low interest rates. The cost of capital has also been held down by the virtual lack of dividend payments to the government by the state-owned enterprises.[4] Consequently, retained earnings of these firms have been a large pool of low-cost financing for investment.
中国维持低成本资本运作的政策阻碍了消费的增长。过去二十年来众多家庭体验到了个人收入相对于GDP的明显下降，相当程度上是由于投资性收入的下降。除了庞大的储蓄外，家庭的投资性收入相对于GDP减少了，因为对这些储蓄而言主要的投资工具是银行存款，而政府又给存款利率设定了一个较低的上限。反过来，低存款利率使得银行能够以较低的利率放贷给企业。而由于国有企业向政府缴交的红利实际上是不足的，资本运作的成本同样被限制在低水平上[4]。结果，这些企业的留存利润便成为了可用于投资的低成本融资的浩大源头。
The low cost of capital coupled with the poor intermediation of savings by the major state-owned commercial banks has resulted in substantial resources being directed toward the large state-owned enterprises, which tend to be in capital-intensive industries. As a result, production in China has become very capital intensive, creating the rather ironic situation that output growth does not generate much employment growth in a country that has such a large pool of underemployed workers. The official target for growth is set at 8 percent because that level of growth is viewed as being required to produce the 1-2 percent of employment growth needed per year to absorb new entrants to the work force and reduce somewhat the substantial underemployment of labor in the rural areas.[5]
资本运作的低成本加上大型国有商业银行对储蓄的低下中介作用，导致大量资源流向大型国有企业，而这些企业多是属于资本密集型的产业。结果，中国的生产变成了高度的资本密集型，这就造成了一个相当讽刺性的场面：产出的增长并不能创造出多少就业的增长，而这个国家又有着如此庞大的失业工人群众。官方将增长目标设定在8个百分点，是因为这个水平的增长被视为每年能给就业带来1至2个百分点的增长，以吸收新产出的劳动力，并在某种程度上减少农村地区相当大的劳动力失业状况[5]。
At the same time, by maintaining an undervalued exchange rate, China has imposed growing costs on its economy. In particular, it has created a serious overallocation of resources in export- and import-substituting industries. This situation will have to be sorted out at some point, and the problem and the costs of sorting it out will only grow the longer adjustment is delayed. Moreover, when the inevitable appreciation in China’s currency happens, the country will experience a substantial loss on the massive foreign exchange reserves it has accumulated while trying to keep its currency undervalued—a loss that the Chinese authorities are already very concerned about. Nevertheless, China’s authorities are reluctant to allow the exchange rate to appreciate out of fear of the short-term impact appreciation could have on growth.
与此同时，由于维持（人民币）汇率低估，中国也给自己的经济逐渐加重了负担。尤其是过多的资源分配给了出口和进口替代工业。这种情况在将来某个时刻必须得到解决，拖得越久，问题只会更大，解决问题所付出的成本也会越高。此外，当中国的货币不可避免地升值时，中国为保持其货币低估而积累起来的庞大外汇储备将会遭受沉重的损失——中国当局已经非常在意这一点。尽管如此，由于害怕升值会对经济增长构成短期压力，中国当局不愿放开让汇率升值。
Maintaining an undervalued exchange rate also stunts the development of China’s financial sector. Efforts to get its banking system to operate on a sound commercial basis are undermined by the government’s continued interference in the banks’ business decisions through heavy reliance on window guidance to control credit expansion and establish lending priorities. The government has been forced to rely on such direct measures to influence bank lending out of concern that use of conventional indirect means of monetary control, which would rely on increases in domestic interest rates, could induce increasing inflows of foreign money, especially since capital controls have become more porous.
维持汇率低估同样阻碍了中国金融产业的发展。中国致力于让其银行系统运营于稳健商业基础上，但政府过于依靠“窗口指导”的方式来控制信贷扩张和建立借贷优先等级，这种不断干预银行商业决策的做法损害了其初衷。政府被迫依靠这类直接干预银行借贷的措施，是顾虑到采用惯常货币控制的间接举措要依赖于国内利率的增长，而利率增长可能导致外资流入增加，尤其是在资本控制已经变得更容易被渗透的情况下。
China’s growth model up to now certainly has delivered impressive results, making China the third largest economy in the world, and it is closing in fast on becoming the number-one trading nation. However, because of the country’s success and its increased importance in the world economy, time appears to have run out on China’s continued use of its investment-driven/export-led growth model. This is particularly true given prospects for slower demand growth in the advanced economies. Continued rapid investment in China will add to productive capacity and require continued strong export growth to make use of the excess in capacity over what is demanded domestically. But to maintain relatively rapid export growth in a slowly growing world economy, China’s producers will have to lower their export prices to overcome competitive pressures, thereby cutting their margins substantially, in order to be able to take the ever-increasing share of world trade required for China to be able to maintain its 8 percent target for growth. However, with declining margins, Chinese firms would be expected to cut investment over time if they are operating on a commercial basis.
中国的增长模式直至现在已经造就了举世瞩目的成果，使中国成为了世界第三大经济体，并且也将很快成为世界第一大贸易国家。然而，鉴于该国取得的成就及其在世界经济中的重要性逐渐增大，中国惯用的投资拉动、出口导向的增长模式看起来已是时日无多了。这一点从发达国家需求增长减缓的前景来看显得尤为真实。中国持续快速的投资会扩大产能，也就需要有持续强劲的出口增长来释放那些超出本国需求的富余产能。但为了能在世界贸易中不断提升占领的份额以完成保八的增长目标，中国的厂商不得不压低其出口价格来抵消竞争压力，以求在世界经济增长缓慢的情况下保持相对较快的出口增长，从而也就极大地压低了自身的利润。然而，随着利润的下降，如果中国的企业是基于商业营运的话，可以预期它们随后会缩减投资。
In these circumstances, Chinese banks too, if they are operating on a commercial basis, should be increasingly reluctant to lend. Consequently, rapid growth and development in China cannot be sustained unless there continues to be strong fiscal support or increased government interference in business decisions. The situation facing China could be even worse if the country’s attempts to maintain export growth were to invite increasing retaliation from partner countries.
在这些情况下，中国的银行，如果它们也是基于商业营运的话，同样会变得不愿放贷。所以，除非有强势的财政支撑，或者政府加大对商业决策的干预，中国的快速增长和发展是无法持续下去的。如果其保持出口增长的企图招致其他伙伴国的报复的话，中国面临的处境会更加困难。
In addition, the Chinese authorities are drawing the wrong lessons from the current crisis, leading the government to decide to play an even bigger role in the economy. Advanced countries’ interventions in their financial systems are being taken as proof that China’s system, which remains dominated by the government, is superior. The stability of China’s banking system during the current financial crisis is only an indication of its detachment from world markets; it is not an indication of inherent strength or soundness. In reality, China’s banking system is staggering forward toward its next crisis and recapitalization by the government. The system has been recapitalized twice in the past ten years, and only limited progress has been achieved in reforming it and getting it to operate like an efficient, commercially based system. The government’s push to have the banks expand lending as part of its economic stimulus plan probably brings forward the date when another recapitalization will be needed, since substantial new nonperforming loans are expected to be created by the government-sanctioned surge in lending that has taken place. Advanced country interventions in the automobile industry are also seen as providing justification for China’s efforts to restructure fourteen of its major industries. As part of these restructurings, China’s large state-owned enterprises are envisaged as playing a dominant role in these industries. This is likely to be a major step backward for the economy.
此外，中国当局错误理解了现时的危机，使得政府决定在经济中扮演更加重大的角色。发达国家对其金融体系的干预，被当作是中国的政府主导体制优越性的证明。中国银行体系在现时的金融危机中保持稳定只是表明了其与世界市场的脱节，并不表明其内在的实力和稳健性。实际上，中国的银行体系正摇摇摆摆地走向其下一次危机，及政府主导的又一次资本重组。过去十年里银行体系已经历过两次资本重组，改革的目的在于能使银行有效地、基于商业来进行营运，但只取得了有限的绩效。政府敦促银行扩大借贷以作为其经济刺激计划的一部分，将可能使下一次需要进行资本重组的日子提前到来，因为政府批准的措施使得借贷激增，预计将会创造出大量无法达成预期收益的新贷款。发达国家对汽车产业的干预，同样被看作是给中国重组其十四项主要产业提供了一个正当理由。而在这一系列的重组中，中国的大型国有企业被设想成在这些产业里发挥决定性的作用。这对于经济而言可能是一次大退步。
The past success of the country’s growth model makes the Chinese authorities very reluctant to do more than make gradual changes to it. Policies adopted by the authorities to deal with the current economic and financial crisis generally continue to focus on boosting investment and stabilizing export growth. Nevertheless, the Chinese authorities recognize the need for change. They have publicly stated that the economy needs to be rebalanced away from its heavy dependence on investment and exports toward consumption.[6]
中国增长模式在过去取得的成功使得该国当局非常不情愿对这一模式作出更多的变革，而只是对其逐步进行小修小补。当局为应对当前经济和金融危机所采取的措施，通常继续集中在激励投资和稳定出口增长上。不过，中国当局还是意识到了改革的必要性。他们公开宣称需要重新平衡经济，从严重依赖投资和出口转向扩大内需[6]。
Rebalancing China’s economy requires removing price distortions and enactment of other policy changes to eliminate inefficiencies and incentives favoring investment over consumption. Serious distortions exist in the pricing of energy, other utilities, land, and pollution abatement; but, as noted above, the major price distortions are the low cost of capital and the undervalued exchange rate. Capital costs need to be raised significantly, and this cannot be done without permitting more flexibility and a more rapid rate of appreciation of the exchange rate.
重新平衡中国经济需要消除价格扭曲，以及制定其他政策性转变的法令来排除掉轻消费而重投资的低效率行径及激励此类行径的措施。能源、其他耐用品、土地和污染治理等的定价都存在着严重的扭曲，但正如之前所说的，主要的价格扭曲在于资本运作的低成本运作和被低估的汇率。资本运作的成本需要得到明显的提高，但如果不允许更多的变通以及让汇率升值有更快速率的话，是无法做到这一点的。
The ceiling imposed on interest rates paid on savings deposits is a major factor behind the low cost of capital, keeping the bank lending rate low and holding down the opportunity cost for enterprises’ use of their retained earnings for investment. This ceiling needs to be lifted. In turn, a higher cost of capital along with a stronger currency will help curb overinvestment in export- and import-substituting industries. Real household incomes would also be boosted by increases in both bank deposit rates and the exchange rate, and consumption would rise as a consequence.
对储蓄存款利率设定的上限是资本运作低成本的主要幕后推手，这使得银行借贷利率维持在低位，也压低了企业利用其留存利润进行投资的机会成本。因而这一上限需要解除。相应地，更高的资本运作成本以及更强势的货币有助于对抑制出口和进口替代产业的过度投资。家庭的真实收入也会随银行存款率和汇率的升高而得到提升，进而增加消费。
Financial market reform is needed to improve the intermediation of savings in China. Lifting the cap on deposit rates would not only help push up the cost of capital, it would also increase competition in the banking sector and provide incentives for banks to expand credit to new customers. Bond and equity markets need to be more fully developed to provide alternative sources of financing for firms and a much broader array of assets for households to invest in. Small- and medium-sized firms have had to rely largely on retained earnings or the assets of their owners to finance investment. Consumers also have had limited access to credit. Better credit access and higher yielding assets to invest in would raise household incomes and reduce household savings over time, boosting consumption.
要改进中国储蓄的中介作用，必须进行金融市场改革。撤销存款利率上限不但能推高资本运作的成本，还能增加银行业的竞争力，激励银行扩充信贷给新客户。债券和股票市场需要得到更全面的发展，为企业提供其它的融资渠道，为家庭提供品种更多样化的可供投资的各类资产。中小型企业相当大程度上必须依靠留存利润或其所有者的资产来为投资项目提供资本。消费者享有的信贷也是相当有限的。更好的信贷渠道以及更高收益的可供投资的资产，会增加家庭的收入，而随着时间的增长，会减少家庭的储蓄而刺激消费。
In addition, the government has an important direct role to play in rebalancing the economy. It has to continue improving critical social services, especially education, health care, and pensions. Reducing the uncertainties surrounding the provision of these services will substantially diminish households’ strong precautionary savings motive and give households the confidence needed to raise consumption.
此外，政府在重新平衡经济的过程中还需要发挥一项重要的直接作用。政府必须继续改进关键的社会福利性机构，尤其是教育、医疗和养老金。减少供应这些社会福利所存在的不确定性能在很大程度上消除家庭强烈的预防性储蓄动机，并且能让家庭有足够的信心来增加消费。
（结论部分暂缺翻译）
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狗仔卡
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