[Foreign Affairs] : Cooperation Gets Shanghaied

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Foreign Affairs

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65724/alexander-cooley/cooperation-gets-shanghaied

Cooperation Gets Shanghaied            



China, Russia, and the SCO
Alexander Cooley


ALEXANDERCOOLEY is Associate Professor of Political Science at Barnard College,Columbia University, and a fellow at the Open Society Institute.
Therecent rise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) -- a mutualsecurity assembly comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan -- has been met with skepticism in the West.Some fear that it has nefarious intentions to control Central Asia;others worry that the West will somehow be left behind in the region ifit does not engage with the SCO. Since its founding in 1996 as a forumfor negotiating lingering Soviet-Chinese border disputes, the SCO'smission has broadened to promote regional security and economiccooperation, and combat what its members call the "three evils":separatism, extremism, and terrorism. As its agenda has expanded, so,too, have Western concerns.

When the heads of the SCO countries called for a timetable forclosing U.S. military bases in Central Asia at its annual summit in2005, the SCO appeared to be positioning itself against U.S. influencein the region. Days later, Uzbekistan ousted American forces from abase in Karshi-Khanabad. And that same year, the SCO strongly condemnedthe Western-backed color revolutions that were sweeping across Eurasia,along with the Western NGOs that were supporting the movements.

Five years later, however, predictions that the SCO would developinto a full-blown anti-West alliance have proven exaggerated. Despiteclaims of widespread cooperation, the SCO has failed to translate itsofficial announcements into actual regional cooperation. And althoughChina has been able to use the organization to project its influenceacross Central Asia, Russia has remained reluctant to deepen itsparticipation. Subtle but key differences in the regional securitypriorities of the two countries have started to play out.

Russia regards Central Asia as its "zone of privileged interests."For the past two decades, Moscow has sought to embed the states ofCentral Asia in a system of Russia-controlled institutions -- theCollective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a mutual defensealliance; the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), a customs union;and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a loose federation offormer Soviet countries. At the same time, it has actively worked toblock Western actors such as NATO. China, in contrast, has been focusednot so much on countering the West as on stabilizing its own westernterritory: the autonomous province of Xinjiang, which borders theCentral Asian states.
When the color revolutions erupted across Eurasia between 2000 and2005, Moscow's and Beijing's security agendas were aligned. Both fearedWestern-backed democratization in Eurasia -- Moscow because its owninfluence over the regimes there would wane, and China becausedemocratization could set a dangerous example for its hinterland.

However, the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 revealed the real gapbetween Russia's and China's security agendas. Just a few days afterthe EU-brokered cease-fire, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev arrivedat the SCO's annual summit in Dushanbe to request support for Russia'srecognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thebreakaway Georgian provinces. China and the Central Asian states stoodfirm against the request. Moscow's dealings with separatist entitiesdid not square with China's security interests, nor with the principleof noninterference in countries' internal affairs. Similarly, Russia'sefforts to grant passports to Russian-speaking residents in thedisputed territories of Georgia just before the war alarmed the CentralAsian states, most of which have substantial Russian populations. Afterthis diplomatic rebuke, Moscow redoubled its efforts to promote theCSTO, an organization that includes the same Central Asian states butis safely in Russia's pocket.

Moscow's misadventure can be contrasted with China's success inwinning SCO support during the outbreak of violence between the UighurMuslims and Han Chinese in Urumqi, Xinjiang, last July. Within a fewhours of the flare-up, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairscirculated a statement to other SCO members describing events inXinjiang as "China's internal matter" and the Chinese actions asdesigned to "restore order in the region." Since the statement alignedwith the SCO's position on internal affairs, it was quickly endorsed byall SCO members and adopted as the assembly's official position.

As the SCO mission expands to include economic cooperation, the gapbetween Russian and Chinese interests has become even more apparent.Wary of Beijing's economic predominance, and thus its ability to usethe SCO to its own economic ends, Russia has blocked many efforts todeepen integration. Moscow opposes Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao'sproposal to create an SCO free-trade area. Instead, it champions theexpansion of EurAsEC, which includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, and Belarus but notably excludes China.

The global financial crisis has magnified differences in Russian andChinese economic potential and ambition. Moscow has been hard hit bythe crisis; it has been forced to scale back many of its projects inCentral Asia and to renegotiate the terms of unprofitable regionalenergy deals. Moreover, many of the projects that it has not abandoned-- such as the Kambarata hydroelectric power plants in Kyrgyzstan --seem to be based more on political goals than commercial considerationsand will likely be a drain on Russia's coffers.

By contrast, China, whose financial system was shielded from thecrisis, has stepped up its economic activities in Central Asia,dispensing substantial bilateral financing under the guise of the SCO.Beijing has recently concluded massive loans-for-hydrocarbon deals withKazakhstan and Turkmenistan and has increased its investments ininfrastructure in SCO states along its border, connecting them evermoreto western China. And Beijing has unilaterally created a $10 billion"anti-crisis" stabilization fund within the SCO, offering cheap,short-term financing for such priority sectors as energy andinfrastructure, after Moscow refused multiple requests to co-financethe fund. Moscow prefers to create a EurAsEC-controlled fund or providewhat bilateral assistance it can directly to weaker states.

Besides Russia-China tensions, the SCO faces another fundamentalproblem: its Central Asian members are unable -- and, in some cases,unwilling -- to fully accede to Russia's and China's plans. Moscow andBeijing remain concerned about the United States' presence in the area,but Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have concludedcommercial transit agreements with the U.S. military anyway, expandingnorthern U.S. supply routes to Afghanistan.

Further, the closed borders of Central Asia have importantcommercial value -- in the form of customs, tolls, and related jobs.The ruling elites of these countries often control border operationsand other major sectors of the economy such as telecommunications andelectricity. It is highly doubtful that they will willingly open themup to true external competition.

Thus, whatever the SCO's ambition for regional cooperation andinfluence, coordination among its members lags far behind. As asecurity collective, the SCO is weak and not the aggressivelyanti-Western bloc it appeared to be a few years ago. As such, it makessense for the United States to work with the SCO to engage China andthe Central Asian states on select Afghanistan issues, such as securingborders and combating the narcotics trade, as part of its broaderefforts to involve more regional and multilateral partners.Additionally, any Western engagement with the SCO on security matterswould be useful, in as much as it undercuts Moscow's efforts todominate the region with the CSTO.

In nonsecurity matters, the SCO is even weaker. While it seeksinternational recognition for its role in integrating the region, it isunclear whether it has or ever will succeed. Ultimately, the SCO shoulddeliver some tangible accomplishments before the West rushes to condemnor cooperate with it.

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