【中文标题】为什么中国不会统治世界
【原文标题】Why China Won't Rule the World
【登载媒体】新闻周刊
【来源地址】http://www.newsweek.com/id/225627
【译者】連長
【翻译方式】人工
【声明】本翻译供Anti-CNN使用，未经AC或译者许可，不得转载。
【提示】由于本人水平有限，经济类文章还望大家海涵，有不对的地方还望多赐教。
【原文库链接】http://bbs.m4.cn/thread-213996-1-4.html【译文】
A National Day parade in China Fang Xinwu/ZUMA Press
中国国庆游行Fang Xinwu/彩色中国照片-ZUMA新闻
Conventionalwisdom can be devilishly hard to dispute. For example, most pundits agree thatthe Great Recession helped China more than any other state. At first glance,this claim seems obviously true. Unlike the United States and the other majorWestern powers, which saw their economies plummet and their financialinstitutions come close to ruin, the Chinese economy has kept on growing.Chinese financial institutions, considered technically insolvent only a fewyears ago, now boast balance sheets and market capitalizations that Westernbanks can only dream of. With its economy expected to grow at 9 percent in2010, China will soon surpass Japan as the world's second-largest economy(measured in U.S. dollars). Pundits like Martin Jacques, a veteran Britishjournalist, are predicting that China will soon rule the world—figuratively, ifnot literally.
传统知识一般是很难争辩的。比如，大多数专家一致认为大衰退帮助中国超越了其他任何一个国家。咋一看，这种论调似乎看起来是正确的。不同于美国和西方国家的是，后者眼看着他们的经济暴跌以及金融机构濒临破产，而中国经济则不断增长。仅仅在几年前，中国金融机构被认为会在技术上破产，而现在，只拥有资产负债表和市场资本（capitalizations这个词不明白，我猜的）的西方银行只能梦想。到2010年，中国的经济将增长9%，很快就会超越日本成为世界第二大经济体（以美元计算）。一个英国的资深记着MartinJacques预测：中国将很快统治世界-----只是一个比喻，并非真正意味上的。
Yetbefore declaring this the Chinese century, you might want to take another lookat what's actually taken place in the country over the past year.
然而，在宣布这是中国的世纪之前，你可能想再看看该国在过去一年里发生了什么。
One of the strangest things about predictions of Chinese dominanceis that they tend to impress everyone but the Chinese themselves. Take China'ssupposedly miraculous economic recovery. While the international businesscommunity has practically run out of words to praise Beijing's handling of thecrisis, Chinese leaders haven't stopped worrying. They fret that their bankshave gone on a reckless lending binge; Liu Mingkang, China's chief bankregulator, warned in September that "all sorts of risks have risen"as a result. He's right. In the first half of 2009, Chinese banks shelled outroughly $1.2 trillion, creating a potential tidal wave of future nonperformingloans. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) used much of the money to speculate inthe real-estate and stock markets and to make questionable expansions; as aresult, Dragonomics, a Beijing-based consultancy, now estimates that as much asone sixth of all the bank loans made between 2008 and 2010 could end up notpaying off. Yet Beijing is still wary of shutting off the spigot, lest Chinaprove unable to keep growing without it.
奇怪的事情之一是：除了中国他们自己，其余的每个人都非常关注有关‘中国优势’的预言。中国的经济复苏令人惊叹。当国际商界几乎耗尽了词去赞美北京的决定性买卖时，中国的领导人没有停止过担忧。他们担忧的是他们的银行持续鲁莽的疯狂借贷。中国的首席银行机构监管者刘明康曾在9月份警告说：“结果就是‘所有的各种风险都是上升’”。他是对的。在2009年上半年，中国的主要银行掏出了大约1.2万亿美元， 埋下了未来的潜在的不良贷款的浪潮。国有企业（SOEs）用大笔的资金去炒房地产和股票，并导致问题扩大。北京一家咨询公司Dragonomics(Dragonomics,我猜大概是研究‘龙’的经济)估计：现在有多达六分之一的银行在2008年至2010年之间的贷款可能最终不会有收益。北京还是谨慎的停止了援助，以免北京无法证明没有它仍能保持经济增长。
Its leaders' frequently voiced trepidation may be overstated.Perhaps the officials are simply being modest or trying to soothe Westernworries about the so-called China Threat. It's far more likely, however, thatChina's leaders are actually telling the truth. They know their country hasindeed pulled off the world's most impressive recovery. But they also knowthat's a relative -accomplishment—and China has paid a huge long-term price inthe process. In addition to sowing the seeds for future dud loans, itsinvestment-focused stimulus policies have exACerbated the country's economicimbalances by creating new productive -capacities—factories and thelike—without really boosting China's anemic household consumption. In otherwords, Chinese plants may be cranking out even more TVs, cars, and toys thanbefore, but no Chinese are buying them. Loosened bank credit has mainlybenefited SOEs, allowing these inefficient behemoths to expand at the expenseof the private sector, which has been given little access to the government'slargess.
他的领导人常常诚惶诚恐，这可能有夸大的成分。可能官方只是故作谦虚，或是试图平息有关中国威胁西方的忧虑---这没什么可信的。然而，中国的领导人实际上说的是实话。他们知道他们的国家的确完成了令全世界印象深刻的复苏，但是他们同时也知道这是相对的成就，中国已经在这一过程中付出了巨大的长期的代价，除了种下未来不良贷款的种子，其刺激重点投资的政策---创造新的生产以及没有提高家庭消费力---加剧了该国经济的失衡。换句话说，中国计划造更多的电视机、汽车和玩具，但是中国人却不去买。开放银行信贷的主要受益者是国有企业，并允许这些低效率的庞然大物扩大在私营部分的花费，那些私营企业获得政府捐赠的机会是很少的。
Meanwhile,China has yet to confront what has become an enormous overcapacity forproducing cheap goods. During the boom, when Americans were hungry for theseproducts, Chinese exports registered double-digit growth year after year,accounting for nearly a quarter of the country's net GDP growth. Now thatnervous and debt-ridden U.S. consumers have virtually shut their pocketbooks,China can no longer expect them to snap up its wares. To account for thischange, Beijing must embark on some painful restructuring, shuttering manyexport--oriented factories and strengthening the social safety net to boosthousehold consumption (which remains stuck below 40 percent of GDP). China'sleaders know all this. But they've yet to take the plunge.
与此同时，中国还没有遭遇在繁荣时期生产的便宜货变得大量过剩，当美国人对这些产品感兴趣是，中国去年一年的出口取得了两位数的增长，几乎占该国GDP总增长值的四分之一。现在，不安的满身债务的美国消费者实际上已经勒紧了他们的荷包，中国不能再指望他们正想购买那些物品了。鉴于这次转变的重要性，北京不得不作出一些痛苦的调整，关闭许多面向工厂的出口，并加强社会治安以提高家庭消费（仍保持生产总值的百分之40%）。中国的领导人知道这一切，但到目前为止，他们还没有冒险去尝试。
Dig a bit deeper, and it becomes very difficult to pin down justhow exactly China has gained so much from the crisis. Its failures are muchmore evident. Take Beijing's lack of success in snapping up prized assetsoverseas. For several years, Chinese leaders have aimed to secure foreignnatural resources by acquiring effective control of or stakes in oilfields,mining companies, and commodity producers in other countries. Beijing isconvinced that such moves are essential for its long-term security. Yetopposition by Western politicians, entrenched multinationals, and vigilantgovernments in developing countries has stymied many attempts by cash-flushChinese SOEs to execute their government's master plan. During the first monthsof the crisis, these SOEs and China's sovereign-wealth fund did nab modeststakes in a few minor natural-resource companies. But they failed to score abig hit, and there were some embarrassing failures. In late 2008, for example,Chinalco (a state-owned Chinese aluminum company) reached a tentative agreementto pay $19.5 billion to increase its stake in Rio Tinto, a global mining giant.But fierce shareholder opposition and the skepticism of Australian regulatorsdoomed the deal, to Beijing's intense frustration. To borrow a colorful Chineseproverb, Chinalco saw its "cooked duck fly away." This ignominioussetback served as an uncomfortable reminder of the humiliation of 2005 whenCNOOC, one of China's state-owned oil companies, was prevented from taking overUnocal, an American energy producer, by congressional opposition.
掘得更深一些，非常难以说明中国究竟在危机中取得了哪些巨大的利益的。它的失败反而更明显，参加抢购海外资产的北京没有大获成功。近年来，中国领导人的目标是获得外国自然资源的有效控制权以及油田、矿业公司的股份和其他国家的商业生产。北京认为这些行动是其长期稳定的必要措施，但是西方政治家和地位牢固的跨国公司仍然反对，并且发展中国家的政府已经限制了资金充足的中国国有企业去贯彻他们政府的控制计划的多次尝试。在危机的第一个月里，中国的国有企业和主要基金趁虚而入，控制了一些小的自然资源有限股份公司。但是他们有时进球则一分未得，并有一些令人尴尬的失败。比如2008年底，中铝（国有中国铝业公司）与全球矿业巨头力拓达成初步协议，支付195亿美元以增加其在力拓的股份，但是股东的激烈反对和澳大利亚监管机构管理者撕毁了协议，使北京强烈不满。借用一个丰富多彩的中国谚语：中铝看到它‘煮熟的鸭子飞走了’。这是人们用来提示丢脸的挫折的暗语，2005年，美国国会曾反对中国的国有石油公司CNOOC接管美国能源制造商Unocal.
Anotherpuzzle: if China is so strong, why doesn't it show more leadership inaddressing global problems? While Chinese officials show up at almost everyimportant gathering of world leaders, and their opinions and support areeagerly solicited, they consistently maintain a low profile, preferring tofocus on guarding their national interests and skipping opportunities toshowcase their soft power. At the G20 summit in London in April 2009, forexample, the only thing China cared about was keeping Hong Kong off the list ofoffshore tax havens being scrutinized. Beijing's coffers may be bulging with$2.1 trillion in foreign-currency reserves, but it is not exactly offering tospend that cash on common crises. Besides calling for a new international reservecurrency, China has remained mostly silent on how to reform the globalfinancial system. Nor did it take charge in advance of the make-or-breakCopenhagen climate-change conference in December 2009. Beijing's foreign policyremains stuck in a reactive mode; if this is a superpower, no one's told thePolitburo yet.
另一个迷题：如果中国的确如此强大，为什么没有更多的参加解决全球性问题的领导人会议？虽然中国官员出现在了几乎所有的世界领导人的每一次的重要会议，并且都热切的征求他们的建议和支持，但他们始终保持低调，情愿将注意力集中在守卫自己的国家利益，忽视了找机会展示他们的软实力。以2009年4月在伦敦举行的G20峰会为例，中国唯一关心的是避免香港出现在避税地名单上。北京的国库可能暴增2.1万亿美元外汇储备，但是他们并不完全提供度过危机的资金，除非制定新的国际储备要求，否则中国会对如何改革全球金融体系保持沉默。2009年12月的歌本哈根气候变化峰会上，Nor did ittake charge in advance of the make-or-break.（他们也没有提前做好成或者败的准备。）北京的外交模式仍然停留在被动状态下，尽管这是一个超级大国。然而没人能转告中国共产党的政治局。
Still, most Chinese leaders seem unconcerned with their inabilityto translate strength into real gains on the international stage. That'sbecause they're far more concerned with domestic stability. Yet here again thenews is hardly reassuring. Antigovernment riots and collective proteststhroughout China are on the rise. Corruption remains rampant. More than a dozensenior officials, ranging from a vice minister of public security to severalCEOs of giant SOEs, were arrested in 2009. The political maneuvering for thenext succession, due in 2012, has already begun, making Chinese leaders all themore cautious—even a tiny misstep between now and then could be politicallycatastrophic.
尽管如此，多数中国领导人似乎也不关心在国际舞台上无法将软实力转化为真正的成果，这是因为他们只关心国内的稳定。而这里还难以令人放心的消息，反政府的骚乱和全国的集中抗议在增多。腐败依然猖獗，十多位高官，上至公安部部长到大型国有企业的几位CEO不等，在2009年被捕。2012年开始下一进程的政治策略，会使中国领导人更加谨慎，甚至一个细微的失误在政治上可能会成灾难。
The worst news on this front has been the reemergence of ethnicseparatism in China's restive, but resource-rich, border regions. The bloodyriots of July 2009 inUrumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, killed nearly 200 and wounded more than 1,000,making it China's worst ethnic conflict in three decades. Coupled with theTibet problem, the challenge by the Uighurs to Chinese rule will preoccupy theminds of Beijing's ruling elites for years to come—and keep their sights firmlyfixed on matters domestic.
在这方面最糟糕的消息是中国难以控制但资源丰富的边境地区已经抬头的民族分裂主义。2009年7月新建首府乌鲁木齐的血腥暴乱造成近200人死亡，1000多人受伤，是中国30年来最严重的种族冲突。结合西藏问题，维吾尔人反对中国的统治迫使北京的统治精英一年来的精力贯注于此---并且同时保持他们的目光坚定在国内的事项上。
All this helps explain why, while China's leaders may be mightilyrelieved to have escaped the worst consequences of the world economic crisis,they see no cause to celebrate. True, the crunch enabled China to close theeconomic gap with its badly ravaged rivals, particularly the U.S. and Japan.And popular perceptions of new Chinese strength have allowed China's leaders tobask in the global limelight and flaunt their elevated international status tothe Chinese public. Deep down, however, Chinese leaders are no fools. Theyunderstand perfectly well how tough are the challenges they still face—and howquickly fortune can turn. If only foreigners knew this as well. Of course, theChinese are thrilled that everyone thinks they're the biggest winner. The truth,however, is that they're more like the least-bad losers—and they know it.
所有这而都有助于解释为什么。中国的领导人可能会非常宽心的逃脱世界经济危机最坏的后果，诚然，经济紧缩缩小了中国与那些被严重蹂躏的竞争对手的经济差距，特别是美国和日本。然而，说句心里话，中国领导人不是傻瓜，他们完全明白有多艰难，他们仍面临挑战，以及如何快速赚的财富。如果只有外国人了解，当然，中国人很乐于让每个人都认为他们是最大的赢家。但是真相是，他们更像是损失最少的输家，他们知道这一点。 |
狗仔卡
发表于 2010-1-6 00:28
提升卡
变色卡
抢沙发
千斤顶
显身卡
发表于 2010-1-6 16:28
