本帖最后由 estelleljb 于 2010-1-7 08:52 编辑
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【中文标题】机遇,中国制造AC四月青年社区* p: O6 U3 E. @; H! _7 g4 x8 n
【原文标题】Opportunity, Made in China
【登载媒体】India Express
【来源地址】http://www.indianexpress.com/news/opportunity-made-in-china/538361/0" ]+ k! ^8 N: A) |
【译者】我AC四月青年社区5 \' U$ J; ^! t+ G, B! W/ v
【翻译方式】人工
【声明】本翻译供Anti-CNN使用,未经AC或译者许可,不得转载。- V3 ?! b# C& `. W/ t! d4 [
【原文库链接】http://bbs.m4.cn/thread-207373-1-1.html6 j/ Z1 L' V8 M
【译文】
Shekhar Gupta Posted: Saturday , Nov 07, 2009 at 0325 hrs
The China Factor has staged a dramatic comeback in our minds, hearts, in public debate and, regrettably, as a negative one. Did it have to be like that? Post 1971, as we felt progressively more secure externally, we had been liberating ourselves from the fear of China. Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing became a happy turning point, followed by many other significant, though small steps in reconciliation. All this while the Dalai Lama was in India, continuing with his activities, spiritual and temporal, and getting into spats with China. Never before have the Chinese ratcheted up the protests to the level we see now, as he sets off to Tawang — and never before have we reacted with so much alarm.
So what is different now? You can analyse the Chinese motivations for ever. In fact, analysing “why is China behaving this way” is a flourishing global industry and we can further swell its ranks while, probably, coming to the same conclusion after our exertions that everybody does, about the inscrutability of the Chinese. Why don’t we, therefore, examine for a change “why are we behaving this way”. Or rather, reacting/responding this way?
中国因素卷土重来,在我们的脑海里,心里,公共辩论中上演,而且很遗憾地,以负面的形象。 是否有必要这个样子呢? 1971年后,我们对外逐渐感到更安全,我们从对中国的恐惧中的到解放。拉吉夫甘地访问北京成为一个愉快的转折点,随后是很多其他标志性的事件,尽管和解还只走出了一小步。与此同时,达赖喇嘛在印度,继续着他精神上的和现世的活动,以及与中国持续的口水战。正如我们所见,中国前所未有地提升了抗议的程度,就像她对达旺一样,而我们也史无前例地有如此警惕的反应。 那么,现在究竟有什么不同了呢? 你总是可以分析中国人的动机。事实上,分析“为什么中国如此行事”是一个在全球蓬勃发展的行业,而我们也可以进一步繁荣这个队伍,然后也许,在我们的努力后,就是每个人都做的那些后,对于中国的不可预测性,得到相同的结论。 因此,为什么我们不转而反思“为什么我们如此行事”。 或者更确切的说,如此反应或回应呢? There’s been a lot of provocative talk in Beijing, but we have seen no evidence of any military movement. In fact the one thing you can say with confidence — and since it is a well-known fact we are not betraying any secrets by saying so — that our satellites are good enough now to detect anything really unusual or significant in that area. Yet, some of the talk on our side is curious: upgradation of airbases along the borders, stationing of Sukhois, raising two more mountain divisions, sanction of funds and, lo and behold, quick environmental clearance of road-building projects in the border region. What do we expect? That, if the Chinese really intend to invade us, will they give us five years to get ready? Or, for heaven’s sake, if they did indeed invade us, will they just walk in, and annex Tawang or whatever else? Neither of the two is an inevitability or even likely. Our armed forces are good enough today to defend their territory and, while capability upgradations are needed, the flurry of activity today is not much preparation of some future invasion, but to make up for lost years in our military modernisation.
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Then why did we react with such alarm? Go back to 1987, when a real border stand-off took place with China (starting with Sumdurong Chu, ahead of Tawang) and both armies did indeed build up eyeball to eyeball. None of the alarm that seized us over the past few weeks was evident then. There was, in fact, a feeling of stoic confidence. Today, as a nation, economy, and military power, we are much stronger. Why, then, did we get more worried? 4 h; K. D" K! j2 S, d: O
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Could it be that this came from a much larger number of our people having much greater exposure to how rapidly China had progressed? Or in fact how much faster than us they had progressed? Until a decade ago, it was merely a talking point for the aam admi in India. Today, he sees images of the flawless grandeur of the Beijing Olympics while we make an embarrassing spectacle of our waffling with a mere Commonwealth Games. He sees Chinese goods swarm his daily life, from chappals to rakhis to TV sets to Ganesha idols while reading of how much of our exports to China are colonial-era raw materials like iron ore. Then he reads all the stories of the fears we have of high-tech Chinese goods and equipment, in vital areas like telecom and power, and of Chinese contractors in road and pipeline building. Could it just be that all this is now creating a deep-set inferiority complex, a feeling that we have been left behind, that we have lost that competition that we thought so enhanced our global stature? India-China was one hyphenated equation we so loved as the rest of the world used it in terms of our rising economic strength, and global power. I know it is an audacious — and risky — point to make, but could it be that the realisation of just how large the gap between us and China has become, and how fast it is increasing, has panicked us into believing that we have lost the competition even before we could join it, much like the war in 1962? Or that the Chinese, powering along at double-digit growth still, have peeled away like a champion marathoner over the also-rans in the last lap, in this case taking that hyphen away with them? 北京方面有不少挑衅言论,但我们看不到任何军事行动的证据。事实上,可以肯定地说——因为这是众所周知的事实,说出来也不算出卖了什么秘密——我们的卫星现在已足以发现我们上空真的不寻常或是引人注意的任何事物。然而,我们这边的某些言论颇为古怪:边境空军基地的升级,苏凯战机的装配,调配两个山地师,批准资金,瞧瞧,还有在边境地区快速清理道路建设环境的计划。我们期待什么?如果中国人真的有意入侵我们,他们难道会给我们5年时间做准备?或者说,看在老天爷的份上,如果他们真的侵略我们,会只是在达旺周围或是别的什么地方走两圈?并没有哪种假设是必然的,甚至都没有哪种是可能的。我们今天的军事力量足以捍卫自己的领土,尽管还需要提升能力,这些密集的活动不是为将来的入侵做准备,而是为了补回我们在军事现代化失去的那些年。 那么我们的反应为何如此警惕?回到1987年,那是一次真正的与中国在边境的对峙(始于达旺城前的桑多洛河谷),双方的军队真的面对面的扎营。在那之前的几周里没有任何明显的警报。事实上,那时处在一种斯多葛式的隐忍的信任感中。今天,作为一个国家,我们的经济和军事力量更加强大。那么为什么,我们却更加担忧了呢?这有可能是因为我们更多的人民更广泛地发现中国的进步有多快么?或是事实上他们前进得比我们快了多少?仅仅十年前, 这还仅仅只是印度某人的聊资(译:此处的aam admi似乎应为 aam aadmi,印地语中和john doe类似用法的泛指词。话说找这个词可把我折腾死了……)。而今天,他看着北京奥运的壮丽场景,而我们正在区区的英联邦运动会上制造尴尬百出。他看着中国产品涌进他的日常生活,从人字拖到rakhis(译:似乎是某种花纹风格的首饰,有知道的同学谢谢帮忙解释一下。) ,从电视机到象头神像,再看看我们又出口了多少还停留在殖民时代的初级原材料吧,比如铁矿石。然后他读到所有关于我们在一些最重要的领域,像是电信和电力,对中国高科技产品和设备以及中国道路和管线建设的承建商的恐惧的故事。那么是否所有这些正在造成一种根深蒂固的自卑情结,一种落后的感觉,一种输掉竞争的感觉,而我们本来深信这场竞争会加强我们的全球地位?印度——中国是一个相连的方程式,我们如此喜爱这个提法,因为在我们的经济实力上升和成为全球力量的过程中,世界的其他地区都在用这个方程式。我知道这是个大胆的——而且冒险的——说法,但是会不会我们和中国之间的已经存在的和正在加快的差距是如此之大,以至于使我们陷入恐慌,相信我们在参加这场竞争之前就已经输掉它了,就好像1962年的那场战争一样?或者是持续以两位数的势头增长的中国渐行渐远,就像一个马拉松冠军在最后一圈对失败者做的那样,在这种情况下扯掉和他相连的方程式另一端? An analysis of our own minds may show that the answer to our fears does not just lie in modernising more air bases or checking out the fortification of our forward defences and the quality of our bunkers. That we should do — and should have been doing — anyway. Good fences, as they say, make for good neighbours. The answer lies in getting our act together as a nation, a system of governance and society to be at least a worthy near-equal to China. We have to defeat internal threats like the Naxals with a sense of purpose, rather than lose time in vacuous debate; multiply, three times over, the pace of infrastructure-building — not just in Arunachal and Ladakh, but all over India; liberate ourselves from the fear of double-digit growth; and show much greater national focus than we do. ! K6 X6 D# t/ D1 z5 }1 F8 r1 a) K
The real threat today lies in our heads, collectively. Our country has somehow found smug peace with the idea of growing on the basis of “China minus four”, that is, if China grows at 10 per cent, aren’t we so happy to grow at six. Then we celebrate so proudly the fact of being the “second fastest growing economy in the world”. We forget that the Chinese grow that much from an economic base four times bigger than ours. And that if this differential continues, they will soon go so far ahead that we could be reduced to being to China what Mexico is to America. Will that leave us with more secure borders, even if we double our armies? 2 O( f! y( j$ z
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The fact is, our armies are now good enough to defend our territory, and will continue to be so. In fact, they will be stronger each passing year. But national power and pride are no longer determined merely in terms of territorial size or integrity. Cuba can protect its territory, but can it stop lakhs of its people from escaping to Florida? An electric fence built by the Americans cannot stop thousands of Mexicans from streaming in, and they will not stop even if Mexico were to use its entire army to keep its own people “within”. In today’s world, it is not rival armies, but your own people who can defy your borders and render them irrelevant. If the current differential in our economic growth and China’s continues for another decade, many of our border populations will start asking us, and themselves, some hard questions. Are we prepared for that?
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If we want to, we will have learn to look at China through a new prism, as an opportunity, rather than as a threat or enemy. Opportunity, because you can use the Chinese example to push for faster decision-making, decisive governance, economic reform to at least slow down the pace by which we are falling behind. If you merely focus on the military, you will be trapped forever in the “threat” syndrome and losing the real battle before you even joined it.
我们自己头脑中的分析表明解决我们的恐惧的答案不在于现代化更多空军基地或是检阅我们前方防御和掩体的质量。反正,这是我们应该做的,而且早就该这么做了。好的防御,正如他们所说,是与邻为善。解决的办法在于我们整个国家一起采取行动,建立一个政府和社会制度,以期至少称得上和中国差不多。我们必须击溃诸如企图明确的纳萨尔派(译:也就是毛派武装分子)之类的内部威胁,而不是把时间浪费在空洞的辩论上;加快基础建设的脚步三倍以上——不仅在阿鲁纳恰和拉达克,而要在整个印度;将自己从对两位数的增长速率的恐惧中解放出来;并阐明比我们现在做的更重要的国内重点。 今日真正的威胁来自我们的整个领导层。 我们国家以某种方式发现了在“中国减四”的基础上的增长这一理念下自鸣得意的和平,也就是说,如果中国增长达到百分之十,我们就该为百分之六的的高兴了。然后我们无比自豪地庆祝是“世界增长第二快的经济体”。我们忘记了中国人是在一个四倍于我们的经济规模的基础上做到这一增长的。如果这一差距继续,他们将很快走得很远以至于我们对于中国微小到就好象墨西哥和美国。这难道会给予我们更多的边境安全,即使我们的军队加倍? 事实是,现在我们的军队足以保卫我们的国土,以后也将如此。实际上,他们会一年比一年强大。但是国家的实力和自豪感不再仅仅取决于国土的大小或是完整。古巴可以保护他的领土,但他能阻止他上十万人民向佛罗里达州逃逸么?美国人建设一个电网,却并不能停止成千上万的墨西哥人的流入,而且即使墨西哥出动其全部军队来让他的人们留在“内部”,这种外逃也不会停止。今天的世界下,就算是你自己的人民也可能挑战你的国境线并让它变得毫无意义。如果目前我们和中国之间经济增长的差距在下一个十年继续,我们很多的边境居民将开始问我们,也问他们自己,一些让人难堪的问题。我们是否准备好回答了呢? 如果我们想回答这个问题,我们要学习用一个新的视角看中国,将之看作一个机遇,而不是一个威胁或者敌人。机遇,因为你们能利用中国的例子来推动更快的决策,果断管理,经济改革以便至少能减少我们落后的步伐。如果你们仅仅将注意力放在军事上,你们将永远陷入“威胁”综合症的魔潭而在参战之前就输掉这张战斗。 |