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【原文标题】China's New Propaganda Machine Going global
【登载媒体】wsj.com
【来源地址】http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123326012456829891.html
【译者】荡漾
【声明】本翻译供Anti-CNN使用，转载请注明译者及出处，谢谢！
【译文】
中国即将进行一项价值数百亿美元的海外媒体扩张项目，其中包括开通一个类似CNN的24小时全新闻英语频道。这些只不过是中国国有媒体“走向世界”并“在国际事务中更好地发出中国的声音”系统化策略的最新措施，该计划由中国主席胡锦涛2002年就任后即刻进行。中国的国有广播机构在很大程度上已加强了国外新闻业务、提高外语服务能力并建立了支持机构以便在新闻发生时立即获得政府信息。
这些计划的庞大规模引起许多有关中国长期目标的疑问。向来扮演中国共产党“喉舌”的国营广播机构能否真地转变为类似CNN与BBC的竞争实体？中国寻求世界听众的意愿能否放宽继续对报道予以限制的严厉的审查制度规则？毕竟中国需要相应“软”实力的增强来匹配其新近取得的经济实力，这是很自然的愿望；随着中国越来越参与国际事务，在世界舞台上也想要发出更大的声音。许多政府都通过国家资助广播机构的方式来操作，例如美国之音、德国之声。那么中国的不同之处是什么？
不同之处在于中国政府和中国共产党对于新闻和信息采取的强有力的控制。当然不否认近些年来中国中央电视台(CCTV)甚至是《人民日报》都显得更灵活、更现代而更少政治性。不过这并未改变国营频道的所有信息必须坚持政府立场的基本前提。
这并不奇怪。政府本身将所有对外工作的媒体视为“外宣”，即“对外宣传”。中央电视台(CCTV)在官方网页（仅限于中文版）上自称为“党和政府的喉舌”，其主要业务列在“宣传状况”栏目下，并称其新开设的外语频道“达到了对外宣传的新台阶”。新华社则自我定义为“有中国特色的通讯社”，并描述其工作“始终是在党中央直接领导下进行的”；新华社现任社长为（原）中央委员会宣传部副部长。对共产党来说宣传不是为新闻服务，宣传就是新闻。这些内容并未出现在这些网页的英文版中。
不过这并不说明中国没有高质量的新闻媒体。过去20年来中国传媒业的市场化带来大量“商业”报纸、杂志、互联网信息门户网站以及电台、电视台。尽管政府仍通过所有权、许可以及行政限制等综合手段加以控制，许多公司已发现吸引（听）观众的最好方法就是“新闻是硬道理”。面对激烈的竞争共产党作出回应，给予最为突出的国有传媒机构更多的空间并鼓励采用西式媒体市场营销手法。即便是CCTV现在也有一个优秀的中文调查节目，叫做《新闻调查》，播出的故事主题涉及诸如艾滋病孤儿、污染、征地和腐败。
然而这些计划还未实现“外宣”媒体的目标。来自中国的英语新闻目的并不在于告知外国公众新闻，而是向世界传递中国既定的视角。共产党的新闻管理基于“内外不同”，即国内与海外不同的原则。中国450亿美元的投资将主要用于针对外国观众装点门面，根本任务是不会改变的。
不仅英语言观众将收到经过精心打造的中国视角，除了即将到来的“中国CNN”外，CCTV最近增加了法语和西班牙语的播出并计划年内开设阿拉伯语及俄罗斯语频道。当美国广播网正在缩减他们的海外业务，中国国属新华社却正考虑将其海外办事处从100个增加到186个。
中国认为提高“海外宣传”将提供又一武器反击针对中国的批评，这种想法或许是对的。但最终中国将付出更大的代价。要知道只有自由、不带偏见地传播新闻而非误导的媒体才能实现软实力，才具有说服力。
注：作者Bequelin系人权观察亚洲部的高级研究员。
【原文】
By NICHOLAS BEQUELIN | From today's Wall Street Journal Asia
China is about to embark on a multibillion dollar media expansion overseas, including the establishment of a 24-hour English language all-news channel modeled after CNN. These are only the most recent steps in a methodical strategy for Chinese state media to "go global" and make "the voice of China better heard in international affairs" -- a plan set in motion by President Hu Jintao immediately after his accession to power in 2002. Since then, Chinese state broadcasters have considerably strengthened their foreign news operations, enhanced foreign language services and established the supporting bureaucracy to get the government's message out swiftly when news breaks.
The sheer scale of these plans raises many questions about China's long-term objectives. Can state-run broadcasters, whose traditional role is to be the "throat and tongue" of the Communist Party, really turn into competitors for the likes of CNN and the BBC? Or could China's quest for international audiences lead to a loosening of the tight censorship rules that continue to straightjacket its reporting? There is, after all, something natural in the aspiration of a rising global power to match its newly acquired economic might with a corresponding increase in its "soft" power, and its growing involvement in world affairs with a bigger voice in the international arena. Many governments do just that with state-sponsored broadcasting, like Voice of America or Germany's Deutsche Welle. So what's different with China?
The difference lies in the strong control the Chinese government and Chinese Communist Party exert over news and information. Sure, in recent years China Central Television (CCTV) and even the People's Daily look slicker, more contemporary and less political than in the past. But this has not changed the fundamental premise that all information on state-run channels must reflect the government's views.
This is no surprise. The state itself refers to all media work abroad as wai xuan, or "external propaganda." On its official Web site -- but only in Chinese -- CCTV describes itself as "the mouthpiece of the Party and the government," lists its main operations under the heading "propaganda situation," and refers to its new foreign language channels as "reaching a new stage in external propaganda." Xinhua -- a self-depicted "news agency with Chinese characteristics" -- describes its activities as "conducted from start to finish under the direct leadership of the central party authorities." Its current director is the vice-chair of the Central Committee's propaganda department. For the Party, propaganda is not a degraded form of information -- it is information. None of this context appears in the English language versions of these Web sites.
This is not to say that there is no quality journalism in China. Over the past 20 years the marketization of the Chinese media industry has led to an explosion in the number of "commercial" newspapers, magazines, Internet information portals and radio and television stations. Although they remain controlled by the government through a combination of ownership, licensing and administrative shackles, many companies have discovered that hard news is the best way to attract an audience. Faced with fierce competition, the Party has responded by giving more leeway to the most prominent state-run organs and encouraging the adoption of Western-style media marketing techniques. Even CCTV now has an excellent Chinese-language investigative program called "News Probe," which has broadcast stories on subjects such as AIDS orphans, pollution, land grabs and corruption.
However, these programs have not made their way to the wai xuan media. English-language news from China is not about informing the foreign public; it is about channeling a specific view of China to the rest of the world. The Party's information management is based on the principle of neiwai butong, or "domestic and overseas differ." Beijing's 45 billion yuan investment will be geared mainly to sprucing up these outlets for foreign viewers, but the fundamental mission won't change.
It's not just English-language viewers who will receive this polished view of China. In addition to the forthcoming "Chinese CNN," CCTV recently added French- and Spanish-language broadcasts and has plans to launch Arabic and Russian channels this year. While American networks are slashing their overseas operations, state-owned Xinhua news agency is considering expanding its overseas bureaus to 186 from 100.
Beijing might be right in thinking that improved "external propaganda" will provide an additional weapon to fight back against its critics, but ultimately it will come at the expense of something far more important: the soft and persuasive power that can only come with a free, unbiased media that informs rather than misleads.
Mr. Bequelin is a senior researcher at the Asia division of Human Rights Watch. |
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发表于 2010-1-9 19:37
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