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【中文标题】为什么印度不能靠中国太近 【原文标题】Why India should not get too close to China 【登载媒体】Rediff 【来源地址】 http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/jan/20/why-india-should-not-get-too-close-to-china.htm 【译者】unsignificant
【翻译方式】人工
【声明】本翻译供Anti-CNN使用，未经AC或译者许可，不得转载。
【原文库链接】http://bbs.m4.cn/thread-220203-1-1.html
译者：文章中粗体的地方是我感觉翻译不满意的地方，特向ACer中的翻译达人求教，讨论，希望能给出一个完美的翻译。请在后面跟帖指教，非常感谢。 小弟我遣词造句都不行，作此翻译，一为兴趣，二为学习。如有贻笑大方之处，请各位海涵，也请多多指教，不胜感激。
There is no need for India to club its future with that of the Middle Kingdom, notes Claude Arpi. 印度没有必要把自己的未来和中国捆绑在一起。
Indians are good people, but this can sometimes become a problem, especially in the fields of defence and foreign policy. Why so?
印度是好人，但有些时候这成了一个问题，特别是在防务和对外政策领域。为什么会这样呢？
Too often they believe that others are like them. The best example has been the first Indian prime minister's Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai policy. Jawaharlal Nehru [ Images ] believed in the fraternity of nations, he believed in peaceful co-existence, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; he tried hard to impose these lofty principles on India's neighbours, and particularly on China.
他们经常相信其他人像他们一样。最好的例子是印度第一任总理的Hindi Chini bhai-bhai政策，尼赫鲁相信国家间的兄弟情谊，他相信和平的共同生存，共同的不干涉其他国家的内部事务，共同的对其他国家的领土完整和宗主权的尊敬；他非常努力地用强迫地那些高尚的原则对待印度邻邦，特别是对中国。
A clever Zhou Enlai pretended to agree with the principles, but his mind functioned differently. Zhou, like his mentor Mao Zedong, was a hardcore revolutionary who believed in the omnipotence of war. Is it not the Great Helmsman who wrote, 'Some people have ridiculed us as the advocates of omnipotence of war. Yes, we are: We are the advocates of the omnipotence of the revolutionary war, which is not bad at all, but good and is Marxist.' There is nothing wrong in believing in the omnipotence of peace, as long one does not forget that others may think (and act) differently.
聪明的周恩来假装赞同那些原则，但是他的内在的想法是不同的。周，像他的导师毛泽东，是相信战争无上威力的革命的核心分子。这不正是伟大的舵手所写的：一些人嘲笑我们因为我们是战争全能的拥护者。是的，我们是。我们是革命战争全能的拥护者，这不算坏，而是好的，是马克思主义的。 相信和平万能没有错，只要他不要忘记其他人或许不是那样想的。
In the case of Nehru, the result was not long to come; eight years after signing the Panchsheel Agreement, China treacherously attacked India in the North East Frontier Agency and Ladakh. The nation paid a heavy price for not being able to understand the Chinese way of thinking.
在尼赫鲁的情况下，结果不久就到来了；签订Panchsheel协议的8年后，中国背叛了印度，攻击了印度东北部边境的机构和Ladakh。印度为不能理解中国的思考方式付出了惨重的代价。
The tragedy is that 50 years later, many in India still believe that the priority No 1 of India's foreign policy should be to be friends with China. Once again, there is nothing wrong to be China's 'friend' or even 'brother', but it should not be at the cost of India's interests or by bending backward over each whim and fancy of a single-party regime in Beijing.
悲剧是50年后，很多印度人仍然认为印度首要的第一对外政策是和中国成为朋友。又一次地，成为中国的"朋友甚至兄弟"没有错，但代价不应该是印度的利益或对一党专政的北京一厢情愿。
In India, you will find different types of apologists. Some could be called 'lackeys' (to use Mao's parlance): They usually have business or academic interests in China and love the reception they get when they travel to the Middle Kingdom. Let us not waste time over them.
在印度，你可以找到不同类型的卫道士。一些可以被叫做走狗（按毛泽东的说法）：他们通常在中国有商业和学术利益，并且喜爱他们到中央王国旅行时受到的招待。我们不用在他们身上浪费时间。
Many sincerely believe that India and China are two emerging economies, for a long time under the political and economic thumb of the West (in particular the United States), therefore their destiny is intimately linked. 另一些则真诚地相信印度和中国是正在崛起的两个经济体，在西方政治和经济上的宣传下（特别是美国），他们的命运是紧密联系在了一起的。
Their 'logical' conclusion is that Beijing and Delhi should work in tandem. They give a recent example: the common position at Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change.
他们的逻辑推论是北京和新德里应该像骑双人自行车一样协作。他们给了一个最近的例子：在哥本哈根气候大会上的共同位置。
I will not go into details but I totally disagree. Although there is one common denominator (the fast development rate), India's case is totally different from China's.
我不会提供细节但我完全不同意看法。虽然他们有一个共同的特性（快速的增长率），但印度的情况是中国完全不同的。
Even Prime Minister Manmohan Singh [ Images ] recently stated in Washington: 'Well, I have no hesitation in saying that I think development in India cannot be a carbon copy of what happens in China. And the Chinese system is very different.'
正如SINGH总理最近在华盛顿的声明：我可以不犹豫地说印度的发展不是中国模式的重复。中国的体系是非常不同德。
Speaking to CNN, he reiterated his government's stand: 'There is enough economic space for both our countries to realise the growth ambitions of our respective countries.' He however made it clear: 'We are a functioning democracy. Democracy is slow-moving
I always believed that it may be slow-moving in the short term, but in the long run, an arrangement which has the backing of the people at large will prove to be more durable.' If one analyses the future of the two countries, this should be kept in mind. India and China are different and their destinies may go in opposite directions.
他对CNN反复重申他政府的立场：我们都有足够的经济空间去让我们实现我们伟大祖国的经济增长目标。然而他清楚：我们是一个行之有效的民主政体。民主体制是移动缓慢的。我一直相信或许在短期内他是缓慢的，但是长期看，一个得到人民广泛支持的的安排会被证明更为持久。如果一个人分析两个国家的未来，应当记得这些。印度和中国史不同的而且他们的未来或许会相反。
Wei Jingsheng, the most famous Chinese dissident who spent 18 years in jail for proposing in the 1970's 'democracy' as the fifth 'modernisation', (Deng Xiaoping had spoken of the Four Modernisations) recently wrote an article in The Christian Science Monitor. He opposed the sentence of 11 years in prison for the mild dissident Liu Xiaobo.
WJS，中国最有名的持不。同。政。见者，曾因为在1970年建议将民主列为第五个现代化（邓小平提出了四个现代化）而被关押了18年，他最近写了一篇文章《基督教的科学监督》。他反对对轻度持不同。政。见。者LXB的11年监禁的判决。
Wei noted that because China 'now sits prominently at the tables of global governance', its leaders think thus: 'Since you made a fuss about releasing Liu after his arrest, we will punish him even more severely. In no uncertain terms, that will let you know that not only don't we care what you think, but we don't have to.' Wei adds: 'We Chinese are intimately acquainted with this authoritarian arrogance', before concluding: 'Now that China's leaders believe their prospering nation has emerged as a player in world history just as America's prestige has been weakened by the Iraq war and the recent financial meltdown, the hardliners have been able to wrest the upper hand once again.'
魏暗示因为中国“正坐在全球权力的桌子上”，她的领导人会这样想：既然你对逮捕刘后的释放小题大做，我们将会更严厉地处罚他。毫不含糊，会让你知道我们不仅不关心你的想法，但是我们没必要那样做。 魏又说：我们中国人熟知官府的自负。最后说道：既然中国的领导人相信当美国的威信因为伊拉克战争和最近的金融危机所削弱了，他们繁荣的国家已经在世界历史上作为一个选手出现了，那么鹰派又可以重新占上风。
No goody-goody Indian analyst will view things like this, though Indian 'experts' would better grasp China if they could understand the centrality of the survival of the Communist party in the preoccupation of all Chinese leaders. Today there is one issue which preoccupies the apparatchiks in Beijing more than anything else: the rate of the yuan. Indeed the fate of the regime depends on the continuation of the growth rate which itself largely depends on the low rate of the Chinese currency.
没有一个印度的老好人分析者这样看待问题，
虽然印度希望能够更好地了解中国，如果他们能够理解中国所有领导者的当务之急中的共产党的习惯的中心。今天，北京有一个别其他任何都要重要的事情：人民币汇率。实际上，这个政治制度的命运依赖于基于低廉的人民币所取得的持续的经济增长。
In 2009, the Barack Obama administration tried the bhai-bhai way with Beijing, accepting to drop a proposed meeting between the Dalai Lama and later forgetting all contentious issues during the November presidential visit to Beijing. But it did not pay off; Beijing hardened its stance in all fronts.
2009年，巴拉克.奥巴马总统和北京尝试了BHAI-BHAI的方式，接受了放弃和达赖会面的提议，之后在11月对北京的总统级访问时忘记了所有有争议的问题。但这没奏效；北京在全方面坚硬了他的立场。
In 2010, Obama seems decided to show the mandarins in Beijing that the US remains a power to reckon with. He will meet the Dalai Lama and sell Black Hawk helicopters and anti-missile batteries to Taiwan.
2010年，奥巴马看上去决心让北京的官僚们看看美国仍然被认为是一个超级大国。他将会见达赖并将黑鹰直升机和反导系统卖给台湾。
The Washington Post pointed out that many American analysts today believe that 'the Obama administration -- with its intensive outreach to Beijing -- tried too hard in its first year to cultivate ties with China. Playing hard to get might have helped smooth out China's swagger.'
华盛顿邮报指出一些美国分析家今天相信“奥巴马式施政”和他的伸向北京的加强的触角，在他第一年非常努力地培养他和中国的联系。这些努力或许有助于抚平中国的傲慢。
Another US expert explained: 'We're in the role of the supplicant' while a senior US trade official mildly threatened: 'If [Beijing] continues on this particular path in a strong and inflexible way, there will be a significant political backlash not just in the United States. China needs to be aware of that.'
另外一个美国专家解释说：当美国一个高级贸易官员轻微地恐吓说："如果北京继续强硬地、固执地在这种道路上走下去，将会受到政治上的强烈抵制，不仅仅在美国。中国必须注意这些."我们其实是处于恳求者的角色。
For these reasons, Beijing will have to reevaluate its currency, sooner or later. Even in China many agree that China has no choice. Zhang Bing, a researcher at the Institute of World Economics and Politics under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, stated in a research paper that the government's current yuan policy of gradual reform is wrong. Zhang admitted: 'There's a very urgent need for pushing forward the reform plan on the yuan and now is the best timing.' He concluded that 'a 10 percent appreciation in the yuan against the dollar should have a limited impact on the Chinese economy. It would reduce speculative fund inflows by effectively eliminating expectations of a yuan appreciation.'
因为那些原因，中国迟早将不得不重新对人民币进行定价。甚至在中国，一些人认为中国没有选择。张兵，中国社会科学院的世界经济政治研究所的一名研究人员，在一份研究报告中指出政府的逐步改良的人民币汇率政策是错误的。张承认，有非常紧急的需要去推进改良计划，现在就是最好的时机。他推断10%的人民币对美元汇率的增值对中国经济的影响有限。它通过消除对人民币升值的预期减少投机性基金的流入。
Whether Beijing decides to reevaluate the yuan in 2010 or not, ultimately the decision is inescapable and this will have incalculable consequences for the Middle Kingdom.
不管北京在2010年是否重新对人民币估值，决定最终是逃避不了的，而且这对中央王国会有难以预料的后果。
On January 1, Swaminathan Aiyar in The Economic Times predicted that during the next decade: 'India will overtake China as the fastest-growing economy in the world. China will start ageing and suffering from a declining workforce, and will be forced to revalue its currency. So its growth will decelerate, just as Japan decelerated in the 1990s after looking unstoppable in the 1980s. Having become the world's second-biggest economy, China's export-oriented model will erode sharply -- the world will no longer be able to absorb its exports at the earlier pace.'
一月一日，SWANMINATHAN AIYAR在经济学人杂志上预测在下一个二十年中，印度将取代中国成为经济发展最快的国家。中国将开始老龄化并遭受减少的劳动力，将被强迫对他的货币进行定价。所以她的增长是减速的，就像日本在1980年代看上去不可阻挡但在1990年却开始衰退一样。中国已经成为世界第二大经济体，中国的出口导向模式将大幅消弱，世界将不再能够像以前那样的速度吸收她的出口。
Well, the future will tell us if the prediction was true. But in the meantime, Chinese supremacy may continue for some time. According to deal tracking firm Dealogic: 'Global property sector M&A [merger & acquisitions] reached just $151.8 billion in 2009, the lowest level since 2003'. However, China witnessed an increase of 41 percent in its M&A levels from its previous year: 'China attracted deals amounting to $29.3 billion or 19 percent of the global volume -- the highest total on record,' commented Dealogic.
时间将告诉我们预测是不是正确的. 但是在这个时候，中国霸权将持续一段时间。根据交易数据跟踪公司DEALOGIC的：《全球资产》
并购部分在2009年达到1518亿美元，是自2003年以来的最低水平。不管怎样，中国比去年在资产并购水平上上升了41个百分点。“中国吸引了总数达到293亿美元占全球总数的19%的合同，历史上的新高。”DEALOGIC评论道。
The only certainty is that the situation of the Middle Kingdom is far more unstable than in India. A scenario found on The Financial Times' web site makes interesting studying. The author projects himself to 2019 when shortage of water in China heralds the end of an epoch: 'By 2015, it was [already] obvious: China was seriously parched. The Great Wall of Credit of 2009-2012 had unleashed too much industrial capacity consuming too much water. That exacerbated a nationwide shortage -- China had more than a fifth of the world's population, but only 6 per cent of its fresh water. Four years later and the crisis has taken on ruinous dimensions. Crop failure and famine in the deserted interiors; emergency rationing in the teeming coastal cities. Ten years ago [2009] China had it all: a well-nourished workforce, vast reserves of paper money, a new swagger on the international stage. The sharp currency revaluation of 2010 unleashed a global mergers and acquisitions spree the likes of which the world had never seen. That president Xi Jinping is considering beseeching poorer neighbours for food aid is a measure of how far the mighty have fallen.'
唯一可以确认的是中央王国的情况没有印度稳定。在财经时代网站上发现的一个事态值得研究。作者推想他自己到2019年当缺水作为中国一个纪元的结束的预兆时：到了2015年，缺水已经很明显了。中国明显很干渴。2009-2012年的信用长城放纵了太多的工业容纳力，消耗了太多的水。加重了全国范围的短缺，中国拥有世界五分之一多的人口，但只有6%的淡水。四年后，危机将呈现灾难性的规模。在干旱的内陆的农作物歉收和饥荒；在富饶的沿海城市实行紧急定量配给。 10年以前(2009年)中国有一个营养良好的劳动力接触，大量的纸币储蓄，国际舞台上的新力量。货币在2010年的大幅增值掀起了一个前所未有的全球的并购和收购浪潮。习近平主席被认为是一个恳求食物援助的贫穷邻居。
One can envisage several other scenarios, but one point is certain, China will have to face far more serious problems than India in the years to come. For sure, there is no need for India to club its future with that of the Middle Kingdom.
你可以想象几个其他场面，但是有一点是确定的，中国在将来的岁月中将不得不面临远远比印度多很多的问题。可以确定的是，印度没有必要把自己的未来和那个所谓的中央王国捆绑。
One of the possible future scenarios is certainly a conflict with India for water which will be triggered by the nervousness of the declining empire.
一个可能的未来是一定这个衰退中的帝国将因为他的神经质就水资源和印度产生冲突。
India can continue to believe in the omnipotence of peace, but it should be ready for any eventuality.
印度可以继续相信和平万能，但应该做好面对任何不可测事件的准备。
编译交流 见7#
That president Xi Jinping is considering beseeching poorer neighbours for food aid is a measure of how far the mighty have fallen.'
习近平主席正考虑向更加贫穷的邻居请求粮食援助，这说明这一强国衰退到了什么地步。
'now sits prominently at the tables of global governance'
现在中国在全球统治力量中地位显赫。
共同立场
这文章真是长啊，楼主辛苦了。很多地方我也不知道怎么翻，等高手指正~~~遥远的冬天 发表于 2010-1-27 17:52  10# Hindi Chini bhai-bhai：印度中国是兄弟
Yog_Sothoth 发表于 2010-1-27 18:31 | 
狗仔卡
发表于 2010-1-27 16:54
提升卡
变色卡
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千斤顶
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楼主
能理解LZ的辛苦，印度人的英语真让人头疼的！有时候看完一句话都不知所云。
发表于 2010-1-27 17:52
