|
【中文标题】123万亿美圆——警告，中国2040年的经济预测。
【原文标题】$123,000,000,000,000*——*China’s estimated economy by the year 2040. Be warned.
【登载媒体】FP 外交政策
【来源地址】http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/123000000000000?page=0,0
【译者】USSR/PodBots
【翻译方式】人工
【声明】本翻译供Anti-CNN使用，未经AC或译者许可，不得转载。
【原文库链接】http://bbs.m4.cn/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=223030&extra=
In 2040, the Chinese economy will reach $123 trillion, or nearly three times the economic output of the entire globe in 2000. China's per capita income will hit $85,000, more than double the forecast for the European Union, and also much higher than that of India and Japan. In other words, the average Chinese megacity dweller will be living twice as well as the average Frenchman when China goes from a poor country in 2000 to a superrich country in 2040. Although it will not have overtaken the United States in per capita wealth, according to my forecasts, China's share of global GDP -- 40 percent -- will dwarf that of the United States (14 percent) and the European Union (5 percent) 30 years from now. This is what economic hegemony will look like.
到2040年，中国的经济总量将达到123万亿美圆，也将几乎是2000年全球经济产出的三倍。中国的人均收入将达到85000美圆，将会是预计中欧盟人均收入的一倍，而且也将大大高于浮尸国和11区的人均收入。换而言之，当中国从2000年的贫穷国家跃居为2040年的超级富国时，中国的大城市居民将过上比普通法国人好两倍的日子。尽管还不会在人均财产上取代美国，依照我的估计，中国30年后在全球GDP中所占份额—40％，也将使美国（14％）、欧盟（5％）相形见绌。这就是一个经济霸权未来的样子。
Most accounts of China's economic ascent offer little but vague or threatening generalities, and they usually grossly underestimate the extent of the rise -- and how fast it's coming. (For instance, a recent study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace predicts that by 2050, China's economy will be just 20 percent larger than that of the United States.) Such accounts fail to fully credit the forces at work behind China's recent success or understand how those trends will shape the future. Even China's own economic data in some ways actually underestimate economic outputs.
对此，多数对中国经济增长的报告不仅少有提到，而且不是含混不清就是危言耸听的空泛言论。而且它们往往极大地低估了这个增长的范围——以及它的高速。（举例来说，一项卡内基基金会近期的研究报告预计，到2050年，中国经济仅会比美国大20％。）这种报告未能全面地重视中国近年来成就背后所作用的力量，也没有了解这个趋势会怎样地塑造未来。甚至中国自己的经济数据在某些方面，也实际上低估了经济产出。
It's the same story with the relative decline of a Europe plagued by falling fertility as its era of global economic clout finally ends. Here, too, the trajectory will be more sudden and stark than most reporting suggests. Europe's low birthrate and its muted consumerism mean its contribution to global GDP will tumble to a quarter of its current share within 30 years. At that point, the economy of the 15 earliest EU countries combined will be an eighth the size of China's.
同样的故事也出现在欧洲作为全球经济动力结束的时代，困扰于低出生率的欧洲，面临着相对衰落。在这里也是同理，不同于多数报告所认为的，经济曲线将变得更突兀和陡峭。欧洲的低出生率和消褪了的消费主义意味着它对全球GDP的贡献，在30年后将跌至现有份额的四分之一。
This is what the future will look like in a generation. It's coming sooner than we think. What, precisely, does China have going so right for it?
这就是未来在一代人的时间里会具有的样子，它来得比我们想象的要快。 为什么，中国到底是怎么变得如此与之相称？
The first essential factor that is often overlooked: the enormous investment China is making in education. More educated workers are much more productive workers. (As I have reported elsewhere, U.S. data indicate that college-educated workers are three times as productive, and a high school graduate is 1.8 times as productive, as a worker with less than a ninth-grade education.) In China, high school and college enrollments are rising steeply due to significant state investment. In 1998, then-President Jiang Zemin called for a massive increase in enrollment in higher education. At the time, just 3.4 million students were enrolled in China's colleges and universities. The response was swift: Over the next four years, enrollment in higher education increased 165 percent, and the number of Chinese studying abroad rose 152 percent. Between 2000 and 2004, university enrollment continued to rise steeply, by about 50 percent. I forecast that China will be able to increase its high school enrollment rate to the neighborhood of 100 percent and the college rate to about 50 percent over the next generation, which would by itself add more than 6 percentage points to the country's annual economic growth rate. These targets for higher education are not out of reach. It should be remembered that several Western European countries saw college enrollment rates climb from about 25 to 50 percent in just the last two decades of the 20th century.
开初始和基本的一点常常为人们所忽视：中国在教育上的巨大投入。【I lol’d】更有文化的工人就是更有生产力的工人。（正如我在其他地方所讲的，美国的数据表明，较之于初中文化的工人，高中文化的工人生产力是其1.8倍，大学毕业的工人则是其3倍。）在中国，高中和大学在校生在政府的重大投资下急剧增长。1998年时，时任国家主席江泽民号召在高等教育领域来一场大规模扩招。在当时，中国高校在校生仅为340万人。响应是迅速的：过了四年，受高等教育者就增长了165％，并且出国留学人数增长了152％。在2000年到2004年间，高校人数继续急剧增长了约50％，我预计中国用下一代人的时间，会将高中人数再扩大差不多100％，高校则扩招50％。这样凭借自身力量，就使得中国的年度经济增长率再加上6个多百分点。这些目标并非遥不可及，要记得，几个西欧国家在20世纪后二十年出现了高校入学率攀升25～50％的增长。
And it's not just individual workers whose productivity jumps significantly as a result of more education; it's true of firms as well, according to work by economist Edwin Mansfield. In a remarkable 1971 study, Mansfield found that the presidents of companies that have been early adopters of complex new technologies were on average younger and better educated than heads of firms that were slower to innovate.
而且不仅仅是劳动者个体由于教育程度的增加而显著地提高了生产力，对于企业来说也是如此。根据经济学者Edwin Mansfield在1971年发表的一份著名的论文，他发现较为快速地采用复杂的新技术的企业总裁，比起对革新反应迟钝的老总来说，平均年龄更轻，受教育程度更高。
The second thing many underestimate when making projections for China's economy is the continued role of the rural sector. When we imagine the future, we tend to picture Shanghai high-rises and Guangdong factories, but changes afoot in the Chinese countryside have made it an underappreciated economic engine. In analyzing economic growth, it is useful to divide an economy into three sectors: agriculture, services, and industry. Over the quarter-century between 1978 and 2003, the growth of labor productivity in China has been high in each of these sectors, averaging about 6 percent annually. The level of output per worker has been much higher in industry and services, and those sectors have received the most analysis and attention. (I estimate that China's rapid urbanization, which shifts workers to industry and services, added 3 percentage points to the annual national growth rate.) However, productivity is increasing even for those who remain in rural areas. In 2009, about 55 percent of China's population, or 700 million people, still lived in the countryside. That large rural sector is responsible for about a third of Chinese economic growth today, and it will not disappear in the next 30 years.
第 二个问题就是，多数人在对中国经济进行预测时，都将农业部门当作一成不变的角色而加以低估。当我们设想未来时，我们倾向于描绘上海的摩天楼和广东的工厂群，而在中国的农村所进行的变革使得它成为一个未被正确估计的经济引擎。在对经济增长进行分析时，常常将经济划分为三个产业部门：农业、服务业、工业。在1978年到2003的四分之一个世纪间，中国的劳动生产率在每个产业间都大大提高了，年均增长6％。在工业和服务业，工人人均产出水平要高很多，于是这些产业受到了最多的关注和评判。（我个人估计中国飞速的城市化进程，给二三产业的年均增长率增加了3个百分点。）然而，即使在仍是农村的地区，生产力也在增长。在2009年，约55％的中国人口，即7亿人，仍然居住在农村。这个巨大的农业部门承担着今日中国经济增长三分之一的责任，而且它在未来三十年里也不会消失。
Third, though it's a common refrain that Chinese data are flawed or deliberately inflated in key ways, Chinese statisticians may well be underestimating economic progress. This is especially true in the service sector because small firms often don't report their numbers to the government and officials often fail to adequately account for improvements in the quality of output. In the United States as well as China, official estimates of GDP badly underestimate national growth if they do not take into account improvements in services such as education and health care. (Most great advances in these areas aren't fully counted in GDP because the values of these sectors are measured by inputs instead of by output. An hour of a doctor's time is considered no more valuable today than an hour of a doctor's time was before the age of antibiotics and modern surgery.) Other countries have a similar national accounting problem, but the rapid growth of China's service sector makes the underestimation more pronounced.
第 三点，尽管中国的经济数据在关键部分掺杂着水份已经是老生常谈，中国的统计部门也很可能低估了经济的增长。这在服务业尤为真实，因为小企业常常对政府瞒报数据，而官方也常常不能有效地对生产在质的改进上作出足够的评估。在中国，和美国一样，若对教育和医疗的改善等服务业的增长上未能加以评估，政府对GDP增长的官方预测就会大大低估。（大部分在此方面的重大进步没有被充分地计入GDP中，因为这些领域的估价是以投入而不是看产出来衡量的。在今日一个医生一小时的价值，较之于抗生素和现代外科手术出现前的时代，被认为已经缩水了。）其他国家也有同样的国民经济核算问题，但中国在服务业上的快速增长使得这个低估的问题更加明显。
Fourth, and most surprising to some, the Chinese political system is likely not what you think. Although outside observers often assume that Beijing is always at the helm, most economic reforms, including the most successful ones, have been locally driven and overseen. And though China most certainly is not an open democracy, there's more criticism and debate in upper echelons of policymaking than many realize. Unchecked mandates can of course lead to disaster, but there's a reason Beijing has avoided any repeats of the Great Leap Forward in recent years. For instance, there is an annual meeting of Chinese economists called the Chinese Economists Society. I have participated in many of them. There are people in attendance who are very critical of the Chinese government -- and very openly so. Of course, they are not going to say "down with Hu Jintao," but they may point out that the latest decision by the finance ministry is flawed or raise concerns about a proposed adjustment to the prices of electricity and coal, or call attention to issues of equity. They might even publish a critical letter in a Beijing newspaper. Then the Chinese finance minister might actually call them up and say: "Will you get some of your people together? We would like to have some of our people meet with you and find out more about what you are thinking." Many people don't realize such back-and-forth occurs in Beijing. In this sense, Chinese economic planning has become much more responsive and open to new ideas than it was in the past.
第 四点，也是令一些人最感惊讶的是，中国的政治制度不像是你所想象的那般。尽管外界的观察者总是假定北京始终是掌舵者，而在经济改革方面，包括最成功的那些例子，始终是由地方政府驱动与监督的。中国当然不是开放的民主政体，而尽管如此在高层的决策中也存在有许多人没有意识到的批评与争论。不受约束的行政命令 当然地会导致灾难，但近些年来北京政府有理由避免重复大跃进的错误。举例来说，每年都会举行中国留美经济学会年会，我也多次参加。有些与会学者对中国政府进行尖锐的抨击——而且非常公开。当然，他们不会说“打倒胡Core”， 但他们会指出财政部新近的政策是有问题的，或是对提高电煤价格产生忧虑，或是呼吁对股权发行的关注。他们甚至可以在北京的报纸上发表批评的公开信。接着中国的财政部长可能就会真的打电话问他们：“你能不能叫上一些你们的人？我们好派些人与你们会晤，以便更深入地了解你们的意见。”很多人没有意识到发生在北 京的这种你来我往的接洽。从这个意义上来说，中国比起过去，在经济规划上对新的观念更加开放和积极响应。
Finally, people don't give enough credit to China's long-repressed consumerist tendencies. In many ways, China is the most capitalist country in the world right now. In the big Chinese cities, living standards and per capita income are at the level of countries the World Bank would deem "high middle income," already higher, for example, than that of the Czech Republic. In those cities there is already a high standard of living, and even alongside the vaunted Chinese propensity for saving, a clear and growing affinity for acquiring clothes, electronics, fast food, automobiles -- all a glimpse into China's future. Indeed, the government has made the judgment that increasing domestic consumption will be critical to China's economy, and a host of domestic policies now aim to increase Chinese consumers' appetite for acquisitions.
最后一点，人们对中国长期受抑制的消费主义没有予以足够认识。在许多方面，中国是当今世界最资本主义的国家。在中国的大城市里，可划归到世行 “中高收入国家”等级的生活水平和人均收入，比方说比起捷克，已经是更上一层楼。在这些大城市里，已经存在着高水平的生活，这还是在中国人自矜的储蓄习惯下，一种清晰的且在增长的对服装、家电、快餐【lol wut?】、汽车的追求，都是对中国未来作一管窥。事实上，政府已经作出判断，提高国内需求对中国经济将是至关重要的，而现今大量的国内政策都旨在刺激中国消费者对消费品的胃口。
And Europe? Europe, by which I mean the 15 earliest EU members, faces twin challenges of demography and culture, its economic future burdened by a mix of reproductive habits and consumer restraint.
然而欧洲又如何呢？欧洲，我的意思是指15个欧盟初始会员国，面临着人口学和文化的双重挑战，它的经济前景受迫于生育习惯和消费抑制的双重桎梏。
Europeans, of course, won't be eating grass in 2040. Their economic decline over the next 30 years will be relative, not absolute, as technological advances and other factors should allow Europe's overall labor productivity to continue to grow about 1.8 percent annually. Yet their percentage contribution to global GDP will tumble, shrinking by a factor of four, from 21 percent to 5 percent, in a generation.
欧洲人，在2040年当然不会吃草度日。他们未来三十年的经济衰退只是相对的，而不是绝对的。在技术进步和其他因素作用下，欧洲总体的劳动生产力会以年均1.8％持续增长。不过他们对全球GDP贡献的百分比会下跌，跌落到原先的四分之一，即从21％掉到5％，在一代人之内。
Demography is the first key issue. The population of Western European countries has been aging rapidly, and that is likely to continue over the next several decades. The basic reason: European couples aren't producing enough babies. Europe's total fertility rate has been below the level needed to replace the population for about 34 years, according to a 2005 Rand Corp. study. As a result, the percentage of women of childbearing age will decline, in the earliest 15 EU countries, from about 50 percent in 2000 (it was also about 50 percent in 1950) to the U.N. projection of about 35 percent in 2040. So we have a double whammy: Not only will reproductive-age women have sharply reduced fertility rates, but the proportion of women who are in their childbearing years will also have declined sharply. By 2040, almost a third of Western Europe's population may be over age 65.
人口问题是最核心的问题。西欧的人口一直在迅速老龄化，而且很可能会在接下来的几十年里继续老龄化。根本原因在于：欧洲的夫妇不能生育足够的孩子。根据2005年兰德公司的报告，34年来的欧洲总体出生率一直在更新人口的需求水平之下。其结果就是，在生育年龄内的妇女比重就会下降，在欧盟的15个早期成员国中，从2000年的约50％（1950年也是50％），将跌至联合国预计的2040年的35％。这样就给了我们双重打击：不仅在生育年龄内的妇女会急剧地降低生育率，而且生育年龄内的妇女比重也在急剧减少。到2040年，几乎三分之一的欧洲人口将步入花甲之年。【Good for’em】 | 
狗仔卡
发表于 2010-2-9 01:46
提升卡
变色卡
抢沙发
千斤顶
显身卡
楼主
发表于 2010-2-9 06:18
...乐观其成.但眼下还是做好自己的事.