【中文标题】现在该担心中国吗？
【原文标题】Time to Worry about China?
【登载媒体】时代周刊
【原文作者】Michael Schuman
【原文链接】http://curiouscapitalist.blogs.time.com/2010/02/25/time-to-worry-about-china/
在时代周刊的香港办公室里，我被大家认为是一个专门抨击中国的家伙。我觉得这很不公平，因为我绝对相信中国将成为下一个超级大国。但是，我认为很多观察家看待中国成长故事的方式是盲目乐观的。很多经济学家似乎是在一厢情愿地假设中国经济中不存在那些严重的结构问题，比较流行的观点是，中国有某种方法比其它国家更有能力处理这些问题。这不能让我信服。所有的迹象都显示中国的长远发展是值得乐观的，但是这并不代表它在向全球超级实力发展的道路上不会遇到挫折和创伤（类似骨折或脑震荡之类的创伤）。美国在走向世界独立经济体的道路上经历了崩溃、恐慌、衰退，甚至一场内战，为什么中国不会呢？
我怀疑中国是否正在准备拆东墙补西墙。诚然，中国GDP在2009年的增长（8.7%）是一项令人吃惊的成就，但是，北京在金融危机期间为了保持增长而采取了一些措施，它已经开始在对抗这些措施所带来的副作用了。
举个例子，华尔街日报有一篇精彩的文章，关于中国本地政府存在的债务危机问题。很多省份和城市在去年的金融危机期间鲸吞了大批贷款，用于基础设施建设，这的确会极为有效地刺激GDP的增长。但是现在，华尔街日报说，北京的领导人越来越担心当地政府无力偿还贷款。
这个现象还带出了更大的问题：中国的刺激政策给其金融系统造成了哪些损害？中国的GDP疯长源于贷款额的巨大增长。与2008年相比，银行在2009年的放贷额几乎增长了一倍，达到了GDP总额的30％。这种放贷趋势与常规的经济运作模式背道而驰。在经济危机期间，银行应当更加谨慎，贷款需求也会减少，因为公司会缩减投资规模。但是中国的银行则与此相反。所有这些贷款都进入那些有信誉的借款人的口袋吗？都被投入到有盈利预期的项目确保借款人可以偿还贷款吗？除非中国的银行家有非凡的投资风险分析能力（我向你保证他们没有），否则以上的答案都是不。如果中国政府即将陷入债务危机，那么这会对国有企业和私人经济体带来什么影响？这个问题不是在讨论中国的银行是否会产生不良贷款，而是在说这些不良贷款有多少，有多么不稳定。
我不是唯一一个担心这个问题的人，汇丰银行在2月19日的一份报告中提到“美国资金经理们达成的共识全部指向中国”。他们所担心的首要问题是潜在的不良贷款（其它问题包括资产泡沫、通货膨胀，其它问题我会在“好奇的资本家”栏目中继续介绍）。汇丰银行的全球首席策略分析师Garry Evans是这篇报告的作者，他承认不良贷款是完全可能发生的，但是似乎还认为这是未来要面对的一个问题，当下并无影响。他说，即使一些贷款无法收回，其造成的多方面影响也要在5到10年之后才会体现出来。“不良贷款在今年或明年都不是一个大问题。”
很多经济学家会和你说，中国很有可能会面对越来越多的不良贷款，但是他们不认为这是一个危险信号，至少目前还不是。希望他们是对的。但是中国的政策制定者们明显在担忧了，我相信他们比我们更了解这个问题的影响范围。过去两个月里，中国领导人已经采取了一些措施遏制银行贷款、避免他们收支平衡表上积累的风险。就在上个星期，中国银监会发布了新的指示，目的是提高贷款质量、避免借款人滥用贷款。
目前，所有美国人都在害怕过多的、有危险的债务，我们只希望中国不要犯同样的错误。
原文：
I've gotten a bit of a reputation around the TIME office in Hong Kong of being something of a China basher. I don't think that's fair, since I have absolutely no doubt China will be the next great superpower. But I do have an issue with what I consider blind optimism on the part of many observers about the China growth story. Too many economists out here seem to wish away some of the serious structural problems in China's economy. The prevailing attitude is that China is somehow more capable of dealing with such problems than other countries. I'm not convinced. There is every reason to be optimistic about China's long-term prospects, but that doesn't mean there won't be bumps and bruises (and an occasional broken bone or minor coronary) along the road to global greatness. The U.S. had its share of crashes, panics, recessions, and even a civil war on the way to becoming the world's indispensible economy. Why would China be any different?
I'm starting to wonder if China is heading into one of those rough patches right now. Sure, China's GDP growth in 2009 (at 8.7%) was an amazing achievement. But now Beijing has to contend with the fallout from the measures it took to create that growth during the Great Recession.
For example, there is a fascinating story in The Wall Street Journal about the percolating problem of debt at China's local governments. Provinces and cities gorged on bank loans during the downturn last year to spend on infrastructure projects, which was a major spur to GDP growth. But now, the Journal says, Beijing's leaders have become nervous that local governments won't be able to pay back their debts.
This problem gets at a much bigger issue: What damage has China's stimulus plan done to its financial system? China's GDP surge was created by a credit boom of biblical proportions. Banks granted almost twice the number of loans in 2009 as they did the year before, an amount equivalent to nearly 30% of GDP. This increase in credit runs counter to usual economic logic. In a downturn, banks should become more cautious, and there is less demand for loans anyway as corporations scale back investments. But China's banks headed in the opposite direction. Could all of this deluge of loans have gone to creditworthy borrowers, to be spent on profitable projects that would allow them to pay their bankers back? Unless Chinese bankers have some superhuman powers to analyze credit risk (and I assure you they don't), that seems impossible. If China's local governments might be in trouble with their debt, what does that imply about state companies and the private sector? The question is not whether non-performing loans (NPLs) at China's banks will rise. The question is by how much, and how destabilizing could that be?
I'm not the only one worried about this emerging problem. HSBC, in a Feb. 19 report, remarked that “the consensus among U.S. fund managers has become deeply bearish on China.” Among their chief concerns was the potential for rising NPLs (along with asset bubbles and inflation, other issues I'll be following on Curious Capitalist). Garry Evans, HSBC's global head of equity strategy and the report's author, acknowledged that higher NPLs are a possibility, but then seems to consider it an issue for the future, not the present. Even if some of the loans turn to NPLs, he comments, the process in many cases could take five to 10 years to play out. “A rise in NPLs will not be an issue for this year or next year,” Evans wrote.
Many economists out here will tell you there is a good likelihood China will face rising NPLs, but they don't see that as a significant danger, at least not right now. Hopefully, they're right. But China's regulators are obviously worried, and I assume they know more about the extent of the problem than we do. For the past two months, China's leaders have been taking steps to rein in the banks' lending and the risk mounting on their balance sheets. Just last weekend, China's bank regulator announced new directives aimed at improving credit quality and preventing the misuse of loans by borrowers.
By now any American can tell you about the horrors of excessive, risky debt. Let's hope China is not making the same mistake.
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