【10.03.24 纽约时报】The Dark Side of China Aid

青蛙小王子

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/opinion/25iht-edwalker.html

A growing number of developing countries receive billions of dollars a year in assistance, loans, and investments from China. Already in 2010, Beijing has committed $25 billion to Asean nations. In March, Zambia’s president returned from a trip to China with a $1 billion loan in hand.
As Beijing’s levels of foreign assistance swell and its relationship deepens with countries across Africa, Asia and Latin America, a key question emerges: What impact will investments by an opaque and repressive superpower have on governance standards in the developing world?
Findings from a Freedom House analysis, “Countries at the Crossroads,” point to the challenges that many of these recipient countries confront as they struggle to build more transparent and accountable systems. Fighting corruption and safeguarding freedom of expression and assembly are proving especially difficult. The dark side of Beijing’s engagement, with its nontransparent aid and implicit conditions, risks tipping the balance in the wrong direction.
To appreciate the “China effect” on developing countries, it is essential to understand the methods Beijing is using to exert influence and warp incentives for accountable governance.
First, as international financial institutions and donor organizations seek to encourage stronger governance norms, aid from China has become an alternate source of funds. Recipient governments use these as a bargaining chip to defer measures that strengthen transparency and rule of law, especially those that could challenge elite power.
Cambodia is a telling example. The government in Phnom Penh, which has received substantial aid from the United States and other democracies, now receives comparable amounts from China. The Cambodian authorities have used this “assistance competition” to their advantage. Rather than combating corruption and implementing sorely needed reforms to the judiciary and media sector, Prime Minister Hun Sen’s government has shrunk space for alterative voices and independent institutions. Western donors, fearful of losing influence, have been increasingly hesitant to penalize the regime for its failures.
In October, the Guinean government announced a $7 billion deal with the China International Fund just as the international community was considering sanctions following a massacre of opposition supporters. The case underscores how even investments by a private entity, this one with ties to Beijing, can be manipulated to undermine efforts to support human rights standards.
Second, while “no strings attached” is commonly used to describe China’s approach in the developing world, the reality is not quite so benign. A combination of subtle and not-so-subtle conditions typically accompanies this largesse. Included among these is pressure to muzzle voices critical of the Chinese government, often undermining basic freedoms of expression and assembly in these countries. The authorities in Nepal, which have recently received a 50 percent boost in aid from Beijing, have violently suppressed Tibetan demonstrations, including the arrest of thousands of exiles in 2008. In December of last year, Cambodia’s government forcibly repatriated 20 Uighurs to China, where they face almost certain imprisonment and torture. Three days later, Beijing announced a package of deals with Cambodia estimated at $1 billion.
Even more democratically developed countries are not immune to such pressures. In March 2009, the South African government barred the Dalai Lama’s attendance at a pre-World Cup peace conference.
Third, Chinese aid funds are frequently conditioned on being used to purchase goods from firms selected by Chinese officials without an open bidding process. In Namibia, anti-corruption agencies are investigating suspected kickbacks in a deal involving security scanners purchased by the government from a company until recently headed by President Hu Jintao’s son. Beijing’s response has been to stonewall investigations and activate its robust Internet censorship apparatus, sanitizing online references to the case Chinese citizens might stumble across.
Observers such as the scholar Larry Diamond have identified countries that are semi-democratic, rather than autocracies, as the most promising ground for expanding the ranks of consolidated democracies globally. The patently negative aspects of the Chinese Communist Party’s developing world influence could deal a real blow to this aspiration.
Findings from Freedom House’s global analysis of political rights and civil liberties put this phenomenon in perspective. Over the past five years countries with only some features of institutionalized democratic systems have slipped significantly — 57 countries within the “partly free” category have experienced declines, while only 38 improved.
Beijing’s deepening involvement in these cases may generate a number of effects, some perhaps positive for short-term economic development. But the dark underbelly of the Chinese regime’s involvement — the opacity of its aid and the illiberal conditions that underpin it — means that over the long haul, incentives for strengthening accountable governance and basic human rights are being warped, or even reversed.

tancong

认领

tancong

【10.03.24 纽约时报】The Dark Side of China Aid
【10.03.24 纽约时报】中国援助的黑暗面

A growing number of developing countries receive billions of dollars a year in assistance, loans, and investments from China. Already in 2010, Beijing has committed $25 billion to Asean nations. In March, Zambia’s president returned from a trip to China with a $1 billion loan in hand.
       越来越多的发展中国家从中国得到数十亿美元一年的援助、贷款和投资。仅2010年，北京就已经承诺了250亿美元给东盟国家。在三月，赞比亚的总统又从中国带回了1亿美元的贷款。
As Beijing’s levels of foreign assistance swell and its relationship deepens with countries across Africa, Asia and Latin America, a key question emerges: What impact will investments by an opaque and repressive superpower have on governance standards in the developing world?
       随着北京对非洲、亚洲和拉美援助层级的提升，与这些地区的关系也进一步加深。但是也出现了一个关键问题：一个超级大国通过不透明的和压制性的投资，对发展中世界的管理标准将会产生什么影响。
Findings from a Freedom House analysis, “Countries at the Crossroads,” point to the challenges that many of these recipient countries confront as they struggle to build more transparent and accountable systems. Fighting corruption and safeguarding freedom of expression and assembly are proving especially difficult. The dark side of Beijing’s engagement, with its nontransparent aid and implicit conditions, risks tipping the balance in the wrong direction.
       一位来自自由之家的发下分析了受援国面临的挑战，“这些国家正处在一个十字路口，”他指出这些国家因为建立有更加透明和更完善的问责制度，他们在面对援助是面临着斗争。打击腐败、维护言论自由和集会被证明尤其困难。北京的援助的黑暗面是伴随着不透明、隐形条件和风险的，这些都将从错误的方向破坏这个平衡。
To appreciate the “China effect” on developing countries, it is essential to understand the methods Beijing is using to exert influence and warp incentives for accountable governance.
       要了解发展中国家的“中国效应”，关键是了解北京是产用了施加影响力和扭曲带有问责的管理措施等这些方法。
First, as international financial institutions and donor organizations seek to encourage stronger governance norms, aid from China has become an alternate source of funds. Recipient governments use these as a bargaining chip to defer measures that strengthen transparency and rule of law, especially those that could challenge elite power.
       一，作为国际金融机构和捐助组织，设法鼓励加强管理的规范，来自中国的援助已经成为替代的资金来源。受援国政府以此作为筹码来延迟对于透明措施的加强和相关立法，尤其是那些可能挑战精英的权力的方面。
Cambodia is a telling example. The government in Phnom Penh, which has received substantial aid from the United States and other democracies, now receives comparable amounts from China. The Cambodian authorities have used this “assistance competition” to their advantage. Rather than combating corruption and implementing sorely needed reforms to the judiciary and media sector, Prime Minister Hun Sen’s government has shrunk space for alterative voices and independent institutions. Western donors, fearful of losing influence, have been increasingly hesitant to penalize the regime for its failures.
       柬埔寨是一个现实的例子。金边，已经得到了美国和其他民主国家大量援助，现在收到来自中国政府的差不多数额的援助。柬埔寨当局已经开始利用这种对他们有利的“援助竞争”。而不是打击腐败和实施改革。他们更迫切需要司法和媒体部门。首相洪森政府已经降低了改革的声音和自主的制度。西方捐助国，害怕失去影响力，已越来越难以惩罚其失败的制度。
In October, the Guinean government announced a $7 billion deal with the China International Fund just as the international community was considering sanctions following a massacre of opposition supporters. The case underscores how even investments by a private entity, this one with ties to Beijing, can be manipulated to undermine efforts to support human rights standards.
       10月，几内亚因为反对派的支持者大屠杀，国际社会正在考虑的制裁，马上几内亚政府宣布了与中国国际基金之间的70亿美元的交易。此案凸显出一个私人实体如何投资，能够来操纵暗中破坏支持的人权标准的努力。
Second, while “no strings attached” is commonly used to describe China’s approach in the developing world, the reality is not quite so benign. A combination of subtle and not-so-subtle conditions typically accompanies this largesse. Included among these is pressure to muzzle voices critical of the Chinese government, often undermining basic freedoms of expression and assembly in these countries. The authorities in Nepal, which have recently received a 50 percent boost in aid from Beijing, have violently suppressed Tibetan demonstrations, including the arrest of thousands of exiles in 2008. In December of last year, Cambodia’s government forcibly repatriated 20 Uighurs to China, where they face almost certain imprisonment and torture. Three days later, Beijing announced a package of deals with Cambodia estimated at $1 billion.
       二，虽然“不附带任何条件”是在发展中世界来普遍对中国做法的形容，但现实并非如此美好。一个个精妙和不那么精妙的条件通常伴随着这个慷慨的组合。其中包括中国政府控制言论危机的压力，这些国家往往破坏言论基本自由和集会自由。收到北京增50%援助的尼泊尔政府，暴力镇压了西藏民主运动，其中包括在2008年逮捕了数千名西藏流亡者的示威活动。去年12月，柬埔寨政府向中国强行遣返了20个维吾尔人，他们几乎肯定会面临监禁和酷刑。三天后，北京宣布了涉及柬埔寨的一揽子援助，估计为10亿美元。
Even more democratically developed countries are not immune to such pressures. In March 2009, the South African government barred the Dalai Lama’s attendance at a pre-World Cup peace conference.
       甚至，更为民主的发达国家也不能免于这种压力。 2009年3月，南非政府禁止达赖喇嘛的出席世界杯赛前的和平会议。
Third, Chinese aid funds are frequently conditioned on being used to purchase goods from firms selected by Chinese officials without an open bidding process. In Namibia, anti-corruption agencies are investigating suspected kickbacks in a deal involving security scanners purchased by the government from a company until recently headed by President Hu Jintao’s son. Beijing’s response has been to stonewall investigations and activate its robust Internet censorship apparatus, sanitizing online references to the case Chinese citizens might stumble across.
       三，中国的援助资金的使用常常是有条件的，需要购买中方官员选择的没有公开招标公司的产品。在纳米比亚，反腐败机构正在调查一宗政府向一家中国公司购买安全扫描仪中涉嫌回扣的案子，而这家公司的主管直到现在都是胡锦涛主席的儿子。北京的应对是设置调查障碍并且开动其强大的互联网审查工具，消除在线信息以避免中国公民可能的发现。
Observers such as the scholar Larry Diamond have identified countries that are semi-democratic, rather than autocracies, as the most promising ground for expanding the ranks of consolidated democracies globally. The patently negative aspects of the Chinese Communist Party’s developing world influence could deal a real blow to this aspiration.
       观察家学者拉里戴蒙认为的这些国家是半民主的，而非专制，是全球最有希望巩固扩大民主国家的阵营的地方。中共在发展中世界影响力的消极方面在真正降低这种愿望。
Findings from Freedom House’s global analysis of political rights and civil liberties put this phenomenon in perspective. Over the past five years countries with only some features of institutionalized democratic systems have slipped significantly — 57 countries within the “partly free” category have experienced declines, while only 38 improved.
       自由之家就全球政治权利和公民自由的分析证实了这个现象符合这样的观点。在过去五年，仅仅有着一些民主系统制度特征的国家有着明显的下滑——57个在“部分自由”类别的国家经历了下跌，只有38个国家得到了增长。
Beijing’s deepening involvement in these cases may generate a number of effects, some perhaps positive for short-term economic development. But the dark underbelly of the Chinese regime’s involvement — the opacity of its aid and the illiberal conditions that underpin it — means that over the long haul, incentives for strengthening accountable governance and basic human rights are being warped, or even reversed.
       在这些案例中，北京的加深介入也产生了一些影响，一些影响也许短期内对于经济增长是正面的。但是，中国政府参与介入的黑暗薄弱部分——援助的不透明和不自由的条件在加深——这意味着，从长远来看，对于加强问责管理方面的激励和基本人权会受到扭曲，甚至是逆转。

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【10.03.24 纽约时报】The Dark Side of China Aid
【10.03.24 纽约时报】中国援助的黑暗面

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tancong 发表于 2010-3-27 00:50

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