【中文标题】后中国时代
【原文标题】The Post-China World
【登载媒体】新闻周刊
【原文作者】Ruchir Sharma
【原文链接】http://www.newsweek.com/2010/06/20/the-post-china-world.html
我们都看到，经济的爆发式增长期已经结束，缓慢增长的连锁反应将会波及全球。
全球经济在十年前的走势丝毫没有揭示出其最终将如何结束。2000年，盎格鲁萨克森经济模式开始抬头，科技创新浪潮席卷全球。新兴国家带着全球股市不到5％的份额，在华尔街巨型嘉年华中只扮演了一个串场表演的小角色。十年前，日本笼罩在聚光灯下，这颗新星在80年代重新定义了全球经济级别。直到1992年美国大选时，一名候选人还在这样描述它的成绩：“冷战结束了，胜家是日本。”今天，日本被普遍认为已经彻底失败，所有人把崇拜的目光投在繁荣的中国身上。中国这股力量如此强大，甚至提升了很多其它经济体的表现。像巴西和澳大利亚这种资源富有的国家，它们之所以在全球经济中成绩斐然，主要是依靠向中国出售铁矿、铜矿和其它商品，以满足其热火朝天的建设需求。很多大名鼎鼎的投资者都认为，中国的经济热潮在投资的驱动下必将持续下去。目前，投资占据中国经济总量的45％，这无论是在中国还是在其它大型经济体中，都是一个史无前例的比例。然而中国能够在若干年的时间里一直保持这种投资比例，其主要原因在于它将大部分的农村经济工业化。由于中国有大量的劳动力可以转移到新兴产业城镇的工厂中，因此政府可以持续不断地投资修建高速公路和工厂。分析人士预测2008年的全球经济危机将削减对中国出口商品的需求，由此拉动经济下滑。出口的确显著下降，但是中国的领导人实施了一项巨额的经济刺激方案。该方案针对更多的基础设施建设，延续投资热潮，经济增长甚至超过了长期保持的每年8％的水平。
但是目前，越来越多的迹象表明，中国的增长“奇迹”已经处于大幅减速的边缘，这有可能让近几十年来每年10％的增长速度在未来几年降低到6％或7％。近期发生的态度鲜明的罢工事件已经公开质疑中国这种依靠廉价劳动力和出口的发展模式。消费和投资的增长幅度也将放缓，因为中国只有众多的新高速公路、铁路和港口可以修建，而土地和劳动力的成本在急速上涨。政府在这些领域的投资计划逐渐缩水，中国大陆的高速公路已经达到6.5万公里，仅次于世界上最大的高速公路网络美国的8万余公里。高速公路的里程在2008年增加了6000公里，2007年增加了8000公里，中国交通部计划从2010年开始，每年只修建5000公里的高速公路。在铁路方面的投资也有可能在今年达到顶峰。经济危机刚刚结束不久，银行依然面临严格的信用控制和高储蓄率的要求，这将会进一步减缓投资的速度。
因此，接下来的十年里中国将失去增长的动力。那些相信经济会继续以两位数幅度增长的人士认为，中国可以用消费取代投资，用内部消化取代出口，从而继续保持增长。这不仅可以重新平衡中国的经济，还可以惠泽全世界，因为狼狈不堪的西方经济会有更多的机会向中国消费者出售商品。但是这个愿望是建立在一大臆断的基础上，即中国有意阻止消费型经济的发展。在过去的30年里，即使调整了通货膨胀的作用之后，中国的消费额每年都以9％的比例在增长。如果增长得再快，就会违背历史经济发展的规律，从而带来危险。
对于中国消费经济增长缓慢的臆断，是基于一个具有误导性的数据。中国2008年的消费支出份额所占的比例的确下降到36％这个最低点，但仅仅是因为投资支出比消费支出的增长要高出很多。这是典型的快速工业化经济现象，日本和台湾都曾经呈现过类似的状况，当然中国对于投资和出口的依赖的确有些过分。日本和台湾消费支出的增长从未超过每年10％的比例，中国也不大可能出现更快的增长速度。
现在，中国似乎已经来到了一个关键性的转折点，它的规模已经大到无法继续飞快地增长了。当日本在70年代中期的人均收入水平与今天中国的水平相当的时候（现值4000美元），投资支出显著放缓，经济的整体增长速度也由9％下降为5％。
当然，国家与国家之间存在着差别。中国只有46％的人口居住在城市中，而日本在70年代中期有55％的人口居住在城市中，这样中国就有更多城市化发展余地，从而带来更多的增长机会。而且，中国的发展趋势很明显。尽管出口在2010年有所反弹，但中国的未来发展依然受到限制，因为中国已经是世界上最大的出口国，占据了全球市场的10％。最后，中国还面临着人民币升值的压力。华盛顿会持续对此而努力，这会让中国的出口更加缺乏竞争力，经济总量中的消费比例会因此而增加，缓慢增长是自然而然的结果。
中国工人阶层的不安定因素只会加速这个进程。劳动力的要价能力越来越强，部分原因在于强制实行的独生子女政策缩减了劳动力的规模。在这个十年里，中国35到54岁的人群中只有5百万人会加入中国的核心劳动队伍中，而在上一个十年，这个数字是9千万。劳动力的工资不得不迅速上升，来填补劳动力数量增长缓慢的现实。这最终会导致一个更加平衡的本土经济模式，但同时意味着那些低端、增长迅速的生产型产业会继续转移到亚洲和非洲更加便宜的劳动力市场中去。
在中国领导层的角度看来，这并不一定是一件坏事。外界人士认为中国的政策制定者只关心快速的增长是否会与保持社会稳定的目标产生矛盾，劳动力市场会以多快的速度萎缩，以及增长放缓是否会引发通货膨胀等问题。大城市的房地产价格一飞冲天，原因在于手握大把现金的中国人受到低贷款成本的鼓励而购买多套住房。房地产的价格从2003年到2008年翻了一番，仅在过去的12个月里就增长了超过30％，大部分居民越来越负担不起房子的价格。近期播出的电视剧《蜗居》大受欢迎，它描述的是普通中国人在不断攀升的房价中的绝望情绪。为了遏制开发商的价格，政府采取了强硬的手段，包括提高首付比例和停止向新项目发放贷款。鉴于房地产贡献了中国投资总量的三分之一，中国的经济增长必将放缓。
具有讽刺意味的是，中国人对他们面临的挑战要比外国人持更加开放和诚实的态度，这种现象的一个标志是股市。中国的股市基本不对外开放，股指已经在低位徘徊了好几个月，回到了一年前的水平。但是在全世界范围内，“中国手段”，也就是持续推动中国经济发展的投资项目，在4月份继续积累，如今的投资总量比去年高出很多。这些手段包括了主要商品出口国的现金和各种各样的原材料股票等等。在中国近期的一次会议中，一个处于业界领先地位的矿产公司高层官员这样形容中国经济增长从10％变为6％，就好比一列火车以时速100公里还是时速70公里撞到一个人。他认为结果是一样的。
我们距离真相不远了。例如，中国的经济增长变得缓慢，产品制造商的世界会因此变得两极颠倒。2000年，生产商的投资极少，因为20年来商品的价格一直在持续降低，同时也没有人能够预测中国的需求将会呈爆发式增长。那么当它真正到来的时候，坚挺的价格导致了暴利。现在，从铁矿石、石油到铜矿的生产商都开足马力扩大生产，期望中国的需求扩张，而这并不一定会实现。
中国发展放缓会撼动过去十年间的几个明星经济体，包括澳大利亚和巴西。中国对大部分工业原材料的需求占据了全球的30％到60％，出口到中国的商品占据了澳大利亚出口总量的64％，巴西出口总量的55％。目前为止，巴西和澳大利亚的发展模式前景大好，但是所有国家在经济高峰期间的预测都是向好的。澳大利亚的感觉从未如此良好，它称自己为“幸运国度”，因为中国的矿产需求创造了就业机会和投资。巴西期望今年的经济增长可以达到井喷式的7％到8％，这让它成为全球投资客的甜心。澳大利亚和巴西都在经历经常项目逆差，意味着他们在出售商品后获得的暴利中几乎没有任何储蓄，意味着他们在期望中国的繁荣会永久持续下去。它们绝不是唯一这样做的国家。中国的需求占据了过去十年间全球石油需求增长数量的一半，对于油价会继续上涨的假设支持着俄罗斯和委内瑞拉这样的国家制定了自己的预算支出。而中国需求放缓则会眨眼间改变这一切。
对于投资者来说，现在是思考一个超越“中国手段”的世界的时候了。从一个层面上讲，它暗示的目标是那些即使经济增长放缓也依然坚挺的市场。比如电脑和液晶电视，市场上还有广大的未满足需求。在另一个层面上，要把目标瞄准那些可以受益于商品降价的进口型国家，比如印度和巴西。进口商品价格下降会缓解通货膨胀的压力，而这恰恰是这些国家经济发展的最大障碍。
如果经济放缓的趋势来得太快、太强势，那么所有人都是输家。实际上有些看空中国的人认为，在目前的经济规模和相关的过度信贷的情况下，这必定会发生。一位评论人士把中国的经济增长低于官方的8％目标，比作好莱坞的惊险大片《生死时速》，影片中一辆公共汽车上的炸弹被设置为时速低于50英里时就会爆炸。在中国，就业机会下降就会启动炸弹，并且会以劳动力骚乱的方式爆炸。
在中国未来问题的争论上有旗帜鲜明的两个阵营——极端看好的多数群体和尖锐固执的少数群体，但事实也许是折中的结果。中国或许就会像70年代中期的日本一样，日本在那时开始走下坡路，但依然令人信服地继续增长了15年。中国对全球经济的贡献在过去十年中增长了一倍有余，但也只达到了8.5％。如果中国在下一年的经济增长降为6％或7％，这不大可能是一个灾难性的事件，除非有人把自己的全部家当押在过去十年的发展趋势中。
原文：
The end of the boom is now in sight, and the ripple effects of slower growth will span the globe.
The way the global economy begins a decade reveals little about how it will end. In 2000, the Anglo-Saxon economic model was ascendant and the tech revolution was sweeping the globe. Emerging nations were a mere sideshow to the great Wall Street carnival, attracting less than 5 percent of the money in global stock markets. A decade earlier, the spotlight was trained on Japan, a star that had redefined the global economic stage in the 1980s. As late as the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign, one candidate reviewed the performance this way: “The Cold War is over and Japan has won.” Today, Japan is widely viewed as a washout, and all admiring eyes are on the boom in China, a force so powerful it has lifted the performance of many other economies. Resource-rich countries like Brazil and Australia have achieved global economic acclaim, mainly by selling iron ore, copper, and other commodities to feed the construction spectacle in China. Many big-name investors believe the China boom is set to continue, driven by investment spending. Investment now represents 45 percent of the Chinese economy, a level that is historically unprecedented, both in China and in any major economy. Yet China has been able to maintain this rate of spending for several years in a row, mainly because it has been industrializing a largely rural economy. With many laborers still available to move to new factories in manufacturing boomtowns, the government could keep pouring money into highways and factories. Analysts expected that the global recession of 2008 would cut demand for Chinese exports and drag the economy down. Exports did drop sharply, but the Chinese leadership launched a massive stimulus plan, centered around yet more infrastructure spending, extending the investment boom, and keeping economic growth above the long-cherished annual goal of at least 8 percent.
Now, however, evidence is mounting that China’s growth “miracle” is on the verge of a major slowdown, which could bring the 10 percent growth rate of recent decades down to 6 or 7 percent in coming years. Recent high-profile labor strikes have dramatically called into question the China model, built on cheap labor and exports. And the rate of growth in spending is about to slow, because there are only so many new highways, railways, and ports China can build, and because land and labor costs are rising sharply. Government targets for spending in all these areas are shrinking; the mainland already has more than 65,000 kilometers of highways, the second-largest network behind the United States’ 80,000-plus kilometers. After adding more than 6,000 kilometers in 2008 and 8,000 kilometers in 2007, China’s ministry of transportation plans to construct only 5,000 kilometers of new highways per year from 2010 onward. Spending on railways is also likely to peak this year. In the wake of the financial crisis, banks are also facing greater credit controls and higher reserve requirements, which will further slow investment.
So the story of the coming decade could well be that China runs out of growth drivers. Those who believe the economy can keep growing at close to double-digit rates often argue that it can do this by replacing investment with consumer spending, and exports with domestic sales. This would rebalance the economy not only of China but also of the world, giving struggling Western economies more opportunity to sell to Chinese consumers. But this hope is built on a big myth, namely that China has deliberately prevented the emergence of a consumer economy. For the last 30 years now, Chinese consumer spending has increased at a robust inflation-adjusted rate of nearly 9 percent a year. For it to grow any faster would defy the history of economic development, in a dangerous way.
The myth of China’s slow-growth consumer economy is built on misleading data. Consumer spending did fall as a share of the economy in 2008 to a record low of 36 percent but only because growth in investment spending was much higher than growth in consumption. This is typical of rapidly industrializing economies; during their decades of “miracle” growth, Japan and Taiwan had a similar profile, though China is even more dependent on investment spending and exports. Consumer spending in Japan and Taiwan never grew faster than 10 percent a year, and it’s not likely to accelerate much faster in China.
Now China appears to be reaching a critical turning point, at which it has become too big to continue growing so rapidly. When Japan’s per capita income in the mid-70s reached levels similar to those of China today ($4,000 in current dollar terms), investment spending slowed down markedly and so did the economy’s overall growth rate from a trend rate of 9 percent to 5 percent.
There are big differences, of course. Only 46 percent of China’s population lives in cities, compared with 55 percent in mid-70s Japan, leaving more room to grow through urbanization. Still, the trend line is clear. Though exports have rebounded in 2010, there are limits to future growth, as China is already the world’s largest exporter with a 10 percent share of the global market. Eventually, China will be forced to revalue its currency, as Washington would very much like it to, and that will make exports less competitive, increasing the consumption share of the economy, with slower growth the natural result.
The unrest among Chinese workers will only fuel this trend. The bargaining power of labor will increase, in part because tight enforcement of the one-child policy is shrinking the size of the workforce. Only 5 million people age 35 to 54 will join China’s core labor force this decade, versus 90 million in the previous decade. Wages will have to rise a lot faster to compensate for the fall in the growth rate of labor. That will mean a more balanced domestic economy, but it also will mean that low-end, high-growth manufacturing will continue to migrate to cheaper parts of Asia and Africa.
That’s not necessarily a bad thing, as far as the Chinese leadership is concerned. Outsiders who think Chinese policymakers care only about fast growth miss the growing focus on social stability, and concern about how quickly the labor market tightened and inflation surfaced after the downturn. Property prices have rocketed in the major cities as the more cash-rich Chinese have been buying multiple homes, encouraged by the very low cost of borrowing. After doubling between 2003 and 2008, property prices in premier cities rose by more than 30 percent on average over the past 12 months, making houses increasingly unaffordable for the vast majority. The most popular television show these days is Woju, or “Snail’s Home,” which depicts the despair of average Chinese people amid spiraling apartment prices. To get developers to cut back prices, the government is cracking down hard, increasing minimum down-payment requirements and suspending lending for some new projects. Given that property constitutes a third of all investment spending in China, growth will inevitably slow.
Ironically, the Chinese are far more open and honest about the growth challenges they face than outsiders are. One good indicator of this phenomena is that China’s stock market, still largely closed to outsiders, has been drifting lower for months, retracing its way to levels seen a year ago. But across the world, “China plays,” or investments that assume a continued boom in China, kept rallying through April, and today remain much higher than they were a year ago. Those plays range from currencies of major commodity-exporting nations to various materials stocks. At a recent China conference, a leading mining-company executive compared talk of China slowing from 10 percent to 6 percent growth to speculation about a train hitting someone at 100 or 70 kilometers an hour. The end result is the same, he argued.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Slower growth in China could, for example, upend the world of commodity producers. In 2000, they were investing very little following a 20-year secular decline in commodity prices, and hardly anyone foresaw the coming boom in demand from China. When it arrived, unexpected, the spike in prices lead to windfall profits. Now producers of commodities from iron ore to oil and copper have been adding capacity based largely on expected demand from China that may not materialize.
A slowdown in China could shock the star economies of the past decade, including Australia and Brazil. China accounts for 30 to 60 percent of global demand for most industrial commodities, and commodity exports account for 64 percent of exports from Australia, 55 percent from Brazil. Today the fundamentals look great in Brazil and Australia, but every country always looks best at its peak. Australia, now more than ever, considers itself the “Lucky Country,” as mining metals for China generates jobs and investment. Brazil expects blowout growth of 7 to 8 percent this year, making it a current darling of global investors. Both Australia and Brazil are running current account deficits, suggesting they have saved little of the windfall from recent commodity sales and expect no end to the China boom. They are far from alone. Rising demand from China has accounted for nearly half the jump in global oil demand over the past decade, and the assumption that oil prices will keep rising underpins the budget outlays of countries from Russia to Venezuela. A slowdown in China could change all this in a flash.
For investors, the time has come to think of a world beyond “China plays.” At one level, this implies looking at markets in China that may grow even if the economy slows. One example could be PCs and LCD TVs, for which there is still wide, unmet demand. At another level, it means looking at commodity-importing countries that could benefit from a decline in prices, like India and Brazil. A decline in commodity prices would ease inflationary pressures that can be one of the major obstacles to growth in these nations.
No one gains if the slowdown comes hard and fast, and some China bears think it will, given the scale of the boom and the related credit excesses. One commentator compares China’s possible fall below the 8 percent official growth target to the Hollywood thriller Speed, in which a bomb on a bus is set to detonate if the vehicle slows to below 50 miles an hour. In China, the bomb would be triggered by the slump in job creation and explode in the form of labor unrest.
The current debate on China’s future has just two camps, the extremely bullish majority and a very shrill, bearish minority, but the truth may lie in the middle. China could well be like Japan in the mid-1970s, a period when Japan began to downshift, but remained a compelling growth story for 15 years. China’s share of global economic output has more than doubled in the last decade, but is still just 8.5 percent. If China moves smoothly to 6 or 7 percent growth in the coming years, it will hardly be a cataclysmic event, except possibly for those who have bet it all on the story of the last decade. |
狗仔卡
楼主
提升卡
变色卡
抢沙发
千斤顶
显身卡
发表于 2010-6-29 18:56
谢谢楼主
