本帖最后由 千年明月 于 2010-8-1 18:14 编辑
【原文标题】How China Gambit Backfired
【中文标题】中国如何收回‘泼出去的水’
【原文链接】http://the-diplomat.com/2010/07/28/how-china-gambit-backfired/
【登载媒体】外交学者
【译者】连长
【原文库链接】http://bbs.m4.cn/thread-257734-1-1.html
【译文】
China’s more assertive foreign policy has challenged the Obama administration’s worldview. Expect a new US grand strategy.
中国更坚定的外交政策是挑战奥巴马政府的世界观。期待新一轮的美国宏大的战略。
In its first year, the Obama administration envisaged a two-pronged foreign policy. The first prong—cooperative strategic engagement—sought to build and sustain cooperative partnerships with states and non-state actors who operated within (or hoped to join) the international order. The second, which was aimed at actors like the Taliban and North Korea who seek to undermine or destroy the international order, consisted of a quite different approach—war, containment, or coercive diplomacy.
在任期的头一年里，奥巴马政府设想了一套双交叉外交政策。一种方法是合作战略意义的作战--试图与国际秩序内能够被操纵的（或者想加入国际秩序的）国家和非政府活动者建立并维持合作伙伴关系。另一种方法则瞄准了试图破坏国际秩序的行动者，如塔利班和北韩，两方面相结合，组成了一个非同寻常的方法---战争，遏制或者强制外交。
US policy toward China was supposed to be the centerpiece of the first approach, based on the underlying assumption that the world’s major powers ultimately share the same threats and interests— tackling terrorism and pandemics, ensuring economic instability, and preventing nuclear proliferation. The Obama administration hoped to build on these shared interests to bring emerging powers, like China and Brazil, fully into the US led international order.
美国的对华政策应该第一个方法的核心，建立于基本的臆断--世界上的主要力量最基本的共同利益和威胁就是打击恐怖主义和大疫情的流行，确保经济的不动荡，以及防止核扩散。奥巴马政府希望借助这些共同利益，将中国和巴西这样的新兴大国完全纳入美国领导下的国际秩序。
Essentially what the administration aspired to create was a concert of powers—geopolitical competition was supposed to be consigned to history. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it in July 2009, the multi-polar world would be a multi-partner world, with the United States set to use its unique role in the world to help major powers overcome barriers to cooperation so they could collectively pursue their common interests.
从本质上说，政府渴望引起一次政权演奏会--地缘政治竞争应该被封存成为历史。正如美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿在2009年7月所提出的一样，世界多极化将是一个多伙伴的世界，美国也将调整其在世界上的独特作用，帮助大国克服合作障碍，以便它们能够集体追求他们的共同利益。
And China was supposed to feature strongly in these plans, with the administration working hard to deepen strategic and economic dialogue and offering China more influence in the international order. Senior officials talked up China’s importance and leverage over the United States and avoided any actions that could antagonize Beijing. For example, in 2009, the president didn’t meet the Dalai Lama and accepted a tightly choreographed visit to China, while his administration initially avoided selling defensive arms to Taiwan and explored adjustments to its relations with India.
而在这一计划中，中国被寄予厚望，政府努力深化在国际秩序中的战略和经济对话，并给中国带来了更大的影响力。高级官员探讨了中国的重要性以及对美国的影响，并且避开了有可能激怒北京的一切行动。比如在2009年，总统没有会见达赖喇嘛、接受了一个行程紧张的对华访问、他的政府起初也避免出售防御性武器给台湾、还探讨调整美国和印度的关系。
But what followed was nothing short of a revelation for much of the administration’s foreign policy team.
但随后的结果却让政府的外交政策团队出乎意料。
Instead of accepting the offer of a full partnership, China became far more antagonistic and assertive on the world stage. It expanded its claims in the South China Sea, engaged in a major spat with Google over Internet freedom, played an obstructionist role at the climate change negotiations in Copenhagen, regularly and openly criticized US leadership, and, sought to water down sanctions against Iran’s nuclear programme at the UN Security Council.
中国没有接受一个全面的伙伴关系，在世界舞台上，中国变得更加敌对和武断。它扩大了它在南中国海的主权要求，在互联网自由问题上和谷歌吵得不可开交，在哥本哈根气候变化会议上阻挠议案通过，经常公开批评美国领导人，并且在联合国安理会上试图淡化针对伊朗核计划的制裁。
Senior administration officials said influential voices in Beijing saw the United States as a power in decline and perceived an opportunity for China to take advantage. The United States’ regional allies and partners, meanwhile, expressed their concerns over this turn of events and called upon the United States to restore its traditional leadership role in the region.
高级政府官员表示，有影响力的人在北京呼吁认清处于衰退状态的美国，意识到中国应抓住有利机会。同时，美国的地区盟友和合作伙伴对这一势头的发展表示关注，并且呼吁美国恢复在该地区一贯的领导角色。
The mounting evidence that China simply isn’t interested in becoming a full stakeholder in the US-led liberal international order has forced the administration to respond with a new policy in Asia. In addition to ongoing engagement with China, this new tack seeks to deepen US ties with other powers in the region, and unlike the earlier approach doesn’t shy away from advancing US interests and values—even if it upsets Beijing.
越来越多的迹象表明中国决非是个对美国为首的自由国际秩序感兴趣的参与者，这迫使政府对亚洲新的政策做出了反应。除了与中国保持紧密地联系，还试图加深美国与该地区其他国家的关系，不会再像之前那样回避美国利益和价值观--即便这会惹恼北京。
This new approach has been on full display over the past few weeks, with the United States standing shoulder to shoulder with South Korea in the face of North Korean aggression by undertaking military exercises in the region to demonstrate its alliance commitments, and it has also offered to mediate on disputes in the South China Sea, much to Beijing’s displeasure.
这一新政策已经在过去几周内充分展现，与美国长期肩并肩的盟友韩国举行联合军事演习，向朝鲜展示武力以显示两国的盟国承诺，并且还主动调停南中国海的争端，这让北京大为不满。
But the implications of this shift extend well beyond China policy. More than any other development, China’s increasing assertiveness revealed a fundamental flaw in the Obama administration’s worldview—that although multilateralism is needed more than ever, emerging powers (and not just China) will often define their interests in ways that conflict with US interests and they will continue to engage in traditional geopolitical competition with the United States.
但是这种转变所产生的影响远远不及中国的政策。不止是任何其他的发展，中国逐渐增长的自信已经显示出奥巴马政府的世界观存在根本缺陷--尽管新兴大国（不仅仅是中国）比以往任何时候都更需要通过多边主义来界定他们的那些利益与美国的利益相抵触，但他们也将继续与美国进行传统的地缘政治竞争。
So what does this mean for US foreign policy? The United States is likely entering a geopolitical period unlike any it has faced before. Americans are used to countries being friends or enemies—for us or against us (something that fit 20th century realities almost perfectly). But relations with China will be a peculiar blend of cooperation and rivalry, meaning the US will be faced with a more competitive world than it has over the past 20 years (although unlike the Cold War, it will be a competition within limits, between interdependent powers, and with plenty of potential for cooperation).
那么这对美国的外交政策意味着什么？美国很可能卷进了一个不同于它以往面对过的地缘政治时期。美国常常与支持我们的国家结盟，或者与反对我们的国家为敌（这一套对于20世纪的实际情况来说近乎完美）。但是同中国的关系将会更奇怪，混杂着合作与对抗，意味着美国将面对一个比过去二十年更加具有竞争力的世界（然而不同于冷战时期，竞争不会超出限度，国与国之间相互依存，存在许多潜在的合作）。
Such unprecedented developments have also sparked a vital debate inside the Obama administration about how to respond, and how best to preserve the liberal international order created at the end of World War II.
这种前所未有的新阶段也促使奥巴马政府内部引发了一场关于如何应付这一切以及如何最大限度的维持二战结束时创立的自由的国际秩序的激烈讨论。
On the one hand are those who wish to persist with cooperative strategic engagement so the international order is run by a concert of powers, with the United States and China at its heart. On the other are those who believe that, even as they cooperate, relations between the United States and emerging powers will be far more competitive and prone to limited rivalry than relations between members of the old Western order, meaning the United States will have no choice but to compete with emerging powers to shape the international order while maintaining a geopolitical advantage over its competitors.
一方面是那些想坚持合作战略政策的人，那么国际秩序就要在以美国和中国为核心的大国演奏会中才能继续维持。另一方面是，那些人认为即便他们愿意配合，美国和新兴大国之间的竞争与西方旧秩序成员的关系相比，美国也只有有限的竞争力，意味着美国将别无选择，只能与新兴大国进行竞争，塑造新的国际秩序，同时也要保证竞争对手的地缘政治优势。
If the China policy is an early test case, then it shows a tilt toward competitive strategic engagement. The question now is whether this approach will stick and gradually spread to influence the president’s overall grand strategy.
如果中国的政策只是一个测试案例，那么它显示出倾向于竞争战略。现在的问题是，是否应该坚持这种策略，并逐步扩展到影响全局的整体战略中。
There’s no guarantee it will—the 2010 National Security Strategy, released in May, continued to articulate the old way of thinking. But if America’s new Asia policy is a sign of things to come, China’s major gambit to take advantage of what it perceived as US weakness in 2009 may go down as its greatest foreign policy mistake in recent memory.
没人能保证这种策略会逐步扩展到影响全局的战略中，5月份发布的《2010年国家安全战略》继续阐明了旧的思维方式。但是如果美国的新亚洲政策标志着这种策略会逐步扩展到影响全局的战略中，那么2009年中国趁美国软弱之机加以利用的主要策略有可能会是中国近期最严重的外交失误。
Beijing’s assertiveness discredited those Americans who were most willing to compromise with China. Its spurning of them has now acted as a catalyst for a more competitive—and geopolitically savvy—US multilateralism.
北京的武断使那些乐于向中国妥协的美国人产生怀疑。被他们唾弃的中国现在已经担当起了一个更具竞争的---精于地缘政治的---美国多边主义催化剂角色。
本文作者：托马斯·赖特（Thomas Wright）
托马斯·赖特是芝加哥全球事务理事会的研究执行董事。可以联系他：twright@thechicagocouncil.org
你还可以在推特上追随他：@thomaswright08 |
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发表于 2010-8-1 17:14
