【2010.8.26 纽约时报】China's Discreet Hold on Pakistan's Northern Borderlands

st_aster

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/opinion/27iht-edharrison.html?_r=2

While the world focuses on the flood-ravaged Indus River valley, a quiet geopolitical crisis is unfolding in the Himalayan borderlands of northern Pakistan, where Islamabad is handing over de facto control of the strategic Gilgit-Baltistan region in the northwest corner of disputed Kashmir to China.
The entire Pakistan-occupied western portion of Kashmir stretching from Gilgit in the north to Azad (Free) Kashmir in the south is closed to the world, in contrast to the media access that India permits in the eastern part, where it is combating a Pakistan-backed insurgency. But reports from a variety of foreign intelligence sources, Pakistani journalists and Pakistani human rights workers reveal two important new developments in Gilgit-Baltistan: a simmering rebellion against Pakistani rule and the influx of an estimated 7,000 to 11,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army.
China wants a grip on the region to assure unfettered road and rail access to the Gulf through Pakistan. It takes 16 to 25 days for Chinese oil tankers to reach the Gulf. When high-speed rail and road links through Gilgit and Baltistan are completed, China will be able to transport cargo from Eastern China to the new Chinese-built Pakistani naval bases at Gwadar, Pasni and Ormara, just east of the Gulf, within 48 hours.
Many of the P.L.A. soldiers entering Gilgit-Baltistan are expected to work on the railroad. Some are extending the Karakoram Highway, built to link China’s Sinkiang Province with Pakistan. Others are working on dams, expressways and other projects.
Mystery surrounds the construction of 22 tunnels in secret locations where Pakistanis are barred. Tunnels would be necessary for a projected gas pipeline from Iran to China that would cross the Himalayas through Gilgit. But they could also be used for missile storage sites.
Until recently, the P.L.A. construction crews lived in temporary encampments and went home after completing their assignments. Now they are building big residential enclaves clearly designed for a long-term presence.
What is happening in the region matters to Washington for two reasons. Coupled with its support for the Taliban, Islamabad’s collusion in facilitating China’s access to the Gulf makes clear that Pakistan is not a U.S. “ally.” Equally important, the nascent revolt in the Gilgit-Baltistan region is a reminder that Kashmiri demands for autonomy on both sides of the cease-fire line would have to be addressed in a settlement.
Media attention has exposed the repression of the insurgency in the Indian-ruled Kashmir Valley. But if reporters could get into the Gilgit-Baltistan region and Azad Kashmir, they would find widespread, brutally-suppressed local movements for democratic rights and regional autonomy.
When the British partitioned South Asia in 1947, the maharajah who ruled Kashmir, including Gilgit and Baltistan, acceded to India. This set off intermittent conflict that ended with Indian control of the Kashmir Valley, the establishment of Pakistan-sponsored Free Kashmir in western Kashmir, and Pakistan’s occupation of Gilgit and Baltistan, where Sunni jihadi groups allied with the Pakistan Army have systematically terrorized the local Shiite Muslims.
Gilgit and Baltistan are in effect under military rule. Democratic activists there want a legislature and other institutions without restrictions like the ones imposed on Free Kashmir, where the elected legislature controls only 4 out of 56 subjects covered in the state constitution. The rest are under the jurisdiction of a “Kashmir Council” appointed by the president of Pakistan.
India gives more power to the state government in Srinagar; elections there are widely regarded as fair, and open discussion of demands for autonomy is permitted. But the Pakistan-abetted insurgency in the Kashmir Valley has added to tensions between Indian occupation forces and an assertive population seeking greater of local autonomy.
The United States is uniquely situated to play a moderating role in Kashmir, given its growing economic and military ties with India and Pakistan’s aid dependence on Washington. Such a role should be limited to quiet diplomacy. Washington should press New Delhi to resume autonomy negotiations with Kashmiri separatists. Success would put pressure on Islamabad for comparable concessions in Free Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. In Pakistan, Washington should focus on getting Islamabad to stop aiding the insurgency in the Kashmir Valley and to give New Delhi a formal commitment that it will not annex Gilgit and Baltistan.
Precisely because the Gilgit-Baltistan region is so important to China, the United States, India and Pakistan should work together to make sure that it is not overwhelmed, like Tibet, by the Chinese behemoth.
Selig S. Harrison is director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy and a former South Asia bureau chief of The Washington Post.

水兵

OMG 这作者真不要脸。

st_aster

OMG 这作者真不要脸。
水兵 发表于 2010-8-30 14:15

    习惯了就好了，这个文章貌似被转载地很厉害，查了下发现始作俑者貌似就是纽约时报

st_aster

【美国《纽约时报》网站8月26日报道】题：中国谨慎控制巴基斯坦北部边境
　　 一场地缘政治危机正在地处喜马拉雅山区的巴基斯坦北部边境悄然上演。吉尔吉特-伯尔蒂斯坦地区位于存在争议的克什米尔地区的西北角，伊斯兰堡正在把这块具有战略意义的地区的实际控制权转交给中国。
　　 巴基斯坦占据的克什米尔西部地区北起吉尔吉特，南到阿扎德。多名外国情报消息人士报告说，巴基斯坦记者和人权工作者透露，在吉尔吉特-伯尔蒂斯坦地区出现了两大最新进展：一是当地在酝酿反抗巴基斯坦统治的活动，二是估计有7000到11000名解放军开进当地。
　　 中国希望控制这片地区，以确保自己不受限制地利用公路和铁路经巴基斯坦到达海湾地区。中国油轮要花16到25天时间才能抵达海湾地区。当经过吉尔吉特-伯尔蒂斯坦的高速铁路和公路完工后，中国就能够从本国东部向自己在瓜德尔、伯斯尼和奥尔马拉等地——这些地方紧邻海湾地区东部——新建的巴基斯坦海军基地运输货物，斯运输时间在48小时以内。
　　 许多开进吉尔吉特-伯尔蒂斯坦地区的解放军官兵预计将参与铁路修建工作。一些解放军在延长连接中国新疆与巴基斯坦的一条公路，还有些军人在修建大坝和高速公路等其他设施。
　　 中方在一些禁止巴基斯坦人出入的秘密地点修建了22处隧道。中国计划修建从伊朗到中国的天然气管道，修这条经吉尔吉特穿过喜马拉雅山的管道必须建造隧道。但是这些隧道也可能用作导弹存放点。
　　 不久以前，解放军建筑队都住在临时营地里，并在完成任务后返回国内驻地。他们目前在建设大型居住区，这显然是为了长期驻扎而建。

我是最先在天涯发现这篇文章的，然后顺藤摸瓜发现了英文完整版

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