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【原文标题】North Korea blinks
【中文标题】朝鲜葫芦里到底卖的什么药?
【登载媒体】外交政策
【来源地址】http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/20/north_korea_blinks
【译 者】批一啊pia
【翻译方式】 人工
【声 明】 本翻译供Anti-CNN使用,未经AC或译者许可,不得转载。
【译 文】
Well, it was a very exciting weekend on the Korea peninsula, as South Korea vowed to go ahead with live-fire artillery exercises on Yeonpyeong Island, site of the artillery exchange between ROK and DPRK earlier this month. North Korea vowed to retaliate, the U.N. Security Council met all day yesterday without any agreement on the matter, Seoul recommended island residents go to bunkers, and everyone urged restraint by everyone else.
朝鲜半岛又是令人兴奋的一周,韩国决意要在延坪岛进行实弹火炮演习,本月早些时候朝韩还在这个地点交火。朝鲜方面发誓要反击,联合国安理会昨日开了一整天的会也未达成任何共识,韩国政府建议岛上居民躲到掩体中,其他国家都呼吁这两个国家保持克制。
Very exciting!! How would today's exercise play out? Mark McDonald and Martin Fackler report for the New York Times:
太令人激动了!!今天是演习是如何结束的?纽约时报的Mark McDonald和Martin Fackler做了如下报道:
Defying North Korean threats of violent retaliation and "brutal consequences beyond imagination," South Korea on Monday staged live-fire artillery drills on an island shelled last month by the North.
无视了朝鲜要进行武力反击的威胁,以及即将带来的超乎想象的后果,韩国周一在延坪岛进行了实弹火炮演习。
The immediate response from Pyongyang was surprisingly muted, however. A statement from the North's official news agency Monday night said it was "not worth reacting" to the exercise.
不过,朝鲜政府的反应出奇的平静。朝鲜政府新闻机构周一晚上发表声明说,这种演习不值得做回应。
"Maybe we had a little impact," said Gov. Bill Richardson of New Mexico, who as an unofficial American envoy was in Pyongyang when the drills ended. Mr. Richardson, a former ambassador to the United Nations, said earlier that the North had offered concessions on its nuclear program, including a resumption of visits by United Nations inspectors.
“可能我们对此有些小小的影响。”新墨西哥州政府官员Bill Richardson在演习结束时正在平壤做非正式访问。Richardson是前驻联合国大使,早前称朝鲜将在其核项目上作出让步,包括重新允许联合国观察员的核查。
Wait, that's it? Pyongyang issues threat after threat and then claims the whole thing isn't worth their bother? Let's dig a little deeper into the Times story:
等一下,就这样嘛?朝鲜政府一再威胁,然后说整个事情不值得他们在意?让我们深入研究一下泰晤士报的报道。
The question now is whether the North will make good on its promises to retaliate, and how it might do so. Mr. Lankov, the analyst, said he did not expect a massive response by Pyongyang because the recent incidents are part of a North Korean "strategy of tensions," meaning that North Korean leaders want to choose when and where to strike.
现在的问题是,朝鲜是否会实践他要进行反击的诺言,他将如何反击。分析员Lankov称他预计朝鲜政府不会进行大规模的反击,因为最近的一连串事件是朝鲜“紧张战略”的一部分,意思就是朝鲜领导人想自己选择何时、何地发起攻击。
"I do not think the North Koreans will do much this time," Mr. Lankov said. "They'd rather deliver a new blow later when they will be ready. But the maneuvers still mean a great risk of escalation."
“我认为朝鲜这次不会做什么大动作。”Lankov说,“他们会在准备好的时候再掀波澜。但是军事演习仍然会带来战争升级的危险。”
Meanwhile, Mr. Richardson said the North had agreed to concessions related to its nuclear program, a main source of tension on the peninsula. A former United States special envoy to North Korea, Mr. Richardson was on an unofficial trip approved by the State Department. He met with high-ranking military officials, the North Korean vice president and members of the Foreign Ministry over four days.
同时,Richardson说朝鲜同意在核查问题上让步,这是朝鲜半岛局势紧张的一个主要来源。作为美国前任驻朝特使,Richardson的非正式访问是得到美国政府的批准的。他在访问的四天中,会见了朝鲜的高级军官、国防委员会副委员长、外交委员会委员。
Mr. Richardson said the North had made two significant concessions toward reopening six-party talks on the country's nuclear program. The North's proposal would allow United Nations nuclear inspectors back into the Yongbyon nuclear complex to ensure that it is not producing enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb. The North recently showed an American nuclear expert a new and stunningly sophisticated facility there. It expelled international inspectors last year.
Richardson说朝鲜在重开六方会谈进行朝核谈判上做出来了两个重大让步。朝鲜的提议是允许联合国核查官员回到延边核设施,来确认朝鲜没有生产用于核武器制造的浓缩铀。朝鲜最近向美国核专家展示了那里一项新的绝妙又精致的核设施。朝鲜去年驱逐了国际观察员。
North Korean officials also told Mr. Richardson that their government was willing to sell 12,000 plutonium fuel rods to South Korea, removing bomb-making material from the North, he said. "I would describe this as important progress," he said of the concessions.
朝鲜官员还告诉Richardson,朝鲜政府将向韩国出售12000根钚燃料棒,以此转移朝鲜的核武制造原料。Richardson说这个让步:“是一个重大的进步。”
So now North Korea also wants to restart the Six-Party Talks? What just happened? As always, trying to explain North Korean behavior is a challenging task. Here are some possible explanations:
所以现在朝鲜也想重开六方会谈吗?到底发生了什么?一直以来试图解释朝鲜的行为都是富有挑战性的工作。以下是一些可能的解释。
1) North Korea finally got caught bluffing. True, they have the least to lose from the ratcheting up of tensions, but that doesn't mean they have nothing to lose from a military escalation with the ROK. The past month of tensions got everyone's attention, and North Korea is only happy when everyone else is paying attention to them.
1)朝鲜终于被吓到了。确实紧张局势升级朝鲜的损失不大,但这并不意味着韩国军事扩张朝鲜就没有损失。过去几个月的紧张吸引了众人的注意,朝鲜很开心每个人都在关注着朝鲜。
2) Kim Jong Un was busy. One of the stronger explanations for the DPRK's last round of provocations was that this was an attempt to bolster Kim the Younger's military bona fides before the transition. Reading up on what little is out there, it wouldn't shock me if he planned all of this and then postponed any retaliation because he'd organized a Wii Bowling tournament among his entourage.
2)金正恩太忙了。朝鲜最近一轮挑衅最有力的一个解释是,想在换届之前巩固金正恩在军界的威望。外界关于他的消息甚少,如果这一切都是他计划的然后中止了任何反击时因为他想跟随从组织一场Wii保龄球锦标赛,那就真的要震惊到我了。
Somewhat more seriously, it's possible that there are domestic divisions between the military, the Foreign Ministry, and the Workers Party, and that the latter two groups vetoed further escalation.
严肃点说,在军界、外交部门和劳动党之间存在着内部分层,后两个组织否决了进一步的危机升级。
3) China put the screws on North Korea. For all the talk about juche, North Korea needs external aid to function, and over the past year all the aid lifelines have started to dry up -- except for Beijing. As much as the North Koreans might resent this relationship -- and they do -- if Beijing leaned hard on Pyongyang.
3)中国给朝鲜拧紧了阀门。谈到自主,朝鲜需要外部的援助来维持运转,在过去几年中朝鲜的援助生命线开始干涸,只有中国政府还在援助他。如果中国政府对其施压,朝鲜政府再憎恨两国的关系也要听话,事实上他憎恨这种关系。
4) North Korea gave the ROK government the domestic victory it needed. Bear with me for a second. The shelling incident has resulted in a sea change in South Korean public opinion, to the point where Lee Myung-bak was catching hell for not responding more aggressively to the initial provocation. This is a complete 180 from how the ROK public reacted to the Cheonan incident, in which Lee caught hell for responding too aggressively.
4)朝鲜给了韩国政府需要的国内胜利。给我点时间。炮击事件造成了韩国民众观点的突变,纷纷指责李明博在朝鲜最初挑衅的时候没有采取更积极的回应。这与天安舰事件发生时的朝鲜民众反应发生了180度的转变,上一次他们责备李明博反应过于激烈。
Lee clearly felt domestic pressure to do something. Maybe, just maybe, the North Korean leadership realized this fact, and believed that not acting now would give Lee the domestic victory he needed to walk back his own brinksmanship.
李明博想做什么都能很明显感受来自国内的压力。可能朝鲜领导层意识到了这个事实,所以决定现在什么都不做,就能让李明博通过国内压力回到战争边缘政策。
5) Overnight, the DPRK military hired the New York Giants coaching staff to contain South Korean provocations. Let's see... a dazzling series of perceived propaganda victories, followed by the pervasive sense that they held all the cards in this latest contretemps. Then an inexplicable decision not to do anything aggressive at the last minute, after which containment policies fail miserably. Hmmm… you have to admit, this MO sounds awfully familiar.
5)昨晚朝鲜军队请纽约巨人队的教练来牵制朝鲜的挑衅。我看看……一系列耀眼的感知上的宣传胜利,紧接着是他们手上握有窘困之时的所有卡片的普遍印象。在朝鲜的遏制政策不幸走向失败时,最后时刻不做任何过激举动的决定让人十分费解。你必须承认,这种手段听起来很耳熟。
If I had to make a semi-informed guess -- and it's just that - I'd wager a combination of (1) and (4).
如果我要在一个有部分提示的赌局下注,我赌1)和4)的结合。 |
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