【2011.5.4 亚洲协会】An American Open Door? （重金悬赏）

rhapsody

第四部分有人认领吗？没人我来~
corie_zhu 发表于 2011-5-9 15:54

第四部分：II. Patterns: chinese Direct investment in the United States 还没人领，欢迎楼上认领

青蛙小王子

第四部分有人认领吗？没人我来~
corie_zhu 发表于 2011-5-9 15:54

    据小楠同学说，朱朱是美女加才女哦，特来支持一下下:loveliness:

yangfuguang

交稿，，，，，，

many chapters in the story of China’s reappearance as a powerhouse are yet to be written because they have not yet happened. This is one of them: the emergence of China as a major global direct investor. We stand at the dawn of hundreds of billions of dollars in Chinese

mergers, acquisitions, and investments in new greenfield facilities around the world over the decades to come.

对于讲述中国将再次成为强国的许多故事，我们在此不再赘述，因为它们还没发生。这里我们讨论的是这些故事中的一个：中国成为全球主要的投资国。现在只是开始，未来中国将在全球未开发的地方进行投资，收购，兼并等活动，这些活动将耗费成千上万亿美元。

This is not just a story of new Chinese economic strength: Beijing is compelled to invest abroad because of resource scarcities at home. Chinese firms must put capital to work overseas, because that is where wealthy customers and value-creating talent are. China’s arrival

as a direct investor marks a turning point in capabilities. This study seeks to explain what that means from the American perspective, for those running businesses, thinking about job creation, worrying about eroding infrastructure, and managing the national security.

这不仅仅是中国新经济力量的故事：中国迫不及待地在全球投资是因为其本身资源的匮乏。中国的公司必须在海外投资，因为海外有的消费市场和人才储备。中国变成直接投资国意味着能力上的转折点。本文试图解释这种变化对美国的意义，对那些商人，就业机会，落后的基础设施，国家安全的影响。

For decades, China has been the biggest destination for foreign direct investment (FDI)1 in the developing world, but an insignificant

player when it came to making such investments around the world. Now, that tide is turning. Over the past five years, China has ramped up its outward foreign direct investment(OFDI) rapidly, and in 2009, China made the top-10 list of global investors for the first time.

China’s nascent direct investments were focused on natural resources—Asia, Australia, Africa,and South America saw most of the action. China’s direct investment profile in the United States remained trivial.

数十年来，中国在发展中国家一直是最大的外资直接投资国，但是当中国转而向外国投资时，中国绝对是很重要的参与者。现在趋势已经改变。在过去五年，中国对外投资急剧增加，在2009年，中国第一次在全球前十投资行为排行榜中占据全部。中国最初的对外投资集中在自然资源——在亚洲，澳洲和南非的投资额最多。中国对美国的直接投资几乎是微不足道的。

Today, however, Chinese direct investment in the United States has reached a takeoff point,and, driven by changes in China’s economy, it is starting to boom. As happened with FDI from Europe and Japan in the past, FDI from China to the United States is now more than

doubling annually. This dizzying growth, and the prospect of more to come, has fixated policymakers and deal advisors. But, at the same time, it has stoked worries about what it will mean to have China as the owner next door rather than just a distant contract manufacturer.

但是现在中国对美国的直接投资开始飞涨，这是由于中国本身经济繁荣有关。过去欧洲和日本的资金投入，现在由中国进入美国的外资投资额度每年上升一倍多。这种令人震惊的增加，以及接下来的跟多的事情，使得政策制定者和交易顾问念念不忘。但同时，这也带来了一种担心，当中国不仅仅是遥远的制造商而是邻居时，这种变化意味着什么。

Introduction: The Tide Turns for Chinese Investment

1 As we will discuss in detail, direct investment is very different from buying securities such as stocks and bonds, which falls into the category of portfolio investment. China is a major portfolio investor because it has such a large surplus of foreign exchange from its trade surplus to reinvest, and because it is easy: call a broker and tell him to buy. Direct investment, on the other hand, is much more complicated.

引言：中国投资趋势的改变

就像我们将要讨论的细节，直接投资和购买有价证券，如股票和债券有本质区别，购买债券只是间接投资。中国是最大的间接投资国，因为中国有庞大的贸易顺差，因而就积攒了大笔的外汇，间接投资也更加容易：找个中间人，告诉他买入。直接投资却要更加复杂些。

FDI from China to the United States is now more than doubling annually.

中国向美国投资额以每年一倍多的速度递增。

The history of the United States is closely connected to inflows of foreign capital, but debates about foreign ownership have been a constant in its history as well.2 In prerevolutionary America, patriots worried that British steel mills would make cannonballs to fire on them. Between the two world wars, it was German investment in the U.S. chemical industry that caused concern.

美国的历史和外资的流入是分不开的，但是对于外资的归属却长久以来就有争论。在革命之前，爱国者担心英国的铁厂会用了建造轰向自己的炸弹。在两次大战期间，德国在美国直接投资的化工厂又成了忧虑的对象。

The oil shocks of the 1970s fed concerns about OPEC etro dollar investors, while in the 1980s, the emergence of Japan as a direct investor created a near panic.3 In the past decade, investment from newly emerging economies has raised alarm. Middle Eastern investments, such as Dubai Ports World’s attempted purchase of port facilities (2006), attracted intense scrutiny after 9/11, India’s Essar made headlines for taking over distressed steel assets in Minnesota (2007), and Brazil’s Marfrig drew attention for buying up parts of McDonald’s supply chain (2010). However, in recent years, no country’s proposed investments have provoked as much anxiety as those from China.

在七十年代又对欧佩克组织持有的原油公司股票产生担心，在八十年代，日本成为最大的外资投资国几乎在国民心中产生一种恐慌。在过去三十年，来自新兴国家的投资已经拉响了警钟。中东的投资，例如迪拜港口公司试图购买港口设备，巴西Marfrig在2010年收购部分麦当劳的股份也引发了关注，然而，在近年来来自中国的投资引发了最强烈的不安，这是其它国家所不能比较的。

China now is testing whether the open-market commitment that the United States consistently has held in the past will be sustained. In a mere half decade, Chinese direct investment overtures have elicited new heights of anxiety about inward investment in the United States. The extraordinary period of growth in Chinese investment in the United States now occurring is simultaneously exciting and certain to test American resolve to stand by its long-held notions about the virtues of unfettered flow of investment—notions it has championed around the world for half a century.

中国现在早就在挑战美国一直以来坚持的市场开发承诺是否还会继续。在短短五年，中国的直接投资把国民对于在美国国内的投资的担心提升到了一个新的高度。现在，中国对美国投资的非比寻常增长显然是很刺激的；而且它还在挑战美国人长久以来对投资的开放政策——这在全球已经盛行了半个世纪。

Investment from China faces the same categories of misgivings previously directed at other nations: China might buy military-enhancing technologies that could augment its military

threat to the United States, deny the United States critical production capacity, or use domestic coperations in the U.S. home market to spy or plan sabotage.

来自中国的投资也引起了忧虑，这和之前那些国家一样：中国有可能购买加强军力的技术，这会提高对美国的威胁，抵消美国关键产品的产能，或者中国也会在美国使用国内的公司作为间谍或者破坏者。

For more than 200 years,hawkish Americans have warned of such threats to U.S. interests, and yet America has—through thoughtful screening procedures and sound policy regimes—managed to allay those legitimate national security concerns without closing American doors to foreign investment.

两百多年以来，鹰派人物一直提醒这种对美国的威胁，而且美国确实——通过严格的审查和明确的政策限制——减少了这种合法的但又危及美国安全的做法，同时也保证美国不是闭关锁国。

And economists have found little evidence of negative impact, and often plenty of gains, from these investments. It is not a specific threat, but a more inchoate fear that China is now large enough to shape the world (more than it is shaped by the world) that worries Americans. By exploiting its size, Americans fear that China can sustain autocratic control of parts of its economy significantly longer than the nonmarket challengers that failed to fundamentally threaten U.S. economic interests in the past.

而且经济学家找不到任何负面的影响，反而是美国从这些投资中大获益处。这不是一个特别的威胁，而是对于中国强大到足以影响世界（比世界影响她要多）的一种担心。通过调查投资的规模，美国担心中国有能力控制美国经济的某些领域，这比那些非政府的挑战者在过去能够威胁美国利益集团的威胁要大。

If those fears are justified, then conventional American thinking on inward investment might need to change. If those fears are not justified, and the United States abandons its free-market

2 In fact, the first multinational corporations to invest in America arrived with the first settlers: the Plymouth Company came in 1606 and was succeeded

by the Massachusetts Bay Company in 1629. The Virginia Company arrived in 1606, and the Dutch West Indies Company appeared in 1621

to establish the trading post called New Amsterdam, which became New York City (see Wilkins 2004).

3 See Graham and Marchick (2006).

Introduction: The Tide Turns for Chinese Investment | 15

principles prematurely, then it might well destroy its economy in the name of saving it. Further,what if China’s arrival as global direct investor is a harbinger of a more liberal China to come?

如果这种担心是合理的，那么美国传统的对内投资的观念就要改变。如果它们是不合理的，那么美国抛弃了自由市场。

实际上，第一个跨国公司来美国投资事伴随着第一批的移民而来的：普利茅斯公司，1602年，它取得了成功；1629年，是马萨诸塞河湾公司；1606年，弗吉尼亚公司，1621年荷兰西印度公司，该公司寻找了一个交易地点，名叫新阿姆斯特丹，就是以后的纽约市。

Will not Chinese firms be profoundly changed by the experience of being legal stakeholders and residents of the global world, just as first- and second-generation Chinese were when they have settled abroad in the past? If so, then the risk to the United States lies in insufficient

action to attract Chinese investment to America, not in insufficient efforts to keep it out.

中国的公司在成为全球股东及居民后，会像中国的第一二代移民从本质上发生改变吗？如果是这样，那么对美国来说，问题的关键就在于美国没有在吸引中方资金上下功夫，而不是把它们赶出美国。

This is the complex test the United States confronts today: whether it has the ability to discern its own interests in light of China’s rising direct investment.

In this report, we explore the implications of Chinese direct investment for the United States. In doing so, our goal is to inform a review of U.S. interests by taking into account the new realities

of a rapidly changing world. We assess the value of investment flows, describe what motivates Chinese firms to venture so far from home, and ask why, after focusing on less-developed places for the past decade, they are now knocking at America’s doors.

这就是美国今日面对的困局：能否看穿中国不断上升的投资的真正意图。在本报告中，我们的目标是探索中国对美直接投资的含义。为了达到此目的，我们将回顾美国在变幻的世界中的国家利益。我们认为投资是很有价值的，探究中国公司远离本土，在不发达地区投资发展之后，来到美国的动机及原因；现在它们在叩击美国国门。

We draw conclusions that we believe are uncontroversial in the face of the evidence we present.

我们得出结论，我们的观点会在证据面前变得毫无争议。

Finally, we offer a brief set of recommendations for American policy makers that flow logically from those conclusions.We believe that a well-informed American response to China’s rise can lead to tremendous benefits not only for the United States, but for China and the rest of the world as well. A poorly conceived response, on the other hand, will push economic benefits to other countries without appreciably advancing U.S. national security.

最后，我们给当政者提供建议，按照本报告的逻辑行事。我们相信，对中国崛起的睿智回应不仅会对美国有好处，而且对中国也是，对世界也是。而糟糕的回应，则会使得别国获益，而对美国本身没有好处。

The study is organized as follows:

Section I looks at trends in China’s global outward investment and explores the motives behind China’s new forays abroad so that Americans can see more clearly the nature of both the risks and the opportunities that this rapidly rising flow of Chinese FDI presents.

本研究按照以下结构组织：

第一部分：描述中国在全球的投资，以及该行为的背后动机，这样美国人可以清楚看到中国对美直接投资的机遇与挑战。

Section II turns specifically to the patterns in Chinese direct investment in the United States, and introduces an alternative methodology for capturing the quantity and quality of investment

now taking place.

第二部分：

重点考量中国资本在美国的合作者，提供一个供选择的吸引现阶段有质量的投资。

Section III analyzes how Chinese investment impacts the United States, in terms of such factors as employment, competitiveness, innovation, and national security.

第三部分：

分析中国投资对美国的影响，比如对就业，竞争力，创新和国家安全的影响。

Section IV examines U.S. inward direct investment policies and politics, both in general and in the case of investment flows from China.

Section V draws conclusions from our new approach to the data and our discussion of the history and current political economy of Chinese outward investment. Then, we offer eight recommendations to better maximize American benefits from China’s foreign direct investment in the United States.

第四：

探究美国的投资政策和政治，包括全部的政策及针对中国的部分。

第五：

从我们对数据和历史和现在的中国对外投资政治经济现状的讨论，得出结论。然后，我们提出八项主张，来最大化来自中国的对外直接投资给美国带来的好处。

yangfuguang

没有严格编辑格式，介个没有影响吧，，，，，，

青蛙小王子

没有严格编辑格式，介个没有影响吧，，，，，，
yangfuguang 发表于 2011-5-9 21:02

    木事的，到时工程完成之后再统一编辑吧。
不过现在能编辑好的话是最好的。:lol:

連長

交稿，，，，，，many chapters in the story of China’s reappearance as a powerhouse are yet to be wr ...
yangfuguang 发表于 2011/5/9 21:01

   速度好快，我也要赶紧跟进。向你学习

yangfuguang

回复 26# 連長


    我这个比较短啊，

yangfuguang

认领第五部分，这个部分明显比较长，

corie_zhu

回复 22# 青蛙小王子


:$

yangfuguang

Conclusions
China’s FDI boom is just beginning: through 2020, we foresee $1 trillion to $2 trillion of Chinese FDI flowing globally. The United States has not been a major recipient of these flows to date—but the numbers show that we are at an inflection. The United States could be a leading beneficiary of Chinese direct investment in the years ahead if we do not turn these investors away.
结论：
中国的直接对外投资才刚刚开始：我们预测,到2020年，中国在全球的投资规模会达到一万亿到二万亿美元。而美国，从数据上来看，没有成为这些资金的主要流入国——但是这一数字也表明我们得有所改变。如果我们不拒人于千里之外，那么美国可以成为这些投资的受益国。
The United States enjoys roughly 15% of global FDI today. If just 5% of China’s expected out flows target the United States over the coming decade, the numbers will be enormous. Exact prediction is impossible—there are too many factors that could shift the results, up or down.
美国每年从大约15%的全球对外投资中获益。如果在未来十年，中国的对外投资中有5%投向美国，这个数字是巨大的。具体的预测有多少是不可能的——因为有很多因素可以改变这一结果，使它上升或者下降。
But the example of Japan is instructive: Japan’s first investments in the United States during the 1980s were almost as controversial as China’s, but in the following years, Japanese U.S. affiliates put hundreds of billions of dollars into America, and today employ nearly 700,000 Americans. Annually, these firms export $60 billion from America to the world, spend $4.6 billion on R&D, and pay more than $50 billion in compensation to U.S. workers.108 Now at the beginning of such a transformation, Chinese firms already have invested more than $11
billion in the United States and employ thousands of Americans—and the numbers are growing more than 100% per year.
但是可以借鉴日本的经验：日本在1980年代对美国的第一波投资和中国现在的投资一样饱受争议，但在接下来几年中，日美的机构把成百上千亿美元投向美国，现在这些机构雇佣大约70万美国人。每年这些公司从美国向世界出口6000亿美元货物，花费460亿美元进行研究和开发工作，每年付给美国工人5000亿美元报酬。现在在这一转变刚刚开始的情况之下，中国公司已经在美国投资了110亿美元，雇佣了成千上万的美国人——而且这一数值每年增加一倍多。
While the benefits are large, there are national security concerns that cannot be ignored, today or tomorrow. Beijing officials sometimes argue that the United States is motivated by protectionism,prejudice, or competitive worries, and that FDI screening is unjustified. This is not helpful, nor is it accurate. What is more, by mislaying blame, such comments sour public opinion in China and exacerbate mutual mistrust.
虽然实在的利益这样多，但是无论是现在或将来，国土安全的考虑也是不能忽略的。北京有时候指责美国持有保护主义，偏见或担心竞争，因而直接投资的审查是不公正的。这很无用，也不正确。更重要的是，这种指责使得中国的公众心里很不好受，而且加剧了双方的怀疑。
National security review is recognized as a legitimate process worldwide, and given China’s poor corporate governance and secretive politics, it is reasonable for Washington to screen Chinese investment with diligence. China has global strategic ambitions and defines the United States as an impediment to those ambitions.
国家安全的审查在全球来看都是一个基本的合法程序，由于中国公司落后的管理以及神秘的政治背景，华盛顿对中国公司的审查就变得合情合理了。中国在全球有自己的雄心壮志，而且把美国作为前进的障碍。
Chinese firms—government owned and otherwise—often are compelled to conform to state edicts to a much greater extent than corporations from other major U.S. direct investor nations. There is sufficient reason to be mindful of orchestrated Chinese efforts to obtain technology and to infiltrate foreign infrastructure abroad in a manner that could be harmful to U.S. national security interests.109
中国的公司——国有的或者其它公司——常常会强迫要比美国的其它主要投资国的公司更加要遵守法律。因此必须要堤防中国的公司获取技术，或者潜入外国的基础设施内来危害美国安全利益。
At the same time, the current policy process works well to screen out security risks, and most Chinese investments in the United States happen without drama. Popular Chinese fears that the United States is closed to their investment are simply wrong, as the evidence on growing
Chinese FDI inflows makes clear.
同时，现行的审查制度可以很好地杜绝国家安全的隐患，而且多数中国在美投资都没有什么猫腻。普通中国民众担心美国会禁止中国在美国投资是错误的，因为证据清楚地表明中国的对美投资在增加。
Those bids that have been impeded concerned specific threats,mostly falling under the category of preventing critical access to strategically important goods or services, new defense-related technologies, or fifth-column homeland security risks. As for concerns that CFIUS is not restrictive enough, we are aware of no damage to U.S. national security that can be attributed to a faulty investment approval process, and we see no evidence that the existing process cannot handle greater flows of Chinese FDI into the United States.
而有些交易被叫停了，因为考虑到可能带来的特定威胁，很多是为了阻止中国获得战略物质或者服务，新国防技术，或者带来的第五纵队问题。对于那些对中国对美直接投资不够严厉的担心，我们知道这些对美国国家安全是无害的，这可以归结于不当的投资批准程序，而且我们认为现在的程序可以有效阻挡中国的资金大量涌入美国。
The current screening process is not perfect. Key definitions in U.S. regulations are ambiguous, such as those defining what constitutes a “critical industry” and “foreign-government control.”、
现行的审查制度不完美。一些关键定义是模糊的，比如什么包含关键工业，和外国政府控制。

Determining whether a transaction is benign or threatening is an art, not a science, and the subjective discretion left open by these definitions is intentional, so as to give screeners sufficient
leeway to adapt as technology and industries evolve. If every aspect of the system were defined in advance—for instance, a list of open and closed industries—it would necessarily be more restrictive. Understandable as such discretion may be, there have been outcomes that seem hard to justify in terms of specific national security concerns.
定义一宗交易是否有威胁是一种艺术，而不是科学，而这些定义的措辞如此宽泛是有预谋的，这就可以给审查者以足够大的回旋余地，使得工业界的干涉变得容易。如果所有一切在之前都定义好——例如，一长串的开放与不开放的领域——那么这些规定必定更加严格。这些定义的描述是可以理解的，而在国家安全这一层面来考虑的话，这些定义很难做到合法化。
Our general conclusion that CFIUS is admirably focused on the discreet national security concerns it is tasked with by law can only be
maintained as long as it remains clear that no matter what its members discuss internally, its determinations are subject to due process and appropriate oversight.
我们的普遍结论是，中国对美国直接投资令人感动的被纳入国土安全的考虑，这是出于法律的规定，而且这种情况不会改变， 不论它们的成员在国内如何讨论，只要决定权依旧在这些审查和合理的监督之下。

If faith that the Committee is not being used as a tool for protectionism slips, then the interests of the United States will be seriously damaged. In light of foreign and domestic misgivings, whether reasonable or not, the Committee will likely need to offer even better assurance in the future that it is keeping to
its mandate.
是否委员会不是作为一个保护主义的工具，美国的利益就会严重受损？鉴于国内外的担忧，不管是否有道理，委员会都要拿出足够多的表现来证明自己依旧忠于职守。
The greater concern is not U.S. policy, but U.S. politics, which is prone to capriciousness and ends up diverting the benefits of Chinese direct investment to workers and communities in other nations if not corrected. Political interference in the FDI screening process, whether to protect special interests here from economic competition or to pursue a “fortress America”vision of national security, will have a toxic effect on even the most well-thought-out policy regimes. As shown in Section IV, it already has, as Chinese investments have been subject to serious politicization, an outgrowth of unfamiliarity, suspiciousness, lobbying efforts by vested interests, and the complexity of the overall U.S.–China relationship.
相比于美国的政策，美国的政治更加让人担忧，因为政治是变化莫测的，如果不改正的话，那么会使得中国的投资带来的好处流向其它国家的民众。在审查直接投资中，政治干预也参与其中，不论是出于保护国内的利益集团免于竞争，还是追求“美国堡垒”似的国家安全主义，这种干预对于深思熟虑产生的政策都会带来恶劣影响。在第四章我们已经看出这种端倪，因为中国的投资被政治化了，从而加剧了陌生，疑心，以及政治集团的勾心斗角和中美关系的不确定性。
109 While it is generally very difficult to attribute cyber attacks to specific groups or even governments, there is enough compelling open-source evidence of concerted Chinese infiltration of governmental, utility, and corporate information infrastructure assets abroad to warrant caution. See, e.g., USCC (2009);
U.S. Department of Defense (2010); and Wortzel (2010).
注释：109把网上的攻击归咎于具体的集团甚至政府是很难的，但依旧有足够的证据表明中国政府在国外渗入，政府的，或者公司的扩张在海外都引起了担心。参见：USCC 2009
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One cannot eliminate political interference in a participatory democracy, but the consequences must be recognized and moderated. We must always keep the pressure on CFIUS to catch threats to America. But while CFIUS reviews are predictable, random eruptions of protectionism masquerading as national security concerns are not.
在一个人人参与的民主社会，消除政治干预是不可能的，但是结果必须要审慎和可接受的。我们必须时刻保持对危及美国安全的直接投资的警惕。但是因为中国对美直接投资是可以预见的，随之而来打扮成保护美国安全的保护主却不是这样。
Even the modest level of Chinese direct investment to date has stoked political fires, though America’s door to China so far has remained
open. Keeping it open in the future will take work, but it can be done. An open door is no guarantee that people will walk in, though. Doors are open to China all around the world—a world in which America is no longer the only place to set up shop. Here, we offer recommendations
to promote each of these concluding imperatives: maintaining the best security screening process, keeping America’s door open to the benefits of China going global, and more actively attracting the right investments from China so the benefits for Americans are assured.
即便是很少的中国直接投资都在政治上引起轩然大波，尽管美国的投资大门依旧对中国敞开。在未来保证它依旧开着是需要很多工作的，但是不是做不到。开着的门也不能保证有人通过。全世界都向中国敞开大门——在这个世界美国并不是唯一的开店的地方。这里，我们提出建议，落实以下结论性的命令：确保最优的审查体系，保证美国向中国走向世界敞开投资之门，采取更多的措施来吸引来自中国的投资，以确保美国的利益。
Recommendations
Our analysis indicates that most Chinese direct investment in the United States is profit motivated and benign, that inflows will increase if permitted with important local benefits, and that our policy for screening inflows for real security threats is sound.
措施
我们的分析暗示中国在美国的投资都是利益使然，而且没有危险，如果和地方的利益许可，那么这些投资会增加，那么我们出于安全考虑来审查这些投资就是合理的。
Therefore, our recommendations emphasize preserving and protecting the existing screening regime, addressing regulatory weaknesses, limiting the potential for abuse and misunderstandings, and beefing up investment promotion regimes.
因此，我们的建议强调保留，保护现有的审查体制，强调管理的弱点，限制潜在的滥用和误解，加大引资力度。

1. Send a clear and bipartisan message that Chinese investment is welcome.
A succession of U.S. presidents have publicly supported investment flows from China. In joint statements during President Hu’s state visit to the United States in January 2011, the two leaders “acknowledged the importance of fostering open, fair, and transparent investment environments to their domestic economies and to the global economy.”110 But because of the many past controversies, there is a growing perception in China that the United States is not open to Chinese investors. That is wrong, but in truth, the signals coming from Washington are mixed.
1.        建立明确的双边信息，表明中国的投资是受欢迎的
美国几任总统都对来自中国的投资表示欢迎。在2011年胡锦涛访问美国时，双边的联合公报中，两国领导人“承认培养开发，公平，透明的投资环境对于两国经济和全球经济都是有好处的”。但是由于过去很多争议，在中国的潜意识中，认为美国对中国时不开放的。这是错误的，但是确是事实，来自美国的信号是不明朗的。
The president makes high-minded statements about openness, but senior officials often express misgivings about doing business with Chinese firms. Critically, attitudes among congressional leaders range from skeptical to hostile, often leading to proposals to exclude Chinese interests.
Business leaders endorse job-creating Chinese investment in the United States, but only when reciprocal concessions from China are available.
总统对于开放有着冠冕的言论，但是基层的官员却对和中国公司做生意充满了担忧。严格来说，国会领导对这种事情也是持批评或敌意态度，因而会提出一些威胁中国利益的提案。商业领袖认同中国能够带来就业的投资，但也仅仅局限于双方互利，而且要中方在可忍受范围内让步才可。
Talk of a bilateral investment treaty began under the George W. Bush administration, but the effort now is in limbo while the United
States revises its existing model bilateral investment treaty. Meanwhile, Chinese officials have suggested a “catalogue of guidance” delineating U.S. industries that are open and closed, and some U.S. analysts even endorse the wholesale cordoning off of industrial sectors such as telecommunications—but the United States does not operate that way (unlike China).
在乔治布什时代，有关双边投资的条约就在讨论中，但是该努力已经终止，而美国也修改了它现行的投资策略。
110 From the U.S.–China joint statement of January 19, 2011, http://www.america.gov/st/texttr ... 33su0.7791799.html.
引自 美中年一月十九日的联合声明
In light of these mixed signals, Americans must ask whether they can blame Chinese for being confused by U.S. investment climate intentions. Sowing such confusion is not in the U.S. interest.
由于这种复合信号，美国人必须问一下，他们是否有理由责怪中国人对于美国这种投资环境的困惑。而这种困惑显然是不合美国利益的。
To resolve this murkiness, we recommend that the president fashion a bipartisan congressional– xecutive statement supporting increased U.S. investment from China.This statement should pport the CFIUS process and pledge to protect it from political grandstanding. Concrete easures to encourage inward investment should follow. Officials in practically every state will favor of such a message: most already are courting Chinese investors actively. Such an initiative
will help change perceptions in China about the climate in the United States and greatly strengthen the hands of those working to promote Chinese investment in America.
为了解决这一僵局，我们建议，总统建立一个两党联立的国会——行政声明，来支持日益增长的来自中国的投资。这份声明应该支持中国对美的直接投资程序，保证在政治层面保护这些行动。切实保护在国内投资的保证也必须要实现。官员们特别是州一级的官员会喜欢看到这一信息：有一些已经非常积极的在吸引中国投资了。这种初始的积极信号会改变中国对于美国投资环境的印象，而且会大大加强这些促进中国在美投资行为的联系。
2. Systematize the promotion of FDI from China and elsewhere.
We recommend a thorough review of efforts to attract foreign investment to the United States.The current laissez-faire approach dates to an era when the United States dominated global FDI flows it is built on the assumption that the U.S. economy is unrivaled in its attractiveness to foreign investors, and it presumes that foreign investors come from countries with similar legal and commercial systems and do not need much on-the-ground assistance.
2．制度化推进吸引来自中国及其它地方的资金
我们建议以一种全新的努力来吸引外国投资来美国。现在的放任方法源于以前美国在对外投资中占据统治地位，而且美国对外资的吸引力是无穷的，它相信流入美国的资金来自那些和美国法律和商业制度一致的国家，不需要样基本的帮助。
This situation has changed, and American policy makers and local business leaders know far too little about what is important to Chinese firms in choosing an overseas investment destination.To ensure that significant Chinese inflows of capital are not diverted to the economies of our competitors, we recommend that Chinese prospects for inward investment be assessed in the context of national competitiveness, and the most desirable from those should then be actively courted. Currently, the burden of attracting foreign investment falls on states and municipalities.
这种情况已经改变了，而美国政策制定者和地方经济领导人对于中国公司选择投资对象的标准一无所知。为了确保来自中国的资金不流入美国的竞争对手那里，我们建议把中国对美国投资的重要性上升到国家竞争力的高度上，而多数让人满意的结果都应该是我们积极追求的，吸引中国投资的重任就落到了州及地方上了。
Compared to other countries, federal efforts in the United States are negligible. America’s states and cities compete head to head with nations that have more financial firepower and high-level support for the removal of national investment impediments. Mundane bureaucratic
hurdles are major obstacles for Chinese investors: during our interviews with Chinese executives, many related how difficult it is to obtain U.S. visas and then to battle bureaucratic procedures.111 The establishment of the Invest in America program in 2007 was a positive step, but its parent agency is minimally staffed and underfinanced compared to similar institutions in peer competitor nations.112
和其它国家相比，联邦在美国的作用几乎可以略去不计。美国各州及城市争先恐后地和中央争夺财政权以及对于消除投资障碍的有力支持。世俗的官僚主义是阻挡中国投资的主要原因：在我们对中国公司管理者的调查中，很多人谈到很难获得美国签证，然后就是在官僚作风下苦苦等候审批，2007年确立的投资在美国的计划是个积极进步，但是和其它国家的相比，它的主管部门却是人员稀少而且资金不足。
These efforts will not eliminate the challenges that Chinese firms face in operating in mature markets such as the United States, but experience shows that programs targeting Chinese investors can help pave the way for more investment to follow.  Many observers believe the best way to promote inflows is by improving formal mechanisms—particularly by concluding a bilateral investment treaty with China.
这些措施不会消除中国公司在成熟的消费市场所面临的挑战，但是经验表明这些针对中国投资者的措施会给更多的投资做足铺垫。很多观察家相信最好的方式是通过改变常规的机制——特别是和中国签订一个双边投资协议。
111 For example, we were told that visa applications often require firms to provide the equivalent of social security numbers for high level executives and
government officials – sensitive information that most U.S. officials would not think of disclosing to Chinese bureaucrats.
112 See Weddle (2009) for relevant data and a comparative view on investment promotion efforts of the United States and its peer competitors.
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It is true that such an agreement would send a powerful signal of our political commitment to boost bilateral FDI flows. However, the extent to which such an agreement would address the problems that Chinese investors confront in the United States is uncertain. Chinese investors already face few formal investment restrictions, after all, and their investments are protected by the robust U.S. legal system.113 Though a bilateral investment treaty might help calm the debate about Chinese investment, it would not change national security reviews or the CFIUS process in any way.
这个协议无疑会发出积极信号，表明我们致力于推动双边的直接投资。然而，该协议能在多大程度上解决中国投资者在美国碰到的问题依旧不确定。中国投资者依旧面对了几个常规的投资限制。他们也碰到了一些新的投资限制，但是他们的投资也是受美国健全的法律制度保护的。尽管双边投资协议可以帮助消减对于中国投资的争论，它也不会改变国家安全的审查或者美国投资委员会的审查。
3. Protect the investment review process from interference.
After reviewing more than 200 inward FDI deals involving China, we have concluded that the U.S. investment screening process is generally well designed. However, we strongly recommend that efforts be made to better protect the screening process from politicization and further improve
the transparency of the formal decision-making process. If politicization is not tempered, the benefits of increased inward investment increasingly will be diverted to our competitors.
Whatever steps are taken to protect the U.S. investment review process, they must be concrete.
在回顾了有关中国的200多起在美的投资案例之后，我们得出结论：美国的投资审查制度是完备的。我们强烈建议必须要有保证审查远离政治化的努力，以及正式决策的透明性。如果政治化不是那样温和，那么国内投资带来的利益就会转移到我们竞争对手那里。不论是什么来保护美国的投资审查制度，它们必须是具体的。
Alterations of the process in ways that would allow further interference—for example, by adding national economic security objectives to the review process, as China recently did in a new regime—should be rejected. The loosely defined terms in the U.S. process, including “national security,” “critical infrastructure,” and “foreign-government control” are not that way by accident.
而改变这些程序则会产生进一步的干涉——例如，增加国家经济安全类的审查，就像中国最近在一些领域做得那样，这应该受到反对。美国审查程序中的宽泛定义比如，国家安全，重要的基础设施和外国政府控制的等条目不是凭空产生的。
Such imprecision leaves room for judgment, and our interests lie not in eliminating space for judgment, but in ensuring that outcomes accord with the goal of openness. This does not mean revealing sources when a deal must be rejected for classified reasons; it does mean taking a more public stand when spurious arguments against an investment are made, rather than letting a deal twist in the wind.
Some in China have suggested clearer up-front U.S. guidance on what is sensitive and what is not, so that Chinese firms do not waste their time and money. That is understandable, especially in light of the arbitrary politicization in several cases discussed earlier, and would mirror China’s own use of such lists.114 However, such an approach is unsuited to the United States.
这些宽泛定义给未来的决定留下了可操作的空间，而如果没有操作空间，我们的利益会损失到，但是我们必须确保这些结果和对外开放的目的不冲突。这不意味着当一个交易因为特定的原因而被反对时，我们可以网开一面；它只是意味着当对于某一个投资的虚假反对产生时，我们需要更加广泛的讨论，而不是就此让一笔生意就此付诸东流。一些在中国的人士建议对于那些是敏感的那些不是要有明确的界限，这样中国的公司就不会浪费他们的时间和金钱，特别是鉴于之前有数笔交易被无端的政治介入，这些会使得中国公司明白该如何明确这些内容。但是这个方法是不适合美国的。
Within a given industry, there are acceptable and unacceptable investments, and it is impossible to anticipate all eventualities in advance so as to fairly proscribe foreign investment in some industries
and not others. We should ask not whether China has ambitions, or whether an industry can be sensitive, but whether a specific deal poses an actual threat; there are good analytical frameworks for making such judgments.115
在一个特定的工业领域，有些投资是可以接受的有些不是，因而预测全部可能的事情，然后禁止外国公司进入一些领域而开放另外一些，这是不可能的。我们不应该假设中国是否有这样的雄心，或者某一领域是否敏感，而是一个特定的交易是否会催生实际的威胁；对此有专业的分析框架。
Finally, for the current policy framework to be defended from constant reproach, it must be
113 Moreover, the question of how big an impact such international investment agreements have on actual investment flows is subject to intense debate in
academia. See, e.g., Yackee (2008).然而这种投资协议能在多大程度上影响到投资流依旧在学术界争论不休。
114 See China’s Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (NDRC and MOFCOM 2007).参见中国对外投资工业目录。
115 See Moran (2009).
dynamic enough to integrate new challenges as they emerge. The evolution of technology and geopolitics necessitate adjusting criteria and processes, as debates about Chinese investment in
telecommunications infrastructure, for instance, make clear.
最后，为了使现在政策架构远离责备，必须把新出现的挑战加以应对。不断演化的技术和地缘政治在调整着标准和程序，例如对于中国投资通讯领域的争论，这些调整必须是明确的。
Flexibility has been a core American strength in the past. But in addition to being timely, adaptation must be transparent and must not
erode confidence in existing regimes. Ad hoc congressional interventions in reaction to perceived threats (see the cases of China Ocean Shipping in Long Beach, CNOOC–Unocal, Alcatel–Lucent,and Dubai Ports World) have damaged the U.S. reputation for openness and must be avoided.
灵活多变曾经是美国的核心优势。但是为了与时俱进，调整是必需的，但又不能侵蚀人们心中的自信。特别是国会为了应对潜在的中国的威胁而做出的干涉（参见中海运在长滩，中海油并购优尼科案，以及迪拜世界港口公司的收购）它们以及损害了美国的开放的名声，这是应该避免的。
4. Work to better understand Chinese motives.
Ask “Joe the Plumber”—the oracle of U.S. popular sentiment—what Chinese firms are doing in America, and chances are, the answer will reveal dark suspicions. The notion that most firms from China cross the Pacific not under government instruction, but in pursuit of profit,
surprises most Americans. If you do not believe a firm is here in search of profit, then how could you not conclude it is here to advance some political objective? There is no easy way to exclude incendiary views about China from the public debate.
4.正确理解中国的动机
问问“水管工乔”——美国流行的神谕——看看那些公司在美国活动，以及由此带来的机会，答案将会揭开居心叵测的猜忌。很多中国公司跨越太平洋来到美国多数不是基于政府的指令，而是为了追求利润，这个结论让很多美国人震惊。如果你不相信在这里的公司不在寻找利润，那么你怎么能相信它们在追寻政治目标？但是从公众的争论中去除针对中国的煽动性言论是很困难的。
We recommend that the only way to reduce the effects of such prejudice is the hard way—through education. U.S. politicians and the general public require a better understanding of Chinese motives and fundamentals. Americans need better education about China, its strengths, its weaknesses, and what it means for the United States. Efforts to create a better understanding of the motives, identity, and behavior of Chinese investors, and especially the economic benefits
of growing investment, are key.
我们认为降低这种偏见的唯一方式是困难的——通过教育。美国政治家和大众需要更好地理解中国的动机和基本情况。美国需要在针对中国的教育方面做得更好，它的优势，它的弱点，以及它们对美国的意义。创造更好的理解中国的努力，包括动机，身份和中国投资者的行为，特别是日渐增加的投资带来的好处等都是很关键的。
How can this educational imperative be achieved? For one thing, the proponents and beneficiaries of Chinese investment in the United States,including deal makers, venture partners, sellers,and localities, can be far more active in presenting the facts. As recommended earlier, a bipartisan statement encouraging Chinese investment is important, and must be aimed at the U.S. domestic audience as much as potential investors in China. And, of course, economists and policy analyst like us should work harder to make the Chinese scene more accessible.
如何让这些教育完全施行呢？一方面，中国投资的美国受益者，交易方，风险伙伴，买方和当地可以更加积极的宣传事实。就像在之前建议的那样，双边的鼓励中国投资的协议是很重要的，但是必须瞄准美国的听众和中国的潜在投资者。而且，当然经济学家和政策分析人士，比如我们，要努力使得中国的状况更加易于接受。
5. Communicate to China its share of the burden.
Suspicions about Chinese firms arise from the relationship between the state and the corporate sector in China. Americans hardly can be blamed for wondering what the bottom line is if the top executives of China’s state-owned enterprise are appointed by and beholden to the
Communist Party, business decisions routinely are subjected to political considerations, and firms are larded with loans regardless of their business prospects.
5.要让中国明白自己的责任
对于中国公司的怀疑源于中国政府和公司部门的关系，美国人的担心是很难被责备的，因为中国国有的大公司的首席管理人员由共产党任命，并且对共产党负责，而商业决定通常和政治相关联，而这些公司的前景不论如何，都会获得贷款。
If China wants a more straightforward hearing for its firms in Washington, it must make corporate governance in China more transparent.
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The lack of transparency that shrouds China’s leading firms often has to do with protecting the privileged parties who enjoy the resulting profit streams, rather than providing cover for nefarious overseas intentions. Americans cannot be expected to intuit Chinese politics, however.
如果中国想要更加直接听到来自华盛顿的关于中国公司声音，它就必须要使中国公司的管理更加透明。
缺乏透明使得中国的领先公司内幕很难被了解，这经常是为了保护利益集团，他们分享了利润，而不是为了掩饰海外投资的邪恶。然而，美国人不可能凭直觉了解中国政治。
If China wants a more straightforward hearing for its firms in Washington, it must make corporate governance in China more transparent. U.S. officials should call for this forthrightly, and take the upper hand with Chinese pundits complaining about investment barriers. Clearer separation between regulators and the firms they oversee would help. A consumer-oriented welfare test in China’s competition policy would help ensure that market performance, and not some other state objective, is the determinant of Chinese firm behavior.
如果中国想要更加直接听到来自华盛顿的关于中国公司声音，它就必须要使中国公司的管理更加透明。美国官员应该号召这样直率，这样可以和中国那些学者抱怨投资壁垒时占据上风。分清什么是规范者和公司很有必要。一个消费者至上的福利考验中国的竞争策略可以确保市场表现，而不是其它国家目标，这是中国公司行为的决定因素。
To put it plainly, if China dismantled its system of state capitalism, there would be less mystery about the possible predatory
intent of the firms under Beijing’s influence, and hence an easier vetting.
为了使得它直接，如果中国拆散了自己的国有资本的体系，那么对于这些公司可能受北京操控的担忧就会减少，那么审核就会简单。
However, we recommend realism in our expectations. Reform in China is not going to happen overnight, but it is important to understand that it has, in fact, happened over the decades. Similarly, China has opened much of its own economy to foreign investors, but there remains
much to be done. We generally take the stance that the United States should not base its own investment review system on questions of reciprocity, but Chinese policy makers must be aware that such considerations play an important role in the domestic debate in the United States about openness to foreign investment, and that an acceleration of reforms would strengthen the position of those in the United States advocating investment openness.
然而，我们建议我们的预期要更加合理。在中国的改变不是一朝一夕就能完成的，但是理解这个过程正在发生史很重要的，事实上，在过去几十年它都在发生。相似的是，中国已经开放了她的绝大多数经济领域，但是还是有很多需要做的。我们通常认为，美国不应该在互惠交往中坚持自己的投资体系，但是中国的政策制定者应该明白这种观念在美国国内对于中国投资的争论占据重要地位，因而加快的变革可以加强在美国鼓励开放投资的行动。
Similarly, Chinese leaders must understand that it does not strengthen their call to U.S. policy makers to keep the U.S. investment screening narrow if China at the same time comes up with a domestic investment review regime that explicitly includes “national economic security” and even“social stability” as criteria to block foreign investment.116
相似的，中国的领导人必须理解，如果中国同时推出了国内的投资审查，而且其中包含国家经济安全以及社会稳定这样的定义来屏蔽国外投资，那么他们无法对美国政策制定者大呼小叫关于美国的投资审查太过严厉。
6. Remain open to “what if” scenarios.
We recommend an initiative to more systematically explore the implications for the United States and the international economy should artificial input prices, especially for capital, distort world
investment patterns significantly in the years ahead. In terms of the nontraditional, special concerns about the economics in the case of China, we see less that is special about China than others do when we look at our more comprehensive data.
6.仍然对“任何”情景开放
我们建议一种积极的更加系统化探索对于美国的意义，以及国际经济应该人为加入价格指数，特别是资本，它们在多年前一直搅动世界经济。而在非传统，特别是在中国这种情况下对于经济的担心，我们会发现中国和我们已知的数据没有太大的特别之处。
The exception is the concern that China could be large enough in the future to be a price maker instead of a price taker. If China’s sheer size, combined with its artificial pricing structures (e.g., the cost of capital arising from financial repression), threatens to “poison” global markets in the future when Chinese outflows make up a greater share of world totals, then a subsidy-disciplining regime for global direct investment, akin
116 See “Circular of the General Office of the State Council on the Establishment of Security Review System Regarding Merger and Acquisition of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors” English version available at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aar ... 0110307430493.html.
to that for trade, probably will be necessary. We suspect that the statist preferences of China seen at present will break down prior to that point, but we cannot be sure.
例外的一种情况是，中国在未来一定足够强大，可以制定价格，而不是仅仅接受价格。如果中国偏离了，考虑到他的人为的价格干预（例如来自财政干预引起的），这对世界是个毒药，当有一天中国的对外投资占到全球很大比例的时候，那时对于对外投资的补贴，类似于现在的贸易补贴可能会出现。我们怀疑，中国现在的统计数据在那个时候将会先于这种情况瓦解，但是我们还不确信。
Analytically, there is no consensus on how one should define, measure, or observe an unfair influence of one nation’s domestic capital costs on world prices. As we noted in Section III, this question is not unique to China: the worldwide impact of the second round of quantitative easing of U.S.dollar liquidity in 2010 (referred to as QE2) was hotly debated for exactly this reason, with China stridently criticizing the United States for domestic policies that affected others. There should be no objection from Beijing on principle, therefore, to a multilateral research initiative to develop better consensus on this topic.
综合来看，对于一国在国内的资本成本的不公平如何影响世界的商品价格，目前还没有一个定义或者衡量或观察的措施。我们在第三章提到，这不是中国独有的问题：2010年世界范围内第二轮摆脱美元流动性也是这样地被争论着。对于一个多边的来更好研究此问题原则问题上，北京不会有异议。
7. Do not play the reciprocity game.
The term “reciprocity” has been used too frequently in the context of Chinese investment—namely, if China is discriminatory against U.S. investment, the United States should reciprocate in kind.
We recommend greater caution. It is true that China maintains significant inward investment restrictions. However, Beijing has been a leader in direct investment openness for decades, and it has grown stronger by opening its door wider to FDI irrespective of overseas openness.
7.不要玩互利的游戏
“互利”这个词在中国的对外投资中经常被使用，名义上是这样的。如果中国有意反对美国的投资，那么美国也应该有所反应。我们认为要有足够的警惕。中国对于国内投资的限制是很严厉的。然而，中国作为直接投资开放国已经几十年了，而且她从这种对外开放的投资中获得了很大的好处。
Furthermore, the notion of withholding U.S. investment access for more access in China is foolish and against American interests. Yes, U.S. negotiators must press China to open wider still to U.S. investors. But it is emphatically in America’s interests to separate that effort from whether to permit cash to flow from China into the United States. The United States should welcome capital from China, regardless of what Beijing’s state planners have to say about foreign investment in
China. Would the United States really prefer that Chinese firms set up plants in Ontario instead of Michigan, or Juarez instead of El Paso?
进一步讲，限制美国资本进入中国是不明智的，也不符合美国利益。是的，美国的谈判代表必须告知中国，在更大程度上允许美国资金进入中国。但是区分是否允许来自中国的资本进入美国是很重要的。美国应该欢迎来自中国的资本，不论中国的计划者不得不说的关于外国投资的种种。美国是否真的更加喜欢中国公司在安大略湖扎根而不是密歇根，或者是墨西哥而不是德克萨斯。
8. Get our own house in order.
Finally, and most importantly, we recommend that the United States get its own house in order to maximize the benefits of rising Chinese investment interests. Foreign investment, Chinese or otherwise, can come to the United States for multiple reasons. Investors will flock to a property in bankruptcy for bargain-basement deals and fire sale steals—after all, beggars cannot be choosers.
8.管好我们自己的国家
最后，也是最重要的，我们建议，美国要管理好自己，以尽可能最大化不断上升的中国投资带来的利益。外国投资，中国或者其它的，可以以各种理由进入美国。投资者也会各式各样，不管怎么样，穷人不会有选择权。
On the other hand, nothing succeeds like success, and for a century and a half, investors have come to the United States because of its sound financial and commercial prospects. The single most important step in attracting foreign investment that creates long-term value in the economy is to address the current political and economic problems that the Unites States faces. Only a country with a healthy economy, political stability, and clear vision for the future will be able to
attract foreign investors that contribute to its long-term prosperity.
另一方面，没有什么是一定成功的，在一个半世纪以来，投资者为了良好的财政和商业环境来到了美国。唯一的最好的吸引外资的方法，就是美国从现在的政治和经济问题中走出来。只有一个拥有健全经济体制的国家，政治稳定，以及未来的确定性，才有可能吸引外国投资者来促进长久的繁荣。

yangfuguang

最近有点事情，所以有点晚了，:lol:

青蛙小王子

最近有点事情，所以有点晚了，
yangfuguang 发表于 2011-5-25 08:42

    第一个交稿，不晚不晚，哈哈
我最近天天一两点才能睡觉，也忙啊，疲惫啊

青蛙小王子

这项工程还有人在做么 ？