【中文标题】基辛格的中国药方
【原文标题】Dr. K’s Rx for China
【登载媒体】新闻周刊
【原文作者】Niall Ferguson
【原文链接】http://www.newsweek.com/2011/05/15/dr-k-s-rx-for-china.html
新兴的超级势力正在摩拳擦掌。亨利基辛格在他的新书中介绍如何避免“世纪对决”。
2011年5月9日，美国财政部长盖特纳在华盛顿举行的中美战略经济对话中，中国副总理王岐山（中）和国务委员戴秉国（左）也在座。内嵌图片：美国国务卿亨利基辛格（右）和中国总理周恩来1974年12月25日在北京。
国务卿希拉里克林顿认为中国政府“惧怕”阿拉伯的春天（译者注：指利比亚埃及等国家近期发生的革命事件）。他在接受《大西洋月刊》的Jeffrey Goldberg采访时说：“他们心怀恐惧，试图阻止历史的前进，这是傻瓜才会做的事情，他们别想得逞。”
这些话——狂妄、无礼，而且似乎会取得相反的效果——绝不会从她的前任亨利基辛格的口中说出。
自从基辛格背负秘密使命首次访华至今，已经过去了40年，他为第二年理查德尼克松总统历史性的访问铺平了道路。从那以后，他不下50次造访中国。如果他学到了什么道理，那就是：威胁中国人才是真正的傻瓜行为。
自从基辛格首次访华之后，世界变化了很多。（在1971年，谁敢预测美国人的头号敌人竟然是一个藏在巴基斯坦居民区中的生于沙特的伊斯兰教基督信徒？）但是至少美国外交政策中的两件事情没有变化：冰冻20年后，以基辛格一己之力焕发青春的与中国大陆的关系；和从约翰肯尼迪到巴拉克奥巴马之间为所有总统担任过顾问职务的基辛格本人。在中国问题方面，基辛格的新书指明了为什么我们的领导人还重视他的意见。这个月就满88岁的他依然是一个无敌的战略思想家。
基辛格已经讲述过如何打开中国之路：他和尼克松怎样预见到这个国家将成为制约苏联的超级力量；他如何在巴基斯坦装病后秘密飞往中国；他和周恩来总理如何敲定了尼克松正式访问时的外交基础（上海公报）。用他自己的话说，结局是双方结成了“准盟友”。这个原本试图把苏联也包括在内的双边关系，延续的时间比冷战要长得多。
然而在这本书中，基辛格运用近期的研究结果来阐释中国人对这段历史的态度。美国向中国开放的同时，中国也向美国展开怀抱，这其中的首要原因是毛泽东对周围形势的担心。毛在1969年对他的医生说：“想一想，我们的北边和西边是苏联、南边是印度、东边是日本。如果我们的敌人联合起来，从东南西北进攻我们，我们该怎么办？”医生说不知道。毛说：“你再想一想，日本的那一边是美国，我们的祖先难道不是曾经教导我们‘远交近攻’吗？”毛召回4名戍边元帅的目的就是想试探美国的态度。中国和苏联军队在乌苏里江已经出现了摩擦。1970年10月，毛命令中国高层领导人全部撤离北京，解放军处于“一级战备”状态。中国人为此所冒的风险极高，高过美国人承担的风险。
基辛格讲到，毛提到“祖先的教诲”并非不同寻常之举。尽管他一生致力于马克思列宁主义，毛对中国古典文化也有很深的造诣。他身边的顾问也是如此，叶剑英元帅曾说：“当魏蜀吴三国鼎立时，我们可以借鉴诸葛亮的作战方针：‘东联孙权，北据曹操。’”基辛格解释这是一部14世纪以汉末纷争年代（公元前475年到221年）为背景的史诗小说《三国演义》中的典故。
这并不是中国共产党领导人唯一一次在古人的话语中获得启发。基辛格说，同样重要的还有春秋时期（公元前770年到476年）的《孙子兵法》。像“胜兵先胜而后求战”之类的格言鼓舞着中国战略家像围棋高手一样思考国际关系。
毛告诫中国老一代革命领导人：中国和其它国家不一样，这个拥有五分之一人类的国家是名副其实的“中国”——中土帝国，或者更准确地说是“中央帝国”，有时候甚至可以理解为“天下”。对这样一个庞大的帝国来说，最好的外交政策就是“让蛮子们互殴”。如果这个政策失败，那么最强壮的蛮子将被中土接纳，并逐渐开化（满族人是一个例证）。
基辛格写道，“刚愎、勇猛、残酷、冷漠、诗人、战士、先知和祸害”——毛心目中的英雄不是列宁，而是残暴的、“焚书坑儒”的秦始皇，他在公元前221年用类似的手段统一了中国。中国当代领导人一直在从孔夫子的理论中汲取营养，他们的理想不是统治世界，而是所谓的“大同”。
这里涉及到一个核心的问题。1971年基辛格第一次访问中国的时候，美国的经济规模大约是人民共和国的5倍。40年之后的今天，毛的继任者邓小平所倡导的工业革命，让中国完全有可能在未来十年里取代美国的位置。这是苏联从未接近过的一个壮举。而且，中国目前还是美国国债的最大持有者，这是它手中庞大的3万亿美元国际储备的重要组成部分。中国将如何使用它新掌控的经济力量是我们面临的最重要的问题，基辛格是回答这个问题的最好人选，因为他与四代中国领导人打过交道。
《On China》一书中最具深度的见解集中在心理方面，书中论述了可以从数千年历史中获取启发的中国人与只有两个多世纪历史可供借鉴的美国人之间的差别。在1989年6月的事件中，这个差别体现得极为明显。美国人对动用军队力量来结束×××广场的民主示威感到惊恐，在基辛格看来，采用制裁手段来报复镇压行动是非常幼稚的：“西方人的人权和个性解放概念，不能直接强加于数千年来生活来另一套社会秩序中的文明上。中国人在传统上对政治混乱的恐惧也不能被认为是陈腐的陋习，不需要西方开明人士的‘纠正’。”
中国第一位会讲英文的领导人江泽民在1991年对基辛格说：“我们从不向压力屈服……这是我们的处事原则。”
中美在朝鲜战场上的对立也是源于双方文化间的鸿沟。当毛下令中国军队开赴朝鲜时，美国人大吃一惊，因为他们认为中国人获胜的几率微乎其微。但是，基辛格认为，毛“诉诸武力的动机只有少部分是先发制人的军事意图，更深层次的原因是平衡个人心理的手段。击败敌人是次要的，改善自身的危险处境的首要的。”毛是古代宫廷阴谋的大师，其中常用的手段就是用自信，甚至咄咄逼人来隐藏自己的弱点。在西方人看来，他坚持说不惧怕核武器攻击，这简直是疯了，或者是冷酷到了极点（“我们或许会死掉3亿人，那又怎么样？战争就是战争，这段时期终将过去，我们还会生出更多的孩子。”）。但这其实是典型的中国式虚张声势，或者是“进攻性威慑”。
基辛格有一段论述，不但需要美国外交官仔细品味，美国商人在前往北京之前也需要额外关注。“中国谈判者使用的策略是把政治、军事、心理等因素交织在一起。”而美国人的策略与此相反，“一般情况下……比较‘灵活’，他们总觉得必须要用一些新的提议来打破僵局——不自觉地把对方逼到死角，以形成一致意见。”基辛格在暗示，我们可以从中国人身上学到一些东西，尤其是孙子有关“势”的全局概念。我们倾向于拟定出一个包含10个不同话题的议程，分别讨论。他们认为这是一盘棋。我们总是急急忙忙地追求讨论的结果，分秒时间的流逝都让我们焦急万分。中国人非常耐心，就像毛曾经对基辛格说过的，他们衡量时间的标准是千年。
这种根本上的文化差异会让我们在未来与中国的冲突加剧，基辛格警告说：“当中国先发制人的观点与西方的震慑观点发生冲突的时候，就会形成一个恶性循环：对中国采取怀柔政策反而会被外部世界误解为咄咄逼人；而西方的威慑行动会被中国解读为包围制裁。美国和中国在冷战期间围绕这个无解的问题无休止地角力，从某种意义上说，他们还没有找到克服这个问题的方法。”
美国与中国之间会再次开战吗？不能排除这种可能性。基辛格提醒到，100年前德国崛起，威胁到英国的经济和地理地位，最终爆发了战争。而且，70年代让美中两国情投意合的因素——公敌苏联（中国人称其为“北极熊”）——已经退出了历史舞台；双方在台湾和朝鲜问题上的分歧由来已久。现在的双边关系就是一个“四不像”——一场完全基于经济基础的悲剧婚姻：一方竭力存钱，另一方挥霍无度。
用基辛格的话来说，中国的崛起会“让国际关系再次两极分化”，形成新的冷战（或许也会是“热”战）局面。像《中国梦》的作者刘明福这类民族主义作家，敦促中国从“和平发展”向“军事崛起”转变，并且期待与美国进行“世纪对决”。华盛顿也有这类角色——很明显，奥巴马政府就是其中之一，他们更愿意看到与中国之间的对抗关系。
但基辛格依然对北京的冷静思绪持有信心：理论家郑必坚倡导，中国要“超越传统超级力量的崛起方式”,“不能重蹈德国发动第一次世界大战的覆辙”。美国不会试图“在限制中国发展的基础上处理亚洲事务，或者培养一批民主国家来发动思想运动”，基辛格建议，更好的方法是与中国合作，建立新的“太平洋秩序”。
四十年前，理查德尼克松比任何人都早地预见到中国的巨大潜力。他在思考：“你好好想一下，假如有一群人，组建了一个相当不错的政府来管理这片大陆，那将会如何？上帝啊……世界上将不会有与之比肩的力量——我是说，8亿中国人步调一致地行动……他们必将领导全世界。”这个预言在我们这个时代已经得到了应验。事实是，中国的崛起直到现在都是美国的福祉，而不是因亨利基辛格的工作而带来的祸害。他通过这本书给他的继任者们提供了不可或缺的指导，以延续由他自己开启的中美“共同进化”道路。
原文：
The rising superpower is flexing its muscles. In his new book, Henry Kissinger explains how to avoid the ‘duel of the century.’
Main: U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington D.C., on May 9, 2011. Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan (center) and State Councilor Dai Bingguo (Left) are also pictured. Inline: U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (R) with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in Beijing on November 25, 1974.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton thinks the Chinese government is “scared” of the Arab Spring. “They’re worried,” she told Jeffrey Goldberg in the latest Atlantic, “and they are trying to stop history, which is a fool’s errand. They cannot do it.”
These are words—intemperate, undiplomatic, and very likely counterproductive—that you cannot imagine being uttered by her predecessor Henry Kissinger.
It is now 40 years since Kissinger went on his secret mission to China, to pave the way for President Richard Nixon’s historic visit the following year. Since then he has visited the country more than 50 times. And if there is one thing he has learned, it is this: the real fool’s errand is to lean on the Chinese.
Much has changed in the world since Kissinger’s first trip to China. (In 1971, who would have dared to predict that America’s public enemy No. 1 would be a Saudi-born Islamic fundamentalist skulking in a walled compound in Pakistan?) But at least two things in American foreign policy remain consistent: the relationship with mainland China, revived by Kissinger after more than 20 years in the deep freeze, and Kissinger himself, consulted formally or informally by every president from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama. On China, Kissinger’s new book, is a reminder of why our leaders still want to pick his brains. Eighty-eight years old this month, he remains without equal as a strategic thinker.
The opening to China is a story Kissinger has told before: how he and Nixon had discerned that country could become a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union; how he secretly flew to China after feigning illness in Pakistan; how he and Premier Zhou Enlai hammered out the diplomatic basis for Nixon’s official visit (the Shanghai Communiqué). The result was, as he puts it, “a quasi alliance,” which, though initially intended to contain the Soviet Union, ended up outliving the Cold War.
In this telling, however, Kissinger is able to take advantage of recent research that illuminates the Chinese side of the story. The American opening to China was also a Chinese opening to America, actuated above all by Mao Zedong’s fear of encirclement. “Think about this,” Mao told his doctor in 1969. “We have the Soviet Union to the north and the west, India to the south, and Japan to the east. If all our enemies were to unite, attacking us from the north, south, east, and west, what do you think we should do?” The medic had no idea. “Think again,” said Mao. “Beyond Japan is the United States. Didn’t our ancestors counsel negotiating with faraway countries while fighting with those that are near?” It was to explore the American option that Mao recalled four Army marshals from exile. Skirmishes were already underway between Soviet and Chinese forces on the Ussuri River. In October 1970 Mao ordered China’s top leadership to evacuate Beijing and put the People’s Liberation Army on “first-degree combat readiness.” The stakes for China were high indeed—higher than for the United States.
As Kissinger shows, it was far from unusual for Mao to refer to “our ancestors’ counsel.” Despite his lifelong commitment to Marxism-Leninism, Mao was also steeped in the classics of Chinese civilization, as were his close advisers. “We can consult the example of Zhuge Liang’s strategic guiding principle,” Marshal Ye Jian-ying suggested, “when the three states of Wei, Shu, and Wu confronted each other: ‘Ally with Wu in the east to oppose Wei in the north.’ ” The allusion, Kissinger explains, is to Romance of the Three Kingdoms, a 14th-century epic novel set in the so-called Warring States period (475–221 B.C.).
Nor was this the only occasion when China’s communist leaders looked to the distant past for inspiration. Of equal importance to them, Kissinger argues, was The Art of War by Sun Tzu, which dates from the even earlier Spring and Autumn period (770–476 B.C.). “The victorious army/Is victorious first/And seeks battle later”: axioms like this one encouraged Chinese strategists to think of international relations like the board game Weiqi (known in the West as Go), a “game of surrounding pieces.”
Mao shared with China’s prerevolutionary leaders an assumption that China is not like other countries. With a population that amounts to a fifth of humanity, it is Zhongguo: the Middle Kingdom or, perhaps more accurately, the “Central Country.” At times it could even seem like tian xia: “all under heaven.” The best foreign policy for such an empire was to “let barbarians fight barbarians.” If that failed, then the strongest of the barbarians should be embraced and civilized (as happened to the Manchus).
“Domineering and overwhelming … ruthless and aloof, poet and warrior, prophet and scourge”—Mao’s true hero was not Lenin but the tyrannical, book-burning “first emperor,” Qin Shi Huang, who united China in 221 B.C. In a similar way, Kissinger shows, the current generation of Chinese leaders have drawn inspiration from the teachings of Kong Fu Zi (known in the West as Confucius). Their goal, he argues, is not world domination but da tong: “great harmony.”
This goes to the heart of the matter. In 1971, when Kissinger first went to China, the U.S. economy was roughly five times that of the People’s Republic. Forty years later, as a result of the industrial revolution unleashed by Mao’s successor Deng Xiao-ping, it is conceivable that China could overtake America within a decade. This is a feat the Soviet Union never came close to achieving. Moreover, China is now the biggest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury notes, which form an important part of its vast $3 trillion of international reserves. How China will use its newfound economic power may be the most important question of our time. Few Americans are better placed to answer that question than Kissinger, who has dealt with four generations of Chinese leaders.
The most profound insights of On China are psychological. They concern the fundamental cultural differences between a Chinese elite who can look back more than two millennia for inspiration and an American elite whose historical frame of reference is little more than two centuries old. This became most obvious in the wake of June 1989, when Americans recoiled from the use of military force to end the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstrations. To Kissinger’s eyes, it was doubly naive to retaliate to this crackdown with sanctions: “Western concepts of human rights and individual liberties may not be directly translatable … to a civilization for millennia ordered around different concepts. Nor can the traditional Chinese fear of political chaos be dismissed as an anachronistic irrelevancy needing only ‘correction’ by Western enlightenment.”
As China’s first Anglophone leader, Jiang Zemin, explained to Kissinger in 1991: “We never submit to pressure … It is a philosophical principle.”
The United States and China went to war in Korea because of another cultural gap. It came as a surprise to the Americans when Mao ordered Chinese intervention because the military odds looked so unfavorable. But, argues Kissinger, his “motivating force was less to inflict a decisive military first blow than to change the psychological balance, not so much to defeat the enemy as to alter his calculus of risks.” Mao was a master of the ancient Empty City Stratagem, which seeks to conceal weakness with a show of confidence, even aggression. To Westerners, his insistence that he did not fear a nuclear attack seemed unhinged or, at best, callous (“We may lose more than 300 million people. So what? War is war. The years will pass, and we’ll get to work producing more babies than ever before”). But this was classical Chinese bravado, or “offensive deterrence.”
“Chinese negotiators,” observes Kissinger in a passage that should be inwardly digested not just by American diplomats but also by American businessmen before they land in Beijing, “use diplomacy to weave together political, military, and psychological elements into an overall strategic design.” American diplomacy, by contrast, “generally prefers …c to be ‘flexible’; it feels an obligation to break deadlocks with new proposals—unintentionally inviting new deadlocks to elicit new proposals.” We could learn a thing or two from the Chinese, Kissinger implies, particularly Sun Tzu’s concept of shi, meaning the “potential energy” of the overall strategic landscape. Our tendency is to have an agenda of 10 different points, each one to be dealt with separately. They have one big game plan. We are always in a hurry for closure, anxiously watching the minutes tick away. The Chinese value patience; as Mao explained to Kissinger, they measure time in millennia.
Such fundamental cultural differences may give rise to conflict with China in the future, Kissinger warns: “When the Chinese view of preemption encounters the Western concept of deterrence, a vicious circle can result: acts conceived as defensive in China may be treated as aggressive by the outside world; deterrent moves by the West may be interpreted in China as encirclement. The United States and China wrestled with this dilemma repeatedly during the Cold War; to some extent they have not yet found a way to transcend it.”
Could the United States and the People’s Republic come to blows again? The possibility cannot be excluded. As Kissinger reminds us, war was the result when Germany rose to challenge Britain economically and geopolitically 100 years ago. Moreover, the key factor that brought America and China together in the 1970s—the common Soviet enemy the Chinese called “the polar bear”—has vanished from the scene. Old, intractable differences persist over Taiwan and North Korea. What remains is “Chimerica,” a less-than-happy marriage of economic convenience in which one partner does all the saving and the other does all the spending.
In Kissinger’s own words, China’s rise could “make international relations bipolar again,” ushering in a new cold (or possibly even hot) war. Nationalist writers like Liu Mingfu, author of China Dream, urge China to switch from “peaceful development” to “military rise” and look forward to the “duel of the century” with the United States. There are those in Washington, too—apparently including, for the moment, the Obama administration—who would relish a more confrontational relationship.
Yet Kissinger remains hopeful that cooler heads will prevail in Beijing: thinkers like Zheng Bijian, who urges China to “transcend the traditional ways for great powers to emerge” and “not [to] follow the path of Germany leading up to World War I.” Rather than attempting to “organize Asia on the basis of containing China or creating a bloc of democratic states for an ideological crusade,” the United States would do better, Kissinger suggests, to work with China to build a new “Pacific Community.”
Four decades ago, Richard Nixon grasped sooner than most the huge potential of China. “Well,” he mused, “you can just stop and think of what could happen if anybody with a decent system of government got control of that mainland. Good God … There’d be no power in the world that could even—I mean, you put 800 million Chinese to work under a decent system … and they will be the leaders of the world.” That prophecy is being fulfilled in our time. The fact that until now China’s rise has been a boon to the United States rather than a bane owes much to the work of Henry Kissinger. With this book he has given his successors an indispensable guide to continuing the Sino-American “coevolution” he began. |
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