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【原帖地址】http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/2 ... dlieven26.html?_r=1
【原文标题】China Is Key to America's Afghan Endgame
【原文作者】ANATOL LIEVEN
【译者】MacTavish_Tang
【翻译方式】人工
阿富汗和巴基斯坦的问题正成为对中美的合作关系和21世纪稳定的最大考验。
这些问题相较于朝鲜半岛的问题有过之而无不及，因为朝鲜半岛的局势已比较稳定，然而阿富汗和巴基斯坦的局势却十分动荡不安——正如本拉登死后引起的一连串事件所体现的那样。
阿富汗的未来将会深远的影响其他大国间的关系，它事关亚洲在21世纪的走向，即中印之间是否注定是敌对关系，还是双方可以在某些领域寻求到合作；中俄关系是否能成为“全天候”的关系，并对国际上的一些主要问题有更有效的解决放法。
随着美国逐渐撤出其在阿富汗的地面部队，阿富汗将会扮演什么样的角色就变得越来越重要。现在美国所面临的问题是：1.做好对这一地区其他强权妥协的准备；2.帮助阿富汗地区形成一个区域协商条约，以此确保只有美国能干涉该地区的权利。
中国，以及巴基斯坦，印度，俄罗斯将扮演十分重要的角色。中国与阿富汗接壤——虽然只有几英里的长度。由于中国国内疆独势力的存在，使得中国对伊斯兰极端势力对于本国和前苏联加盟共和国的威胁十分关注。中国已经承认是阿富汗最大外资投资来源——中国冶金科工集团(MCC)同意投资30亿美元开发阿富汗的艾纳克(Aynak)铜矿。
最后，中国在巴基斯坦，这个中国事实上唯一的盟友，拥有巨大的利益。拉登死后不久来自中方对巴方的支持声明以及巴总理Yusuf Raza Gilani的访华，都很好的诠释了“中巴友谊”这一关系的重要性。来自喀布尔的报告显示，巴基斯坦鼓励卡尔扎伊政府向北京方面寻求帮助，并将中国作为未来的靠山，而不是美国。
许多巴基斯坦人现在认为中国而不是美国，才是他们在国际上重要的后援。虽然中国对巴基斯坦的帮助远不及美国，但是中国已经成为巴基斯坦最重要的军备来源，并且中国对巴基斯坦的基建设施也进行了大量的投资。
中国在巴基斯坦的利益是三方面的。一是由于中印之间的领土争以及中国视印度为潜在对手，所以中国希望借助巴基斯坦制以衡印度。二是中国希望以巴基斯坦为桥梁，联系该地区的伊斯兰教团体。三是中国正在修建从波斯湾至巴基斯坦的能源管道，以防止未来来自美国或印度的海上封锁。
但是同时，中国并不是无条件的支持巴基斯坦，这就给了美国实战策略的空间。实际上，北京对巴基斯坦的援助十分谨慎。由于巴方本身存在着贪污腐败和能力不足的问题，以及伊斯兰极端势力在巴基斯坦的扩张使得北京对于作出更深入的承诺十分谨慎。
虽然要中国加入美国一方并劝说巴基斯坦同意美国提出的阿富汗和平进程协议是不可能的。相反，如果美国最终选择与塔利班谈判，并利用巴基斯坦作为调停人，那么中国对于伊斯兰堡的影响力将会更大。为了达到这一目的，美国需要劝说印度抑制其在阿富汗地区的野心，中国则需要拉上俄罗斯与伊朗。
迄今为止，中国似乎表明塔可以单独与塔利班进及其盟友行“交易”，以排斥激进的维吾尔族人。他们同样以为这样的方式也适用于开发艾纳克(Aynak)铜矿。这显然是错的。
虽然美国与印度希望在普什图族人聚居去消灭塔利班是明显不可能的，塔利班统一阿富汗的愿望也同样是不可能的。美国，印度，俄罗斯依然如911事件前所希望的一样——不再有普什图族武装继续对抗塔利班。这是结束阿富汗内战的秘诀，虽然这对于阿富汗铜矿的生产与出口而言并不是个成功的方法。
另一个中国会寻求阿富汗和平协议的原因是为了巴基斯坦的稳定。在阿富汗的持续战争只会导致巴基斯坦越来越激进。这最终会导致以巴基斯坦为基地的恐怖分子对美国和印度发起袭击。特别是在本拉登死后，一次与巴基斯坦有关的恐怖袭击激怒了美国，并且让美国试图向巴基斯坦报复，但是中美两国都将避免这里情况的发生。
如果中国真的关心巴基斯坦的生存问题，那么中国就应尽其所能来帮助巴基斯坦防止任何恐怖分子在巴境内立足。
原文：
LONDON — The affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan are becoming the biggest test of whether the United States and China can cooperate to maintain global peace and stability in the 21st century.
They are an even bigger test of this than the Korean Peninsula, for the security equation there is largely frozen, whereas in Afghanistan and Pakistan it is very volatile indeed, as circumstances surrounding the death of Osama bin Laden have emphasized.
The future of Afghanistan is also a test of other great-power relationships that will largely define the 21st century in Asia: Of whether China and India are doomed to mutual hostility or can find areas of cooperation; and of whether the Chinese-Russian relationship will become a true partnership that will seek common solutions to key problems.
As the United States moves toward a withdrawal of its ground forces from Afghanistan, the role of the region is bound to become increasingly important. The question now is whether Washington is prepared to accommodate its wishes to those of other powers in the area, and help broker a regional settlement for Afghanistan in which the United States will be only one player among several.
China, along with Pakistan, India, Russia and Iran, has a critical role to play. It borders Afghanistan, albeit for only a few miles. China’s possession of a huge Muslim territory in Xinjiang makes it acutely conscious of the threat of Islamist extremism both to its own territory and to former Soviet Central Asia. China has committed itself to far the biggest commercial investment in Afghanistan — $3 billion in the Aynak copper mine.
Finally, China has a very great stake in Pakistan, which is indeed China’s only real ally in the world. The importance of this relationship has been emphasized by statements of support for Pakistan from Beijing in the wake of Bin Laden’s death, and the visit of Pakistan’s prime minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani, to China. Reports from Kabul say that Pakistan has been encouraging the Karzai administration to look to Beijing, not Washington, as a future sponsor.
Many Pakistanis are now open in their desire that China replace the United States as Pakistan’s main international backer. China’s aid to Pakistan is still considerably exceeded by that of the United States, but China has become a key provider of military equipment to Pakistan, and has also invested heavily in Pakistani infrastructure.
China’s stake in Pakistan is threefold. There is the desire dating back to the 1960s to use Pakistan as balance against India, with which China has a major border dispute and that China regards as a potential rival. China has also used Pakistan as a link to Islamist groups in the region. Finally, China is building up energy routes from the Gulf via Pakistan to insure China against any future naval blockade by the United States or India.
At the same time, China is by no means unconditionally committed to Pakistan, and this should give Washington room for maneuver. Beijing has in fact played a rather cautious hand, keeping its aid limited. Both the corruption and incompetence of the Pakistani state and the spread of Islamist insurgency in Pakistan have made Beijing wary of a deeper commitment.
It is extremely unlikely, though, that China will join the U.S. in pressuring Pakistan to accede to the U.S. version of an Afghan peace settlement. Rather, if Washington swings round to the idea of negotiating a deal with the Taliban and using Pakistan as a mediator, China’s ability to influence Islamabad will be of great importance. For this to happen, however, Washington will have to persuade India to limit its own ambitions in Afghanistan; and China will also have to help bring Russia and Iran on board.
Up to now, China seems to have assumed that it could do separate deals with the Taliban and their allies to exclude Uighur militants, and that it may be able to do the same kind of deal to defend the Aynak mine. This is a mistake.
While American and Indian hopes that the Taliban can be defeated in the Pashtun areas are clearly impossible, so to are Taliban hopes of sweeping to power in the whole of Afghanistan. The U.S., India and Russia will make sure that, as before 9/11, non-Pashtun armies continue to defend their own areas against the Taliban. This is a recipe for unending civil war — which is no recipe for successful copper production and export.
Another reason why China should help seek an Afghan peace settlement is for the sake of Pakistan’s stability. Continued war in Afghanistan will mean continued radicalization in Pakistan. This in turn will increase the risk that Pakistan-based terrorists will strike at the U.S. or India. Especially following Bin Laden’s death, a terrorist attack with links to Pakistan would so infuriate Americans that retaliation against Pakistan would be a real possibility, and no concern either for the risks or for U.S. relations with China would prevent this.
If China truly cares about Pakistan’s survival, it should be doing everything possible to get the Pakistanis to prevent international terrorism based on their soil.
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