本帖最后由 满仓 于 2011-8-24 11:21 编辑
【中文标题】台湾能挣脱中国越收越紧的怀抱吗？
【原文标题】Can Taiwan Escape China's Ever-Tightening Embrace?
【登载媒体】福布斯
【原文作者】Doug Bandow
【原文链接】http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2011/08/22/can-taiwan-escape-chinas-ever-tightening-embrace/
台湾金门岛——一个世纪以前，全世界似乎都准备为金门岛开战，那时它的名字是Quemoy。今天，金门成为了台湾和中国之间的中转站，游客们走在炮弹曾经落下的土地上。但是，这种平和的景象对台湾其实是一种威胁，尽管其方式与战争截然不同。
1949年，共产党把蒋介石的中华民国赶出中国大陆。蒋撤退到台湾岛，那里曾在1895年被日本占领，二战结束后归还给中国。中华民国还占据了大陆海岸线以外的几个小岛屿，其中包括金门。
新成立的中华人民共和国在1949年10月试图武力收回后者，但在为期三天的激战之后铩羽而归。之后是中国的冷战时期，共产党政权时时炮击金门，威胁要再次进军。
国民党政府在岛上修建了巨大的地下军事掩体，让它变成了一个蜂窝状的地堡。到了80年代，金门依然属于军事管理禁区，官方的访客必须乘坐军事飞机在海面上低空飞行。尽管多年来双方没有开过一枪一炮，但是潜在的战争威胁依旧存在。
中华人民共和国和中华民国都声称自己是中国唯一的合法政府，但是天平逐渐向前者倾斜。尽管美国在私下与台湾保持密切的关系，但它也最终转而承认了前者。
北京的经济成就改变了两个中国对峙的格局。15年前，中国回应台湾总统选举——当选人是强硬的台独派李登辉——的方式是恰逢其时的“导弹试验”。从那时开始，中华人民共和国就放弃了公开的军事打击手段，但从未正式拒绝使用武力的可能性。
因此，大陆把装备精良的铁拳隐藏在了身后。实际上，两个国家几乎没有停止相互间的军事试探。最近，中国在嘹亮的号角声中试航了第一艘航母瓦良格。8月初航母下水的时候，我正好在台湾访问。同一天，台湾国防部隆重推出最新型的雄风三号巡航导弹，称其是“航母克星”。
国家政策研究所所长林文程满怀忧虑地说，总体来看，“近几十年来，军事力量的平衡已经发生了变化，现在很难承受来自中国大陆的压力。”国际间良好的愿望并不是一种防御。立法院主席王金平说：“中国大陆有太多的变化因素，所以我们不能把自身的安全单纯依赖大陆。”
于是台湾继续向美国购买武器。实际上，华盛顿和北京之间最大分歧之一就是美国对台军售。自从三十年前断绝与中华民国政府的关系之后，华盛顿依然继续支持台北的军事力量。然而，中国对美国两面派的行为越来越感到愤怒。去年，在奥巴马政府宣布最近一批对台军售之后，大陆方面暂时停止了双方的军事对话。
现在，据说政府已经决定不向台湾出售用于在台湾海峡获取制空权的F-16战斗机。国防部副部长杨念祖表达了他的担心，没有新型的飞机，“我们不但会失去竞争优势，而且在履行我们保证这一地区的和平和稳定的职责时会遇到严峻的挑战。”该问题还引发了外交影响。国家政策研究基金会的Stephen Chen大使说，强大的国防力量是台湾与大陆谈判的重要筹码，“当我们与大陆进行政治谈判时，我们需要从军事力量的角度来切入。”
马英九在2008年当选总统之后，台北的策略发生了变化，不再那么急切地要求承认自己是一个独立的国家。例如，台湾不再无望地追求重回联合国怀抱。
中国也停止了外交方面的竞争，两个政府都合上支票本，不再使用昂贵的外国援助手段来增加或减少目前承认中华民国政府的23个小国这个可怜的数字。
更重要的是，两个国家都在强调经济和文化相互依存的重要性。原先的投资和贸易都必须途经香港，但最终它们放下了虚假的架子（同时也降低了费用），开始直接接触。
今天，台湾70％的海外投资都在大陆，有10万台湾生意人在大陆生活。中华人民共和国占据了台湾41％的国际贸易份额。
双方的经济关系在自然增长，但两个中国都希望加速这一过程。陆委会副部长赵建民说，台北“努力把双方关系的单行道改为双行道”。到目前为止，这两个国家依然通过非官方的途经交流，因为它们都不承认对方。即使如此，双方已经达成了15项两岸协定，内容从旅游和渔业到犯罪。
台湾逐渐放松了对大陆游客的限制，这些人已经成为台北故宫和其它景点的一道风景。从2008年7月到现在，台湾已经接待了571万大陆游客。
双方最显著的成就是去年达成的《海峡两岸经济合作框架协议》，它大幅降低了经济贸易壁垒，数百种产品的关税将被逐渐取消。
经济增长让双方都获得了收益。但是，北京要的不仅仅是更加亲密的关系，它要掌控政权。尽管北京提出了若干种台湾自治的方案，但毫无疑问，它必须掌控最终的统治权。
尽管双方的经济纽带关系愈加紧密，但是台湾人的政治倾向似乎在向相反的方向移动。他们更加坚定了独立的决心，无论是理论上还是在实际上。他们越了解大陆，似乎就越加不希望接受北京的统治。
国立台湾大学的David Huang说：“越来越多的台湾人意识到他们与大陆人的不同。”但即使他们是相同的，2300万台湾人有什么理由把他们繁荣、强大的民主体制交给由一个残暴的独裁统治、时常被社会不安定因素侵扰的13亿人呢？
然而，悉尼独立研究中心的John Lee说，《海峡两岸经济合作框架协议》“完全是政治意义上的协定”。在中国看来，“它的目的是让两个经济体尽量融合，让台湾的未来与中国密不可分。”
黄教授担心的问题是“与中国的经济整合侵蚀了我们独立的意志”。他预测：“如果这种状况再持续十年，台湾就永远不会独立了。”黄着重提到了中国对媒体的影响。前立法委员、反对党民进党国际事务部的萧美琴也有同样的顾虑，她说，“一些媒体在进行自我审查”，希望以此在与大陆的交易中获利。
政府官员认为，中国游客被台湾开放的政治进程和民众批评领导人的强烈意愿所深深吸引。陈大使认为，台湾“或许是唯一一个可以影响大陆发展的国家”。在他看来，中国游客“希望看到台湾人的生活”，包括台湾的民主制度。国际关系学会的丁树范断言，“改变目前的状态可以让台湾人保持自身的特性”，这有这样才能继续坚持独立的方向。
另一方面，我们很容易联想到这些观点其实包含了不少绝望的情绪。与大陆断绝经济来往是不可想象的，因为双方因此受益良多。萧美琴对此并不乐观：“现在不是台湾在改变中国，而是中国在改变台湾。”她的这种担忧让越来越多的商人开始秘密地支持民进党。
如何维持台湾的独立性，是一月份即将进行的立法委员会和总统选举中的重要问题。执政的国民党在传统上认为中华民国应当是中国的执政党，而今天的国民党推崇台湾与大陆独立存在，并且对北京采取了很多怀柔政策。马总统拥护的是“不统、不独、不战”。
类似《海峡两岸经济合作框架协议》这样的经济合作是国民党的政策核心。马总统宣称：“我们把曾经是危险地带的台湾海峡变成了一个和平的走廊。”这个进程并没有结束。赵建民说：“如果马总统再次当选，他还会坚持当前的路线。”
大陆所执念的政治一体化进展如何呢？陈大使说，马总统拒绝讨论统一的问题，“维持当前的局势是他的首要工作。”然而，有些人在质疑国民党对台湾人自治的承诺。萧美琴说：“我们的一些支持者感到马和大陆走得太近了，他们怀疑马会加快（如果他再次当选）政治一体化的进程。”
反对党民进党曾经正式主张独立，它不愿接受今天这种状态，不遗余力地试图扩大台湾的国际影响。民进党对于台湾在经济上越来越依赖大陆感到非常不满。
尽管如此，民进党总统候选人蔡英文承诺在没有先决条件的情况下与大陆谈判。赵对此持怀疑态度，说：“如果反对党赢得竞选，我们恐怕要面临一些问题。”因为民进党根本不赞同所谓的“九二共识”，他们认为北京和台北篡改了台湾的身份（换句话说，坚持一个中国的原则）。他认为，失去了这个前提，中国人不会和台湾谈判，因为这等于“容忍台湾的独立存在”。林文程也表达了同样的担心，如果民进党取胜，“大陆会因失望而停止谈判”。
然而，萧美琴认为：“所谓的九二共识基础并不牢固。”1992年，台北和北京之间其实并没有真正的共识，“民众对此并不认同”。唯一的共识只有“在国民党和中国共产党”之间才可以达成。
她说，大陆或许会采取一些行动让民进党在竞选中落败，这在以前也发生过，但这并不意味着北京不愿意与蔡氏政府展开对话。萧说：“我们无法制定出一个可以取悦中国的政策，所以干脆不要玩文字游戏了。我们应当直接面对中国，在相互间建立一个稳定和合作框架。”她说前总统陈水扁是民进党的第一任总统，他在2000年当选之后试图保持政策的弹性，但是大陆“根本不准备有所回应，机会转瞬即逝”。
至于《海峡两岸经济合作框架协议》和其它的贸易协定，“我们会继续审核其内容，权衡看它对整体国家的利弊。然而，我们是否会更改甚至取消这个协议，那是另外一个问题了。就像其它国际贸易协定一样，我们会在民主的程序中解决这个问题。”
尽管民进党一直在强调国内经济问题，林文程认为，国民党还是会强迫蔡回答有关中国的问题。到目前为止，她“一直在回避相关的问题”。然而，即使民进党在总统和立法委选举中获胜，所有人都不认为他们真的会把这些经济协议撕碎。
佛光大学的张中勇预测：“即使民进党在明年掌权，他们也最终会改变自己的观点，不会再回头去走对抗的道路。”国立政治大学的李琼莉认为，现实最终会战胜一切，“海峡两岸的经济关系是牢不可破的，大趋势不可能被逆转。”
他的主张基本上是正确的。哪个台湾人愿意交回通过贸易往来和旅游而挣到手的钱？谁愿意天天听到北京的威胁言论？谁愿意再次回到金门的防空洞里躲避大陆的枪林弹雨？
无论谁在一月份当选，他/她都会面临困难的选择。就像赵建民所说：“中国在利用一切机会展示它的力量。”今天，它对台湾的影响主要是经济方面的，不是军事方面的。
台湾怎样才能挣脱中国令人窒息的怀抱？没那么容易。政府信息部的Philip Yang说：“在处理两岸关系时，我们需要极为谨慎，充满耐心，以便保持我们自身的独立和繁荣。”
台湾人民已经建立起一个美丽动人、充满活力、自由的社会。我们只能盼望海峡两岸都有足够的谨慎和耐心。
原文：
Kinmen Island, Taiwan—A half century ago the world seemed poised for war over the island of Kinmen, known then as Quemoy. Today Kinmen has become a transit point between Taiwan and China, as tourists tread where bombs once fell. But this peaceful traffic also may threaten Taiwan, albeit in a very different way.
In 1949 the Communist Party pushed Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China off the Chinese mainland. Chiang retreated to the island of Taiwan, seized by Japan in 1895 and returned at the end of World War II. The ROC also retained control of several smaller islands off the mainland’s coast, including Kinmen.
The newly created People’s Republic of China attempted to forcibly reclaim the latter in October 1949, but failed after a three-day battle. After that a Chinese Cold War ensued, with the Communist regime periodically shelling Kinmen and threatening another invasion.
The Nationalist government developed a vast underground military complex and honeycombed the island with bunkers. Up into the 1980s the island was under military administration and official visitors would be flown in low over the water in military aircraft. Although no shots had been fired in years, the potential for war seemed real.
The PRC and ROC maintained dueling claims as the sole legitimate government of China, but the balance steadily shifted in favor of the former. Even the U.S. eventually switched recognition, though it kept close, unofficial ties with Taiwan.
Beijing’s economic success has transformed the competition between the two Chinas. Fifteen years ago China responded to Taiwan’s presidential election—won by Lee Teng-hui, a strong advocate of Taiwan’s sovereignty—with conveniently timed “missile tests.” Since then the PRC has abandoned overt military pressure, while refusing to formally eschew the use of military force.
Thus, the mainland’s mailed fist still lurks in the background. Indeed, both nations are engaged in almost continuous military shadow-boxing. With great fanfare China recently launched its first aircraft carrier, the Varyag. I was visiting Taiwan in early August when the ship began its first sea trials. On the same day, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense highlighted its newest cruise missile, the Hsiuing Feng III, as an “aircraft carrier killer.”
But overall, worried Lin Wen-cheng, executive director of the Institute for National Policy Research, “because the balance of military power has been changed in recent decades, it is very hard to resist pressure from the PRC.” Clearly international good will is no defense. Wang Jin-pyng, president of the Legislative Yuan (or parliament), observed: “because there is so much unpredictability in Mainland China our security cannot solely depend on Mainland China.”
So Taiwan continues to purchase weapons from the U.S. In fact, one of the sharpest disagreements between Washington and Beijing is over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. While breaking relations with the ROC more than three decades ago, Washington promised to continue supplying Taipei’s military. However, China has grown increasingly angry over American transfers; after the Obama administration announced its latest package last year the PRC temporarily cut bilateral military ties.
Now the Administration reportedly has decided against selling the F-16 C/Ds needed by Taiwan to contest air superiority over the Taiwan Strait. Vice Defense Minister Yang Nien-Dzu (Andrew) expressed concern that without the newer planes “we lose our leverage and immediately face the challenge of fulfilling our responsibility of preserving peace and stability in the region.” The issue has a diplomatic impact as well. Explained Ambassador Chen S.F. (Stephen), now at the National Policy Foundation, a stronger defense would enhance Taiwan’s bargaining power: “when we enter into political negotiations with the mainland we need to go into negotiations from a position of strength.”
With the election of Ma Ying-jeou as president in 2008, Taipei changed course, moderating its push for recognition as a separate country. For instance, no longer is Taiwan pursuing its hopeless quest to get back into the United Nations.
China also eased the diplomatic competition. Both governments closed their checkbooks and ended their expensive use of foreign aid to add or subtract to the 23 small nations which now recognize the ROC.
Most significant, the two nations now emphasize economic and cultural interdependence. Investment and trade originally developed through Hong Kong. But eventually the two Chinas dropped the pretense (and expense) of indirect dealings.
Today 70 percent of Taiwanese investment goes to the Mainland, where nearly 100,000 Taiwanese businesses operate. The PRC accounts for 41 percent of Taiwan’s international commerce.
Economic ties would increase naturally, but both Chinas are accelerating the process. Chao Chien-min, Deputy Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, said that Taipei is “trying to change the relationship from a one-way street to a two-way street.” So far the two countries—they actually deal with each other through unofficial organizations since neither formally recognizes the other—have reached 15 cross-strait agreements on issues ranging from tourism to fisheries to crime.
Taiwan has steadily loosened restrictions on Chinese tourists, who have become a common sight at the National Palace Museum and elsewhere. Some 5.71 million Mainland residents have visited Taiwan since July 2008.
The most important accord, finalized last year, is the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, which significantly lowered economic barriers. Tariffs on hundreds of products will be eliminated over time.
These growing economic ties have profited both sides. However, the PRC wants more than closer relations. It wants sovereign control. Although Beijing has suggested some form of autonomy for Taiwan, there is no doubt where ultimate authority would lie.
Yet as economic links have tightened, the Taiwanese people have moved in the opposite direction politically, ever more determined to retain their independence, de facto if not de jure. The more they learn about the PRC, the less it seems they want to be ruled by Beijing.
Observed Huang W.F. (David) of National Taiwan University, “more and more Taiwanese realize that they are different than people from the Mainland.” But even if they were the same, why would 23 million people wish to submerge their prosperous and robust democracy in a nation of 1.3 billion, topped by an oppressive autocracy and threatened by violent social unrest?
However, ECFA “is all about politics,” wrote John Lee of Sidney’s Centre for Independent Studies. In China’s view “this is about enmeshing the two economies in such a way that Taiwan’s future is tied to China’s.”
Which is precisely what Professor Huang fears: “our autonomy is eroding through closer economic integration with China.” He predicted that “If this goes on for ten years, Taiwan will lose its autonomy.” Huang particularly pointed to Chinese influence over the media. Hsiao Bi-khim, a former legislator and head of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party’s Department of International Affairs, voiced similar concern, stating that “some of the media practices self-censorship” in hopes of profiting from Mainland business.
Government officials respond that Chinese visitors are impressed by Taiwan’s open political process and its people’s willingness to criticize political leaders. Ambassador Chen argued that Taiwan “may be the only country which can impact the development of the Mainland.” In his view, Chinese visitors “want to see the way of life here,” including Taiwan’s democracy. Ding Shuh-fan (Arthur) of the Institute of International Relations contended that the way ‘to improve the situation is to make people in Taiwan more identify with Taiwan,” in which case they will keep their autonomy.
On the other hand, it is hard not to feel that some of these arguments are born of desperation: Ending economic ties with the PRC is inconceivable, ergo they must be beneficial. Hsiao Bi-khim is less sanguine: “Instead of Taiwan trying to change China, we see China trying to change Taiwan.” This fear, she claimed, has caused an increasing number of businessmen to secretly support the DPP.
How to best preserve Taiwan’s autonomy is an important issue with legislative and presidential elections scheduled for January. Traditionally the ruling Kuomintang, or KMT, insisted that the ROC was the rightful ruler of all China. Today the KMT promotes Taiwan’s separate existence, while pressing for a more conciliatory policy towards Beijing. President Ma has espoused “no unification, no independence, and no use of force.”
Economic integration, exemplified by ECFA, is the centerpiece of KMT policy. President Ma declared: “We have transformed the Taiwan Strait from a danger zone into a peace corridor.” And the process is not over. Chao Chien-min said that “if President Ma is reelected the current pace will be continued.”
What of political integration, as desired by the PRC? Ambassador Chen said President Ma has refused to talk about reunification: “Maintenance of the status quo is his top priority.” However, some question the KMT’s commitment to Taiwanese sovereignty. Hsiao Bi-khim said “The perception of our supporters is that Ma is getting too close to China” and they “suspect that Ma would move faster [if reelected] toward political integration.”
The opposition DPP once formally advocated independence. Today it reluctantly accepts the status quo, while pushing to enlarge Taiwan’s international space. The DPP has been critical of Taiwan’s growing economic dependence on the PRC.
Nevertheless, DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has pledged to continue negotiating with China, but without preconditions. Chao was skeptical, contending that “if the opposition wins we are going to have a problem” since the DPP does not agree with the so-called “92 consensus,” by which Beijing and Taipei fudged the status of Taiwan (one China, interpreted differently). Without that agreement, he argued, the Chinese may not continue negotiations, since doing so could lead to charges “of accommodating Taiwan’s independence.” Lin Wen-cheng similarly warned that “the PRC may grow frustrated and discontinue talks” in the event of a DPP victory.
However, Hsiao Bi-khim responded that the “so-called 92 consensus is a very weak foundation.” There was no real consensus in 1992 between Taipei and Beijing, she argued, and “there is no domestically agreed to consensus.” The only real consensus might be “between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party.”
She noted that the PRC could be expected to attempt to contribute to the DPP’s defeat, as in the past, but that does not mean Beijing would not talk with a Tsai government. Hsiao said there is “no way to come up with a formulation to make China happy, so we won’t try to play with words.” Instead, “we need to deal with China and build a stable framework with each other.” She said that former President Chen, the first DPP president, tried to be flexible after his election in 2000, but the PRC “was not prepared to respond” and “the window of opportunity closed quickly.”
As for ECFA and the other deals, “We would constantly review them to see if they benefit or hurt the national interest.” However, “whether we should change or even eliminate them is another question.” The issue, Hsiao explained, would “need to be addressed as part of the normal democratic process like any other international agreement.”
Although the DPP has emphasized domestic economic issues, Lin Wen-cheng figures that the KMT will press Tsai to answer the China question. Until now, he said, she “has tried to avoid any discussion of this.” Yet no one really expects the DPP, even if it wins the presidency and control of the legislature, to tear up existing economic accords.
Indeed, Chang Chung-Young of Fo Guang University predicted that even “if the DPP takes power next year they might change their perspective and not go back to the confrontational perspective of three years ago.” Chyungly Lee of National Chengchi University suggested that practical necessity would triumph: “cross-strait economic relations are irreversible.” They “cannot be reversed.”
He’s almost certainly correct. Who in Taiwan wants to give up the extra money earned from commerce and tourism? Who in Taiwan wants to listen to a renewed litany of threats from Beijing? Who on Kinmen wants to head back to a bomb shelter to escape an artillery barrage from the Mainland?
Whoever wins in January will face only difficult choices. As Chao Chien-min acknowledged, “China is doing everything to exploit its strength.” Today that influence in Taiwan is more economic than military.
How can Taiwan escape Beijing’s potentially suffocating embrace? It won’t be easy. Government Information Minister Yang Y.M. (Philip) observed: “We need to be prudent and patient in dealing with cross-strait relations” in order to “maintain our independence and prosperity.”
The Taiwanese people have built an engaging, vibrant, and free society. One can only hope that sufficient prudence and patience exists on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. |
狗仔卡
发表于 2011-8-24 11:16
提升卡
变色卡
抢沙发
千斤顶
显身卡
发表于 2011-8-24 11:26
