毛泽东52年关于西藏工作的指示，中英文版本

深浣熊

1952年给出的工作方针，至今还是有参考意义。

最近拉萨的示威不应看作只是两司伦等坏人做的，而应看作是dl集团的大多数向我们所作的表示。其请愿书内容很有策略，并不表示决裂，而只要求我们让步。其中暗示恢复前清办法不驻解放军一条，不是他们的真意。他们明知这是办不到的，他们是企图用这一条交换其它各条。在请愿书内批评了十四辈dl，使dl在政治上不负此次示威的责任。
~~~看看，50年过去了，游戏规划其实变化不大.

http://www.marxists.org/chinese/17/marxist.org-chinese-mao-19520406.htm


中共中央关于西藏工作方针的指示

(一九五二年四月六日)
　　*这是毛泽东同志为中共中央起草的给西南局、西藏工委并告西北局、新疆分局的党内指示。
　　我们基本上同意西南局、西南军区四月二日给西藏工委和西藏军区的指示电，认为这个电报所取的基本方针(除了改编藏军一点外)及许多具体步骤是正确的。只有照此做去，才能使我军在西藏立于不败之地。
　　西藏情况和新疆不同，无论在政治上经济上西藏均比新疆差得多。我王震部入疆，尚且首先用全力注意精打细算，自力更生，生产自给。现在他们已站稳脚跟，取得少数民族热烈拥护。目前正进行减租减息，今冬进行土改，群众将更拥护我们。新疆和关内汽车畅达，和苏联有密切经济联系，在物质福利上给了少数民族很大好处。西藏至少在两三年内不能实行减租，不能实行土改。新疆有几十万汉人，西藏几乎全无汉人，我军是处在一个完全不同的民族区域。我们惟靠两条基本政策，争取群众，使自己立于不败。第一条是精打细算，生产自给，并以此影响群众，这是最基本的环节。公路即使修通，也不能靠此大量运粮。印度可能答应交换粮物入藏，但我们的立脚点，应放在将来有一天万一印度不给粮物我军也能活下去。我们要用一切努力和适当办法，争取dl及其上层集团的大多数，孤立少数坏分子，达到不流血地在多年内逐步地改革西藏经济、政治的目的；但也要准备对付坏分子可能率领藏军举行叛变，向我袭击，在这种时候我军仍能在西藏活下去和坚持下去。凡此均须依靠精打细算，生产自给。以这一条最基本的政策为基础，才能达到目的。第二条可做和必须做的，是同印度和内地打通贸易关系，使西藏出入口趋于平衡，不因我军入藏而使藏民生活水平稍有下降，并争取使他们在生活上有所改善。只要我们对生产和贸易两个问题不能解决，我们就失去存在的物质基础，坏分子就每天握有资本去煽动落后群众和藏军反对我们，我们团结多数、孤立少数的政策就将软弱无力，无法实现。
　　西南局四月二日电报的全部意见中，只有一点值得考虑，这就是短期内改编藏军和成立军政委员会是否可能和得策的问题。我们意见，目前不要改编藏军，也不要在形式上成立军分区，也不要成立军政委员会。暂时一切仍旧，拖下去，以待一年或两年后我军确能生产自给并获得群众拥护的时候，再谈这些问题。在这一年至两年内可能发生两种情况:一种是我们团结多数、孤立少数的上层统战政策发生了效力，西藏群众也逐步靠拢我们，因而使坏分子及藏军不敢举行暴乱；一种是坏分子认为我们软弱可欺，率领藏军举行暴乱，我军在自卫斗争中举行反攻，给以打击。以上两种情况，无论哪一种都对我们有利。在西藏上层集团看来，目前全部实行协定和改编藏军，理由是不充足的。过几年则不同，他们可能会觉得只好全部实行协定和只好改编藏军。如果藏军举行暴乱，或者他们不是举行一次，而是举行几次，又均被我军反击下去，则我们改编藏军的理由就愈多。看来不但是两司伦[1]，而且还有dl及其集团的多数，都觉得协定是勉强接受的，不愿意实行。我们在目前不仅没有全部实行协定的物质基础，也没有全部实行协定的群众基础，也没有全部实行协定的上层基础，勉强实行，害多利少。他们既不愿意实行，那末好吧，目前就不实行，拖一下再说。时间拖得愈久，我们的理由就愈多，他们的理由就愈少。拖下去，对我们的害处并不大，或者反而有利些。各种残民害理的坏事让他们去做，我们则只做生产、贸易、修路、医药、统战(团结多数，耐心教育)等好事，以争取群众，等候时机成熟，再谈全部实行协定的问题。如果他们觉得小学不宜办，则小学也可以收场不办。
　　最近拉萨的示威不应看作只是两司伦等坏人做的，而应看作是dl集团的大多数向我们所作的表示。其请愿书内容很有策略，并不表示决裂，而只要求我们让步。其中暗示恢复前清办法不驻解放军一条，不是他们的真意。他们明知这是办不到的，他们是企图用这一条交换其它各条。在请愿书内批评了十四辈dl，使dl在政治上不负此次示威的责任。他们以保护西藏民族利益的面目出现，他们知道在军事力量方面弱于我们，但在社会势力方面则强于我们。我们应当在事实上(不是在形式上)接受这次请愿，而把协定的全部实行延缓下去。他们选择在班禅尚未到达的时机举行这次示威，是经过考虑的。班禅到拉萨后，他们可能要大拉一把，使班禅加入他们的集团。如果我们的工作做得好，班禅不上他们的当，并安全到了日喀则，那时形势会变得较为有利于我们。但我们缺乏物质基础这一点一时还不能变化，社会势力方面他们强于我们这一点一时也不会变化，因而dl集团不愿意全部实行协定这一点一时也不会变化。我们目前在形式上要采取攻势，责备此次示威和请愿的无理(破坏协定)，但在实际上要准备让步，等候条件成熟，准备将来的进攻(即实行协定)。
　　你们对此意见如何，望考虑电告。
　　注释
　　[1]“司伦”是dl下面最高的行政官。当时的两司伦是反动农奴主鲁康娃和罗桑札喜。
（《毛泽东选集》第五卷，人民出版社1977年4月第1版，第61-64页）

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http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_20.htm

Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung
ON THE POLICIES FOR OUR WORK IN TIBET -- DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA



April 6, 1952 [Inner-Party directive drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was sent to the Southwest Bureau and the Working Committee in Tibet and communicated to the Northwest Bureau and the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau.]

The Central Committee essentially approves the instructions which the Southwest Bureau and the Southwest Military Area cabled on April 2 to the Working Committee and Military Area in Tibet. It holds that the basic policies (except the point about reorganizing the Tibetan troops) and the various specific steps set forth in the telegram are correct. Only by following them can our army establish itself in an invulnerable position in Tibet.
Conditions in Tibet are different from those in Sinkiang. Tibet compares poorly with Sinkiang, whether politically or economically. But even in Sinkiang, the first thing the army units under Wang Chen did when they got there was to pay the utmost attention to strict budgeting, self-reliance and production for their own needs. They have now gained a firm foothold and won the warm support of the minority nationalities. They are carrying out the reduction of rent and interest and will proceed to agrarian reform this winter, and by then we can be sure of even greater support from the masses. Sinkiang is well connected with the heartland of the country by motor roads, and this is of great help in improving the material welfare of the minority nationalities. As for Tibet, neither rent reduction nor agrarian reform can start for at least two or three years. While several hundred thousand Han people live in Sinkiang, there are hardly any in Tibet, where our army finds itself in a totally different minority nationality area. We depend solely on two basic policies to win over the masses and put ourselves in an invulnerable position. The first is strict budgeting coupled with production for the army's own needs, and thus the exertion of influence on the masses; this is the key link. Even when highways are built, we cannot count on moving large quantities of grain over them. India will probably agree to send grain and other goods to Tibet on the basis of exchange, but the stand we must take is that our army should be able to carry on even if India stops sending them some day. We must do our best and take proper steps to win over the Dalai and the majority of his top echelon and to isolate the handful of bad elements in order to achieve a gradual, bloodless transformation of the Tibetan economic and political system over a number of years; on the other hand, we must be prepared for the eventuality of the bad elements leading the Tibetan troops in rebellion and attacking us, so that in this contingency our army could still carry on and hold out in Tibet. It all depends on strict budgeting and production for the army's own needs. Only with this fundamental policy as the cornerstone of our work can we achieve our aim. The second policy, which can and must be put into effect, is to establish trade relations with India and with the heartland of our country and to attain a general balance in supplies to and from Tibet so that the standard of living of the Tibetan people will in no way fall because of our army's presence but will improve through our efforts. If we cannot solve the two problems of production and trade, we shall lose the material base for our presence, the bad elements will cash in and will not let a single day pass without inciting the backward elements among the people and the Tibetan troops to oppose us, and our policy of uniting with the many and isolating the few will become ineffectual and fail.
Of all the views set forth in the Southwest Bureau's telegram of April 2 there is only one that calls for further consideration, what I refer to is the feasibility and advisability of reorganizing the Tibetan troops and setting up a military and administrative commission fairly soon. It is our opinion that the Tibetan troops should not be reorganized at present, nor should formal military sub-areas or a military and administrative commission be established. For the time being, leave everything as it is, let this situation drag on, and do not take up these questions until our army is able to meet its own needs through production and wins the support of the masses a year or two from now. In the meantime there are two possibilities. One is that our united front policy towards the upper stratum, a policy of uniting with the many and isolating the few, will take effect and that the Tibetan people will gradually draw closer to us, so the bad elements and the Tibetan troops will not dare to rebel. The other possibility is that the bad elements, thinking we are weak and can be bullied, may lead the Tibetan troops in rebellion and that our army will counter-attack in self-defence and deal them telling blows. Either will be favourable for us. As the top echelon in Tibet sees it, there is no sufficient reason now for implementing the Agreement [1] in its entirety or for reorganizing the Tibetan troops. But things will be different in a few years. By then they will probably find that they have no choice but to carry out the Agreement to the full and to reorganize the Tibetan troops. If the Tibetan troops start one or even several rebellions and are repulsed by our army each time, we will be all the more justified in reorganizing them. Apparently not only the two Silons [2] but also the Dalai and most of his clique were reluctant to accept the Agreement and are unwilling to carry it out. As yet we don't have a material base for fully implementing the Agreement, nor do we have a base for this purpose in terms of support among the masses or in the upper stratum. To force its implementation will do more harm than good. Since they are unwilling to put the Agreement into effect, well then, we can leave it for the time being and wait. The longer the delay, the stronger will be our position and the weaker theirs. Delay will not do us much harm; on the contrary, it may be to our advantage. Let them go on with their insensate atrocities against the people, while we on our part concentrate on good deeds -- production, trade, road-building, medical services and united front work (unity with the majority and patient education) so as to win over the masses and bide our time before taking up the question of the full implementation of the Agreement. If they are not in favour of the setting up of primary schools, that can stop too.
The recent demonstration in Lhasa should be viewed not merely as the work of the two Silons and other bad elements but as a signal to us from the majority of the Dalai clique. Their petition is very tactful because it indicates not a wish for a break with us but only a wish for concessions from us. One of the terms gives the hint that the practice of the Ching Dynasty should be restored, in other words, that no Liberation Army units should be stationed in Tibet, but this is not what they are really after. They know full well that this is impossible; their attempt is to trade this term for other terms. The Fourteenth Dalai is criticized in the petition so as to absolve him from any political responsibility for the demonstration. They pose as protectors of the interests of the Tibetan nationality, being aware that while they are inferior to us in military strength, they have an advantage over us in social influence. We should accept this petition in substance (not in form) and put off the full implementation of the Agreement. The timing of the demonstration to take place before the Panchen's arrival in Lhasa was deliberate. After his arrival they will probably go all out to work on him to join their clique. If on our part we do our work well and the Panchen does not fall into their trap but reaches Shigatse safe and sound, the situation will then become more favourable to us. Nevertheless, since neither our lack of a material base nor their advantage over us in social influence will change for the time being, neither will the unwillingness of the Dalai clique to carry out the Agreement fully. At present, in appearance we should take the offensive and should censure the demonstration and the petition for being unjustifiable (for undermining the Agreement), but in reality we should be prepared to make concessions and to go over to the offensive in the future (i.e., put the Agreement into force) when conditions are ripe.
What are your views? Please consider and wire your reply. NOTES


1. This refers to the Agreement Between the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, May 23, 1951. 2. The "Silons" were the highest ranking administrative officials under the Dalai. The two Silons referred to here were the reactionary serf-owners Lukhangwa and Lozang Tashi.
Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project.
HTML revised 2004 by Marxists.org
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung