【商务内参111030】老外的损招 之 中国拯救欧洲的最好方式:出去的钱留在外面,直到欧洲活

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【商务内参111030】老外的损招 之 中国拯救欧洲的最好方式:出去的钱留在外面,直到欧洲活了再回过头帮衬中国制造。

There's Only One Way For China To Save Europe, And It's Not A Bailout
Patrick Chovanec, An American Perspective From China
Oct. 30, 2011, 8:31 AM
http://www.businessinsider.com/europe-looks-to-china-2011-10


The news these past couple of days has been dominated by the efforts of European Union leaders to reach a bailout agreement — and the fact that, immediately after the outlines of such an agreement were reached, the first thing the EU did was dispatch an envoy to Beijing, to persuade China to help fund the plan.
Arvind Subramanian, a scholar at the Peterson Institute and author of a new book called Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance (which argues, among other things, that the Renminbi will emerge as a global reserve currency sooner than anyone expects), caught the mood of the moment with a prominent op-ed in the New York Times titled “Why China Should Bail Out Europe.”  In it, he argues that China’s moment as a Great Power has arrived: that it can and should save Europe, and in doing so, ought to demand political and economic concessions, including a dominant role in running the International Monetary Fund:
China should demand nothing less than a wholesale revamping of the governance of the I.M.F. to reflect the current economic realities. Governance reform can no longer be just about the nationality of the I.M.F.’s managing director but should fundamentally be about who will have the greatest voice and exercise the most power in the new world . . . Supplicants, China should insist, cannot have veto power in a financial institution. The Chinese government could then trumpet a nationalist achievement — equal status as the United States, and a greater status than that of Europe, in running the world’s premier financial institution — as the return for investing its cash abroad.
I haven’t had the chance to read Subramanian’s book in full (although I look forward to doing so), so I’m not going to undertake here to rebut his broader thesis.  But in this particular instance, China’s role in the EU bailout, I find his take — which admittedly seems to be the prevailing interpretation among both European leaders and their publics – more than a little misconceived.  I’ve expressed this before, but let me restate it again:
Many people inside and outside of China are of the mistaken impression that China’s $3 trillion in FX reserves make it a massive investor in US Treasuries, Euro sovereigns, etc. at its own discretion, able to turn on or off the flow at will and therefore requiring to be courted and appeased.  In fact, unless China (wisely in my view) were to consciously break its dependence on exports and captive savings, it must accumulate ever-growing reserves and has little choice but to put them somewhere.  China can’t reallocate the deployment of those reserves (among currencies) to any sizable extent without also reallocating the global payments imbalances they reflect and support.  Shift your reserves from dollars to euros, and you shift your trade/capital flow surpluses with it.

In some media accounts, it is made to seem like China could single-handedly recapitalize European banks and bond markets, by deploying its $3 trillion reserves, should it choose to do so.  Those who are looking to China as a short-term savior for Europe would do well to ask themselves why China has such a ready pool of investable cash on hand.  It does so because it runs a chronic surplus with most EU countries (besides Germany and Ireland) much like it does with the U.S.  China produces more than it consumes, the US and most of the EU consume more than they produce — hence their growing dependence on debt.  The ultimate solution to the EU debt crisis is not more debt, but growth, so countries can earn their way out of debt.  Certainly there are internal imbalances at work in Europe (Germany’s surpluses with the rest of the EU) but China’s surpluses, and its reserve accumulation, are part of Europe’s growth deficit, part of the underlying problem.
If China really wants to do European countries a genuine favor, the best way is not to continue running surpluses with the EU, then turning around and lending the proceeds back to the Europeans to keep them on life support.  The best way is to use the proceeds from what China sold to Europe, or received as investment from European companies, to buy European goods and/or make productive investment in Europe, thereby generating jobs, growth, and earnings that can get Europe back on its feet and back buying Chinese-made goods on a more sustainable basis.  But that would require a significant mental and policy shift from China’s current growth paradigm.
Such a shift, however, would be squarely in China’s own interests, not just that of its trading and investment partners.  The popular, conventional view sees China as a vastly wealthy bank sitting on a pile of money, and the deficit nations of the US and EU as ”supplicants” (as Subramanian puts it) desperately hoping that bank will lend them some.  In fact, China is more like a shopkeeper who keeps allowing his customers to run up higher and higher tabs on credit, for fear that if he doesn’t, they won’t be able to keep buying and he will go out of business.  That certainly isn’t good for the customers, who end up getting into greater and greater debt, but it isn’t a particularly good position for the vendor to be in either.
I have heard some argue, in reaction to Subramanian’s op-ed, that China participating in the EU bailout would somehow hasten the acceptance and credibility of the Renminbi as an “international” currency — a key development Subramanian sees as heralding the dawn of Chinese economic and political supremacy.  Regarding that goal, however, I would rank, in order of importance, the following as far greater priorities and/or obstacles:

1) Giving people outside of China some way to earn and accumulate RMB by becoming a net exporter rather than massive net importer of currency (i.e., running a balance of payments deficit, either on the current or capital account)
2) Making the RMB “useful” for far more than a highly constrained/regulated set of purposes (i.e., freely convertible)
3) Offering those who do earn RMB somewhere to hold them until they want to use them (i.e., developing deep, liquid, transparent, and freely accessible capital markets, particularly bond markets).

I would not rank recycling China’s surpluses as debt-financing for deficit countries, which it is already doing and must do in any event, high on that list – even when it appears to be extending much-needed “help” in a crisis.  In fact, the “help” that China is able to extend — its massive accumulation of foreign currency — is itself testament to the marginal status of the Renminbi in China’s own international trade and investment transactions, much less the world’s.
It is entirely possible that China will declare, in response to European entreaties, that it will deploy some fraction if its annual balance of payments surplus — say $50 billion — to support the European bailout fund or bond markets.  Such an allocation — which it may well have had to make anyway, given its ongoing accumulation of reserves — will no doubt win it media kudos and perhaps favors from a grateful Europe.  For China, the optics will be fantastic, and the widespread misunderstandings regarding China’s role will only exaggerate, rather than diminish, the political and PR benefits for the Chinese as “saviors.”
The reality, though, is a long way from China “saving” Europe.  Not that I disagree with involving the Chinese — it is a good idea to involve China as a “responsible stakeholder” in organizing a response to any crisis that affects the global economy.  But if China truly wants to be a “responsible stakeholder,” the most responsible step it could take would be genuine movement towards a more sustainable balance of trade and investment.

中国应该怎样拯救欧洲？

炫耀至极@译言http://article.yeeyan.org/view/174392/228407
于2011-11-01 09:12:07翻译
译者注：

觉得作者的观点虽然中肯，但是牺牲自己利益来支持别国的发展，这样做难道也是可持续的么？

中国拯救欧洲的方式只有一种，但不应通过救援计划来实现

最近一段时间，欧盟领导人开会达成救助计划协议的新闻占据各大媒体的版面，事实上，协议草案一经达成，欧盟做的第一件事便是派遣了一位特使到北京游说中国政府为该救助计划注资。

彼得森研究所的一位学者阿文德•萨勃拉曼尼亚在《纽约时报》一个知名的专栏中撰写了题为《为什么中国应该拯救欧洲》的文章，他顺应了当前的舆论导向，倾向于中国应该为欧债危机做点什么。在他的新书《黯然失色：生活在中国经济主导地位的阴影下》中，萨勃拉曼尼亚认为人民币成为全球性储备货币的速度比任何人想象的都快。他同样认为，中国成为大国的时机已经到了，她能够也应该拯救欧洲。中国应该通过此举来获得欧洲对其政治和经济上的认可，包括国际货币基金组织的主导权：

   “为了能够反映当前的经济现状，中国应该要求对国际货币基金组织支配权进行全面修改。支配权改革不再只是国际货币基金组织总裁的国籍问题，而是，在新世界中，谁拥有这个组织最大的话语权以及最大的权力的问题。中国应该强调，作为资金乞求者（也就是欧洲），是不能在金融机构中拥有否决权的。假如中国真的向欧洲救援计划注资，那么作为回报，中国政府能够谋求在国际货币基金组织中享有和美国一样的地位，比欧洲要高。”  
我还没有机会读完萨勃拉曼尼亚的书（虽然我想这么做），所以我不会在此处对他的其他观点进行反驳。但是，单就中国在欧盟救援计划中所扮演的角色这一点上，我便发现他的观点不仅仅是有一点小错误，而且似乎和欧洲领导人以及公众的观点如出一辙。我之前已经表达过这样的看法，现在让我重申一下：

中国国内和国外的很多人有这样一种错觉，中国拥有3万亿外汇储备，那么她便是美国国债、欧元区主权债券等债券的主要投资者。所以，中国能够根据自己的判断任意开启和关闭资金流，因此，其他国家需要看中国的脸色行事。实际上，除非中国有意识地打破自己对于出口和高储蓄的依赖（在我看来这很明智），否则她的外汇储备会越来越多，中国几乎没有其他选择，只能把外汇投向某些地方。而在很大程度上，中国重新分配这些外汇储备的同时，全球收支失衡的情况也会改变。也就是说，我们在将美元储备换做欧元储备的同时，贸易顺差和资本盈余也会随之改变。

一些媒体的报道使人产生误解，似乎中国会选择凭借其3万亿外汇储备单独向欧洲银行和债券市场注资。那些期望中国担当短期“救市主”的人最好问问自己，为什么中国手中拥有如此庞大且可供投资的现金。产生这种结果的根源在于，像对美国一样，中国在对大多数欧盟国家（包括德国和爱尔兰）的贸易中保持着长期的顺差地位。中国的产出比消费高，而美国和大多数的欧盟国家则消费大于产出，因此这些国家越来越依赖于举债度日。欧洲债务危机的最终解决方案不在于更多的债务，而在于增长，因此这些国家能够通过经济的增长抵消掉原来的债务。当然，在欧洲内部会出现收支失衡的情况（比如德国相对于其他国家便是贸易顺差），但是，中国的贸易顺差和外汇积累便是欧洲经济不断增长的赤字中的一部分，也是潜在问题的一部分。

如果中国真的想对欧洲国家做出什么实质性的帮助，最好的方式不是继续保持对欧盟的顺差地位，而是让自己在贸易中处于逆差地位并将盈余的外汇借给欧洲使得他们能够度过难关。中国拯救欧洲的最好方式，便是把从出口或者欧洲公司投资中获得的外汇用来购买欧洲的产品或者在欧洲进行生产性投资，这样做可以创造就业岗位、使得欧洲经济复苏。最终，在经济可持续增长的基础上，欧洲国家将站稳脚跟并回头购买中国制造的产品。

但是，这种转变恰恰关乎中国自身的利益，而不仅仅是她的贸易和投资伙伴的利益。普遍的观点认为中国就像是一家非常富有的银行”，手握庞大的资金，而美国和欧盟国家这样的“乞讨者”正在焦急地等待银行给他们放款。实际上，中国更像是商店的老板，其他国家则是顾客，中国允许她的顾客们借钱借的越来越多，因为如果他们不再借贷，他们就再也买不起商店的东西，中国自己也会破产。

我看到在萨勃拉曼尼亚的专栏里有人评论道，中国参与欧洲的救援计划在某种程度上会快速提升人民币作为国际储备货币的接受度和公信力，萨勃拉曼尼亚认为这是中国走向政治经济霸权的关键一步。然而，对于这个目标，我按重要程度列举了以下前提或者障碍：

1. 在货币上，通过从货币净进口国转变为净出口国，让中国境外的人能够通过一些渠道赚取和积累人民币，也就是说，中国应该使其国际收支出现逆差，无论是当前净值还是资本净值。

2. 让人民币变得“有用”，而不是基于一些目的去约束和监管人民币，也就是说，让人民币实现自由兑换。

3. 建立深入、透明、自由的流动性资本市场，特别是债券市场。

我不赞成中国将外汇盈余以债务融资的方式来帮助欧洲国家，因为不管怎样，中国已经在对欧洲提供帮助。事实上，中国能够给予的“帮助”（庞大的外汇储备）正好证明了人民币在中国国际贸易和投资交易中的边缘地位，更不用说世界上的其他国家了。

为了回应欧洲的诉求，中国很有可能会宣布拿出年度收支盈余的一部分资金（比如500亿美元）来为欧洲救援基金和债券市场注资。考虑到中国正在增加的外汇储备，中国不得不做出这样的表态，而这一举动无疑会赢得媒体的广泛赞誉，可能还有欧洲的好感。世界的目光都会关注中国的举动，人们对于中国所扮演的角色的误读只会夸大而不会减小，因为政治环境和公共关系将从中国“救市主”的舆论导向中获益。

实际上，中国拯救欧洲还有一段很长的路要走。并不是我反对将中国牵涉其中，相反，让中国以“有责任的利益攸关者”的身份对影响全球经济的任何危机作出回应是个好主意。但是，如果中国真的想成为一个“有责任的利益攸关者”，那么她应该朝着可持续的贸易及投资平衡作出实质性的改变，这才是最负责任的做法。

clover213

这篇文章观点是向着中国的。
让欧洲开放投资市场，让中国参与生产性投资，一直是一个目标。只是他们一直很忌惮，不愿意让中国国家资本过去投资而已。

乘桴客

自私的家伙。

in2out

他们落井下石，中国就救急？干嘛这么高尚

台灯

中国的外汇储备越多说明借出的钱越多，欧美是拿白条子（欧债、美债）换中国的实物，而且理直气壮不许中国有意见，理由是中国的债权都是他们受了中国蛊惑不情愿欠下的。

插队在德国

只要欧洲愿意出售核心技术，帮助培养技术人才，允许中资控股，这样的交换条件也不是损招啊。