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本帖最后由 lilyma06 于 2011-11-23 13:54 编辑
Against the East Asia 'pivot'
Posted By Daniel Blumenthal Friday, November 18, 2011 - 1:54 PM http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/18/against_the_east_asia_pivot
There has been much ado in the media and from the Obamaadministration about a great strategic shift from the Middle East and SouthAsia to East Asia. Obama and senior administration officials are making thecase for this shift by claiming that we have accomplished our Iraq andAfghanistan goals, and that the time has come to focus on the "real problem": China.This week, the president announced the basing of 2,500 marines in Australia anda pushed for the Trans-Pacific Partnership,a regional free trade agreement that excludes China. The U.S. military has alsoreleased some details on its new AirSea battle concept -- an answer to thedense network of submarines, mines, anti-aircraft capabilities, and missilesthat China has created to keep the United States out of China's periphery. Allof these moves are to be commended. However, they do not and should not add upto a new "pivot." Here are some reasons why:
1) There isno way for the U.S. to project the necessary influence into East Asia if Aghanistanand Pakistan are on fire. One major reason is that if India is tied down in acompetition with Pakistan, China, and Iran in Afghanistan, it cannot become thekind of East Asian power we wish it to be. The Bush administration's Indiastrategy was designed to help India break out of its squabbles in South Asiaand exert influence in East Asia. A hasty pull-out of Aghanistan will reversethat sensible strategy.
2) China is exercising more influence in the MiddleEast in ways harmful to our larger goals (e.g., support of Iran). To competewith China in East Asia, we must retain our influence in the Middle East andSouth Asia and check destabilizing Chinese diplomacy.
3) The deployment of U.S. Marines to Australia andthe highlighting of a military concept to respond to China's military build-upare necessary but insufficient first steps. These developments cannot make upfor the fact that our military has faced deep cuts in its budget and will facemore. No matter what administration officials say, these cuts will affect ourposture in Asia profoundly. We need more ships, more aircraft, more missiledefense. To be a bit flippant, we are putting Marines in Australia withoutsufficient equipment to get out of Australia. Our allies and China need to seeand feel our presence. That can only be accomplished with more sea patrols,surges in exercises that promote freedom of navigation, and so on.
4) The AirSea battle concept is a serious effort tomeet the China challenge. But based on information released about it, theconcept suffers from two flaws. First, the resource question -- how would weshut down Chinese military operations without sufficient platforms and munitions?Second, AirSea battle fails to take into account China's nuclear ambitions. Chinais already a nuclear-armed country with every incentive to continue itsbuild-up of nuclear forces. That is because we have agreed on a bilateral (withRussia) rather than multilateral basis to cap our nuclear forces. Since Chinais bound by no important arms control treaties, and because we are openlytalking about major conventional strikes on the Mainland, China has everyreason to seek nuclear parity with us over time.
5) The TPP is a great idea. In particular, securingJapanese agreement to an FTA would be a great success . The question is, are weserious? It took the better part of Obama's term to ratify the FTA with SouthKorea. Are we really to believe that he will take on his base and sign moremajor FTAs?
There is no dispute that we need to take serious steps tobalance China's power. But we cannot do so by "pivoting" away from two criticalareas of the world. We need India to have peaceful borders in order to competewith China, and we need to diminish China's influence in the Middle East. And finally,the Obama Administration needs to resource its stated Asia strategy, which itso far shows little sign of doing.
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