【外交政策0124】双赢世界的终结——为何中国的崛起对美国有害

花落无声

【中文标题】双赢世界的终结——为何中国的崛起对美国及其它黑暗势力有害

【原文标题】The End of the Win-Win World   Why China’s rise really is bad for America -- and other dark forces at work.      

【登载媒体】外交政策

【来源地址】http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/24/the_end_of_the_win_win_world

【译者】花落无声

【翻译方式】人工

【声明】欢迎转载，请务必注明译者和出处 bbs.m4.cn。

【原文库链接】http://bbs.m4.cn/forum.php?mod=v ... 1&page=1#pid5545914

【译文】


I have spent my working life writing about international politics from the vantage points of the Economist and now the Financial Times. Surrounded by people who tracked markets and business, it has always felt natural for me to see international economics and international politics as deeply intertwined.

我整个职业生涯中都在从《经济学人》——现在是《金融时报》——的有利位置写关于国际政治的话题。我身边围绕着跟踪市场与贸易的人们，因此我总是很自然地认为国际经济与国际政治间有着很深的关系。

In my book Zero-Sum Future, written in 2009, I attempted to predict how the global economic crisis would change international politics. As the rather bleak title implied, I argued that relations between the major powers were likely to become increasingly tense and conflict-ridden. In a worsening economic climate, it would be harder for the big economies to see their relationships as mutually beneficial -- as a win-win. Instead, they would increasingly judge their relationships in zero-sum terms. What was good for China would be seen as bad for America. What was good for Germany would be bad for Italy, Spain, and Greece.

在2009年写的书《零和未来》（Zero-Sum Future）中，我尝试预测全球经济危机将会如何改变国际政治。正像这个有些凄凉的书名暗示的一样，我试图证明大国之间的关系可能会越来越紧张并充满冲突。在逐渐恶化的经济环境中，要让经济大国将它们之间的关系视作互惠的——或者说双赢的——会越来越难。相反，它们越来越会以零和的角度来判断彼此的关系。对中国有益的可能会被视作对美国有害。对德国有益的可能会对意大利、西班牙和希腊有害。

Now, as the paperback edition of my book comes out, the prediction is being borne out -- which is gratifying as an author, although slightly worrying as a member of the human race. The rise of zero-sum logic is the common thread, tying together seemingly disparate strands in international politics: the crisis inside the European Union, deteriorating U.S.-Chinese relations, and the deadlock in global governance.

现在，在我写的书的平装本出版的时候，我的预测也逐渐成真了——作为作者，这是令我满足的，而作为人类的一员，这让我有些担忧。零和逻辑的增加是一条共同主线，将在国际政治中表面上毫不相干的线联系在一起：欧盟的危机、逐渐恶化的中美关系、以及全球治理遇到的僵局。

This new, more troubled mood is reflected at this year's World Economic Forum. In the 20 years before the financial crisis, Davos was almost a festival of globalization -- as political leaders from all over the world bought into the same ideas about the mutual benefits of trade and investment and wooed the same investment bankers and multinational executives. At Davos, this year, the mood is more questioning -- with numerous sessions on rethinking capitalism and on the crisis in the euro zone. The European Union is an organization built around a win-win economic logic. Europe's founding fathers believed that the nations of Europe could put centuries of conflict behind them by concentrating on mutually beneficial economic cooperation. By building a common market and tearing down barriers totrade and investment, they would all become richer -- and, eventually, would getused to working together. Good economics would make good politics. The nationsof Europe would grow together.

这种全新的不平静情绪在今年的世界经济论坛中有所体现。在金融危机发生前的20年，达沃斯几乎是全球化的节日——全世界的政治领袖都认同贸易和投资的互惠，并追求相同的投资银行家和跨国管理人员。而今年在达沃斯更多的是怀疑情绪——有数不清的会议都是关于重新思考资本主义和欧元区危机的。欧盟是一个围绕着双赢经济逻辑建立的组织。欧洲的国父们相信欧洲国家可以通过关注互惠经济合作而把几个世纪的冲突放在脑后。

For decades, this logic worked beautifully. But, faced with a grave economic crisis, this positive win-win logic has gone into reverse. Rather than building each other up, European nations fear that they are dragging each other down. The countries of southern Europe -- Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain -- increasingly feel that they are locked into a currency union with Germany that has made their economies disastrously uncompetitive. For them, European unity is no longer associated with rising prosperity. Instead, it has become a route to crippling debt and mass unemployment. As for the countries of northern Europe -- Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands -- they are increasingly resentful of having to lend billions of euros to bail out their struggling southern neighbors. They fear that they will never get the money back, and their own prosperous economies will be dragged down. Now that France has lost its AAA credit-rating, Germany is left as the only large AAA-rated country in the euro zone. Many Germans feel that they have worked hard and played by the rules -- and are now being asked to save countries where people routinely cheat on their taxes and retire in their fifties.

几个年代以来，这个逻辑都很美好地奏效了。然而，在面临着重大经济危机的时候，这种积极的双赢逻辑走向了反面。欧洲国家害怕自己正在拖彼此后腿，而非帮助彼此。欧洲南部国家——希腊、葡萄牙、意大利和西班牙——越来越多地感觉自己被困在一个和德国一起的货币联盟里，这个联盟使它们的经济灾难性地无竞争力。对它们来说，欧洲的联合不再意味着日渐繁荣。相反，那成了一条通往难以承受的债务和大量的失业的路。而欧洲北部的国家——德国、芬兰和荷兰——不得不借出上百万欧元来救助挣扎中的南方朋友，这让它们越来越气愤。它们害怕再也收不回钱，害怕它们自己的繁荣经济被拖垮。现在法国已经失去了AAA信用评级，德国成为了欧元区唯一一个AAA级的大型国家。很多德国人觉得自己一直在努力工作并遵守规则，而现在却被要求去拯救那些人民在税收方面作假还在五十多岁就退休的国家。

From the beginning of the crisis, Europe's politicians have argued that the solution to a severe crisis within the EU was "more Europe" -- deeper integration. Unfortunately, their interpretation of what this means is rather different and dictated by the singular nature of their national debates. For the southern Europeans, "more Europe" means Eurobonds – common debt issuance by the whole European Union that would lower their interest rates and make it easier to fund their governments.. But the Germans regard this as a dangerous pledge simply to underwrite their neighbors' debts, long into the future. For them, "more Europe" means stricter enforcement of budgetary austerity from the center -- German rules for everybody.

从危机的开始，欧洲政治家们就一直在说对欧盟中严重危机的解决方法是“更欧洲”——更深入的联合。不幸的是，他们对于这到底意味着什么有着不同的解读，取决于他们的国家辩论的性质。对于欧洲南部人，“更欧洲”意味着欧元债券——整个欧盟发行的共同债卷，能够降低他们的利率并使向政府投资更容易。但德国人觉得在漫长未来里资助邻居的债务是危险的。对他们来说，“更欧洲”意味着从中心开始执行更严格的预算紧缩——每个人都用德国的规则。

Over the next year, this inherent contradiction is likely to cause increasing discord and rivalry within the EU as the political argument plays out against a deteriorating economic climate. Britain's refusal to go along with a new European treaty at the December 2011 Brussels summit led to screaming headlines about a continental divorce. But it is likely to be just a foretaste of things to come. The development to watch for in European politics will be the rise of political parties that are more nationalist in tone and that take a much more skeptical attitude to the European Union -- not to mention the single currency. Marine LePen and the National Front will do well in the upcoming French presidential election. Other rising Euro skeptic parties include the Freedom Parties in the Netherlands and Austria, the Northern League in Italy, the True Finns in Finland, and a motley collection of far-right and far-left parties in Greece.

在下一年里，在逐渐恶化的经济环境中的政治纷争上演的时候，这种内在矛盾很可能导致欧盟内部越来越多的不和与敌对。英国在2011年12月的布鲁塞尔峰会上拒绝同意一个新的欧洲公约，这带来了有关欧洲分裂的耸人听闻的新闻标题。但这可能只是将要来临之事的预告而已。欧洲政治中更值得注意的发展是越来越多对欧盟——更不用说单一货币——持怀疑态度的国家主义政党的发展。玛丽娜•勒庞和国民阵线会在即将到来的法国总统选举中表现优秀。其它正在发展的质疑欧元的政党还有荷兰和奥地利的自由党，意大利的北方联邦党，芬兰的正统芬兰人党，以及希腊的一些极右和极左党派的混合。

Ironically, this intensifying crisis in Europe comes just at the time that the United States has decided to readjust its foreign policy to concentrate much more on Asia and Pacific. Although the "pivot to Asia" is being presented as a far-sighted reaction to long-term economic trends, it also represents an adjustment to a shift in the global balance-of-power in the aftermath of the global economic crisis.

讽刺的是，欧洲逐渐严重的危机恰好出现在美国决定重新调整外交政策、主要关注亚太地区的时候。尽管“亚洲支点”被表现为对长远经济趋势的有远见的反应，它也是针对全球经济危机后全球权力平衡的变化的调整。

Put bluntly, the United States is taking the rise of China much more seriously. American preeminence, long into the future, can no longer be taken for granted. Nor can it be assumed that a stronger, richer China is good news for America -- as successive U.S. presidents argued all the way back to 1978. On the contrary, both as individuals and as a nation, Americans are getting the queasy feeling that a richer, more powerful China might just mean a relatively poorer, relatively weaker America. In other words, the rise of China is not a win-win for both nations. It is a zero-sum game. That belief is now feeding through into the presidential election -- and is reflected both in the protectionist rhetoric of Mitt Romney and in the soft containment of China of the Obama administration.

坦率地说，美国更加重视中国的崛起。在漫长的未来，美国的杰出不能再被视作理所应当了。而一个更加强大富有的中国也不能再被美国视作好消息了——就像从1978年开始每任美国总统就一直在说的那样。相反，无论作为个体还是整个国家，美国人都有着这样的反胃感觉：一个更加富有和强大的中国也许意味着一个相对来说更加贫穷和弱小的美国。换句话说，中国的崛起不是对于两国的双赢。这是一场零和游戏。这种信念也被注入到了总统选举中——在罗姆尼的贸易保护者修辞中和奥巴马政府对中国的软遏制中都有体现。

Romney has promised to designate China a "currency manipulator" and to slap tariffs on Chinese goods. These kinds of arguments have surfaced before, particularly during presidential elections -- but they are not normally made by pro-business Republicans. However, with America beset by worries about high unemployment and a spiraling national debt, old nostrums about free trade are easier to jettison. Missed in all the excitement of a presidential election is the extent to which protectionism is being intellectually rehabilitated in the United States. Respected economists like Paul Krugman and Fred Bergsten have argued that imposing tariffs would be a legitimate U.S. response to Chinese currency policies.

罗姆尼已承诺将会指称中国为“货币操纵者”并对中国商品施加关税。这种言论原来也浮现过——尤其是总统选举期间——但一般不会由支持商业发展的共和党提出。然而，在美国被高失业率和盘旋上升的国家债务困扰的时候，有关自由贸易的旧体制就很容易被抛弃了。在总统选举的所有激动中错过的是贸易保护主义在美国被聪明地恢复的程度。受人尊敬的经济学家们——比如Paul Krugman和Fred Bergsten——辩论说施加关税应该是美国对中国货币政策作出的合理反应。

A similar shift is underway in America's military and strategic thinking. The Obama administration's much-ballyhooed Asian turn is essentially a response to the rise of China. According to the Economist, China is likely to be the world's largest economy (in real terms) by 2018. And Washington sees Beijing as already flexing its muscles, with increases in military spending and a harder-line in border disputes with a range of neighbors, including India, Japan, and Vietnam. As a result, the United States is seeking to make common cause with China's nervous neighbors -- bolstering alliances with its traditional Asian allies, while committing to strengthen its own military presence in the region. This move is all the more significant since it comes in the context of a plan to make deep cuts in overall U.S. military spending.

类似的转变也发生在美国的军事和战略思想中。奥巴马政府大肆宣传地转向亚洲本质上是对中国崛起的反应。根据《经济学人》，中国在2018年以前很可能成为世界第一经济体（按实质计算）。而华盛顿觉得北京已经开始展示力量了——通过增加军费开支以及在和一系列邻国（包括印度、日本、越南）的边界争端中更加强硬。结果，美国正试图和中国附近那些紧张不安的国家联合起来——加强和一直以来的亚洲盟友的联盟，并且致力于加强自己在该区域的军事存在。这一举动在计划大力削减美军整体开支的背景下显得愈发意味深长。

The Chinese are not wrong to see this policy as essentially one of "soft containment." They are unlikely to respond passively. A new Chinese leadership – under pressure from a nationalist public -- might push back hard.

中国人把这一政策视为一种本质上的“软遏制”，他们没错。他们不太可能消极承受。中国新的领导阶层——在国家主义的民众的压力下——可能狠狠还击。

American-Chinese relations have long contained elements of rivalry and co-operation. But, increasingly, the rival elements are coming to the fore. This is not yet a new cold war. However, the state of relations between the United States and China -- the sole superpower and its only plausible rival -- are likely to set the tone for international politics in the coming decade.

中美关系一直包含着竞争和合作的元素。然而，竞争的元素逐渐占了上风。这还不是一场新的冷战。但是，美国与中国——唯一的超级大国、美国唯一似是而非的竞争对手——关系的状态很可能为下一个十年里的国际政治奠定基调。

In fact, the increasing rivalry between Washington and Beijing is an important contributor to the third major manifestation of the spread of zero-sum logic through the international system -- the increasing deadlock in multilateral diplomacy, from the World Trade Organization (WTO) to climate-change negotiations to the G-20's stalled efforts at global financial regulation.

事实上，华盛顿和北京之间越来越多的竞争是零和逻辑在国际体系中之散布的第三个主要表现，其它的表现还有多边外交——从世贸组织到气候变化谈判，再到20国集团对全球金融监管的陷入停顿的努力——遇到的僵局。

In the heyday of globalization over the past three decades, big trade agreements were both a symbol and a driver of the strengthening of common interests between the world's major powers. The creation of a European single market in 1992 and of a North American free-trade area in 1994, the setting-up of the WTO in 1995, and the admission of China to the WTO in 2001, were all landmarks in the creation of a truly globalized economy. But the days of heroic new trade accords are over. World leaders have stopped even calling for a completion of the Doha round of trade talks; the repeated empty exhortations have become embarrassing. There have been, however, some small victories: At the end of 2011, Congress finally passed a free-trade deal between the United States and South Korea, and Russia was admitted to the WTO around the same time. But the WTO is now largely playing defense, trying to prevent a major new outbreak of protectionism. Officials there dread the prospect of being asked to adjudicate a U.S.-Chinese dispute over currency-- fearing that any such case would be so politically charged that it could blow apart the world trading system.

过去三个年代里的全球化全盛期中，重大贸易协议是世界大国间共同利益加强的标志和动力。1992年欧洲单一市场诞生，1994年北美自由贸易区诞生，1995年世贸组织成立，2001年中国加入世贸组织，这些都是创造真正的全球经济过程中的地标。但史诗般的新的贸易协定的时期已经过去了。世界领袖们甚至不再要求完成多哈回合（多边贸易谈判），那些总被重复的空谈只会让人尴尬。然而，也有着小型的胜利：2011年末，国会最终通过了美国和韩国间的自由贸易协议，大约同时，俄国被批准加入世贸组织。但世贸组织目前主要是在防御，试图阻止新的贸易保护主义的大爆发。世贸组织的官员担心未来被要求裁定中美对货币的争论——他们害怕这个问题带有太多政治色彩以至于可能会弄垮整个世界贸易系统。

It is a similar picture in other areas where there were once high hopes for multilateral cooperation. The world climate talks were saved from complete disaster in Durban, South Africa, at the end of 2011 – but few believe that the vague and vestigial agreement reached there will have any real impact on the global problem. The G-20's efforts to push forward with new forms of global financial regulation have also disappointed. The crisis within the European Union -- which has so long seen itself as the champion of global governance -- has damaged the whole cause of multilateralism.

在其它曾经对多边合作抱有很高期望的地区也有着相似的景象。2011年末在南非德班举行的世界气候会谈并非是完全的灾难，然而很少有人相信那个达成的含糊不清并且不完整的协议能真的对全球问题起到任何作用。20国集团推进新形式全球金融监管的努力也落空了。欧盟——它一直视自己为全球管理的冠军——内部的危机损坏了整个多边主义的原因。

A few months ago, I found myself sitting next to a senior EU official who turned out to have read my book. "My job is to prove your zero-sum thesis wrong," he told me. I replied that, as an author I hoped to be proved right -- but as a European and a human being I was hoping to be proved wrong. My lunch companion laughed and said, "That is too dialectical for me."

几个月前，我发现自己坐在一位读过我的书的欧盟高级官员的旁边。“我的工作就是证明你的零和主题是错误的。”他告诉我。我回答他说，作为一名作者，我希望自己被证明是正确的，但是作为一个欧洲人和人类的一员，我希望自己被证明是错误的。我的午餐伙伴大笑道：“这对我来说就太辩证了。”

It is one of the nice things about the best EU officials that they are happy to talk to their critics, and comfortable using words like "dialectical." However, I fear that cultured technocrats will not do terribly well in the new era. A zero-sum world may summon up rather darker forces.

最优秀的欧盟官员的好处之一就是他们很乐意和自己的批评者交谈，并且很舒服地用像“辩证的”一类的词语。然而，我害怕斯文的技术专家们在新时期不会表现优秀。一个零和的世界可能会召唤起更黑暗的势力。

fod_liberty

把危机归源于中国而不是失败的美元体系，注定美国还会继续在下坡路上走下去。