【朝日新闻20121107】采访/怀特（Hugh White）：美国应与中国分享权力

Jigong

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/opinion/AJ201211070018
November 07, 2012
By YOICHI KATO/ National Security Correspondent

                                                                                                                                                                               PARIS--The only viable policy option for the United States to peacefully coexist with an ascending China is to share power.

So says Hugh White, a professor of strategic studies at Australian National University.
White, who formerly served as an adviser to Australia's prime minister, shared his thoughts with The Asahi Shimbun in a recent interview.

"If the United States stays to compete with China for primacy, then rivalry between the United States and China escalates. And we end up with increased risk of conflict," he said.

He also pointed out that in the event of military conflict, the United States would not prevail in spite of a new air-sea battle concept created to deal with China's growing military capabilities.

Excerpts of the interview follow:
        
***
        
Question: In your recent book, "The China Choice," you wrote: "War between the United States and China is already a clear and significant danger." What makes you say that?

Answer: Well, when we look at the U.S.-China relationship today, we see a kind of a paradox. On the one hand, they have a relationship of intense economic interdependence. And we also see many aspects of the relationship in its day-to-day interactions, being quite well managed.

        On the other hand, there seems to be a very deep fracture in the underlying relationship. And I think the source of that fracture is very different and incompatible views between Washington and Beijing of the essential nature of their relationship, their status in that relationship and what that means for their respective roles in Asia. What we have seen over the last few years is an increasingly stark demonstration of that difference.

        And if we look at, for example, the situation in the East China Sea today, where a territorial dispute between Japan and China exists, there are clear risks of a U.S.-China conflict flowing from it. The further that strategic competition escalates, the higher the risk of war becomes. We're in a very serious, downward trajectory.

        Q: You name three options for the United States to deal with China's challenge.

        A: The United States can withdraw from Asia, which I believe is unlikely. But I don't think any of us in the Western Pacific should rule out the possibility that in 10 years or 15 or 20 years from now that the United States could find that it has made a series of choices which, taken together, mean that the United States no longer asserts the kind of role in Asia that it has played in the past.

        If China and Japan, for example, came to blows over the Senkakus, and if the United States were to choose not to support Japan, I think that would do massive damage to the U.S.-Japan relationship, and could fundamentally change its nature. If Japan is no longer a strategic client of the United States, it's not quite clear what America's role in the Western Pacific is.

        The second possibility is that it competes with China and that, as China challenges American primacy, America pushes back. That's what's happening.
        And the third possibility is to share power with China.

       Q: Why is "power share" the best option?

        A: It seemed to me that China was very unlikely to accept American primacy. If America responded by withdrawing, that would be a disaster for Asia, because China is much more likely to try to establish hegemony over the region.

        I think, in the end, it's unlikely to succeed in doing that, because other countries, Japan obviously, perhaps also India and Southeast Asian countries, would resist. And if Japan chooses to resist a Chinese bid for primacy, even without American support, we'd end up with an escalating strategic rivalry between China and Japan, which I don't think China can win. I don't think Japan can win it, either. I think it ends up being very destructive for the whole region, disastrous for the region.

        On the other hand, if the United States stays to compete with China, then rivalry between the U.S. and China escalates. And even if the United States has the support of Japan and the rest of us, America's chances of prevailing in that competition are very low. But I think what happens is that we end up with increased risk of conflict. And, of course, that rivalry also damages economic interdependence and interaction, impoverishes the region, slows economic growth and reverses all of the trends that we've seen in the last 40 years, which have been so positive for all of us.

        So, if withdrawal and competition are bad outcomes for the region, sharing power is the only option that's left. There's the middle option in which the United States accepts that it needs to share power with China. I then started asking, "What might that kind of power sharing look like? How might it work?" And that is how I came to build the model of the "concert of Asia."

       Q: But if you talk to U.S. military people, they are confident that they can defeat China militarily.

        A: I think they're wrong. I think one of the reasons is that they are focusing on the operational rather than on the strategic level, and that's a mistake military people often make. And it's always disastrous to do so.
        I mean, let's go back a couple of steps. The military foundation of America's strategic position in the Western Pacific is its capacity to project power by sea. It's the aircraft carriers and the Marines. And what's happened since 1996 is that China has progressively expanded its capacity to sink American ships.

       Q: That is what the United States calls the "anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capabilities."

       A: And, of course, that means that the costs and the risks to the United States of projecting power by sea have gone up. And the U.S. response to China's A2/AD strategy has been the air-sea battle concept. It is about degrading China's sea denial capabilities to restore American sea control.

        And I think there are three problems with that. The first is it's unlikely to work. The Americans are wrong to be confident that they can sufficiently erode China's sea denial capabilities to the point where it becomes safe for the United States to operate their aircraft carriers.

        I think Americans underestimate China's capacity to find American carriers, and there's a real standoff in space. Chinese capacity to use space-based systems to find U.S. carrier groups has gone up a lot. The Americans, I think, believe that they can deprive China of that capability. But the Chinese can deprive the United States of a lot of space-based capability as well.

        A second point is it's mistaken to believe that, even if it does win the air-sea battle, that it's achieved very much.

        Now, China is a very, very big country. So, if the United States achieved the capacity either to sail the carriers or sail the Marines up to the China coast, I don't see what decisive strategic difference that's going to make. It's not going to make China stop.

        The third reason I don't like the air-sea battle concept is that it's massively capable to escalate. Among other things, there is a risk of nuclear escalation. Chinese might make the mistake of thinking that the United States would not retaliate against mainland China if the Chinese staged a nuclear strike on Guam.

        Q: Now, how does "power share" work?

        A: The essence of it is, first of all, that both the United States and China have to accept that the other will continue to play a very significant strategic role in Asia and that the other will be there to constrain and limit each others' power. They both have to treat one another as equals.

        Now, we don't have very many examples in history of this kind of thing. But the best model we have is the concert of Europe that was established during the 19th century. It was a very unusual international system, because you had a series of great powers, six really, all of whom agreed with one another that none would seek to dominate the system, and that if any one of the group tried to dominate the system, the others would all federate together against them. In order to make it work, all of the countries have to accept the legitimacy of the political systems of the others, even though they might be very different. They have to accept that the interests of the other are going to be different from theirs and that they are legitimate.

        And if we think about that in relation to the United States, for example, that means the United States would absolutely have to accept the legitimacy of the Chinese system of government, which I don't believe it does today.

       Q: But doesn't it require Americans to give up their core values, like democracy and human rights?

        A: They don't have to give them up, but they have to recognize that the costs of allowing those values to dictate the way they relate to China is going to be very high, and they've got to set against the values of human rights and freedom of religion and so on, the value on the other side of maintaining peaceful relations.
        Now in the end, strong states like the United States can afford to go to war with countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. But going to war with China would be completely different. This could quite easily be the worst war in history. And after that war was over, people would go back and say, "Were those values really worth that much?" "Is the government of China so bad?"

        The second thing the United States has to do is to accept the legitimacy of China's interests on international issues, even where they differ from America's.

        Q: So, for example, accept China's claim over the entire South China Sea?

        A: The United States might say, "OK, we'll accept your claim to the South China Sea, as long as you accept our right to undertake military operations through those waters." So, you do a deal. Or, "As long as you absolutely guarantee freedom of commercial navigation through those waters."

       Q: That would invite criticism of appeasement, surely?

       A: Appeasement is exactly, in a sense, what it is. And, of course, what people do, then, is to say, "Well, that's what we did in the 1930s."

        And they say, "Look at what happened in Munich, where we appeased Hitler, we gave him stuff, and all he did was take more." I think that's a legitimate concern. But I also think there are two really critical points to be made.

        The first is we've got to be very careful about exactly what the lesson of Munich in 1938 was, because what some people think the lesson of Munich was is that we were wrong to allow Hitler to take over the Sudetenland and that we should have gone to war with Hitler in 1938.

        But what was wrong in 1938 was that Chamberlain didn't make it absolutely clear that he'd go to war over Poland. And when Hitler took over the rest of Czechoslovakia in early 1939, Chamberlain extended a guarantee to Poland, and Hitler didn't believe him.

        Now, that was a fundamental mistake. So, to me, the lesson of 1938-1939 is not that you never compromise with ambitious powers; it's that, when you stop compromising, you have to make that absolutely unambiguous. You have to define the boundaries of your compromise absolutely unambiguously. And I think that's relevant to our situation with China.

        The second point about appeasement is that China is a very difficult, complex, country, but it's not Nazi Germany. I think it's a country we can do business with. It's certainly worth testing whether we can or not, before assuming the worst.

       Q: When you say "concert of Asia," the membership is not limited to China and the United States, is it?

        A: No. A very key thing about a concert is that it has to include all of the great powers in the system, countries which are strong enough that they can disrupt the whole thing. I think, in Asia at the moment, they are the United States, China, Japan and, eventually, India.

        Q: What kind of reactions did you get to your idea of "power share" from the United States?

        A: A lot of Americans argue that I'm too pessimistic about the trajectory of U.S.-China relations, because they don't believe that China is really that strong. They say the economy's bung, the political system doesn't work, the environment's "shot to ribbons," and the population is aging.

        The second part of the argument is that, OK, maybe China will keep growing economically, but it's not that strong strategically and politically, and so, even though our economy is relatively lower, our military and diplomatic strength will sustain us. And I think that's wrong.

        If you look at all the countries in Asia other than Japan, which I think is in a very special position, all of us want the same thing. None of us wants to live under Chinese primacy. All of us recognize that having the United States stay engaged in Asia is the best way to avoid that. On the other hand, all of us want to get on well with China. All of us see it as economically essential to our futures. All of us really fear being drawn into a U.S.-China strategic conflict on America's side against China.

        All of us want the U.S. to stay engaged in a way that doesn't lead to escalating strategic rivalry with China. We want America to stay to balance China, but not to try to dominate it.

        Q: The reactions from China?

        A: The China reaction is more complex. They like the argument about America treating China as an equal. But, on the other hand, there are some aspects of the argument that the Chinese find hard to accept. It is the idea that the concert involves Japan as well as America.

        I think the Chinese are ambivalent about America's future role in Asia, because some aspects of Chinese policy and rhetoric emphasize that they expect and accept that the United States will remain a significant strategic player in Asia.

        On the other hand, when they're talking about the South China Sea, for example, they say the United States has no role there. And so I think there's a tension in the Chinese position, and I don't think that’s resolved.

       Q: What do you think of the decision by Australia and the United States to have a new rotational deployment of the U.S. Marine Corps in Northern Australia?

        A: I think it is a very unwise decision, not because China might punish us directly but because it encourages the United States to pursue an approach to China which is not in our interests and not in America's interests.

       Q: So, you think the pivoting, or rebalancing of the United States to the Asia-Pacific region is not a good idea?

        A: It's always important to separate the operational from the strategic. There's nothing wrong with the United States maintaining a strong military presence in the Western Pacific. In fact, it is essential to my concept of how the U.S. role should play out. But, if the intention of that presence is to support a posture of containment against China, of resisting any accommodation with China, then it's wrong, because it won't work.

       Q: How should Japan and China solve the Senkaku Islands issue?

        A: If the U.S. found itself drawn into a Japan-China war over the Senkakus, America would expect Australia to support it. And Australia would find that an extremely difficult choice. If I was the prime minister of Japan, I would say, "Let's put that to one side. We need to have a conversation, we three, Japan, China and the United States, about our basic relationships." That would be the really statesmanlike thing to do.

        
* * *
        
Hugh White, 58, is a professor of Strategic Studies at Australian National University. His book, "The China Choice," was published in August. He was deputy secretary for strategy and intelligence in the department of defense of Australia.
                                                        
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        By YOICHI KATO/ National Security Correspondent                                                                                                                        
                                                                                       

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