【福布斯】改革30年之后的中国(第二部分)
【原文标题】China After 30 Years of Reform(Four-Part Series)
【原文】
China After 30 Years Of Reform, II
Gordon G. Chang, 12.17.08, 06:10 PM EST
Beijing won't bail out the world economy.
Everyone wants the Chinese to rescue the global economy with their $1.9 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, the product of 30 years of economic reform.
Unfortunately, for two principal reasons, Beijing will not do so. First, using the reserves would expose the
Chinese government to substantial risk. Second, Chinese leaders are reluctant to become an integral part of an international rescue effort. Their main contribution to global recovery, they continue to say, will be to stimulate their own economy.
Can they do so? Beijing, lamentably, has maintained an economic model particularly ill-suited to deal with faltering global growth. Much of its success in recent years has been due to exports, and Beijing's initial response to shrinking consumer demand around the world has been to boost this critical sector, which now accounts for about 38% of the Chinese economy, by direct and indirect measures.
The most important of these export-boosting measures involves the currency. Until July 2005, the renminbi was tightly pegged to the dollar. From that month until July 2008, Beijing permitted a managed float against an undisclosed basket of currencies. As a result, the renminbi appreciated 9.4% against the dollar in this three-year period.
Last July, however, the ruling Politburo switched gears, dropping the fight against inflation and starting a campaign to stimulate growth. As a part of its growth campaign, it adopted measures to stimulate exports, including keeping the value of the renminbi at artificially low levels to give the country's exporters important price advantages.
This month, the People's bank of China, the country's central bank, engineered a one-day fall of almost 1% of the value of the renminbi, apparently a warning that Beijing would resume its efforts to cheapen its currency.
Such steps can only aggravate tensions between China and its trading partners, but, more importantly, they show that Chinese leaders are not seriously trying to get their economy to more stable ground. Long term, China will prosper only if it develops a large internal market.
Why? The world will not--actually, cannot--indefinitely continue to absorb Chinese goods in ever-increasing amounts. So Beijing has no practical alternatives other than to create internal demand. But driving down the value of its currency--one of Chinese officialdom's principal responses to the global economic crisis--inevitably depresses consumption, which accounts for just 35% of the Chinese economy. In no nation does consumption play a smaller role.
Falling consumption dashes hopes around the world that Chinese consumers will be buying foreign products and thereby stimulating growth in other countries. Yet foreign expectations were never realistic to begin with. As an initial matter, it would take years for Beijing to reorient its economy from exporting to consumption. Moreover, Chinese officials have always been reluctant to allow their internal market to power growth overseas. China's record trade surplus in November was largely the result of a precipitous fall in imports.
Understandably, central government technocrats are too worried about their own economy, which is decelerating at an alarming pace, to help others. In 2007, China's gross domestic product grew by an impressive 11.9%; this quarter, analysts say they expect 5.8% growth, which really means it will grow by 5.2 or 5.3%. If this trend continues, next year's growth will come in well below the World Bank's most recent forecast of 7.5%.
It is true that most other nations would welcome 5.8% growth, yet that level is dangerous for an economy that was expanding twice as fast just a few months ago. The slowdown has been so sudden that Chinese economists are now worried about deflation.
The slowdown creates another risk for the economy: the prospect that both domestic and foreign parties will convert their renminbi to other currencies and take their money out of China. In the first week of December, there were signs they might be beginning to do so. If "hot money" flows reverse and funds illicitly leave China, the consequences could be severe.
Among the first victims would be the Chinese banks, which are likely counting large amounts of questionable loans as good assets on their books. In the last few years, they have gone on a lending spree, blowing up their balance sheets in the process. Continual growth has papered over these loan-quality issues. As money leaves the country and the economy slows, however, many bank customers--especially hard-pressed local governments--could have trouble paying back their loans. No one knows the extent of the problems in these financial institutions, but the central government's statistics showing single-digit nonperforming-loan ratios have a too-good-to-be-true quality to them.
To reverse the downturn in growth, Chinese leaders have decided to step up their investment in the economy, especially infrastructure. Early last month, the State Council, the central government's cabinet, unveiled a $586 billion spending program over nine calendar quarters. The downturn is so sharp, however, that Beijing announced it is working on a second stimulus package and now issues a continual stream of bulletins--almost all of them vague--on new initiatives. The problem is that, even after 30 years of reform, Chinese leaders have yet to develop an economy that can stand on its own.
As we saw in the Great Depression, countries with large current account surpluses are especially vulnerable to deteriorating global conditions. This time, China, which has been accumulating these surpluses, now finds it cannot adjust its economy quickly enough to make up for the sharp decline in exports.
The Chinese were once protected from external financial disruptions, such as last decade's Asian financial crisis. But at this moment, due to 30 years of integration of their economy into the global system, they are particularly vulnerable.
改革30年之后的中国(第二部分)
Gordon G. Chang08.12.17美国东部时间下午6:10
北京不打算拯救世界经济
每个人都想让中国用她那1.9万亿美元的外汇储备来拯救世界经济,这些钱是中国30年改革开放的成果。
然而不幸的是,有两个主要的原因,中国不会这么做。第一,动用外汇储备会使中国政府面对巨大的风险;第二,中国领导人不想在国际救援行动中担任主演。他们对世界经济作出的重要贡献,就像他们不断说的那样,就是继续刺激本国经济。
他们能这么做吗?北京,拙劣地保持着一种与处理摇摇欲坠的全球经济极不适应的经济模式。北京最近的成功主要是靠出口,北京最初的对于全球消费萎缩的反应是间接或直接的推动这一领域的活力,因为出口占中国经济的38%。
对于这些推动出口的重要措施包括货币政策。从2005年7月开始,人民币开始和美元挂钩。从那时直到2008年7月,北京允许一个有管理的汇率机制的一揽子货币政策。结果是,人民币在这三年里对美元升值了9.4%。
然而,去年七月,中央政治局放弃对抗通货膨胀,转而刺激增长。作为刺激增长的一部分内容,中国采取措施来刺激出口,包括稳定人民币汇率,来给国家的出口带来价格优势。
这个月,中国的中央银行——中国人民银行,策划了一个在一天之内让人民币贬值1%的行动,这是一个明显的信号——北京将要用货币贬值来促进出口。
这种行为只会恶化中国和她贸易伙伴的关系,这表明中国领导人不是认真的想把中国的经济变得更加稳定。从长时间来看,中国只有产生了一个广大的内在市场才能继续繁荣。
为什么?
因为世界不会自然而然的无限期地消化中国不断增长的产品。所以北京没有更好选择,只能是开发国内的需求。但是贬值本国的货币——中国官方应对全球经济危机的行动——不可避免地产生消费紧缩;而国内消费只占中国经济总量的35%——在其他任何国家不会有这么小的角色。
全球消费市场的低迷使得世界上其他国家希望中国的消费者能够多买他们的产品,这样便于刺激本国经济的增长。但是外国的这种一厢情愿是根本不会发生的。首先就是,中国必须经过多年才能适应从出口到消费的经济模式的转变。此外,中国官方不愿意让本国的市场来促进海外的增长。中国11月贸易顺差很大程度上是由进口的急剧减少带来的。
中央政府的专家是太过于关心本国的经济了,这可以理解,因为经济在快速下滑,现在没有办法帮别人了。在2007年,中国GDP以惊人的11.9%的速度增长,这个季度分析家说增长会在5.8%,实际上,他的意思是增长只会在5.2%到5.3%之间。如果这种趋势继续的话,明年的经济增长会大大低于世界银行最近预测的7.5%的增长速度。
对于世界上其他国家,5.8%的速度是梦寐以求的,但是,对于不久前还以两倍于这个增速增长的中国来讲,这是很危险的。经济下滑是如此的突然,使得中国的经济学家开始担心通货紧缩。
中国曾经在97年的亚洲金融危机中免于外部资金断流的危害。但是现在,由于30年间中国经济不断融入到世界经济中,中国很容易受到伤害。
经济下滑给这个国家经济带来新的危险:国内和国外的投机者会把人民币兑换成其他货币,然后撤出中国。在12月第一周已经有这种迹象了。如果热钱流出和资金非法流出中国,其结果将是严重的。
首当其冲的将是中国的银行,他们的账簿上有大量不良贷款。过去的几年间,由于疯狂的借贷行为使得他们的资产负债表也大幅增加。持续的增长掩盖了这种贷款问题。伴随着资金流走和经济下滑,银行的许多客户——尤其是窘困的地方政府——可能在偿还贷款上存在问题。没有人确切知道这些金融机构面临的问题,但是中央政府的统计表明:一位数的不良贷款率,对于他们来说太过好了而让人难以置信。
为了扭转增长的疲软状态,中国领导人决定加大对经济的投资,特别是基础设施的建设。上个月早些时候,国务院——中央政府的内阁——在九天之内提出了5860亿美元的刺激计划。然而,下滑是如此的急剧,因此北京宣布她在研究第二个刺激计划,现在发布了一系列的公告——所有的都是模糊的——在新的主动性方面。问题是,即便经过30年的改革,中国领导人也没能发展一个依靠自己的经济体系。
就像我们在大萧条中看到的那样,庞大的外汇盈余的国家更容易受到日益恶化的全球经济的影响。现在,已经积累了这种外汇盈余的中国,发现现在没有办法快速调整经济来适应出口的急剧下降。
更多阅读
【美国福布斯】《中国即将崩溃》一书作者看改革30年之后的中国 (1)
http://bbs.m4.cn/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=126965&page=1&extra=#pid1791715
【美国福布斯】《中国即将崩溃》一书作者看改革30年之后的中国 (3)
http://bbs.m4.cn/thread-127130-1-1.html
【美国福布斯】《中国即将崩溃》一书作者看改革30年之后的中国 (4)
http://bbs.m4.cn/thread-127366-1-1.html
|