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【原文标题】The view from the roof of the world
【中文标题】来自世界屋脊的观点
【登载媒体】英国卫报
【来源地址】http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/10/tibet-dalailama
【声明】本译文版权归Anti-CNN及译者所有，未经许可，切勿转载
【翻译】末末的快乐（题记，1，2，12，13，14，15）、三花小猫（3，4）、realgen（5，6，7，8，9）、yuexidong（10，11）
【致谢】感谢四位翻译人员，“谁知盘中餐，粒粒皆辛苦”，欢迎大家指正。
【译文】
The view from the roof of the world
来自世界屋脊的观点
（以下一段为题记：译者注）
It's 50 years since the Dalai Lama fled Tibet, and in that time a romanticised western vision of his country has flourished. But, argues Patrick French, it has done little to help the cause of those left behind.
50年前，达赖喇嘛逃离（谢谢5楼建议）西藏。自此，西方国家对他的祖国孳生了各种“有色”观点。不过，帕特里克•弗兰奇提出，这些观点不能揭示事件背后的真相。
A woman stands beside Buddhist prayer flags high up on Simla mountain in Tibet Photograph: Dan Chung/Guardian
佛教经幡高挂在西藏西姆拉山上，边上站着一名妇女。/卫报Dan Chung
[1]
The Himalayan region has long held a particular fascination for the western mind. When the Dalai Lama made good his daring escape into exile in 1959, crossing the Himalayas while the People's Liberation Army followed in hot pursuit, Tintin in Tibet was about to be published, and the remote land of snow peaks and deities, yaks and yetis, forbidden cities and flying lamas was already well known through the writings of mystics such as Madame Blavatsky, Alexandra David-Néel and T Lobsang Rampa, author of the bestseller The Third Eye. (Rampa was later unmasked as a surgical truss manufacturer from Devon named Cyril Hoskin.) Convinced that Tibet was the fountain of "Indo-Germanic" racial purity, Heinrich Himmler had sent a number of exploratory expeditions there and, on a single trip, Nazi ethnographers took 60,000 photographs, mainly of baffled Tibetans with good "Aryan" cheekbones.
喜玛拉雅地区长久以来都在西方人的心目中闪烁着特别的魅力。达赖喇嘛在1959年勇敢出逃并流亡，穿越喜玛拉雅山脉；而人民解放军对他穷追不舍。此时，《丁丁历险记（西藏篇）》即将出版。人们通过诸如布拉瓦兹基、亚历山德拉•大卫•妮尔、洛桑伦巴等人的神秘主义著作已经知道了遥远的雪山领地及女神，牦牛与雪人，紫禁城和飞升的喇嘛。（洛桑伦巴出了一本畅销书《第三眼》，但后来证实，他是英国德文郡的一名手术桁架制造商，真名西里尔•霍司金。）由于确信西藏是纯种印度日耳曼语系种族的发源地，海因里希•希姆莱派遣了多个探险队到那里，纳粹民族学者单次探险，就拍了6万张照片，主要对象是面露困惑、带着“古雅利安人”颧骨特征的藏民。
[2]
With the flight of the Dalai Lama and many important lamas into exile, Tibetan Buddhism gained new followers in the United States and western Europe in the 60s and 70s, as the half-understood precepts of a complex religious tradition opened doors for those who were in search of a fresh spiritual direction. The Tibetan refugees, in their turn, found financial and social possibilities available to them through the export of their culture that would not have been obtainable in any other way. In Dharamsala, the little Indian hill town where the Dalai Lama made his headquarters, there is still tension between local men and the Tibetan exiles, who easily attract the eyes of visiting westerners.
在20世纪六、七十年代，随着达赖喇嘛及其他佛教重要人物的流亡，藏传佛教在美国和西欧都有了追随者。人们对这个有着复杂教条的宗教派系一知半解，这也为那些寻找超脱精神方向的人们敞开了大门。藏族难民由此发现，只有通过输出他们的文化，才有寻求经济和政治上援助的可能。达赖喇嘛在印度山区小镇达兰萨拉建立政治中心。当地人与西藏流亡人员的关系仍然紧张：后者，很容易吸引来旅游的西方人的目光。
(
译者注:
Shimla：西姆拉，位于印度北部喜马拉雅山山区，是印度喜马偕尔邦的首府。
图片说明用的是Simla，但在往上查，并没有Simla，而是有Shimla。不知道作者是地理不过关还是故意为之？竟然把印度的地名归为中国。
)
[3]
The underlying reason for the popularity of abstract Tibet may have been the assumption that a pure, isolated place on the roof of the world must have harmonious mystical methods that are lost or undiscovered in more regular post-industrial societies. So when Sandra Bullock in Miss Congeniality or Kate Hudson in How to Lose a Guy in 10 Days wish to bring calm back in to their lives, they instinctively namecheck the Dalai Lama. Even Harry Angstrom, the boorish American everyman in the Rabbit novels written by the recently departed John Updike, says: "The only country over there I've ever wanted to go to is Tibet. I can't believe I won't make it." Half a century after the uprising that led to the Dalai Lama's departure, this ethereal perception of Tibet has been updated with our knowledge of the tragedy of communist rule, and in particular the immense damage done during the Great Leap Forward in the late 50s and the Cultural Revolution, unleashed in 1966.
理论上西藏流行的根本原因可能是假设，在世界屋脊这样纯粹孤立的地方，肯定有在端正的后工业社会所丢失的或未发现的和谐的神秘的方法。因此，当选美小姐中的桑德拉•布洛克或十日拍拖手册中的凯特•哈德森希望他们的生活回归平静的时候，他们本能的说出达赖喇嘛的名字。即使最近去世的约翰•厄普代克所写的《兔子》系列里的哈里•安斯特洛姆这样一个美国现实社会中的典型人物,说“那里我最想去的国家是西藏。我不敢相信我不能去。”导致达赖喇嘛流亡的起义后的半个世纪里，据我们所知，西藏的庄严神圣的已成为共产党统治下的悲剧，特别是50年代末始于1966年文化大革命时，大跃进所造成的巨大破坏。
[4]
Living in exile, the 14th Dalai Lama is still seen as the face and voice of the Tibetans but, more emotively, he is a religious leader with a huge appeal to people of no definite religious belief. With his quirky humour and sermons conducted in broken English in which he emphasises love and compassion, he can reach across borders and draw enormous crowds. But 50 years after his flight, Tibet remains under the rule of Beijing and the Dalai Lama still faces the same quandary that he discussed with the Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, as soon as he reached New Delhi in 1959: how do you influence a country as large and as powerful as China, and is western support for his campaign for Tibetan freedom anything more than gesture politics? Nehru's view was that American and European support for the Dalai Lama's cause was insincere, and that if the Dalai Lama went to the west in the hope of drumming up political enthusiasm, he would "look like a piece of merchandise". Since the early 90s, negotiations between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government have been stalled."
流亡在外的十四世达赖喇嘛仍然被视为西藏人民的代表，然而更让人感动的是，作为一个宗教领袖，他对没有明确信仰的人们依然有着巨大的吸引力。他以古怪的幽默感和蹩脚的英语传教，他强调爱和同情，他可以跨越国界，吸引庞大的人群。但是他流亡后的50年里，西藏依然被北京控制，达赖喇嘛仍然面临着同样的窘境，这在他1959年到一达新德里就与印度总理贾瓦哈拉尔尼赫鲁讨论过：你如何去影响一个像中国这么广阔而又强大的国家呢？西方是真的支持他的自由西藏运动还是只是故作姿态？尼赫鲁认为，美国和欧洲的支持达赖喇嘛的想法其实言不由衷，如果达赖到西方游说，他将“像一件商品” 。自90年代初，达赖喇嘛和中国政府之间的谈判一直陷于停顿状态。
[5]
In earlier centuries - when it took several months for a messenger to travel between the Tibetan capital Lhasa and Beijing - it was possible for Tibet and China to have a working, symbiotic relationship without China's nominal power disturbing Tibet's distinctive cultural identity.But when the Dalai Lama was born in 1935 in a region controlled by a Chinese Muslim warlord, Tibet was in a vulnerable position. Attempts by the 13th Dalai Lama to introduce reforms had fallen foul of monastic conservatives, and with a civil war raging in China, it was possible to postpone the day of reckoning.For most practical purposes, the country was in control of its own affairs. A search party was sent to locate the nation's new ruler. They saw a house with a roof of turquoise tiles, which matched a building seen by a monk in a dream, and inside was a little boy named Lhamo Dhondrub who recognised a rosary and drum belonging to the late Dalai Lama. This was taken as proof that he must be his reincarnation: so he was taken to Lhasa and enthroned.It was a unique and lonely childhood for the Dalai Lama, living at the top of the Potala palace and being trained in Buddhist dialectics and ritual by scholarly monks.
上个世纪初期——当一个信使从西藏首府拉萨出发到达北京需要几个月的时候——在没有中国名义上的力量扰乱西藏地区的文化认同，西藏和中国保持一种可运转的、共生的关系是可能的。但是，当达赖喇嘛1935出生于一个被中国穆斯林军阀控制的地区的时候，西藏处于一种脆弱的状态。13世达赖喇嘛引进改革的尝试和僧侣的保守派发生冲突，内战满布中国，（这样的背景下）推迟最后算账的日子是可能的。很大程度上由于实际原因，这个国家曾自己管理着自己的事务。一个搜索队伍被指派来找寻这个国家新的统治者。他们看见一个有着绿松石色瓦片屋顶的房子，这和一位僧侣梦中看到的建筑相吻合，里面有一个名叫拉木登珠的小男孩，（文章原文中用的是“Lhamo Dhondrub”，应该就是“ Lhamo Toinzhub”，“拉木登珠，达赖原来的名字：译者注）他能认出最后一位达赖的念珠和鼓。这被当做他必定是达赖转世的证据，因而它被带到拉萨，登上王位。达赖喇嘛住在布达拉宫顶上，由学者型的僧侣对他进行佛教辩证法和宗教仪式的训练，这童年对他来说是独特而又孤独的。
[6]
When the communists won the civil war in China in 1949 and set about capturing territory over which they believed Beijing had a historical claim, the teenage Dalai Lama was obliged to take up temporal power.But by 1959 and the start of the Great Leap Forward, as monasteries were destroyed and social structures undermined, the population of eastern Tibet rose up against communist rule, and the Dalai Lama escaped.Initially, he and his advisers thought Chairman Mao Zedong's revolutionary reforms would bring progress and prosperity, and for nearly 10 years the Tibetan government co-existed with the invaders - a decade that has now been largely eradicated from popular history.
当共产主义者在1949年赢得中国内战，开始着手夺取那些他们坚信北京历史上拥有的领土，十几岁的达赖喇嘛不得不担当临时权利。起初，他和顾问认为毛泽东主席的革命性改革会带来进步和繁荣，西藏政府和入侵者共存将近十年——从大众历史中完全消失的十年。但是，到1959年大运进开始，寺院被毁掉，社会结构的基础被腐蚀，西藏东部的大众叛变（起义）反抗共产主义制度，达赖喇嘛出逃了。
[7]
In exile in India and Nepal, it was necessary for refugees from across the wide Tibetan plateau to bond together and establish a common identity. United by their reverence for the person of the Dalai Lama, these displaced people with different dialects and customs tried to unite and put regional and sectarian differences to one side. They acquired the structures and symbols that foreign supporters had told them would be helpful to emphasise the notion of nationhood; a song written by the Dalai Lama's tutor Trijang Rinpoche was adopted as Tibet's national anthem, and a regimental banner featuring blue and red stripes and a pair of snow lions became the national flag. Over the coming years, as more children were born in exile, they were imbued with a sense of their own Tibetanness through the system of schooling set up in refugee settlements by the government-in-exile. Many of the current younger generation of pro-Tibet activists have never been to the country that they consider home. When new arrivals escape across the Himalayas today, often enduring desperate journeys, they usually have trouble assimilating: the exiles consider their behaviour, language and cultural reference points to be "too Chinese".
对于来自大西藏高原，流亡在印度和尼泊尔的难民来说，联合起来建立一个共同的民族认同是必需的。这些迁徙来的、有着不同方言和习惯的人们由他们所崇敬的达赖喇嘛联合起来，试着把地域和宗派差异(消除而)合而为一。他们形成了那些国外支持者告诉他们能够帮强化调国家概念的组织结构和符号象征；达赖喇嘛的一个上师Trijang Rinpoche写的一首歌曲被采纳为西藏国歌，一个以蓝红条文为主、上面有一对雪狮子的团旗成为了国旗。在接下来的几年里，越来越多的孩子在流亡中出生。通过流亡政府在难民居住地开办的教育教学系统，他们蒙受了他们自己的西藏（元素）的浸染。许多支持西藏运动人士的当今年轻一代从来没有到过他们当作故乡的地方。今天，当新来的人常常忍受着绝望的旅途而逃离跨越喜马拉雅山的时候，他们通畅有着相似的问题：流亡的人认为他们的行为，语言和文化关系“太过中国”。
[8]
I spent the summer and autumn of 1999 in Tibet and its border areas covertly interviewing people from all sides of the political and ethnic divide, sometimes through a translator. By the end of this process, I began to see quite how complicated the situation was for Tibetans inside Tibet. Restricted from knowledge of the outside world, and of the workings of alternative and democratic political systems, it was hard for them to imagine a different future. Most retained a deep, hidden reverence for the Dalai Lama, despite Beijing's vicious campaigns depicting him as a "splittist" and a "wolf in monk's clothing", but within this devotion was a sense that the battle for independence had been lost many decades before.
花了1999年夏天和秋天，我有时通过一个翻译，在西藏和其边境地区秘密的访问了来自不同政治和种族文化圈的人。在这个活动的最后，我开始看清楚，对于在西藏的西藏人来说，形势有多么错综复杂。他们与世界知识隔离，他们不知道可选择的民主的政治系统：对他们来说，想象一个别样的未来是如此的困难。尽管有北京的卑劣行为，把他描绘成一个“分裂着”和“一个穿着袈裟的狼”，（哎，他们开来，中国的就是错误的，哎，到底谁被洗脑了：译者注）很多人（还是）对于达赖喇嘛保持着深深地、深藏着的崇敬，但是，这种忠诚里有这么一个意识，那就是：独立战斗在几十年前已经被忘掉了。
[9]
Older people felt relief above all that the dark days of the 60s and 70s were behind them. They had little option but to operate within the system - in the bureaucracy, in the police or in politics - and the fact they did so did not mean they were pro-communist. Their Han Chinese colleagues were not regarded as enemies, and many Tibetans spoke Chinese when in the "public" sphere, for example when talking about their job or speaking a telephone number. Underlying this acceptance of Chinese control was an intense resentment that Tibetans were subordinate and, for example, had never held any of the key posts in the government of the Tibet Autonomous Region.
年纪大一些的人们觉得是全面大解放：60年代，70年代黑暗日子的留在他们心底。他们没有什么选择，但却依照制度体系行事——在官僚系统（此处没有贬义：译者注）中，在管辖治安中，在政治中——他们这样做的事实并不意味着他们支持共产主义。他们的中国汉族同事不被当作是敌人，许多西藏人会说在“公共”场合说汉语，例如当他们谈论他们的工作或者说电话号码的时候。处于接受中国统治的下面的是强烈的愤怒，那就是藏人处于次要地位，例如，从来没有藏人位于在西藏自治区政府的重要职位上。
[10]
While China has liberalised since the end of the Maoist era, the "minority" regions of Tibet and Xinjiang remain under close supervision, and in urban areas people are still obliged to spy on their neighbours. At present, the country is closed to outsiders. Over the last year, there have been repeated small-scale protests by Tibetans, which have been suppressed brutally, and it remains difficult to obtain accurate information about everyday life. One of the best depictions I have seen was in last year's BBC4 series A Year in Tibet, which was criticised by campaigners as being insufficiently condemnatory of the authorities. Foreign journalists who wish to report from the country either have to work under heavy restriction or rely on Tibetan refugees. A few days ago, I had a familiar experience: a senior TV correspondent was telephoning for advice about going to Tibet. His intention was to intercut undercover footage filmed in border areas with interviews conducted among exiles, since speaking to "actual" Tibetans was too difficult and dangerous.
自从中国解放直到毛泽东时代结束，西藏和新疆区域一直处在严密的监控之下，城市地区的人民仍然不得不暗中监视他们的邻居。目前，城市对外界关闭着。去年，那里一再发生小规模的藏人抗议，但都被残酷的镇压下去，想要得到那里人们每天的生活的真实信息是相当困难的。其中我曾经看了BBC4台去年的一个系列片，是是这一年中关于西藏最好的描绘了，批评人士谴责当局不尊重人权。外国记者希望从现实中去报道而不是在严格的限制下工作或是依赖于西藏流亡人士说法。几年前，我也有类似的经历，一个资深的电视记者打电话咨询去西藏的建议，他采访流亡藏人的打算被在边境地区的便衣警察阻挠，因为对于谈论“真实”的藏人来说实在是太困难太危险了。
[11]
In the decade since my extended stay in Tibet, despite Beijing continuing to pour money into the region in subsidies, the overall situation has not improved. For most mainstream Han Chinese, who are ever more aware of their country's growing economic and strategic status in the world, the "Tibet problem" is an unwelcome distraction to the rise of China. The new railway line to Lhasa has brought a fresh wave of settlers, and the immediate spark for last year's protests by Tibetans was anger that the economic advantages of recent years had gone to outsiders. Their countrymen who study or work in places such as Xian, Chengdu and Beijing face constant suspicion, and find it more difficult, for instance, to get rooms in hotels. Although the Tibetan cause regularly brings out protesters in London, Washington, Berlin and Paris, it has little sympathy on the streets of China's cities.
我在西藏延期停留之后的十年里，尽管北京继续加大对于该地区补贴的力度，但是整体的条件还是没有改善。对于中国最主要的族群汉人来说，他们是更容易享受他们国家经济增长和在世界战略地位提升所带来的荣誉的，在发展中的中国，西藏问题是一个不被待见的分歧。通达拉萨的新铁路线已经带来了新一波的定居者，同时也引发了去年藏人的反抗，藏人们对近几年经济的优势都已经被外来者取代感到愤怒。他们的同胞都学习或工作在象西安、成都和北京等城市，他们面对着不断被猜忌，例如，在酒店里获得一个房间都是很难的。尽管藏人在伦敦、华盛顿、柏林和巴黎制造了一些有组织的抗议，但他们没有得到中国普通民众的一丝同情。
[12]
This inability to gain Chinese popular support even among those who are otherwise unsympathetic to the Communist party is the biggest single failure of the western pro-Tibet lobby, which is caught in a cul-de-sac, speaking to the converted and culling any messenger who dares to question its virtue. Adversarial contest is at the heart of the west's legal, political and academic life, and the Tibet movement operates within that paradigm, unaware that public humiliation of visiting Chinese leaders does nothing to improve the situation for Tibetans inside Tibet. I noticed during last year's Olympic torch procession that when rival groups of Han Chinese and iridescent pro-Tibet supporters stood waving flags, neither side attempted to speak to the other. The way in which China was routinely abused at this time caused distress to many Chinese, and led to counter-protests and the creation of websites such as anti-CNN.com.
无法获得中国大众,甚至是那些在别的场合也对共产党毫不留情的人的支持，是西方援藏游说者最大的一次失败。这种失败陷入死巷,与信仰已经改变的人交谈并排查出那些敢于率先质疑它的品行、道德原则的人。对抗的中心内容在于西方国家的法律、政治、学术生活,西藏运动也在这种模式下进行,却没有意识到公开羞辱到访的中国国家领导人对改善藏区的藏民的状况完全没有作用。我注意到在去年的奥运火炬传递过程中,当对立的汉族和身穿灿烂色彩服饰的西藏支持者挥都舞着旗帜,双方都不愿意跟对方对话。这种情况下，中国通常都会遭到辱骂，许多中国人为此感到忧虑。并导致与之对立的抗议活动及网站的建立，如anti-CNN.com。
[13]
The ageing Dalai Lama continues to shuttle the globe selling the cause of Tibet and attracting sympathy and admiration rather than substantive political backing. Late last year, aware that a younger generation was disappointed with his strategy, he offered to step down and called an open meeting of Tibetans in Dharamsala. The government-in-exile managed the event: contrary views were ventilated at the margins, and the conference agreed to continue with more of the same.
不断衰老当中的达赖喇嘛仍继续在全球来回兜售西藏问题的起因，吸引同情和钦佩，而不是实质性的政治支持。去年年末,他意识到年轻一代对他的策略很是失望,他提出自己下台,在达兰萨拉召开开放式会议。流亡政府操纵了整个事件：:相左的观点只进行有限讨论，会议就保持之前大部分的策略达成一致。
[14]
He has also made ambiguous statements about what will happen when he dies, even suggesting that he may not reincarnate and may instead nominate a successor. If this happens, the atheist Chinese government may usurp his authority by naming a child as his reincarnation, as they did after the death of another senior Tibetan Buddhist leader, the Panchen Rinpoche. Should Beijing decide to reach out and try to cut a deal with the exiles, it is likely to be in the post-Dalai Lama era.
他也对自己将来死后会发生什么发表模稜两可的声明, ,甚至暗示他可能不会再生,反而会提名接班人。如果这一切发生的话,信奉无神论的中国政府可能会篡权，命名一个孩子作为他的转世。当另一个高级藏传佛教领袖班禅活佛死后，他们就是这么做的。要想北京伸出手来，与流亡人员达成最终协定，那一定是在后达赖喇嘛时期。目前,想要看到中国人与藏民之间的僵局有一个令人高兴的结局是很难的。公路建设，电力项目和民族主义的宣传,还没有在西藏自治区赢得民心。北京方面知道，它能用武力镇压任何反抗力量；而藏人也意识到--用传统的话来说就是--公开反叛犹如以卵击石。同时,西藏的苦难却仍在继续。
[15]
At present, it is not easy to see a happy outcome to the impasse between the Chinese and the Tibetans. Road building, power projects and nationalist propaganda have not won the hearts and minds of many in the Tibet Autonomous Region. Beijing knows it can put down any rebellion with force, while the Tibetans realise that, to use a traditional phrase, open revolt would be like throwing an egg against a rock. In the meantime, the suffering in Tibet continues.
目前,想要看到中国人与藏民之间的僵局有一个令人高兴的结局是很难的。公路建设，电力项目和民族主义的宣传,还没有在西藏自治区赢得民心。北京方面知道，它能用武力镇压任何反抗力量；而藏人也意识到--用传统的话来说就是--公开反叛犹如以卵击石。同时,西藏的苦难却仍在继续。
Patrick French is the author of Tibet, Tibet: A Personal History of a Lost Land, published by Harper Perennial.
作者简介：派区克．佛兰区是《西藏，西藏》一书的作者，Harper Perennial出版。 |
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狗仔卡
发表于 2009-3-13 15:12
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