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本帖最后由 I'm_zhcn 于 2009-7-12 01:59 编辑
Seeing China as a Colonizer
视中国为殖民者
Stevan Harrell, an anthropologist at the University of Washington, has collaborated with minority scholars from China for more than 20 years. He is author of “Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China.”
华盛顿大学人类学家史蒂文·哈雷尔与中国少数民族学者进行过二十多年的合作，并著有《中国西南地区少数民族风俗》一书。
The 130 million members of China’s 55 officially designated minority groups have all the civil rights of full citizenship, and are even beneficiaries of affirmative action and less stringent birth planning regulations. They are also poorer, less educated, and less represented in Communist Party and government positions than are the majority Han Chinese.
中国有55个官方认可的少数民族，人口共一亿三千万。少数民族享有充分的公民权利，并且享受民族优惠政策和相对宽松的计划生育政策。但少数民族相对贫困，受教育程度也相对较低。少数民族代表在共产党和政府中的比例低于汉族。
Not all minority groups are the same. Most are citizens of no state but China and have never been independent nations. While all of these groups — which range in size from the Zhuang, with a population of 16 million, and the Hui Muslims, with 10 million, to the Lhoba, with only 3,000 members — have their conflicts with local Han and have at times demonstrated over Chinese state policies and the Han presence in their home areas, they have not developed political separatist movements.
各少数民族的情况有所不同。大到一千六百万人口的壮族和一千万人口的回族穆斯林，小到只有三千人口的珞巴族，大多数少数民族散居于中国各地，从未建立过独立的国家。这些民族与当地汉族时有纠纷，不希望汉族居住在本族地区，并曾对中国国家政策表示不满。但这些民族没有政治分裂主义的倾向。
The Tibetans and Uighurs (and perhaps the Mongols) are different. They are “minority nationalities,” peoples with historic and contemporary claims to nationhood. Historically, they have sometimes been ruled by a larger East Asian empire, and have sometimes been independent. Despite being officially included as citizens and members of the Chinese nation, many think that their nations are rightfully independent and not part of China.
藏族和维吾尔族则不同。（或许还有蒙古族。）他们是“minority nationalities”（此处或可译为：具有国家性的少数民族）。从古到今曾多次提出过成立国家的要求。历史上这些民族曾被强大的东亚帝国所征服，也曾独立自治。虽然他们表面上是中国公民和中华民族的一员，但是很多人认为自己的民族不是中国的一部分，有权独立。
Recent infusions of financial support from the government to develop their regional economies have not altered that sentiment. Not unlike the the Kikuyu in Kenya or the Bengalis in India, who prospered materially under British rule but were eager to be rid of it, rising standards of living among minority nationalities in China have not diminished their sense that they are an occupied people.
近来，政府通过财政支持促进少数民族地区经济的发展。但此举并未改变上述情绪。少数民族生活质量的提高没能降低少数民族的被占领感。这有些像英国统治下的肯尼亚基库尤人和印度孟加拉人：虽然物质生活丰富了，但他们依然渴望摆脱英国的统治。
Both the Tibetans and Uighurs would probably choose to be independent of China. But most of them realize that this is almost certainly impossible in the foreseeable future, and many have accommodated to the current system, as do colonized peoples anywhere — they go to school, learn Chinese, migrate to Han areas to work and become local officials. Some even join the Communist Party and rise high in its ranks. But most continue to feel that their land is being held by an outside power.
藏族和维吾尔族很可能希望选择独立。但大多数人都明白，在可预见的将来，这几乎是完全没有可能的。和殖民地人民一样，很多人已经适应了当前的体制，他们上学，学习汉语，前往汉族地区工作，成为地方官员。有人甚至加入了中国共产党并身居高位。但是，大多数人仍然感到自己的土地被异己所占。
The Chinese authorities may or may not realize this, but they do not accept it. For them, all minorities are fully — and only — Chinese citizens, and therefore must be loyal to the government and grateful for its largesse.
不管中国政府是否意识到了这点，它都不会允许这种事情发生。对他们来说，所有少数民族都必须是、也只能是中国公民。他们必须忠于政府，并应对政府的帮助感到感激。
There will never be much gratitude unless China’s leaders grant these groups real regional autonomy, guarantee freedom of religion, curb Han Chinese migration and stop their insulting rhetoric about underdeveloped minorities in need of help. But they won’t. So the unrest and discontent — at times exploding into the violence of the past few days — are bound to continue.
中国领导人应该赋予这些民族真正的区域自治，保证宗教自由，限制汉族移民，并停止激情雄辩地指出欠发达的少数民族需要帮助，这对他们是一种侮辱。如果不这样做，少数民族就永远不会对他们有感激之情。但是政府不会这样做。因此，引发前几天暴力事件的不满和动乱必然会持续下去。
My Han Relatives’ View From Xinjiang
我身在新疆的汉族亲戚的看法
Yan Sun, a native of Sichuan, has lived in the United States since 1985 and been a professor of political science at the City University of New York since 1992. She has also written “A Sichuan Family and Tibet’s Future.”
四川人孙燕（音）1985年移居美国，1992年起任纽约城市大学政治学教授，著有《一个四川家庭与西藏的未来》一书。
After arriving at the home of my parents in Chongqing on July 7, I asked my mother how many relatives we still had in Xinjiang and how they were doing lately. Ten families of close relatives, she said, and several more distant ones. Some were born and raised in Xinjiang, but the majority migrated there in the 1960s and 1970s from the Sichuan countryside. The sole reason was to get out of the poor farmland and have a chance at becoming urban residents.
7月7号我到达重庆父母的家中，我问母亲，家里在新疆还有多少亲戚，他们近况如何。母亲说，比较近的亲戚有十家，还有几家远一些的亲戚。他们中有人生在新疆、长在新疆；但多数是在六七十年代从四川农村迁去的。当时迁居主要是为了离开贫困的农庄，并有机会做城里人。
They were introduced to Xinjiang by an aunt who was assigned there in the 1950s but had managed to bring her family back to Sichuan in the 1980s.
他们是被一个姑姑介绍到新疆的。那个姑姑在五十年代的时候被分派到新疆，八十年代又举家迁回了四川。
I scrambled to reach some of them by phone and talk to them candidly about the issues that are often cited in the Western media as responsible for growing ethnic divide and tensions between the Uighur and Han Chinese. Some of my cited reasons took them by surprise; others made them laugh. With their decades of life and work in an austere region, I have little reason to dispute them. As a social scientist, it is fascinating for me to learn about their perspective on the deeper roots of the recent riots. After all, they were supposed to be the very source and targets of local grievance.
我赶忙给这些亲戚打电话，并直言不讳地向他们讲述了西方媒体报道的导致维汉间民族问题恶化的种种事件。有些报道令他们颇感意外，有些则使他们失声大笑。他们在新疆朴素地生活和工作了几十年，因此我没有理由质疑他们。作为社会学者，我很希望了解他们眼中近期暴乱的真正根源。毕竟，他们才是这一地区各种问题的当事人。
Without any need to repeat government accounts to me, my relatives mostly see “outside forces” as the main reason for the latest as well as other riots in Xinjiang in recent years. Citing long-term good friendship with local Muslims, they are hard-pressed to think of divisions serious enough to cause deadly riots. Rather, they claim to have seen outside influences at work from their own experience, e.g., money for underground mosques where mullahs engage in inciting rhetoric, for “terrorist groups” that make explosives and bombs, or for restless Muslim youths who stage trouble on the streets. They also see a pattern of Uighur separatist forces imitating the tactics of Tibetan exiles, namely, phrasing issues in terms that appeal to Western sensibilities, such as religious freedom, cultural and linguistic preservation, ethnic equality or territorial autonomy.
亲戚们无须向我重复政府的官方解释，在他们自己眼里，“境外势力”才是造成本次以及近年来其他暴乱的主要原因。他们说自己与当地穆斯林有着多年的美好友谊，实在难以想象有什么矛盾能造成残害生命的动乱。他们说，根据切身经历，倒是境外势力在起作用：资助地下清真寺的毛拉进行煽动宣讲；为“恐怖组织”制造的炸药炸弹买单；教唆失足的穆斯林青年当街闹事等等。他们还说，维吾尔分裂分子还模仿流亡藏人使用的手段，将事件描述成西方国家最感冒的宗教自由问题，文化和语言保护问题，民族平等问题或领土自治问题。
But aren’t there problems in these areas? My relatives were unanimous in their view that state policies are already tilted in favor of local ethnics. Freedom of religion? My relatives see the state restrictions are justifiable: no mosques for those under 18 because they are not mature enough to have good judgment, and no mosque attendance for those holding government jobs. The state does send an (Uighur) official as a liaison with the mosques on a weekly basis, but again this is seen as justifiable since the state funds helped with their construction and to pay the mullahs’ salaries. Why not let them fund on their own? The answer is that outside religious forces would otherwise fund them. Having read about how foreign-financed madrassahs spring up and spread in western Pakistan, I am hard-pressed to pass judgment here.
难道这些地区就不存在问题吗？亲戚们一致认为，国家政策已经对少数民族有了特殊的照顾。宗教自由呢？亲戚们认为，国家禁止未成年人进入清真寺的规定是正当的，因为他们的心智还不够成熟，而禁止政府人员入寺朝拜也是正当的。政府资助建设清真寺并负担毛拉的工资，因此有理由每周派一名维族官员与清真寺进行联络。为什么不让穆斯林自己建清真寺呢？因为否则境外宗教势力便会资助他们。我读过文章，知道国外势力在巴基斯坦西部资助建立的穆斯林学校是怎样出现和发展的，因此我很难在这里做出判断。
How about the imposition of Chinese language instruction in schools? This was news to my relatives. They grew up attending separate schools from their Uighur peers, where different languages were used in instruction. Some Uighurs chose to attend Han Chinese schools for career benefits. Only since 2005 has bilingual education been introduced in public schools in Xinjiang. Most technical colleges use Chinese in instruction, because of available resources, while colleges for ethnic nationalities instruct in minority languages. Rather than seeing bilingual education as forced assimilation, my relatives see it as a good skill to have in the job market, because many modern-sector jobs will involve interaction with Han Chinese in and out of Xinjiang. For their part, my Xinjiang cousins speak enough Uighur to communicate with Uighurs on a daily basis, and tell me that they live more like Uighurs than Han Chinese, enjoying mutton more than pork.
那么在学校强制教授汉语呢？这对我的亲戚们来说可是一条新闻。他们从小就和维吾尔族在不同的学校上学，授课的语言也是不同的。有些维吾尔族人为未来事业着想，选择去汉族学校上学。直到2005年，新疆的公办学校才开始使用双语授课。由于资源有限，多数专科学校使用汉语授课，但少数民族院校使用少数民族语言授课。亲戚们认为双语教学不是强制的民族同化过程，而是为适应劳动力市场的需求而提供的。因为新疆内外很多现代型的工作都需要同汉族人打交道。我在新疆的表兄弟会说维吾尔语，能够同维吾尔族进行日常交流。他们告诉我，他们的生活方式更像维人而不是汉人。与猪肉相比，他们更喜欢吃羊肉。
What about widened income gaps between Han Chinese and Uighur Muslims in the market economy? My relatives cite different attitudes toward education, achievement and life. This is where some “racist” assessments may be found, if they may be so-called: nomadic traditions do not value sending kids to schools, but rather roaming around or bathing in the sun; nor do they prioritize professional and material pursuits like the Han Chinese, or hard work or long-term planning for this world, but rather satisfaction in the spiritual world, etc. These are the contrasts I have learned in Western social sciences — conflicts between pre-modern and modern values, religious and secular cultures, or an achievement and non-achievement ethic. So it is hard for me to pass judgment here as well except to urge Han Chinese to loosen up and enjoy life a little as our ethnic brothers do.
在市场经济条件下，汉族人和维吾尔族穆斯林收入差距越来越大的问题呢？亲戚们说，这是因为不同民族对教育、成就和人生的态度有所不同。这一观点或许有些所谓的“种族歧视”的味道：根据游牧民族的传统，享受阳光、去各地漫游比送孩子上学更重要；他们对职业和物质的追求也不像汉族人看得那么重；与在现世中努力工作、做长期打算相比，他们更重视精神世界的满足。我在学习西方社会科学时了解过这种反差，这是传统价值观与现代价值观的区别，宗教文化与非宗教文化的区别，无欲无求与成功至上的道德标准的区别。因此，我很难作出什么评判，只能说，希望汉族人能够多向少数民族学习，轻松享受生活。
What about the squeezing of Uighurs in their own native land by growing Han presence? Is that occupation or colonialism? These lines usually shocked my relatives. One aunt, a college professor who spent three decades in Khotan of southern Xinjiang, gave me a history lesson about how Xinjiang came under Chinese control in the Han Dynasty in the 200s B.C. and remained so on and off till the Manchu Dynasty finally consolidated Chinese rule in the 1770s. Xinjiang was loose whenever China was weak internally and its rulers were preoccupied elsewhere.
越来越多的汉族人在新疆生活，这不是会压缩维族人在自己家园上的生活空间吗？这是占领或殖民主义吗？这样的问题经常让亲戚们感到震惊。我一个姑姑在和田当了三十多年的大学教授，她给我上了一堂历史课。早在公元前二百年汉朝的时候，新疆就成为了中国的领土，之后的年代里情况时有变化。终于在18世纪70年代，满清帝国彻底巩固了对新疆的统治。也就是说，只有在中国国力孱弱、统治者无暇西顾的时候，对新疆的统治才会有所松懈。之后的统治者总会再次夺回新疆，恢复对疆主权。
But successive rulers always reasserted control and sovereignty. Another aunt who had lived in a Tibetan region called the Chinese nation a melting pot of different ethnic groups over millenniums. Citing our own ancestors who had migrated to Sichuan generations back, my mother recalls her grandmother as one with white skin and yellow hair, possible of Turkic origin herself from western China.
另一位生活在藏族区的姑姑把中国称为一个有几千年历史的各个民族的大熔炉。母亲跟我说，我们家族的祖先也是从外地来到四川的。母亲的祖母长着白皮肤、蓝眼睛，很可能是中国西部土耳其人的后代。
Are there government policies on minority regions responsible for increasing ethnic tensions? Surprisingly (or not so surprisingly for someone familiar with America’s ethnic politics), some of my relatives fault the government’s preferential policies for helping to enhance ethnic identity and entitlement for minorities. Uighurs with disciplinary problems or criminal offenses are treated leniently, they say. In matters of employment, appointment and promotion in the public sector, Uighurs may be preferred over (perceived) more qualified Han candidates. “Reverse discrimination” in college admissions and population policies are other areas of Han complaints. While Han Chinese can have only one child, Uighurs receive honorary and monetary rewards for stopping at three, along with yearly bonuses. Whether legitimate or not, such complaints make it difficult for Han Chinese to appreciate Uighur grievances.
国家政策是否加剧了少数民族地区的民族矛盾？令人惊讶的是（如果你了解美国的民族政策，可能也不会感到惊讶），一些亲戚对政府为保护少数民族而制定的民族优惠政策感到不满。他们说，政府对违法犯罪的维吾尔族人进行宽大处理。在国有部门，（人们感到）维吾尔族人享有就业、任职和升迁的优先权。汉族人还对大学录取的“反向歧视”和人口政策感到不满。汉族家庭只准生一个孩子，维吾尔家庭生三个以内就会颁发荣誉证书并给予金钱奖励，之后年年都有奖金。且不提这些抱怨合理与否，汉族人实在无法理解，维吾尔族人还有什么好不满意的？
Do they think the World Uighur Congress and its exiled leader, Rebiya Radeer, were behind the recent riots? My older relatives from Xinjiang recalled Soviet instigations of Uighur separatism in the 30s and during the cold war, so they said they would not be surprised by any outside support for the W.U.C. or Radeer. Younger relatives point to the U.S. — not the U.S. per se but to the exploitation of U.S. apprehension over anything Beijing does and of U.S. sympathies for any group that Beijing opposes. The real point of staging riots inside China, they assert, is that they enable the exiled groups to survive and thrive. So they expect such riots for years to come.
在他们看来，世维会及其流亡领袖热比娅·卡德尔是最近这张暴乱的幕后主使吗？生活在新疆的长辈说，苏联在三十年代和冷战时期煽动维吾尔族进行分裂活动，所以如果世维会和热比娅有境外支持，他们一点也不感到惊讶。年轻些的亲戚则将矛头指向了美国的做事方式。不管北京做什么，美国都会进行曲解宣传；不管北京反对哪个组织，美国都会对其表示同情。美国为流亡组织的存在和兴盛提供了土壤，这才是产生动乱的关键。亲戚们说，好多年前他们就知道，这样的暴乱一定会出现。
Terrorists Fan the Flames
恐怖主义煽风点火
Rohan Gunaratnais a professor and head of the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His books include “Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror.”
罗汉·古纳拉特纳教授是新加坡南洋理工大学大学政治暴力和恐怖主义研究国际中心主任，著有《深入基地组织：全球恐怖主义网络》等著作。
Despite efforts by Beijing to restore piece, the simmering tension and sporadic violence between Muslim Uighurs and Han Chinese in Urumqi, the worst in China since 1949, is likely to remain a continuing source of instability and to spread beyond Xinjiang province.
乌鲁木齐发生了中国自1949年以来最大的维汉暴力冲突事件，尽管北京尽力收拾残局，但一触即发的民族矛盾与偶尔出现的暴力事件很可能导致不稳定的未来局势，甚至扩散到新疆以外的其他省份。
The Chinese hard-line approach towards Uighur separatists fails to differentiate among terrorists, supporters and sympathizers. Instead of investing in community engagement initiatives, the Chinese government has detained several thousands of protesters.
中国对维吾尔分裂分子采取强硬态度，却没能对恐怖主义分子，支持分裂者和同情分裂者进行区别对待。政府没有把精力放在发展社区参与行动上，而是拘留了数千抗议者。
The propaganda by the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), an Uighur separatist group associated with Al Qaeda, is driving the hatred and fueling the violence. The ETIM leadership, located in Waziristan on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, was responsible for a series of bombing both in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China in the lead-up to the Beijing Olympics.
东突厥斯坦伊斯兰运动（ETIM）是一个维吾尔分裂组织，与基地组织有着密切的联系。此组织宣传煽动民族仇恨，并挑起民族暴力事件。东突总部位于阿富汗和巴基斯坦边界的瓦齐里斯坦地区。北京奥运会前，它策划了新疆和中国其他地区的一系列爆炸案。
Having received training, weapons, finance and ideology from Al Qaeda, ETIM members today fight both in tribal Pakistan and in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda-trained ETIM suicide bombers present a growing threat both to coalition forces in Afghanistan and to China. Al Qaeda ideologues have argued that after the defeat of the existing superpower, the U.S. forces, the next enemy of the Muslims will be the multiheaded dragon, a reference to China, the emerging superpower.
东突成员接受基地组织的培训、武器和资金供给以及意识形态的灌输，参加巴基斯坦部落和阿富汗的战斗。基地组织训练的东突人体炸弹对阿富汗联军和中国构成越来越大的威胁。基地组织的追随者们说，打败目前的超级大国美国之后，穆斯林的下一个敌人将是一条多头巨龙，即未来的超级大国中国。
In addition to ETIM, a dozen Uighur separatist groups in the U.S., Canada and Europe are radicalizing the Uighur communities in China. Some of these groups have pushed for the release of the Uighur detainees held in Guantanamo Bay.
除东突外，美国、加拿大和欧洲也有十几个挑唆中国维吾尔族群众从事分裂活动的维吾尔分裂主义组织。一些组织要求关塔那摩监狱释放被关押的维吾尔族人。 |
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狗仔卡
发表于 2009-7-9 03:36
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Stevan Harrell, an anthropologist at the University of Washington, has collaborated with minority scholars from China for more than 20 years. He is author of “Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China.” 
发表于 2009-7-9 22:38
