【中文标题】胡的来访：探索中美关系的方向（上）
【原文标题】Hu's Visit: Finding a Way Forward on U.S.-China Relations
【登载媒体】时代周刊
【原文作者】Joshua Cooper Ramo
【原文链接】http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1978640,00.html
【原文库链接】http://bbs.m4.cn/thread-238147-1-1.html
去年秋天的一个下午，北京的天气异常闷热。市中心地区聚集着众多的指挥人员、士兵和共产党官员，他们在为庆祝中华人民共和国成立60周年的纪念活动做最后的准备。庆祝仪式将在全国范围转播，预计观众人数超过10亿，也只有中国能完成这样的壮举。党计划的游行方案包括喷气式战斗机的飞越、导弹车延长安街行进，以及每隔10年举行一次的仪式——最高领导人穿着毛式服装，站在50年代豪华轿车的天窗里，行驶过紫禁城。这个场景对西方人来说带有唐吉诃德式的滑稽，就好像美国总统每隔10年就带着三角帽穿过特拉华河，来纪念1776年的冬季。但是中国人认为这样的形式是必不可少的。在改革形势扑朔迷离之际，他们为自己划定了一条自信的路线：回顾过去走过的道路；展望未来前进的方向。
负责策划庆祝仪式的党内官员们，给焰火表演的设计人员提出了一个特殊要求。他们在担心，中国和其它很多国家一样，健康的爱国主义与偏激的民族主义之间的界限很模糊，只有在这个界限被超过的时候才会发现。他们担心一白天的军事活动喧嚣，再加上一个晚上的焰火刺激，会不会有些过火。因此他们要求，是否有可能设计一个庞大、美丽、平静的焰火表演。
“平静的焰火表演”，这种类型的要求反映出生活在中国的大部分魅力和危险。在这个国家中有很多矛盾，无论是其破记录的社会主义市场性经济增长模式，还是矢志向巨型绿色城市转化的愿望（这似乎是在说一个有益健康的汉堡包），都有所体现。这个国家的党内精英在改革年代里奋发图强，但是现在，他们对执政的共产党的抱怨声音比谁都高。两极分化、野心勃勃、不可思议，但又挣扎在历史与未来的分界线上——这就是今天的中国，一个期望颠覆性变化，但又不想发生任何颠覆性事件的国家。
过去几个月以来，北京和华盛顿之间的紧张关系得到了一些缓和。这件事提醒我们，中国另外一个变态的野心需要特别关注，那就是在确保现有国际秩序不崩溃的前提下，成长为一个国际超级势力。这似乎是不可能的，历史上几乎没有一个国家可以完成这个壮举。那么在当今社会，在一个危机和意外并存，从金融市场到国家安全都有可能引发大动荡的年代做这样的尝试？很难设想这样的冒险有多大的成功几率。
所以，我们必须提一个问题：当奥巴马总统和中国的胡锦涛主席在即将开始的核安全峰会中坐在一起时，他究竟在寻找什么？一个朋友还是一个敌人？现实是中国变化得太快，我们无从了解。奥巴马所真正寻找的东西要比这重要得多——这是一个机会，可以使用充满活力的、创造性的治国之道来重新定义双方的关系，并且借此确定未来50年的世界权力走向。如果没有一个连贯性的中国策略，国际政治家的那些问题根本无法得到解决。所以有意思的一件事是，胡头脑中的念头并不重要，重要的是奥巴马头脑中在想什么。他清楚地了解对手吗？如何才能缓解双方的紧张关系？他是否知道，有关势力的条条框框或许会和中国达成真正的友谊关系，但也可能导致灾难性的僵局？
最重要的一件事是，奥巴马必须摒弃那些过时的对付中国的方法。北京不会像很多冷战分子所一厢情愿地认为的那样被“压制”，它已经与国际社会形成了密不可分的交织状态。但是幻想中国变得强大之后，会更加支持美国人的利益，也同样是行不通的。美国需要的是一个新的战略，它的出发点必须建立在绝对捍卫美国人利益的基础上。因为如果失去这个基础，它就不是一个可持续的战略。它必须反映出北京的实力和共产党领导人思想之间的真正平衡点，还必须能够加固我们与盟友之间的关系。这不仅可以削弱中国逐个挑拨我们之间关系的意图，还因为中国的主要力量都集中在欧洲，而不是在美国。这个时机，以及当下所面临的问题，都需要一个有魄力、充满自信的解决方法。但是美国有可能会遇到一个困境：如果中国需要改变，那么鉴于全球气候的变化，美国也需要改变。
当奥巴马与胡坐在一起时，他会面临一个选择：是用老方法来审视这个世界，还是用新态度来考量这个新生势力。再也没有其它任何时机要比中美关系更值得让思维模式发生这种转变了。我们可以这样认为：是选择互不伤害的停滞不前，还是选择相对激进的共同发展；是选择一个僵持的结局，还是选择一个相互确保繁荣稳定的承诺，它可以让我们与中国的未来关系清晰、明确，就像我们曾经与苏联达成的相互消灭的承诺一样明确。
清楚地认识中国
如果像奥巴马的顾问团所认为的那样中美之间近期的紧张关系会自然而然地解除，这的确可以宽慰人心。但是看看近期发生的事情——哥本哈根环境峰会上的争吵、西藏问题上的愤怒言论、伊朗问题上的意见分歧、美国公司在中国的灭顶之灾，以及中国的盈利本性所引发的不愉快，一个严肃的历史学者不会认为它们可以自然而然地解除。随着中国不断壮大，它会不断地试图颠覆现存的国际秩序和行事方式，北京所爆发出的火花也不会停止。中国的网络入侵、贸易游戏、不对等的军备实验——所有这些都将成为我们未来的现实。它们不会因为在这个星期对我们表示友好就停止这些行为，也不会像有些人一厢情愿地保证的那样，通过我们的行动而使其有所收敛。我们必须接受一个事实，即与中国之间的紧张关系是不可避免的，试图缓解这种紧张关系的任何举措都是无效的。应当承认，与中国共同发展这项策略在短期内是一个痛苦的决定，但是不管你是否愿意接受，中国已经具备了我们这个时代的决定性实力，现在美国该用一种崭新的方式来重新思考全球战略系统了。中美友好这个概念听起来似乎和“平静的焰火表演”一样不可能，但是我们今天所做的决定，就像奥巴马和他的团队在华盛顿与中国人会面时所采取的方式，也不会让其成为可能。
如果我们不把这些问题搞清楚，就无法在中国关系问题上取得太多进展。看到中国改革的进展，并且一厢情愿地认为邓小平的著名观点“致富光荣”等同于“致富就是帮助美国”曾经是多么诱人的一件事啊。不仅仅在北京的财务报表上，其它很多方面都有过类似的观点：坦率地说，致富就是把钱借给感恩戴德的美国人。但现在的情况是，北京内部已经开始了激烈的争论：中国应当遵循那种发展模式？怎样做才能体现国家利益？我们可以相信美国吗？这些争论是令人震惊的，也是一个面对如此巨大问题的国家所无法避免的。你也许想不到，一个在2009年经济增长9％的国家会发生这样的争论。争论中肯定有人傲慢地拍胸脯，但是也一定混杂着很多翻着眼皮的质疑。中国此刻面临着诸多的挑战：金融市场、腐败、军民关系、西藏、新疆等等，和它坐在一起等于是提醒奢侈的美国人也要关注类似医疗健康法案这类问题。
北京绝大部分人都认为美国并不强大。中国的知识分子经常把911和所谓的914——雷曼兄弟宣告破产的日期——相提并论，认为这都是西方开始衰败的标志性事件。美国人对中国同样有一种模糊的认识，我们的领导人所经常表现出对所谓“真实中国”的初等了解更是加强了这一印象，在中国权力中心内部工作过的人都熟悉那种粗糙、野蛮的办事风格。这就是中国，一个没有法律制度，却在30年里以每年10％的速度增长的国家。这绝不是西方人设想的那种礼貌、和谐的中土帝国。“真实中国”可以地锉掉西方人的锐气，像西方公司屡见不鲜的商业恶梦那样轻松地在政治谈判领域击败我们。这就是为什么我们对北京的外交政策屡屡受挫的部分原因，就好像爱丽丝在仙境里被丢进一个溜冰赛场。
然而中国的领导人并不是一心想和美国开战，他们现在还是希望保持良好的关系，以便争取时间来面对国内发展的挑战。你可以在中国副主席习近平——领跑2012年主席职位角逐者——去年访问墨西哥时坦率的讲话中确认这一点。他说：“有一些外国人似乎是吃饱了没事干，坐在那里指指点点。首先，中国没有制造动荡和不安；其次，也没有输出饥饿和贫穷；第三我们没有给你添麻烦。你还有什么可说的？”他的潜台词就是：走开吧。
但这只是我们希望听到的回答。中国或许没有输出饥饿和动乱，但是制造麻烦？没有人比中国的举动更能撼动旧的权力秩序的稳定性。过去30年来，美国总统在办公室里抨击中国要比表扬中国的时候多得多。双方之间的话题在一开始全都是如何制约苏联，后来变成经济的相互依存性。但是现在世界上的势力分化得比较复杂，中国民族主义的复兴、美国经济危机、中国经济模式的变化——所有这些都危及到了常规利益团体。
即使双方领导人有互相示好的意向，他们也会遭到外交政策和国内民众支持的严峻考验。对很多美国人来说，中国所宣称的永不伤害美国人的利益这一信条早已不复存在。很多人亲眼看到中国每天都在伤害着美国人：它的唯利主义为美国经济带来危及；它对外国公司采取的对抗态度损害了美国投资的价值；它缺少对核扩散条例绝对支持的态度在考验着华盛顿的耐心。
公平地讲，很多中国人也同样念念不忘美国伤害中国利益的事实：用军事基地包围中国、压迫人民币升值、向台湾出售军火以干涉内政、承认达赖喇嘛。很多中国人已经开始改变他们对这个孱弱、漫无目标的美国的看法。中国人愿意亲近奥巴马，但是即使是奥巴马最值得称道的举措，比如最近美国有意使用核武器，也被他们看作是懦弱的表现。（中国领导人绝不会收回将无限制使用核武器进行防卫的观点。）毛的老论调在中国已经变成了一种比喻：还是和共和党人打交道比较好。
原文：
One afternoon last fall, on an unusually humid day in Beijing, the center of the city was buzzing as teams of designers, soldiers and Communist Party officials finalized preparations for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. The event would be broadcast nationwide to one of those billion-person audiences only China can deliver. The party had planned a parade with fighter-jet flyovers, missiles that would roll along Eternal Peace Street and the once-a-decade ritual in which the top leader dons a Mao suit, stands in the open sunroof of a 1950s-style limousine and is driven past the Forbidden City — a moment that can seem quixotic to Westerners, as if the American President crossed the Delaware River wearing a tricorn hat every 10th anniversary of the winter of 1776. But the Chinese know that such symbols matter. Amid the uncertainty of reform, they sketch a confident line: Look where we came from. Look where we are going.
Party officials working on one element of the program, the nighttime fireworks display, had a particular request of the designers. China, they worried, is like many other nations — a place where the line between healthy patriotism and nationalism isn't apparent until you've stepped over it. They fretted that after a day of military adrenaline, a night of explosive percussion might be too much. So they asked, Would it be possible to arrange for a big, beautiful, calming fireworks display?
Calming fireworks. It was the sort of request that tells a great deal about the charm and dangers of life in China. This is a country that runs on contradictions, whether it is the market socialism that now produces record economic growth or the plans for giant green cities, an idea that seems as likely as healthy cheeseburgers. This is a nation where party élites who have done well during the era of reform now complain ever more loudly about the ruling Communist Party. Split, ambitious, miraculous at times, but stretched on that line between past and future — this is China today, hoping for more explosive change without, well, an explosion.
As the past few months of unnerving tension between Beijing and Washington have reminded us, all this matters a great deal because of another of those mind-twisting ambitions China has: to rise to a position of great power without causing the international system to crumble. This seems unlikely. Few nations in history have managed such a feat. And to try it now, in our age of risk and surprise, where everything from financial markets to national security seems packed with the potential for detonation? It's hard to imagine such an adventure has much chance of success.
So it is worth asking: Who, exactly, will President Barack Obama be looking at in Washington as he sits down with China's President Hu Jintao during the coming nuclear-security summit? A friend? An enemy? The fact is that China is changing so fast, we don't really know yet. What Obama will really be looking at is something far more important: the chance to use dynamic, creative statesmanship to remake a relationship that will define the next 50 years of global power. No problem of international politics can be solved without a coherent China strategy. So the more interesting question is not what is in Hu's mind but what is in Obama's. Does Obama have a clear sense of the man he is dealing with and how to shape the tense landscape of our relations? Does he understand the rules of power that might make real friendship with China possible — or lead to catastrophic deadlock?
More than anything, Obama needs to replace our outdated ideas for dealing with China. Beijing can't, as many cold-warrior views of it might wish, be "contained"; it's far too interwoven into the global system for that. But it is also true that the fantasy some had of "engagement" — the hope that as China became richer, it would become more supportive of American interests — isn't working out either. What the U.S. needs is a new strategy. It should be one that takes a ruthless defense of American interests as a starting point, since without that, no strategy is sustainable. It must reflect a real understanding of the levers of power in Beijing and the psychology of the Communist Party leadership. And it has to unite us with our allies, both as a way of blunting China's instinct to play us off one another and because much of China's beef is with the West, not just with the U.S. This is a moment and a problem that demand an ambitious and confident solution. But they also demand something that may be harder for the U.S.: while China needs to change, so, in the face of a changing world, does America.
What Obama will face as he sits with Hu is a choice between old ways of looking at the world and a new way of thinking about power. Nowhere will this emerging dynamic be clearer than in the links between the U.S. and China, the other great power of the age. We can think of what we face as a choice between polite stasis and co-evolution, between stalemate and a commitment to a mutually assured stability that can mark our future with China as clearly as mutually assured destruction once marked our ties to the Soviet Union.
Seeing China Clearly
It would be comforting to think, as some of Obama's advisers do, that the tensions between China and the U.S. in recent months — the falling-out at the Copenhagen climate-change summit, angry words over Tibet, disagreement about the right way to handle Iran, the woes of U.S. companies in China and a rumbling unhappiness over China's mercantilism — can be passed over as normal strains. But no serious student of history would believe this. As China grows, as it scrapes against international norms and habits of a different era, the sparks won't stop coming from Beijing. Chinese cyberattacks, trade games, asymmetric-war experiments — all these are part of our future. They won't stop just because the Chinese are being friendlier this week. Nor will the fact that our actions, even ones intended to reassure China, will often unnerve it. We have to accept that tension with China is unavoidable and that removing tension is not a strategy. To be sure, a vision that aims for a concept of co-evolution with China will be harder in the short run. But it accepts that China is, like it or not, a defining power of our time and that the day has come for the U.S. to think in fresh ways about our global system. U.S.-China friendship sounds as impossible at the moment as calming fireworks. But decisions we make now, the way Obama and his team handle China as early as when they meet in Washington, may yet make it possible.
It will be very difficult to make much progress with China if we don't see it more clearly. It has been tempting to look at China's process of reform and think that Deng Xiaoping's famous line "To get rich is glorious" might also mean "To get rich means to help America." This has happened in some areas, not least on Beijing's balance sheet, where to get rich has meant, frankly, to lend to an indebted U.S. But what is playing out with China is an expression of a debate that has been gathering force in Beijing: What sort of model should China follow? How should it construe its national interest? Can it trust the U.S.? This debate is electric, and it is inevitable in a nation facing such huge problems. The mood in Beijing isn't what you might expect from a nation that grew at some 9% in 2009. There is some arrogant chest slapping, to be sure, but it is mixed with plenty of exhausted eye rubbing. To sit with China's leaders as they ponder the enormous challenges facing them in financial markets, corruption, civilian-military relations, Tibet, Xinjiang and a dozen other areas is a reminder of the luxury Americans have to consider one problem like health care for a year.
To many in Beijing, the U.S. looks weak. Chinese intellectuals often pair 9/11 with what they call 9/14 — the day news broke of Lehman Brothers' 2008 collapse — as mileposts of Western decline. There is a sense of American haziness that is reinforced by the fact that our leaders have often shown only a rudimentary understanding of what we might call Real China — the harsh, smashmouth China familiar to anyone who works in its streets and corridors of power. This is the China that has grown for 30 years at an average rate of some 10% a year with no rule of law. It is a very different place from the polite, harmony-seeking Middle Kingdom many Westerners expect. Real China can baffle Westerners and confound them as easily in political negotiations as in the sort of commercial nightmares that are only too commonplace. This is part of the reason our diplomacy toward Beijing often falters, as if Alice in Wonderland were dropped into a Roller Derby match.
Yet China's leaders aren't really spoiling for a fight with the U.S. They want good relations for now and generally feel that what China needs is time to face the challenges of development. You could spot this in the candid remarks made by Vice President Xi Jinping — front runner to become President in 2012 — during a trip to Mexico last year. "It seems there are some foreigners who've stuffed their bellies and don't have anything else to do but point fingers," he said. "First, China does not export revolution. Second, we're not exporting hunger or poverty. And third, we aren't making trouble for you. What else is there to say?" So leave us alone, he might have added.
But this is wishful thinking. China may not be exporting hunger or revolution. But making trouble? Nothing as big as China moves without pressing up against old ideas of power and stability. For most of the past 30 years, U.S. Presidents arrived in office bashing China and left praising it. Ties between the countries were cemented by a desire to balance the Soviet Union and, later, economic co-dependence. But these underlying forces have now been complicated. The growth of nationalism in China, American economic nervousness, China's changing economic model — all conspire against common interest.
Even if leaders on both sides want good ties, they may succumb to the acid test of any foreign policy: domestic support. To many in the U.S., Beijing's old line that China has never hurt the interests of the U.S. in the period since reform began no longer holds true. In the eyes of many, China is hurting America's interests every day: its mercantilism creates a sense of danger in the American economy, its antagonism to foreign firms damages U.S. investment, its lack of unqualified help on nuclear proliferation tests Washington's patience.
To be fair, many Chinese feel the U.S. is mindfully hurting China's interests too: surrounding it with military bases, pressing for currency change, meddling in its internal affairs by selling arms to Taiwan and acknowledging the Dalai Lama. Even Western-oriented Chinese now aver that the U.S. wants to slow the country's rise. And many Chinese worry about what they see as the aimlessness of a weakened U.S. The Chinese want to like Obama, but they regard even his most prized initiatives, like the new U.S. posture on the use of nuclear arms, as a sign of weakness. (No Chinese leader would dial back the country's option for unlimited nuclear response in self-defense.) Mao's old line has become a trope in China: It's better to deal with Republicans.
--------------------------
相关链接：：【10.04.08 时代周刊】胡的来访：探索中美关系的方向（下）
|
狗仔卡
楼主
提升卡
变色卡
抢沙发
千斤顶
显身卡
发表于 2010-4-14 18:07
