本帖最后由 下个月 于 2010-4-16 19:01 编辑
【中文标题】胡的来访：探索中美关系的方向（下）
【原文标题】Hu's Visit: Finding a Way Forward on U.S.-China Relations
【登载媒体】时代周刊
【原文作者】Joshua Cooper Ramo
【原文链接】http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1978640,00.html
【原文库链接】http://bbs.m4.cn/thread-238147-1-1.html
但是我们与中国之间的问题不仅仅是相互的误解。毛曾经说，所有的问题都可以分为“主要矛盾”和“次要矛盾”。我们的主要矛盾就是，中国经常感到自己游离在西方世界的权力中心之外。数个世纪以来，受本土战略文化的影响和马克思主义的戕害，中国人的思维已经定式。要求中国成为一个负责任的风险共担者之所以无法成功，最主要的原因就是它对于目前自己陷在其中的国际秩序怀有矛盾的心情。即使我们可以解决目前所面对的所有的困惑事项——贸易、汇率、西藏、台湾，但是主要矛盾依然存在。所以，只有可以在策略层面起作用的解决之道才有长治久安的希望。
在考虑中国问题时，我们经常犯的一个错误是去问：西方怎样才能容下一个不断强大的中国？这好像是在说，我们怎样才能把一个大个子塞进已经满员的汽车后座？无论怎样回答，这个问题都会散播不愉快的情绪。但是在北京那些人看来，这辆车本来就跑得狼狈不堪，重新安排一下乘客难道不会更好吗？中国所提出的那些有关国际秩序的问题，其实我们自己也应当发问。这并不是说我们要屈服于中国那些不合理的要求，而是说我们应当承认，真正的挑战不是要腾出更多的空间给中国，而是用一种崭新的方式来思考国际秩序。
被时代
中国对西方世界秩序怀有矛盾的心理这件事情并不奇怪，毕竟中国与其交往的开始充满了血腥和暴力。170年前的鸦片战争在中国人看来是世纪的奇耻大辱，9个国家的军队在自己的国土上为所欲为。美国人总是在问中国人，你们为什么那么看重领土的完整性？中国人会说，当你们被9个国家入侵之后再回来问这个问题吧。
所以，大部分中国人依旧对国家内部和外部的弱点所在保持警惕就毫不奇怪了。中国媒体也表示出同样的担忧，他们曾指出2009年是“被”的一年。政府控制的新华社这样解释这个词语：“中国人用这个词来表达一种比被动语态更强烈的情绪，他们试图表达一种无助的、无法决定个人命运的情感。”这个词的流行范围有着明确的界限，它最先出现在一个中国人的博客中，所描述的是一个刑事案件。一名犯罪嫌疑人被发现在一个似乎不可能的状态下自杀，事实也许是警察或者其它犯人谋杀了他。警察说，这个人是“被自杀”的。后来出现了很多的变化版本，比如“被和谐”（对胡的“和谐社会”言论的尖锐讽刺）。“我的网站被和谐了”所表达的意思是说它被关闭了。
被如何如何，这句话触动了中国在国际舞台上脆弱的神经，它或许还可以用来诠释2009年在中国互联网上最热门的一个事件——一个年轻的女服务员刺死了一名试图强奸她的共产党官员。网民说，这里至少还有人敢反抗。中国似乎不时地会出于本能需要站起来，试图探索那些超越传统观念束缚的地带。“雪耻”这个中文单词是用来描述一种洗刷掉国家耻辱的愿望，确切的含义是用雪来掩盖污点而使其消失。但它也可以被翻译成“复仇”。这个单词的多重含义恰恰可以用来解释一个没人可以正确回答的问题：中国在国际舞台上寻找的是什么？被接受还是复仇？
你可以看到，中国的领导层在试图突破这些束缚。例如，胡所主导的外交政策已经脱离了传统的、小心翼翼的观念，比如“韬光养晦、有所作为”，而是向着所谓的四大优势迈进。胡说，中国在外交上必须贯彻政治影响力、经济竞争力、形象吸引力和道德支持力。用了这么多的字，胡的策略就是说，中国必须要调动所有可能的力量来确保其不再“被”做事。在哥本哈根的环境变化峰会上中国不会“被”做事，在汇率市场上中国也决定不再“被”做事。
中国与西方的冲突原因至少有部分是出于这种自我保护的心态，还有部分原因来自于一些激烈的争论，争论的焦点在于西方是真的愿意接纳中国还是没来得及做出应对。一个口碑良好的中国学者在近期的一篇文章中写道，即使是在政治局内部，有关胡是否应该在美国“严重伤害了中国人的尊严”的行为之后参加华盛顿核峰会，也曾经有过激烈的争论。西方应当了解，正是这种内部力量的激烈相互作用才成就了中国的成功，而不是因为我们做了什么或者没做什么。这种天性永远不会因为美国经济衰退和中国财富的增加而消失。如果美国是在等待中国足够富裕、足够发达之后可以轻易接受美国的全球秩序策略，那么它将会永远等待下去。
中国还有很多地方需要变得更加成熟。我们不能忘记，它在共产党统治之下的真正对外开放只有30年，这个国家国际事务的基本方针（类似于一个健壮的国家安全机构）还在组建过程中。中国无疑充满了雄心壮志，但是能让其大胆冒险的内部环境还不够安全。在未来10年里这些都会发生改变。中国将组建起全世界规模的国际事务机构，就像它曾经修建的那些体育馆和机场。但是这个组织会由那些真正了解西方性情的人，和那些认识到合作的价值所在的人来运作吗？有些坚持认为西方不希望中国成功的人或许会爬到领导层的位置，这个组织会交接到他们的手里吗？西方又会怎么样？主导我们方向的原则又是什么？
共同进化——前进的方向
1946年冬天，在美国驻莫斯科大使馆任职的George Kennan因流感而卧病在床。与疾病同时让他烦恼的还有来自华盛顿的电报，里面所提到的一些指示与他所在的国家情况格格不入。Kennan打起精神，回复了一份8000字的电报给Foggy Bottom。这份长篇电报最后成为了冷战的定义性文件。Kennan解释道，苏联对全世界虎视眈眈，在每个角落搜索危险的信号，它的策略就是通过扩张来确保自身的安全。他所提出的建议后来发展成著名的遏制政策，这个政策主导了未来50年所有政策的制定方向。
中国当然不是苏联，笼罩在亚洲上空的隔离和制裁措施也已经不复存在。如果说莫斯科在通过扩张来获得安全感，那么中国领导人则是走的另一条路。由于担心冲突和对自身弱点的顾虑，他们或许会去操纵并改变国际秩序。这种间接的、缓慢的行事方式既符合中国人的脾气禀性，也满足了这个国家对稳定性的看重。也就是说，中国会去试图改变对手周围的环境，不战而屈人之兵。在军事战略方面，这意味着中国会尽量利用外国的先进科技，而不是去与其竞争；会攻击电脑和卫星，而不是去进攻军舰和飞机。在经济方面，这意味着中国会利用自身的力量创造一个自己需要的国际秩序，而不是去试图主导现存的国际秩序。
乍看起来，这似乎是不祥的预兆。但其实这仅仅是与目前的状况不同，无所谓好还是不好。中国有可能与美国共同来修正国际秩序，所采取的方法利于美国的经济复苏，建立新的势力扩张准则，确保计算机网络安全。但它也有可能采取削弱美国及其盟友的方式，同样是在以上几个方面下工夫。接受这种不确定性对我们来说是个真正的考验，仅凭中国的所作所为，我们可以归纳出无数个不同的故事版本。例如，四川省的一个研究机构发表了一篇有关美国电网弱点的论文，这仅仅是学术上的好奇还是有其不可告人的目的？中国增持美国国债仅仅是面对全球经济状况的偶然行为，还是像中国一句古老的俗语“上屋抽梯”所表达的意思——让你的敌人爬到房顶，然后把梯子拿走？没有人知道。今天的一些机会、未来的走向，以及我们当下所采取的行动将会决定中国会与我们肩并肩还是面对面。
所以，用一种可以保护我们自身利益的方式与中国合作，其实不一定要采取冷战以来我们一直所奉行的直接对抗战略，当时美国是把中国当作一个极为危险的敌人。而是要采取一种所谓的“共同进化”的方式。这个生物学专用词汇描述的是一些物种如何相互合作更变得更加强大，现成的一个例子是蜂鸟和一种花之间的关系。科学家发现，它们双方的确是在共同进化，以满足相互间的需要，你可以想象一下蜂鸟的长喙和花的狭窄的花蕊颈。
与中国之间就其货币相对价值所展开的斗争其实恰好体现了这种动态的关系。人民币（含义是人民的钱）是中国的计划经济与世界市场经济接壤之处，就好像我们与苏联之间的紧张关系在政体碰撞问题上尤为尖锐一样，中国的人民币实际上就是新的柏林（译者注：指人民币像曾经的柏林墙一样成为资本主义和社会主义的分界线）。鉴于它所体现的深不可测的背景，双方必须都要采取小心翼翼的手法来处理。中国人认为，美元作为未来10年的唯一国际储蓄货币是不可思议的；而美国人认为，美元如果不是未来10年的唯一国际储蓄货币，那才是不可思议的。
这里有一个现成的例子来描述中国是如何既想保护自身利益，又想要避免冲突。中国汇率问题的根源绝不仅仅是人民币的实际价值，而是中国对待货币流动的宽容性有多大。中国有三个选择：它可以继续脱离全球体系，自我运作；它还可以逐渐与国际接轨；或者它可以说：我们是世界上最大的发展中国家，你们都想到这里来投资，好吧，那我们要有自己的规矩了。中国有可能在很多场合都摆出这种姿态。它想要制定符合自身需要的制度，无论是在汇率问题、核扩散问题、朝鲜问题，以及如何确保信息的自由流通有所收益等方面。在处理所有这些问题的时候，我们都必须要找到一个新的、不孤立中国的全球规则。而且，我们还必须确保真正的共同进化要让中国得到它想要的东西——稳定。
在此之后，中国那些威胁全球稳定的行为必须要遭到指责，我们以前所习惯的那种采取妥协方式让中国合作的策略已经不再起作用了。共同进化理论提供了一个新方法。首先必须承认，让中国在世界发展问题上拥有发言权是至关重要的，但交换条件是，必须绝对停止那些威胁全球发展的行为。可以这样对中国说：你现在已经加入了管理全球经济的俱乐部，但是你不可以再操纵汇率，以获取不公平的贸易优势。或者可以说：我们一起合作来缓和全球的紧张局势，我们会尊重你的利益需求，但是当我们在对抗那些破环稳定局势的势力时，你必须要站在我们这边。
共同进化策略能够凑效的部分原因在于，它让中国和美国一起思考制定新的国际秩序。这不是件容易的事，因为美国人习惯于颐指气使地支使其它国家做这做那。这需要高气势的外交策略。实际点说，奥巴马本周的待办事项中首先应该是退出我们现在用来对付中国的那个论坛——有时候我们称其为战略和经济对话，这有点像是在和中国每年召开一次家长会。这个缓慢、拖沓的对话所导致的问题与对话双方所希望解决的问题根本不合拍，而且压抑了解决问题的自发性。中美联合应付经济危机是一个很好的范本，双方的行动不约而同、群策群力、步伐一致。要想达成这样的效果，华盛顿必须有一个人可以处理谈话可能涉及的所有问题。奥巴马也应该想一想，谁能与中国对弈？
我们今天与中国的关系让我们有机会做出一些持久的、历史性的、关键的举措。但还是有一些更要紧的事情：与西方关系良好的中国人会指出，2012年的领导人可能并不热衷于和西方合作，其下面的组织中可能都是对美国持怀疑态度的年轻官员。而且，可以预见的前景是，我们需要在美国利益和做出改变间取得平衡，尤其是在世界局势不断变化的背景下。我们要记住，我们可能面临的最大风险不是与中国开战，而是无法在全球范围与其合作，尽管后者所造成的损失不啻于一场战争。中国，携其数千年历史所积累的忍耐，以及作为新兴力量所怀有的急迫心情，正在穷兵黩武地保护自己。
那么美国呢？奥巴马在面对胡的时候，会提出一些崭新的观点来捍卫美国人所关注的问题吗？我们希望如此。否则，美国应该很快就会发现，中国不是世界上唯一一个担心“被”做事的国家。
原文：
But our problem with China isn't simply that we misunderstand each other. Mao used to say any problem could be divided into a "main problem" and "subsidiary problems." Our main problem is that China often feels only limited attachment to the power system that has evolved in the Western world. It has often been victimized by this system and has never felt the ownership over it that Western nations do. And of course China has centuries of native strategic culture that, overlaid with the neuralgia of Marxism, shapes its thinking. Calls for China to be a responsible stakeholder have failed not least because China is ambivalent about the international system as it's currently construed. Even if we could solve the laundry list of perplexities we confront — trade, currency, Tibet, Taiwan — the main problem would linger. So only a solution that functions at the strategic level offers any hope of a durable arrangement.
A mistake we often make in thinking about China is to ask, How does the West accommodate a rising China? This is sort of like asking, How do we fit a big and growing guy into the back of an already full car? It's a question to which any answer suggests expanding discomfort. And in the eyes of many in Beijing, the car isn't running so well anyway. Might it not be better, Chinese wonder, to redesign it? Some of the questions China has started asking about the world system are ones we should be asking too. This isn't to say we should give in to China's sometimes unreasonable demands. But we should admit that our real challenge isn't making room for China. It's thinking about the global system in a new way.
The Passive-Voice Era
It's probably not a surprise that China is a bit ambivalent about the Western world order. Its association with it, after all, began violently: the shock of the Opium Wars 170 years ago, a collision that led to what the Chinese think of as a century of humiliation during which nine foreign nations tromped through the country. Americans often ask why Chinese care so much about sovereignty. To which Chinese say, Come back and ask after you've been invaded by nine countries.
Little wonder, then, to find most Chinese still very alive to sensations of weakness, whether inside or outside the country. This was surely the worry that the Chinese media fingered when they declared that the 2009 phrase of the year was beishidai, or "the passive-voice era." The phrase, state-run Xinhua news later explained, "is being employed by Chinese to express a sentiment deeper than just the passive voice: they are using it to convey a sense of helplessness in deciding one's own fate." There's a sharp edge to this phrase's popularity, since it was first used on Chinese blogs to describe court cases in which suspects were found to have committed suicide under unlikely conditions, probably killed by police or other inmates. Such a suspect was, police said, "suicided." And there are now many variations on the phrase, like bei hexie, which means "to be harmonized" (a critical take on Hu's vision of a harmonious society): "My website was harmonized" is a way of saying it was shut down.
Being done to. The phrase touches painfully on China's sense of worry on the global stage. And perhaps it also explains one of the most popular Internet stories of 2009 in China, about a young waitress who knifed a party official who tried to force himself on her. Here, Web surfers noted, was someone at least doing something back. China seems at times to have an instinctive need to stand up for itself that stretches beyond what cold reason might suggest. The term Chinese use to describe the desire to wash away a sense of national humiliation is xuechi, which suggests blotting out a stain as if you were covering it with falling snow. But it can also be translated as "avenge." It's an ambiguity that captures a question that no one really knows the answer to: What is China looking for, acceptance or revenge?
You can see the leadership trying to thread the passage between these extremes. Hu, for instance, has pivoted the nation's foreign policy away from older, slower-moving ideas like "Bide our time, get something done" and toward what are called the four strengths. China, Hu says, must deploy political influence, economic competitiveness, an attractive image and moral force in diplomacy. In so many words, Hu's strategy suggests, China must use what strength it can to make sure it isn't being done to again. It wouldn't let itself be done to at the climate-change summit in Copenhagen — and it's determined that it won't be done to in currency markets.
At least some of China's temptation to engage in conflict with the West comes from this sense of self-protection, from an intense debate about whether the West is really trying to welcome China or to do something to it yet again. One well-connected Chinese scholar wrote recently that even at the level of the Politburo, there had been intense fights about Hu's attending the Washington nuclear summit after what was seen as the U.S.'s "ruthless undermining of Chinese dignity." The West needs to remember that this excitability among internal forces emerges as a result of China's success and not always because of what we do or don't do. It's an instinct that won't disappear in the face of U.S. concessions or growing Chinese wealth. If the U.S. keeps waiting for China to get rich enough or developed enough to buy easily into the American model of the world, then it will wait forever.
A great deal of maturation still awaits China. We can't forget that it has only been really open to the world for 30 years under Communist rule. The country's basic tools of international affairs — like a robust national-security apparatus — are still under construction. And they have not yet been tested by crisis. China is ambitious, to be sure, but it is too insecure to be audacious yet. In the next 10 years, this will change. China will build a global-size foreign policy apparatus just as it has built stadiums and airports. But will this framework be crafted and staffed by people who understand the Western temperament and who see the virtue of cooperation? Or will it be handed to those who have won their positions by insisting that the West wants China to fail? And what about the West? What habits will guide us?
Co-Evolution: A Way Forward
In the winter of 1946, George Kennan, who was serving at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, found himself confined to bed with a brutal flu and confronted with another dense cable from Washington, proposing ideas that made no sense for the nation he saw around him. Summoning his energy, Kennan dictated an 8,000-word reply to Foggy Bottom, the Long Telegram that became the defining document of the Cold War. The Soviet Union, Kennan explained, looked at the world and sensed danger in every corner. Its reaction would be to seek expansion as a way to guarantee its security. And the solution he proposed became known as containment, the doctrine that dominated the next 50 years of policymaking.
China is not the Soviet Union. There's no Jade Curtain falling over Asia. And if Moscow sought security through expansion, China's leaders will take another path. Uneasy about collision and aware of their weakness, they are likely instead to manipulate and eventually reshape the international system. Such an indirect, slow route suits both the Chinese temperament and the nation's obsession with stability. It means trying to reshape the landscape around an opponent instead of colliding with it directly, to win battles before you need fight them. In terms of military strategy, this means that China will attempt to neutralize foreign technological advantage instead of matching it, attacking computers and satellites instead of ships and planes. And in terms of economics, it will mean using China's strengths to create an order that fits its needs rather than trying to dominate the order that stands now.
At first glance, this might look sinister. But the reality is that it is simply different and not yet necessarily good or bad. China could try to reshape the global order alongside the U.S., in ways that help by supporting American economic recovery, defining new norms on proliferation, cooperating on computer security. Or it could undermine the U.S. — and its allies — in each of these endeavors. Accepting this indeterminacy will be a real challenge. For it is possible to assemble the facts of what China is doing into different narratives. When a research institute in Sichuan publishes a piece on vulnerabilities in the U.S. electrical grid, for example, is it just academic curiosity or something darker? Is China's accumulation of U.S. debt a temporary quirk of the global economy or an expression of the ancient Chinese strategy of shangwu chouti — let your enemy get on the roof, then take the ladder away? It's very hard to know. Chance and the future and what we do now will determine whether China is with us or against us.
So working with China in a way that can protect our interests is less about direct confrontation of the sort we remember from the Cold War — when the U.S. knew it faced a very dangerous enemy — and more about what we might call co-evolution. The phrase comes from biology and describes how some species work together to become stronger over time. A textbook example is the hummingbird and certain flowers, which, scientists have found, have evolved together to serve each other's mutual needs. Think of the long beaks on the birds and the narrow funnels on the flowers.
The struggles with China over the relative value of its currency capture this dynamic well. The renminbi — it means "the people's money" — is the place where China's control economy touches the free-market world. Just as tensions with the Soviet Union sharpened at places where systems collided, the same will be true of China: the renminbi is the new Berlin. It needs to be handled with appropriate sophistication by both sides, especially since it reveals a deeper tension. Chinese find it inconceivable that the dollar will be the only global reserve currency in 10 years; Americans find it inconceivable that it will not be.
Here's an example of where China wants to both secure its interests and avoid conflict. The real puzzle about China's currency isn't just the value of the renminbi. It is, rather, how open China will be to flows of money. China has three choices: it can remain unplugged from the global system, it can plug in gradually, or it can say, We're the largest developing country in the world and everyone wants to invest here, so we're going to make our own rules. This is the sort of challenge China will pose in many areas. It'll want to configure the system so it fits its needs — whether in relation to exchange rates, nuclear proliferation, how to handle North Korea or how to ensure that the benefits of information technology flow freely. In all these areas, we will need to find new global rules that don't isolate China. Beyond that, we need to ensure that real co-evolution gives China what it wants most: stability.
It follows that any actions by China that threaten global stability have to be rebuked. The habit of trying to make China cooperate only by granting concessions has not worked. Co-evolution suggests a different approach. It acknowledges the importance of giving China a say in how the world develops but demands in exchange an absolute commitment to curtail activities that make it more dangerous. It's a case of saying to China, You're a partner in managing the global economy, but you can't then manipulate your currency to gain unfair trade advantages. Or: We'll respect your interests as we work together to reduce global tensions, but you've got to be with us when we try to confront those who foster instability.
Part of the reason co-evolution could work is that it puts China alongside the U.S. in thinking about these new rules. That won't be easy. The U.S. is used to telling the rest of the world what to do. It will require energetic diplomacy. Practically, one item on Obama's agenda this week should be starting to retire the forum we now use for engaging China — something called the Strategic and Economic Dialogue — which is sort of like an annual parent-teacher conference with China. The slow-moving dialogue drives issues at a pace largely irrelevant to what they demand and removes the chance for spontaneity. The U.S.-China joint reaction to the financial crisis is a better model: it was and is informal and constant, based on working groups that evolve and move at adjustable paces. Keeping this organized will demand a single figure in Washington who can handle every element of the discourse, and Obama should be considering this too. He needs someone who can play chess like the Chinese.
Our relations with China now offer a chance to do something enduring, historic and essential. But there's some urgency: Chinese who are friendly to the West are quick to point out that the leaders arriving in 2012 may be less inclined to cooperate with the U.S. and will sit atop a system packed with younger officials who are suspicious of America. Still, it is possible to imagine a way forward that balances U.S. interests against the need to change in the face of a changing world. It's a path that should be informed by remembering that our biggest risk with China isn't out-and-out war but rather a failure to cooperate on issues of a global scale — though that could be a tragedy almost as great as any war. China is not sure we're capable of this sort of transcendence. So with the patience of thousands of years of history and the urgency of a rising power, it is gathering the tools to protect itself.
And the U.S.? Will Obama sit with Hu prepared to develop fresh ways to defend what Americans care about? We have to hope so. If not, it's likely that the U.S. will soon discover that China is not the only nation in the world that needs to worry that it is about to be done to.
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相关链接：【10.04.08 时代周刊】胡的来访：探索中美关系的方向（上）
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发表于 2010-4-16 15:23
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