【中文标题】中国，历史上最孤独的崛起大国////中国人的美国综合征
【原文标题】China’s America Obsession
【登载媒体】外交政策
【原文作者】John Lee
【原文链接】http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/06/china_s_america_obsession
【翻译说明】
标题引自文章中的一句话，基本涵盖了文章的中心意思，《环球时报》也对这个问题有若干报道，可以参考文章中带着的链接，还有胡锡进的这条微博（http://t.sina.com.cn/1989660417/ezNxmcEercd?retcode=0），里面提到了他的报纸和原文作者的对话和想法。
中国人的美国综合症 ----为什么本拉登的死让中国领导人紧张
这周四，中国共产党的《环球时报》发表了一篇题为《本·拉登之后，中国会成为美国的敌人吗？》的社论。尽管文中提到希望两国的经济融合可以减少美国那些针对中国的“右翼偏执狂”，但社论最后依然总结道：“中国的崛起必然引发和美国的摩擦”。周五，这份报纸发表了另一篇社论，并引用我在四月份接受采访时说过的一句话承认道，“中国是历史上最孤独的崛起大国。”
当然，国家报纸的社论并不一定代表共产党的思想和政策。但在这个事情上，这两篇社论却可以让我们对中国政府的两个与之相关的世界观管有一定了解。首先，绝大多数美国人可能都没意识到的是，中国尊重甚至害怕美国。其次，中国在国际上的孤立感不是装出来的，而是剧烈的，真实的----本拉登的死亡将会加剧美国再次重视其亚洲盟友和伙伴的速度，而这个过程中，付出代价的将会是中国。
当华盛顿在911后将重点放在中东和反恐上后，北京是实实在在的感到轻松了。中国的领导和战略家们相信，一个被两场战争和不景气经济拖累着的美国，为中国提供了一个不可多得的在亚洲及世界扩充影响力的的机会。但北京同样认识到，华盛顿最终是会把其战略眼光放在东方的，而本拉登的死，不管多么微不足道，在加速那一天的到来上却有里程碑意义。就像不久前中国社科院一位资深分析师告诉我的,“美国将会把矛头指向北京。”
中国领导人和战略家对美国的重视，可以说是近乎偏执，而且无处不在。在一个对中国社科院那些从官方智库到全国各个机构顶尖学者最近发表的100篇论文的研究中，我发现其中有八成都和美国有关----这里面既有试图了解美国制度和政治价值观的，也有描述如何限制，回避，约束和减少美国力量和影响力的。在这些文章中，有那么几篇能帮助我们更好的了解《环球时报》那两篇社论背后的思维。
第一，北京对国际政治的看法基本上属于是新现实主义。中国的战略家们认为，今天世界权力的划分，将会决定明天世界的冲突。中国长久以来认为，自己和美国之间竞争的加剧是必然，而且会决定未来世界的战略互动。在北京看来，崛起国家和现存强国之间的矛盾可以被控制，但绝不可能得到解决。这种矛盾是结构性的，不可避免的。
但是在中国的专家看来，美国这个超级大国的特殊之处在于，它不但无情的巩固和保持自己的权力，同时也在散布自己的民主价值观。这让中国权威体制下的领导很烦恼，因为他们相信，只要共产党继续独占权力，美国就很难接受中国（在国际事务中）扮演更大的领导角色。麦凯恩议员提出的“民主联盟”可能永远不会成为现实，但北京相信这个东西已经存在了，起码在亚洲如此，比如印度，日本和韩国。
另外，北京害怕美式民主。尽管在美国人看来，民主是其优势所在，如制度化的和平的权力交接和政策改变，对中国来说，美式民主则是不理性，不确定性的根源。中国政府中的许多人将布什匆忙在911后发动阿富汗和伊拉克战争作为例子，认为那种令人不悦的政策变更可能因为一个新政府的建立而增加，致使华盛顿把它那富有敌意和竞争性的眼光投向东方。
首先，美国创建的世界秩序，并不是仅仅建立在美国自己的权力之上，而是依靠着一个民主社区。
北京自己也注意到，在东亚和东南亚，几乎没有那个国家害怕印度的民主式崛起。尽管印度的崛起被视作自然的，可预见的，和受欢迎的，几乎所有的亚洲国家在试图受惠于中国经济成就的同时，都在战略上通过不断亲近美国来防备中国的军事力量。（以澳大利亚为例，澳洲总理杰拉德在近期对议会做的一个讲话中就再次肯定了奥美同盟，将其视为澳大利亚国家安全的基石。同样的，新加坡领导李显龙也敦促美国继续留在亚洲。）
其次，不同于中国，美国和亚洲国家之间不存在领土领海争端，而中国依旧对80%的南中国海有领土要求，认为那是中国的“历史水域”，并且和印度争夺着印度最东边的阿鲁纳恰尔邦。从这个意义上讲，中国的崛起有着天然的破坏性，因为一个更强大的中国会倾向于用自己的式解决这些问题。
第三，地理上，美国并不是个亚洲大国。中国现在认识到，这个原本被当成美国劣势的简单的事实，其实给美国提供了独特的优势。为了在亚洲维持自己的军事基地，以便保持其在亚洲的具有主导性的战略优势，美国需要其他重要的国家和地区组织默许自己扮演的安全角色和关系。美国和澳大利亚，日本，韩国的联盟以及同印度，菲利宾，新加坡及泰国的伙伴关系在这个地区是有着广泛认可的。这种相互依存的关系意味着，美国的权力还没有大到让它可以简单地无视其他亚洲国家希望的地步。（这段说白了就是，美国因为自己不在亚洲，因此为了维持它在亚洲的地位，就要依靠其他国家，因此它是有所顾忌，有所牵制的----译注）
与此形成对比的是，假如中国处于战略上的主导地位，则这种地位将很稳固，更加难于被挑战，被改变。北京并不需要像美国那样的来自别国的默许。作为一个位于在亚洲的强国，中国军事力量在亚洲的存在，不需要其他亚洲国家的“许可证”。作为亚洲最大的国家，如果没有美国存在，中国可以轻而易举地主导地区性的机构----而这恰恰是为何是美国，而非中国，成了受信任的亚洲海域公共产品和安全提供者的原因。
这也正是为何北京并没有完全利用恐怖主义对美国的困扰，而是不满地注视着美国建立起的等级式民主秩序，一个亚洲国家则心甘情愿地帮助美国保持其主导性地位的秩序。在这样一个秩序中，中国在亚洲是个战略上的孤独者，只有缅甸和朝鲜才能算作是真正的朋友。
中国很清楚自己相对脆弱的处境。而美国与其为自己失去的昔日辉煌悲伤，还不如更好的了解一下自身的优势所在。
【原文】InThursday's edition of China's Communist Party-owned Global Times newspaper, the lead editorial washeadlined, "After Bin Laden, will China become US's foe?" Hoping thateconomic integration would defuse "right-wing paranoia" about Chinain the United States, the editorial nevertheless concluded: "The rise ofChina is certain to cause friction" in America. On Friday, the paper ledwith an editorial that referenced an interview I had given the Global Times in late April to admit that "China could be the loneliestrising power in world history."
Of course, editorials in state-ownednewspapers do not always mirror the Communist Party's thinking or policies. Butin this case, these two editorials remind us of two related points aboutBeijing's worldview. First, China respects and even fears the United Statesmore than the vast majority of Americans probably realize. And second, China'ssense of isolation is not an act but acute and real -- and Osama bin Laden'sdeath will only accelerate America's reengagement with its Asian allies andpartners at China's expense.
WhenWashington shifted its focus toward terrorism and the Middle East after theSeptember 11 attacks in 2001, Beijing experienced genuine relief. As China'sleaders and strategists came to believe, an America distracted by two wars anda weak economy presented a priceless window of opportunity for China to extendits influence in Asia and beyond. But Beijing realizes that Washington'sstrategic attention will eventually turn eastwards, and the death of bin Ladenis one small but significant step in hastening the arrival of that day. As oneprominent Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) analyst put it to me recently, theAmerican "spearhead will soon be pointed at Beijing."
China'sfocus on America is obsessive and omnipresent among its leaders andstrategists. In a
studyof100 recent articles by leading academics at CASS, comprising the network ofofficial state-backed think-tanks and institutes throughout the country, Ifound that about four in every five were about the United States -- whether itwas seeking to understand the American system and political values, ordescribing how to limit, circumvent, bind, or otherwise reduce American powerand influence. Of these themes, several emerged that help better understand the thinking behind editorials like the one in the Global Times.
One is that Beijing views internationalpolitics in broadly neorealist terms. Chinese strategists believe thedistribution of power in the world today will determine tomorrow's conflicts.China has long seen building competition between itself and America inparticular as the inevitable and defining big-picture strategic play. InBeijing's thinking, tension can be managed, but never resolved, between theestablished power and the emerging one. Tension is a structural inevitability.
ButChinese experts also view America as a unique superpower that relentlesslyseeks not only to build and maintain its power, but also to spread itsdemocratic values. This is of grave concern to the authoritarian Chineseleaders, because they believe that America will have difficulty accepting agreater leadership role for Beijing so long as Communist Party remainsexclusively in power. Senator John McCain's "League of Democracies" mightnever become a formal reality, but Beijing believes that it already exists, at leastin Asia, through democracies such as India, Japan, and South Korea.
Moreover,Beijing fears the American democratic process. While Americans view democracyas an advantage since it can offer United States an institutional and bloodlessprocess for leadership and policy renewal, China views American democracy as asource of irrationality and unpredictability. Many in Beijing, pointing toPresidentGeorge W. Bush's rapid decisions to go to war in Afghanistan and Iraq after9/11, believe a new administration might actually increase the chances ofuncomfortable shifts in policy that will lead Washington to suddenly focus itscompetitive and hostile gaze to the east.Some of Beijing's strategists now even arguethat the United States has three advantages over China that will help preserveAmerican strategic primacy in Asia.
First,the United States has built an order based not just on American power but alsodemocratic community. It has not escaped Beijing that few countries in East andSoutheast Asia fear India's democratic rise. Whereas India's ascent is seen asnatural, predictable, and welcomed, almost every country in Asia is trying tobenefit from China's economic success while strategically hedging againstChinese military power by moving even closer to the United States. (Witness therecent speech byAustralian Prime Minister Julia Gillard to Congress in which she reaffirmed thealliance with America as the bedrock of Canberra's security strategy, orSingapore's leader Lee Hsien Loong urging America toremain engaged in Asia.)
Second,unlike China, America does not have land and territorial disputes with otherAsian states. For example, China still claims
around80 percent of the South China Sea as its "historic waters" and is inan ongoing dispute with India over the eastern-most Indian state of
ArunachalPradesh. In this sense, China's rise isinherently disruptive since a more powerful China is likely to demand aresolution to these issues that is in Beijing's favor.
Third, the United States is not a residentpower in that it is not geographically in Asia. China now realizes that thissimple fact, once seen as a handicap, instead presents America with a uniqueadvantage. To maintain its military bases in the region and thus remain thepre-eminent strategic power in Asia, the United States requires other keystates and regional groupings to acquiesce to its security role andrelationships. There is broad-based regional approval of U.S. alliances withAustralia, Japan, and South Korea, as well as with partners such as India, thePhilippines, Singapore, and Thailand. This interdependent relationship meansthat America is not so powerful that it can easily ignore the wishes of Asianstates.
In contrast, if China were in the dominantstrategic position, its pre-eminence would be much harder to challenge orshift. Beijing would not need the same level of regional acquiescence. As aresident power, China would not need the "approval" of other Asianstates to maintain its military footholds. As the largest Asian power, it wouldbe easier to dominate regional institutions without an American presence -- yetone more reason why America is trusted to provide the public and security goodsin Asian sea lanes while China is not.
Allthis is why, instead of taking full advantage of America's terrorism obsession,Beijing has watched resentfully as the United States has built a hierarchicaldemocratic order in which Asian states willingly aid in preserving Americanpre-eminence.In suchan order, China remains a strategic loner in Asia, with Myanmar and North Koreaas its only true friends.
China is well aware of its relativevulnerabilities. Rather than lament the irretrievable loss of its better days,America should learn to better appreciate its relative strengths. | 
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发表于 2011-5-9 09:37
