【2011.05.30 Lowy Institute】中国航母的秘密（三）

diver18

他出答案了，先把原文摆在这里，让看过1，2贴的 看看他的论点成立否？
要不 谁 帮 翻译下？

China's aircraft carrier mystery (part 3)
By Raoul Heinrichs - 30 May 2011 9:08AM

China has spent much of the past two decades trying to exploit the limitations of aircraft carriers, yet now has its own carrier program. Beijing probably doesn't want to challenge US sea control directly, so why is it pursuing this course?

A more plausible rationale for China's carrier involves the formation of a concentric naval strategy, characterised by a denial effort directed at major powers beyond the second island chain and, further in, localised sea control that allows for limited power projection against weaker states on China's periphery.

To this end, the PLA may well envisage the use of aircraft carriers for a range of military operations, from constabulary functions like disaster relief and establishing presence to higher level contingencies such as strike operations against smaller states without the capacity for sea denial. These kinds of operations would likely be concentrated in the South China Sea where, absent local or US denial capabilities, even modest investments in power projection may allow China to forcefully prosecute its territorial claims.

But if China's carrier is about 'presence', a more cost-effective set of options exist – China's destroyers, for example, dwarf anything presently fielded in Southeast Asia, and could surely fulfill China's requirements for gunboat diplomacy.

More importantly, can China really expect to operate uncontested in the South China Sea, a transit point between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and a critical conduit for Japanese energy supplies? The increasing geopolitical salience of this region makes it unlikely to be relinquished in any modus vivendi between Washington and Beijing, and it is hard to imagine others not hedging their bets militarily to prevent China from attaining dominance.

For China, in short, controlling the South China Sea in the face of countervailing capabilities has become a truly formidable undertaking, one that raises real doubts about the viability of even limited power projection against major power resistance.

This points to the most likely explanation for China's carrier: what Sinologist Robert Ross calls 'naval nationalism'. In this vision. China's aircraft carrier is not the product of rigorous cost-benefit analysis. Nor does it reflect China's urgent strategic priorities. Rather, it is a status symbol, a source of pride and prestige designed to convey to the Chinese people the attainment of military power commensurate with China's newfound economic fortunes.

The exact institutional drivers of such policies are hard to discern. What is clear is that support within China for aircraft carriers has expanded beyond the military establishment, as Ross notes, 'to the provinces and to all sectors of China's society, including to universities, government think tanks, industrial circles, the political elite, and the general public.'

In many respects, this explanation is the least disturbing, and is consistent with the measured pace of Chinese carrier development thus far. It suggests that China's carrier acquisition is domestically driven, underpinned by a desire among China's leaders to consolidate their legitimacy. This does reflect the fact that Chinese nationalism is rising and beginning to manifest itself militarily. But in practical terms, China's pursuit of aircraft carriers will carry with it increasing opportunity costs, including for the acquisition of more potent denial capabilities.
http://lowyinterpreter.org/post/ ... stery-(part-3).aspx

diver18

自己领了！过一两天交稿吧

China has spent much of the past two decades trying to exploit the limitations of aircraft carriers, yet now has its own carrier program. Beijing probably doesn't want to challenge US sea control directly, so why is it pursuing this course?

A more plausible rationale for China's carrier involves the formation of a concentric naval strategy, characterised by a denial effort directed at major powers beyond the second island chain and, further in, localised sea control that allows for limited power projection against weaker states on China's periphery.

中国花了近二十年试图利用航母的局限性，但现在却有了自己的航母计划。北京可能不想直接挑战美国的海上控制，那么为什么实施这种构思呢？

中国发展航母的一个似乎更加合理的理由 涉及到 一个 以海军为轴心的整合，其特点是，直接对第二岛链以后的主要军事力量进行海上封锁，更进一步，实施局部海域的控制，允许对中国周边的弱小国家进行有限的兵力投送。

diver18

To this end, the PLA may well envisage the use of aircraft carriers for a range of military operations, from constabulary functions like disaster relief and establishing presence to higher level contingencies such as strike operations against smaller states without the capacity for sea denial. These kinds of operations would likely be concentrated in the South China Sea where, absent local or US denial capabilities, even modest investments in power projection may allow China to forcefully prosecute its territorial claims.

But if China's carrier is about 'presence', a more cost-effective set of options exist – China's destroyers, for example, dwarf anything presently fielded in Southeast Asia, and could surely fulfill China's requirements for gunboat diplomacy.
从这一点上，解放军可能会有一系列的围绕使用航空母舰而展开的军事行动的理想构思， 从行使国际警察职能的灾难救助和“例行巡视”，到 更高级别的突发事件应对，例如直接打击某些不能采取海上封锁的小国。 这种行动可能会多集中在南中国海，在那里，那些小国缺少自身和美国的炮舰保护，即使是少许的兵力投放就可能允许中国强势重申领土主权。

但是，比起航母出巡，一个更具成本效益的选项集存在 ----中国的驱逐舰，例如，‘巡视’东南亚目前的任何区域，肯定可以实现中国的炮舰外交的要求。

More importantly, can China really expect to operate uncontested in the South China Sea, a transit point between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and a critical conduit for Japanese energy supplies? The increasing geopolitical salience of this region makes it unlikely to be relinquished in any modus vivendi between Washington and Beijing, and it is hard to imagine others not hedging their bets militarily to prevent China from attaining dominance.

For China, in short, controlling the South China Sea in the face of countervailing capabilities has become a truly formidable undertaking, one that raises real doubts about the viability of even limited power projection against major power resistance.

更重要的，中国真的能期望在南中国海无可争议地行使主权？这里是太平洋和印度洋之间的交接点，同时也是一条日本能源供应的重要管道。
不断增强的地缘政治的突出使得华盛顿和北京之间不可能在任何临时妥协中放弃这一地区，还有这也很难想象其它人不暗中投注军事，以防止中国实现优势。

简而言之，排除制约能力而控制南中国海已经成为中国一个真正艰巨的任务，一个引发真正疑问的， 关于（中国）有限的军力投放 对 （南中国海周边国）主要力量抵御的 生存力的任务。

diver18

This points to the most likely explanation for China's carrier: what Sinologist Robert Ross calls 'naval nationalism'. In this vision. China's aircraft carrier is not the product of rigorous cost-benefit analysis. Nor does it reflect China's urgent strategic priorities. Rather, it is a status symbol, a source of pride and prestige designed to convey to the Chinese people the attainment of military power commensurate with China's newfound economic fortunes.

中国实施航母计划最有可能的解释是：海军民族主义（中国问题专家Robert Ross提出的）。
基于这个观点，中国的航母即不是严格意义上的成本效益分析的产物，也不是反映中国的紧迫的战略重点。相反，它只是海军民族主义的象征，一种激发中国人民 在新的经济时运下强大的军事实力的 ，自豪和自信感的源泉。

The exact institutional drivers of such policies are hard to discern. What is clear is that support within China for aircraft carriers has expanded beyond the military establishment, as Ross notes, 'to the provinces and to all sectors of China's society, including to universities, government think tanks, industrial circles, the political elite, and the general public.'

很难确定航母计划的具体倡导者，但有一点是明确的：在中国对航空母舰计划的支持大大超出了军方的预想。正如上面提到的 Robert Ross所说：所有所有，从中国的社会各阶层，从各个省份，大学，政府智囊团，工业界，政治精英和广大市民（无不大力支持）。

In many respects, this explanation is the least disturbing, and is consistent with the measured pace of Chinese carrier development thus far. It suggests that China's carrier acquisition is domestically driven, underpinned by a desire among China's leaders to consolidate their legitimacy. This does reflect the fact that Chinese nationalism is rising and beginning to manifest itself militarily. But in practical terms, China's pursuit of aircraft carriers will carry with it increasing opportunity costs, including for the acquisition of more potent denial capabilities.
在许多解释中，这种解释是最令外国人不安的，而它迄今与中国航母发展既定的步伐是一致的。
它表明，中国的航母计划是中国领导人为了巩固政权的稳定性而内在驱使和支持的。这确实反映了一个事实，即中国的民族主义正在上升，并在军事上开始显现。但在具体实施上，中国的航母计划将伴随着它不断增加的机会成本，当然也包括获取更强大的海上封锁能力。