【中文标题】邓后院中的枯骨
【原文标题】The Skeletons in Deng's Closet
【登载媒体】外交政策
【原文作者】CHRISTIAN CARYL
【原文链接】http://www.foreignpolicy.com/art ... ons_in_dengs_closet
真正改变中国的这个人的最新传记作品是最为完整和激进的，但是它是否也忽略了一些黑迹？
邓小平是20世纪最杰出的领导人，然而你对此几乎一无所知，除非你是中国人。尽管人民共和国中大部分居民都完全明白，拜邓所赐，他们得以脱离贫穷，中国得以进入世界领先的工业国家行列，然而在世界其它地方，印在T恤衫上的始终是毛主席的头像。邓在1997年去世，毫无疑问，在他家乡之外，他并不被看作是当代世界上最成功的政治家。
这背后隐藏着很多原因。毛之所以成为一个全球象征性的符号，是因为他发动的波澜壮阔的文化大革命与当今世界年轻人对权力的反叛意识有完美的切合点。即使全世界现在已经完全清醒地认识到他所犯下罪行的真正性质，但罩在他头上的代表蔑视法律、敢于亡命的光环依旧没有消失。（在某些情况下，毛对群众暴力行为赤裸裸的热情或许还增添了他个人的吸引力。）与此相比，邓的市场化改革更加微妙，更加具有循序渐进的特点，他的武器不是激动人心的长征，而是达沃斯论坛上的讲话。过了若干年之后，这些行动的效果才显示出来，尽管成果令人瞠目结舌，但过程并不激动人心。
邓经历了漫长、意义非凡的一生，期间世界上发生了很多重大事件，他个人也需要被割裂开看待。所以，我们必须深深感谢哈佛大学教授Ezra Vogel，他把自己学术生涯中很大一部分时间花费在这部辉煌的传记作品上——《邓小平与中国的变化》，这是到目前为止有关邓的最宏大的作品。Vogel在写作过程中，做了巨大的准备工作。他似乎仔细研读了中国共产党自1921年到现在发布的所有会议文件。（我不能说自己很羡慕他完成了这项壮举，但是，这件事总要有人去做。）
在此之前曾经出现过多部邓的传记作品——从吝啬的Benjamin Yang、狡诈的前外交家Richard Evans，到一丝不苟的分析人士Michael Marti，但是Vogel的作品可以算作是最完整、信息最全面的。（Maurice Meisner曾经写了一本书，有关邓异乎常人的精力，但是这本书并没有包括太多传记作品应当包含的内容。）Vogel的作品既大又全，这当然是件好事。但是这本928页的书中——有的章节名称是“经济调整和农村改革，1978－1982”——有时候并非巨细无遗。如果你想专门了解邓的职业生涯，这本书绝对是个好东西；但是如果你想了解这个人的生活，那么你恐怕要失望了。Vogel或许并不赞成工作是这本书最核心的内容，但在某种程度上，事实的确如此。一本传记，从文体上说，就应该讲一个故事，而且是读者不必费力解读的故事。赤裸裸的事实是必要的文学技巧。William Taubman在创作赫鲁晓夫的传记时，史无前例地进行了大规模的研究，用嘲弄、挖苦的语气完成了这部作品。而Vogel似乎相当草率地略过了书中主角那些困苦、黑暗的历史。大量含混不清的描述、令人惊愕的扭曲事实，以及四川人辛辣的恶臭习气似乎形成了一个不大可能存在的生活状态，这的确令读者难以接受。
Vogel自60年代就经常出访中国，多年来，他与邓的亲属和中国共产党内部高层官员建立起了密切的关系，这种经历毫无疑问让他的作品深具内涵。每当Vogel发现一些新鲜的素材，往往都不是来自文件，而是内部人士所发表的观点。我最喜欢的是邓的小儿子说的一句话：“我父亲认为戈尔巴乔夫是个傻瓜。”
你或许认为，这样不经意的一句话是邓职业人生的基石，也是中国与苏联采取完全不同路线的重要原因。1956年，已经度过30年坎坷职业生涯的邓率领中国代表团到莫斯科参加苏维埃共产党第20届代表大会。就是在这次会议上，赫鲁晓夫发表了决定苏联未来命运的反对斯大林个人崇拜的“秘密讲话”。（译者注：报告原题为《关于个人迷信及其后果》，这个令全球震惊的报告全面清算了斯大林时期个人迷信、血腥统治、残酷迫害的种种罪恶，开启了非斯大林化的关键一步。）像其他外国与会者一样，在赫鲁晓夫清算斯大林罪行和政策失误时，中国人并不在场，但是他们很快就了解到了足够的信息。
戈尔巴乔夫在当时还是一个年轻的自以为是的家伙，后来他努力推进赫鲁晓夫在政治解放领域的改革，但从未建立起一个连贯的经济体制。邓在那时已经是一个经历过数十年血腥政治斗争的老练领导人，他因此得出了相反的结论。如果你的政治体制把领导人奉若神明，那么强行摘去他们头上的光环只会造成极为不稳定的效果。最好还是让神仙们自生自灭，把精力放在改善人民生活上来。当他在70年代末掌权之后，邓首先把经济放在第一位。尽管他和其他数百万中国人民都在文化大革命中遭遇到毛的残酷洗礼，但他依然维护主席在人民共和国中超级英雄的地位。
后来证明，这是一项伟大的策略。邓和他的党内同志们在1979年所进行的改革，是人类历史上最大规模的脱贫行动。在过去三十年里，中国所采取的市场经济体制让数亿人脱离贫困。就像Vogel写道的：“当邓在1978年成长为一个卓越的领导人之时，中国与世界的贸易总额只有不到100亿美元。经过三十年之后，这个数字已经增长了一百倍。”
毫无疑问，邓扩大了很多中国人的个人自由领域，尽管他曾经无情地捍卫共产党的领导地位，并拒绝进行基本的民主改革。1989年6月，邓选择用武力方式镇压北京和其他城市的学生行走活动，这给他的职业生涯留下了不可磨灭的污点。但是经济改革依然没有停步，主要原因是他已经向那些保守的批评人士证明了自己捍卫共产党地位的能力。Vogel花费了巨大的篇幅描述邓在1992年的“南巡”，他是在为自己在70年代实施的经济特区计划大唱颂歌。这次出行让经济改革家们更加大胆，在与对手的较量中获得了巨大的优势。中国从未走过回头路，今天的世界为之叹为观止。
邓76年职业生涯中的前半段完全是毛的侍从，他对自己导师的盲从程度让他可以忽视他人的生命。（据Vogel所写，邓在担任军事委员会主席的多年期间，必要时毫不在乎士兵的生命。）但渐渐地——或许是在50年代末饿死4500万人的大跃进活动期间——邓对这位神一样的主席失去了幻想。1961年，邓在党内一次会议上发表讲话，说他笃信老家四川的一句谚语：“不管黑猫白猫，抓到耗子就是好猫。”邓用他自己的方式向党呼吁把经济放在革命前面，毛当然理解这种思想是对他自身路线的威胁。就是这种异见让邓在文化大革命期间、在1976年周恩来去世之后给自己招致了几乎致命的困境。邓总共被他的对手清除出党三次，但每一次他又积蓄了更大的力量回来。
1977年，邓重返党内，这时党内领导人已经打倒了毛极端教条主义的遗孀江青和她的盟友（臭名昭著的“四人帮”）。Vogel明智地在这之后的一段时期花费了巨大的篇幅。据我测算，对1978年到1979年间事件的描述共有263页，邓在这段时期最终登上中国最高领导人的宝座，并开始他的改革计划。无须多言，他从其它东亚国家身上借鉴了许多经验，这些国家在专制制度下把现代化进程开展得有声有色。其中就包括（或许最有讽刺意味的）“叛徒”台湾。
美国人总是凭直觉把改革和创新与年轻划等号，但是邓在进行这个惊心动魄的变化时，已经年届70。Vogel像大师一般把中国巨变的政治细节呈现在读者眼前。
然而，他在描述邓不那么光彩的一面时，并没有展示出大师级风范。举一个例子，Vogel在描述1957年反右运动时，说邓在毛的命令下主导的这场运动是“对55万名被标榜为右派的知识分子的疯狂攻击，这场运动摧毁了中国大部分最优秀的科学技术人才，让很多人流落他乡。”他写道：“一些知识分子自命清高，肆意批评政府官员，其实这些官员也有自己的困难处境。这让邓非常恼火。”仅此而已吗？Vogel丝毫没有提到运动受害者遭到虐待、被逼自杀、在劳改营中被判刑，以及被流放几十年之久。
坦率地说，让传记作家用其书中主角的视角审视一切其实是存在困难的，如果我们仅听一面之词，就无法完全看懂邓的故事。但问题是Vogel有些过于谄媚地去解释党在天安门×××和西藏方面的逻辑，有时人们很难理解为什么会有人这样想。80年代初，邓粗暴地阻止党内知识分子的自由对话，Vogel一本正经地说：“西方人认为全能的上帝会批判尘世间的统治者，这并不是中国传统的一部分。”或许我说的不对，但邓和他的同志们倾毕生之力，根据一个德国犹太人的神秘理论来改造中国。这是传统吗？奇怪的是，Vogel只要一提到书中主角，就说中国人的价值观是由党来决定的，批评人士从来无权参与。
Vogel并非一贯巨细无遗，他的确提到了一些事情的黑暗面，但总是小心翼翼地避之唯恐不及。他对邓在1978和1979年间走上最高领导人岗位的描述丝毫不含讽刺意味，只是说：“邓为党国福祉考虑而排挤掉华国锋。”他还提到，北京的民主墙在1978年底的几个月出现了很多批判性大字报，那里成为多元化思想的集中地。“在那里发表作品的都是对自由理念有新发现的年轻人，但由于生活在一个封闭的社会中，他们缺少经验和智慧来提炼自身的思想。”《人民日报》也写不出这样敏锐的评论。
毫无疑问，Vogel比任何人都更加详细地讲述了邓的故事，他应当因此获得掌声。如果不是他，很多珍贵的历史资料永远不会有人知晓。但是，这个故事仍然不完整。我在想，其它内容究竟还有没有重见天日的机会呢？
原文：
The new biography of the man who really transformed China is the most complete and ambitious ever. But does it leave out some black spots?
Deng Xiaoping is the most important 20th-century leader you know almost nothing about -- unless you're Chinese. While most people in the People's Republic are perfectly aware that Deng deserves most of the credit for lifting them out of poverty and heaving China into the ranks of the world's leading industrial nations, in the rest of the world Chairman Mao is the one on the t-shirt. No question about it: Outside of his homeland, Deng, who died in 1997, has to be the least celebrated of the modern era's most successful statesmen.
There are many reasons for this. Mao became a global icon because the rhetoric of his Cultural Revolution dovetailed perfectly with a contemporary worldwide youth rebellion against authority, lending him an aura of outlaw chic that endured even after the world gained a much clearer understanding of the epic nature of his crimes. (In some circles, Mao's frank enthusiasm for mass violence may have actually contributed to his appeal.) Deng's market-oriented reforms, by contrast, were subtle and cumulative, the stuff of Davos speeches rather than rousing marches. It took a while for their full impact to become apparent, and the results, while astonishing, were not exactly calculated to appeal to the higher emotions.
And yet Deng led a long and remarkable life, packed with drama and global significance, one that deserves to be dissected in detail. So we must be thankful to Harvard professor Ezra Vogel for devoting a large chunk of his academic career to compiling a prodigious biography, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, the most ambitious account of the man so far. In writing this volume, Vogel has done an enormous amount of work. He appears to have absorbed the documents from every single Chinese Communist Party plenum since 1921. (I can't say I envy him the task, but hey, someone's got to do it.)
There have been several Deng biographies before this -- from the curmudgeonly Benjamin Yang, the suave ex-diplomat Richard Evans, the meticulous analyst Michael Marti -- but Vogel's can be regarded as the most comprehensive and informative of the lot. (Maurice Meisner wrote a book of marvelous verve about Deng and his era, but it doesn't actually contain that much in the way of biography.) Vogel has left no stone unturned, and this is mostly a good thing. But sometimes -- in a 928-page book with chapter titles like "Economic Readjustment and Rural Reform, 1978-1982" -- it wears. If you want to know the particulars of Deng's career, you'll be well-served here; if you want to know his life, you might find this book a bit frustrating. Vogel would probably object that it is the career that matters most, and of course that's true -- up to a point. But a biography, by the very nature of the beast, should also be a story -- preferably one that doesn't pull its punches. Brutal candor is a vital literary device. William Taubman set the standard with his fantastically well-researched yet bracingly sarcastic portrait of Khrushchev. Vogel, by contrast, is a bit too quick to skip over the rougher, blacker sides of his hero's past. The massive ambiguities, the jaw-dropping plot twists, the spicy Sichuanese reek of an unlikely life never quite filter through.
Vogel has been traveling to China since the 1960s, and over the years he has cultivated close relationships with Deng's relatives and leading members of the Chinese Communist Party, a level of access that has unquestionably enriched the book. When Vogel reveals something truly fresh about his subject, it's usually not because of a document, but rather because insiders have shared their views. My favorite quote comes from Deng's youngest son: "My father thinks Gorbachev is an idiot."
You could argue, in fact, that this casual remark is the keystone of the whole Deng story -- and of the remarkably different paths taken by China and the Soviet Union. In 1956, already 30 years into an eventful career, Deng was the head of the Chinese delegation that traveled to Moscow for the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the one where Nikita Khrushchev gave his fateful "secret speech" on Stalin's personality cult. Like the other foreigners, the Chinese weren't actually in the hall when Khrushchev gave his epochal reckoning of Stalin's crimes and personal failures, but they learned the contents soon enough.
Gorbachev, still a young whippersnapper at the time of the speech, later strove to emulate Khrushchev's attempts at political liberalization while never quite managing to formulate a coherent economic policy. Deng -- at the time of the speech already an experienced functionary with decades of bloody political struggles under his belt -- drew the opposite conclusion. If your political system treats its leaders as deities, he realized, bringing them down to human size is likely to have a profoundly destabilizing effect. Better, instead, to leave the gods in place while focusing your energies on improving the people's daily lot. When he came to power in the late 1970s, Deng correspondingly decided to put economics first. Even though he and millions of others had personally born the brunt of Mao's wrath during the Cultural Revolution, he made sure to preserve the Chairman's status as the superhero of the People's Republic.
It proved an astonishingly successful strategy. The reforms that Deng and his party comrades unleashed in 1979 turned out to be the largest poverty-reduction program in human history. Over the past three decades, China's embrace of markets has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. As Vogel writes, "When Deng became preeminent leader in 1978, China's trade with the world totaled less than $10 billion; within three decades, it had expanded a hundredfold."
Deng thus unquestionably expanded the realm of personal freedom for many Chinese, even as he ruthlessly defended the ascendance of the Communist Party and deferred fundamental democratic reforms. In June 1989, Deng chose to suppress the student demonstrations in Beijing and other cities with a brutish display of force that has stained his reputation ever since. But economic liberalization continued -- not least because he had demonstrated his credentials as a defender of the Communist Party to his conservative critics. As Vogel shows with great verve, Deng's "Southern Tour" in 1992, when he sang the praises of the Special Economic Zones that he had launched at the end of the 1970s, galvanized the economic reformers and enabled them to gain a crucial edge over their opponents. The Chinese have never looked back, and today the world marvels at the results.
Deng spent the first half of his 76-year career in the party as a Mao acolyte -- and he followed his master in the somewhat cavalier disregard with which he held human life. (As Vogel notes, during Deng's long years as a military commissar he had a reputation as a man who was not shy about expending his soldiers' lives when the occasion demanded.) But somewhere along the way -- perhaps during the catastrophic Great Leap Forward that took the lives of some 45 million people at the end of the 1950s -- Deng lost his illusions about the chairman's infallibility. In 1961, Deng gave a speech to the party faithful in which he proclaimed his allegiance to an old proverb from his home province of Sichuan: "It doesn't matter whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice." This was Deng's way of appealing to the party to put economic efficiency ahead of revolutionary spirit -- a call that Mao correctly understood as a challenge to his own approach. It was a difference of opinion that later got Deng into near-lethal trouble in the Cultural Revolution, and again after Zhou Enlai's death in 1976. Altogether Deng was purged three times by his enemies -- and each time he returned to accumulate even greater power.
Vogel quite rightly puts a lot of work into the period immediately following Deng's third comeback in 1977, after party notables engineered the overthrow of Mao's ultra-doctrinaire widow Jiang Qing and her allies (the notorious "Gang of Four"). According to my count, Vogel devotes a whopping 263 pages of his 928-page narrative describing the events of 1978-1979, when Deng finally achieved his status as China's top leader and embarked on the reforms. Without saying so publicly, he got many of his ideas from other East Asian countries that had already blazed the path of authoritarian, market-oriented modernization, including (perhaps most ironically) the "renegade province" of Taiwan.
Americans instinctively associate the values of experimentation and reform with youth, but Deng was in his mid-70s when he embarked on this breathtaking change of course. Vogel does a masterful job of reconstructing a great deal of the political minutiae that went into the turn-around.
However, he's less masterful when it comes to reconstructing some of Deng's less savory moments as a leader. To name but one example, Vogel describes the 1957 Anti-Rightist Movement, which Deng oversaw on Mao's order, as a "vicious attack on some 550,000 intellectual critics branded as rightists" that "destroyed many of China's best scientific and technical minds and alienated many others." Deng, he tells us, "was disturbed that some intellectuals had arrogantly and unfairly criticized officials who were trying to cope with their complex and difficult assignments." Huh? Nowhere does Vogel explain that the victims of the campaign were tortured, hounded into suicide, or sentenced to terms in labor camps or internal exile that sometimes ended decades later.
To be sure, there is good reason for a biographer to focus on the way his subject saw the world; we would miss much of Deng's story if we only listened to his critics. The problem here is that Vogel bends so far backward to explain the party's logic on, say, the Tiananmen crackdown or Tibet that it sometimes becomes difficult to understand why anyone might possibly think differently. About one instance in the early 1980s, when Deng harshly dismissed some liberal talk from party intellectuals, Vogel primly informs us that "Western notions of a transcendental God that could criticize the earthly rulers were not part of Chinese tradition." Maybe I've missed something here, but Deng and his comrades spent their entire lives reshaping Chinese society according to the esoteric theories of a German Jewish intellectual. Chinese tradition? Oddly enough, whenever Vogel brings up the subject, it's the party that gets to decide what constitutes Chinese values. The critics somehow never do.
Vogel is not always officious. He does mention some of the darker sides of the story. It's just that he is often a bit too eager to tiptoe around them. He describes Deng's ascendance to the status of preeminent leader in 1978-1979, entirely without irony, as the moment "when Deng began to push aside Hua Guofeng for the good of the party and the country." He tells us that some of the critical texts put up to public view on Beijing's Democracy Wall, the place where a remarkable spirit of pluralism was allowed to flourish for a few months starting in late 1978, "were posted by other young people who were inspired by their newfound freedom but, having lived in a closed society, lacked the experience and wisdom to inform or temper their judgments." People's Daily couldn't have put it better.
There's no question that Vogel has gone farther than anyone else to date in telling Deng's story. For that he is to be applauded; there is a whole hoard of valuable material here that we probably would not have gained otherwise. But it's still not quite the whole story. I wonder, at this rate, if it will ever be told.
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发表于 2011-9-23 15:27
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发表于 2011-9-23 15:52
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