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【中文标题】中国在伊朗棋盘上开局
【原文标题】China’s Iranian Gambit
【登载媒体】外交政策
【来源地址】http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/31/china_iran_nuclear_relationship
【译 者】 WilliamRUC
【翻译方式】 人工
【声 明】 欢迎转载，请务必注明译者和出处 bbs.m4.cn。
【译 文】
Beijing is using the Islamic Republic to foil American interests in the Middle East. It's time we wised up to this dangerous game.
北京在利用伊朗来遏制美国在中东的利益。是我们在这场危险游戏中提高警惕的时候了。
BY MICHAEL SINGH, JACQUELINE NEWMYER DEAL | OCTOBER 31, 2011
The elections in Tunisia and the dramatic demise of former Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi have pushed the allegations of an Iran-sponsored plot to assassinate the Saudi envoy to Washington on U.S. soil from the headlines. But countering Iran's efforts to develop a nuclear weapon and exploit the tumult in the Arab world for its own gain is vital to securing U.S. interests in a rapidly changing Middle East, and remains an urgent priority of U.S. diplomacy around the world.
突尼斯的选举和利比亚前领导人卡扎菲的悲惨结局之后，伊朗暗杀沙特特使的阴谋已逐渐走上华盛顿的前台。伊朗为发展核武器，以一己之私在阿拉伯世界掀起波澜，这使美国在迅速变化的中东保护利益极为重要。这在美国的世界外交中依旧是一个首要事项。
Inevitably, efforts to isolate Iran will refocus Washington and Europe's attention on Beijing. Past attempts to persuade China to support new measures against Tehran -- or even robust enforcement of existing ones -- have met with little success, in large part due to a misunderstanding of Chinese motivations. Whereas Washington tends to see Beijing as torn between conflicting priorities, Chinese strategists see the Islamic Republic as a potential partner in their strategic rivalry with the United States. Unless Beijing can be convinced that the costs of obstructing U.S. efforts on Iran outweigh the benefits of doing so, the Chinese will be of little help. Shifting China's calculus in this manner ultimately requires that the United States develop a credible military option to neutralize Iran's nuclear-weapons aims.
孤立伊朗的努力不可避免地让美国与欧洲的焦点集中到北京。过去试图说服北京制裁德黑兰的努力并没有多大成就。这在很大程度上被归结于对中国核心利益的误解。而华盛顿往往将北京视为冲突中的麻烦者。中国的战略家将伊朗视为与美战略斗争中的潜在合作者。除非北京能够被说服在伊朗问题上抵制美国毫无益处，否则算上中国在这一问题上的介入，美国可能最终不得不在伊朗核问题上采取军事行动。
For three decades, U.S. diplomats have failed to secure real Chinese cooperation in their efforts to prevent Iran from going nuclear. Although Beijing has formally supported U.N. Security Council sanctions resolutions against Iran since 2005, it has at the same time actively undermined those measures by watering them down in council deliberations and then implementing them only weakly and unevenly. According to the Washington Post, a senior U.S. official handed over to his Chinese counterparts in October 2010 a "significant list" of Chinese firms thought to be aiding Iranian proliferation in violation of U.N. sanctions.
三十年来，美国外交家在伊朗无核化的努力中并未得到中国的合作。尽管中国在联合国安理会自2005年对伊朗制裁的决议中持支持态度，它在安理会审议时采取了消极的态度，并不执行决议。据华盛顿邮报报道，2010年10月，一位美国高级官员从他的中国伙伴手上得到了一份“令人惊讶”的名单，列出了被认为违反联合国制裁决议来帮助伊朗的中国公司名单。
The effects are pernicious. Increasing Chinese trade with Iran --projected to reach $40 billion in 2011, up from $30 billion last year, according to the Chinese ambassador to Iran -- eases the pressure on Tehran and provides the Iranian regime with revenue, expertise, and other resources. It also leads to howls of protest by European and Asian firms that have curtailed their business with Iran only to see it backfilled by Chinese competitors.
这些行为造成损害。据中国驻伊朗大使称，不断增加的中伊贸易在2011年达到了400亿美元，超过了去年的300亿。如此缓解了德黑兰的压力，为伊斯兰政权提供资金、技术和其他资源。它还导致了欧洲与亚洲其他公司的抗议，他们削减了在伊朗的业务，却眼睁睁地看着中国竞争者填入空虚。
Chinese trade with Iran is driven in large part by Beijing's growing need for energy imports, and its desire to secure them by participating in oil and gas exploration, development, and other "upstream" activities of its overseas energy suppliers. Indeed, from a security perspective, Iran's geographic position is unique -- it is the only Gulf supplier that China can reach by both pipelines and sea routes. This diversification of supply lines helps reassure those in Beijing who most fear a foreign interdiction campaign or blockade that would cut China off from its energy supplies.
中国与伊朗的贸易在很大程度上源于北京不断增长的能源进口需要。而且它渴望通过参与海外油气勘探、开采与其它“上游”产业来确保安全。从安全角度看，伊朗的地理位置的确很特殊——它是唯一一个能够通过海运和管道运输向中国输送油气的海湾国家。多样化的供给方式让中国方面减少对因外国封锁而削减能源供应的担心。
But the Chinese-Iranian love affair is not all about oil and gas. China has also provided Iran with substantial strategic and military assistance, through official and non-official channels. China provided critical support to the development of Iran's nuclear program during the 1980s and 1990s and emerged in the 1980s as one of Iran's principal arms suppliers, with transfers including cruise missile and ballistic-missile capabilities. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the value of these transfers reached more than $3.6 billion during those decades.
不过中国与伊朗的友谊不仅止于石油与天然气。中国还通过官方和非官方的方式为伊朗提供了大量战略与军事援助。中国在1980年代成为了伊朗的核心援助国，并在1980年代与1990年代成为伊朗核项目的关键支持者，还提供了巡航导弹和弹道导弹的技术。据斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究会称，这些技术转让在几十年里达到了价值36亿美元的数量。
This support has continued and, in certain areas, seems to have expanded. For instance, news reports that arms from Tehran have found their way into the hands of militants in Iraq and Afghanistan mention not only Chinese-made anti-ship cruise missiles, but also sniper rifles, armor-piercing rounds, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-aircraft missiles and guns, mines, and other components for explosive devices. In a February op-ed, retired Adm. James Lyons, a former head of U.S. Pacific Fleet, wrote of the probable transfer from China to Iran of passive radar technology that could contribute to Iran's recently announced anti-ship ballistic-missile program. According to Iranian media outlets, the same week as Admiral Lyons's op-ed appeared, Maj. Gen. Wang Pufeng of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences was meeting with Iran's defense attaché in Beijing to express China's desire for expanded military ties.
支持仍在继续，在一些特定地区似乎还拓展了。比如有报道称伊朗不仅拥有中国制造的反舰巡航导弹，还有狙击步枪、穿甲弹、火箭推进式榴弹、防空导弹和火炮、地雷和其他爆炸装置。二月初，美国太平洋舰队退休司令海军上将莱昂斯写到中国可能向伊朗出口了用于反舰导弹计划的雷达装置。据伊朗媒体称，就在莱昂斯爆料的同一周，中国军事科学研究院的王普丰少将与伊朗在北京武官会晤，表达了中国加强军事联系的愿望。
Perhaps most alarming are the continuing allegations of Chinese support for Iran's nuclear program. Earlier this year, China moved to block the release of a U.N. report that described suspected Chinese involvement in the transfer to Iran of aluminum powder used as a solid propellant for nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Last week, China joined Russia in pressing the IAEA not to release damning information on Iranian military nuclear research. And last year, media sources covered the sale by Chinese firms of high-quality carbon fibers that would help Iran build better centrifuges.
也许最令人担忧的是中国与伊朗核项目的持续支持。今年初中国阻止了联合国一份怀疑中国为伊朗提供核导弹固体燃料铝粉的报告发布。上星期中国与俄罗斯阻止了国际原子能机构发布一份关于伊朗军事核研究的报告。去年，媒体还报道了中国公司把高质量的碳纤维卖给伊朗以建设更好的离心机。
China's reluctance to pressure Iran is no secret in Washington. The conventional wisdom holds that Chinese policy is the result of a dilemma -- Beijing, so the logic goes, is caught in a conflict between its interest in secure energy supplies and its interest in good relations with the United States and global nonproliferation. Writing in English-language outlets, Chinese foreign-policy intellectuals such as Wang Jisi have echoed this line. From the perspective of China's Communist Party leadership, on which all Chinese scholars depend for their travel visas and permission to publish, it makes good sense to spread this notion in the hopes of eliciting more active American attempts at diplomatic persuasion or economic incentives.
中国不愿意向伊朗施加压力在华盛顿已不是秘密。传统观点认为中国的政策面临两难——北京在追求能源供应安全与与美国保持良好关系之间存在矛盾。中国的外国政策智囊如王缉思用英语提到这一点。从中国共产党领导人的视角看，美国通过外交劝服和经济制裁积极尝试。
This strategy has to some extent succeeded, as prescriptions for solving this "dilemma" rely heavily on carrots such as granting China official prestigious visits and greater inclusion in diplomatic deliberations. For example, Erica Downs and Suzanne Maloney argued recently in Foreign Affairsthat the United States should "elevat[e] the bilateral diplomatic dialogue" and "ensure clear communication" with Beijing about sanctions.
这一战略已在一定程度上获得了成功，美国为了解决这一两难严重依赖胡萝卜，如在官方正式访问和外交审议上给予更大的优惠。比如，Erica Downs和Suzanne Maloney最近在《外交政策》上讨论美国应该在核制裁上与美国“提升双边外交对话”和“保证沟通顺畅”。
In reality, however, such efforts by Washington appear to yield little. For years, a parade of high-level U.S. envoys -- from State Department nonproliferation advisor Bob Einhorn to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to President Barack Obama himself -- have trekked to Beijing on Iran-related missions, only to come up short. The truth is that it is China, not the United States, that has been reluctant to engage on Iran -- Beijing has frequently declined to send high-level envoys to meetings of the so-called "P5+1" powers, choosing instead to send its nearest ambassador, or be absent entirely. China hardly seems eager for more dialogue on Iran.
然而事实上华盛顿的类似行动效果不大。经年以来，一系列美国高级官员——从国务院防扩散顾问鲍勃•埃因霍到国务卿希拉里•克林顿以至总统巴拉克•奥巴马本人长途跋涉到北京却在伊朗相关问题上成就不大。真相是中国，而不是美国，不愿意过多介入伊朗——北京经常推迟所谓的“P5+1”力量的高规格会议，而以派遣最近的大使或者干脆完全缺席替代。很少见到中国对关于伊朗的对话关心。
The image of Beijing as a "reluctant partner" on Iran reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of China's motivations. If China truly faced the dilemma described above, its nuclear and strategic assistance to Iran would make little sense. Rather than using its clout as one of Iran's largest energy customers and vendors-of-last-resort to secure Iranian compliance with U.N. Security Council and nonproliferation norms, Beijing appears to fuel the very behavior that is most provocative to the United States and its allies -- behavior that could destabilize the Middle East. Furthermore, other U.S. allies -- Japan and South Korea, for example -- have continued to obtain sizeable energy supplies from Iran while actively supporting the international sanctions regime.
中国作为对伊朗“不积极力量”折射了对中国注意力的误解。如果中国真的面临上文描述的两难境地，它在核与战略上对伊朗的帮助将没有多大意义。作为伊朗最大的能源客户，北京并没有致力于防扩散，这样的行为是对美国和其盟友的挑衅——也是中东的不稳定因素。进一步看，美国的其他盟友——比如日本和韩国继续从伊朗获得可观的能源供应，又在防扩散领域积极支持。
The reality is that China -- quite unlike Japan and South Korea -- considers the United States its chief rival for influence in the Middle East and beyond. Viewed through this lens, Beijing's policies toward Iran and the United States are not in conflict, as many analysts suggest, but are entirely compatible. The United States may see China as a key partner in isolating Iran, but China sees Iran as a potential partner in countering U.S. power.
中国的现实完全不同于日本和韩国，中国认为美国是其在中东和其他地区影响力的最大对手。从这个角度看，北京对伊朗和美国的政策并不冲突，正如许多分析员所表示的完全兼容。美国可能认为中国是孤立伊朗的关键伙伴，而中国认为伊朗是对抗美国力量的潜在伙伴。
China's strategic thinking is laid out clearly in Chinese-language publications aimed at Beijing's political and military elites. This literature differs significantly in tone and content from those produced for foreign consumption. For example, defense analyst Maj. Gen. Zhang Shiping, who is often described in the Chinese press as a "researcher" within China's Academy of Military Sciences, argued in China's Sea Power, an important 1998 book that was re-published in 2009 for the 60th anniversary of the Chinese navy, that Iran was a potentially desirable location for a Chinese military base in the Middle East.
中国的战略想法明显在关于北京政治军事的中文出版物中体现。那里的语气和内容与在外交场合的说法都不一样。比如，国防分析家张世平少将经常被描述为中国军事科学院的“研究人员”。他在《中国海权》一书中认为伊朗是中国部队在中东未来的军事基地选址，该书出版于1998年并在2009年中国海军组建60周年再版。
Zhang's sentiment has been echoed by other high-ranking Chinese military officers -- including Dai Xu, an outspoken Chinese Air Force colonel and Yin Zhuo, a Chinese rear admiral -- in discussions of how China can counter the perceived threat posed by democratic rivals like India and the United States and protect its interests in the face of American power projection in the Gulf and across the Pacific.
张少将的论点被其他高级将领响应，包括空军上校戴旭和海军少将尹卓，在中国如何抵抗来自印度和美国的威胁，以此保护它在美国力量涉及的海湾与太平洋地区的讨论提到。
From this perspective, securing Chinese cooperation with U.S. efforts to pressure Iran is hardly the matter of a few good meetings. The cultivation of Iran's security establishment and top-level leadership provides China with a strategically placed, regionally powerful client that can frustrate U.S. aims in a region where China seeks greater influence. For China, Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons may be a negative development, but it is preferable to a reorientation toward the West.
从这个视角看，寻求中国对伊朗施加压力的合作几乎没有什么好处。中国为了在该地区寻求更大的影响力，中国在伊朗的安全机构和高层领导中具有策略性的位置，并使美国的努力荒废。对中国来说，伊朗寻求发展核武器的想法也许是个负面问题，但是它更趋向于重新定位和西方的关系。
The U.S. Treasury Department's penalties imposed on Chinese sanctions-defying entities have sought to force Chinese firms to choose between their U.S. business and their relatively smaller trade with Iran. However, this approach has not worked because, ironically, the United States, unlike China with America, truly does face a conflict between its Iran and China policies.
美国财政部的制裁迫使中国公司在美国生意与较小的伊朗生意之间选择。不过，这种情况尚未发生，因为具有讽刺意义地，美国在对华和对伊政策上并没有冲突。
U.S. officials, most recently Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, have asserted that sanctions have led China to suspend new energy investments in Iran. This data point does not tell the full story, however: Existing China-Iran projects continue apace, and Chinese imports of oil from Iran increased 40 percent in January to August of 2011 compared with the same period the previous year. It seems that Beijing has been able to write off any diplomatic tensions caused by its business in Iran as an inevitable -- and to date, largely low-cost -- feature of the U.S.-China rivalry.
美国官员，主要指助理国务卿温迪•谢尔曼强调制裁引领中国在伊朗发展新的能源投资。这一点还不是故事的全部。目前的中伊项目继续深化，与去年同期相比，中国从伊朗进口原油的数量从2011年2月到8月上升了四十个百分点。看上去北京因为在伊朗的利益可能忽视任何外交紧张局面，介于目前中美竞争的低成本局面。
Although diplomatic cajoling won't make much headway, Washington does have ways to induce Beijing to reassess its approach to Iran. Exercising these options, however, requires taking a step that the Obama administration has so far avoided: establishing a credible military threat to Iran. CCP strategists who judge Chinese interests as being well-served by current U.S.-Iran tensions would not make the same calculation in light of a credible U.S. threat to disarm the Iranian regime. Such a scenario would threaten China's oil supplies and increase its energy costs, and could threaten Iran's China-friendly regime. The United States need not dismiss or downplay the very real risks that would accompany conflict with Iran, but it must persuade Beijing and Tehran alike that this option is the alternative to full compliance with international sanctions.
尽管外交途径可能不起作用，华盛顿也拥有推动北京改变对伊朗策略的办法。可是采取这些行动要求奥巴马政府做一些长期以来不愿意做的事情：构建一个对伊朗的可信军事威胁。共产党的战略家认为目前美国与伊朗的紧张局面并不足以引发战争。而战争会威胁中国的原油供应并提高能源成本，影响中伊友好大局。美国必须冒着和伊朗发生冲突的危险，必须说服北京和德黑兰完全可能用战争无替代制裁。
Making this threat credible would not be a trivial feat, especially in the context of U.S. defense budget cuts and growing Iranian military preparedness. Iran's nuclear program is growing increasingly advanced as well as difficult to strike -- as demonstrated by the revelation in 2009 of a new enrichment facility under development underneath a mountain near Qom. On the other hand, Iran's currently limited retaliatory options will only improve -- especially given the precision strike capabilities that Iran has been developing -- with Chinese assistance. Chinese strategists are careful students of U.S. military capabilities and movements, and convincing them of the credibility of the U.S. military option will be less costly now than it will be in the future.
做出这样的威胁并不容易，尤其在美国国防预算削减和伊朗军事准备加强的情况下。伊朗的核项目正在逐步发展而且难以打击，2009年底在库姆附近的山区正开发新的浓缩设施。另一方面，伊朗目前的军事发展只能依赖中国的帮助——尤其是考虑到伊朗已发展精准打击技术的情况。中国的战略家是美国军事能力的谨慎学习者，考虑到未来战事，说服他们美国军队的选择代价较少。
The good news is that China's position can be adjusted. There is no structural bond guaranteeing Beijing's support for Tehran. The key to winning this geopolitical chess match is to recognize that China's devotion to its own interests will trump any friendship with Iran. Only by presenting a challenge to those interests is Washington likely to divert Beijing from its current approach, which has done much to increase China's access to energy supplies, boost its influence in a strategic region, and frustrate American ambitions in the Middle East.
好消息是中国的位置可以改变。中国对伊朗的支持并没有坚实的基础。赢得这场地缘象棋比赛的关键是意识到中国维护自己利益的重要性高于与伊朗的关系。只有摆出对这些利益的挑战，华盛顿才能有可能改变北京目前的态度——后者为提高中国的能源补给，在中东这个战略位置重要的地区使美国目标受挫。
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