【外交政策0210】Bull in the China Shop

lilyma06

Bull in the China ShopThe Obama administration is welcoming China's presumptive next leader, Xi Jinping. But how can it make good policy when the strategy is a mess?
   BY DANIEL BLUMENTHAL |            FEBRUARY 10, 2012http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/10/bull_in_the_china_shop


      
Last month, as Barack Obama's administration began to prepare for ChineseVice President Xi Jinping's visit to Washington, someone close to the U.S. vice president leaked that Joe Biden would "take over" Chinapolicy. The leaker made the case that Biden had a good rapport with Xi, thus primingthe U.S. vice president to add the China mandate to his portfolio. According to a number of administrationsources, however, this leak was nothing more than an instance of a Washington-stylepower play -- or score settling. But the episode does demonstrate how importantthe China relationship has become in the Washington power game, how the portfoliois troublingly up for grabs, and how wildly elbows swing (or pivot)to take control of it.
  
   
               

How important is the relationship between top U.S. and Chineseleaders? And shouldn't China policy be about more than a single relationship?
If one judges by the seriousness of purpose with which Chinese andU.S. officials are taking Xi's visit, the answer to the first question is thattop-level engagement is very important. By all accounts, Xi is the putativenext leader of China, and both sides want a successful visit for different reasons.
For Xi, the purpose of his visit is to consolidate his power overan ever more complex Chinese political system. This is no easy feat. Xi needsto demonstrate to rival party factions, to the People's Liberation Army, to thegrowing business class, and increasingly to the public that he is in commandof the most important foreign-policy portfolio. His various constituencies willsearch for signs that he is 1) tough enough on the Americans; 2) committed tocontinuing economic reform; but 3) not overly committed -- lest he ignore whatChina calls "social tensions." Obviously, these tasks are somewhatcontradictory, and in the end, form will be more important than substance. It'snot as if it's all going to be settled by a day or two in Washington. Chineseleaders will be satisfied if there are no major missteps during the visit.
The Obama administration will look for some of the same things. Buttrue to American political culture, U.S. officials will also always try todivine whether the new leader is "someone we can work with." This isparticularly true now, as relations with China have been especially tenseduring the current term. There have been contretemps over the South China Sea,North Korea, Taiwan, and trade issues. Administration officials have all butgiven up on President Hu Jintao. They view him as too risk-averse and hope that Xirepresents a new kind of leader, one who is more cosmopolitan and open-mindedthen his predecessors. They hope Xi will finally be the Chinese leader who acceptsthe U.S. view that China does best by embracing the made-in-America rulesof the road.
Alas, U.S. officials are likely to be disappointed. The Chinesesystem simply will not allow Xi to govern in bold strokes. As the firstleader without the blessing of China's revolutionary generation (it cannotbless from the grave), Xi will likely be as risk-averse as Hu and more beholdento consensus within the Politburo Standing Committee, more deferential to the People's Liberation Army, and less likely to undertake liberal reforms given current socialconditions. Although he seems to have Hu's support, there are otherambitious politicians who would gladly take advantage if Xi slipped up.
And such missteps are not out of the question. Beijing has beenunderstandably confused about America's China policy. The Obama administrationcannot seem to decide whether it thinks America is weak or strong, whether itshould accommodate China or confront the country, or whether it wants to deploy more U.S.forces to the Pacific or cut the very forces that would be deployed. That Ximight adopt ill-conceived foreign policies (as Hu did in 2009 and 2010) is notout of the question.
So does Washington's top-level engagement with China matter? Yes,it does. Even though Xi will be limited in what he can accomplish, the need forvery close coordination on strategic matters is vital to continued stability inAsia, especially in light of the Obama administration's attempt to focus moreattention and resources on the region. U.S. leaders will have made progressif they can put candor before niceties. And it is time to explain how dangerousthings can become if direct lines of communication continue to be held hostageto Chinese whim. To increase the likelihood that the Sino-American competitionwill not lead to conflict, the two countries need sustained dialogue over matterssuch as military activities by both countries close to China's shores, therisks of the perennial flashpoints (Taiwan, Korea, and now the South China Seaand Indian Ocean), and new domains of warfare -- including cyberspace. Theseare not topics that China particularly enjoys discussing.
But engagement among top leaders is not enough. China is far morepluralistic than it was when Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon made their secretdeals with party leaders or when President George H.W. Bush secretly sent national security advisor BrentScowcroft to toast the Chinese after the Tiananmen Square massacre. Today, China'sentrepreneurs want a truly free market. The less privileged want protectionsfrom a rapacious state. Reformers want more of a voice. U.S. engagementmust expand to all levels of Chinese society, both within the Communist Party'sconfines and outside them.
Ultimately, the top engager must be the president, with the secretariesof State, Defense, and the Treasury, as well as top military officials, playing a secondaryrole. That Vice President Biden thinks he has a solid rapport with Xi is of limitedimportance -- remember how much good it did President George W. Bush, whothought he had looked into Putin's eyes and seen his soul.
The limitations of one-on-one diplomacy mean that real strategyis needed to tie the ends of policy with the means of the relationship. AndWashington's China policy is, necessarily, a bit of a muddle. Thus it's littlesurprise that it has been called the horribly named "congagement," a policy restingon the twin pillars of containment and engagement.
Engagement's objectives are twofold: 1) to encourage China tobecome a responsible great power, and 2) to press for liberal reform. The aimof containment is to hold the line on a status quo-- a liberalizing Asia -- that hasprovided decades of peace and prosperity. But strengthening the pillars ofcongagement is a complicated and, at times, contradictory endeavor. Naturally, differentU.S. cabinet officials work at cross-purposes to either contain or engageChina. National security officials work to balance China's power while economicofficials try to deepen engagement. Somebody needs to orchestrate the cacophony.
That's where strategy comes in. Strategic managers of the Chinarelationship now have to contend with the Treasury's interest in continuing tosell bonds to China, the Agriculture Department's desire to sell more wheatto China, and the Navy's need for more ships to meet the demands of deterrence.On top of that, domestic constituencies -- from business owners to religiousgroups -- interested in China are growing, commensurate with America'sincreased interdependence with China. What will the United States do about China's intellectualproperty theft? Undervalued currency? Treatment of Tibetans?
Even on issues of "high politics" (diplomatic negotiations, force-posture decisions, alliance relationships), where the prime actors are the secretariesof State and Defense and the national security advisor, strategy-making isproblematic. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has shown great vision andenergy in her Asia policy, from demonstrating tough resistance to China'sclaims to the entire South China Sea to pushing a multilateral Asia-Pacificfree trade agreement to instituting a very important new trilateral relationshipbetween Washington, Tokyo, and New Delhi.
But while the United States has deepened its commitments to moreplayers in the region, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has been under ordersfrom the president to cut the resources needed to match the country's diplomaticendeavors. For example, he is slowing the acquisition of the much-needed F-35Joint Strike Fighter and shrinking the Navy's surface fleet -- both crucial forforce projection in the Pacific. This is classic "strategic insolvency," a termcoined by Walter Lippmann that describes a strategy in which one's commitmentsand one's resources do not match. And insolvency is dangerous because it undercutsdeterrence -- aggressors can plainly see when the United States does not havethe capabilities needed to follow through on its commitments. Tighter controlof strategy-making -- taking care that ends, ways, and means are better held inbalance -- would avoid this state of affairs. Strategicchoices should be clarified. For example, either the United States makes fewer commitments toits friends and thereby weakens the containment leg of its policy, or it ensuresthat before it deepens commitments it is prepared to resource them adequately. Bidenmay have a relationship with Xi, but he has not played much of a role in themaking of grand strategy, which is precisely what the China lead must do.
Goodstrategy, not rapport diplomacy, is critical to making sure containment initiativesserve those of engagement -- and vice versa. Effectively deterring Chineseaggression in the South China Sea, for example, enhances U.S. efforts toencourage peaceful resolution of disputes there. Once Beijing comes to believe thatintimidating others will not achieve its goals, engagement with Washingtonimproves. Ultimately, U.S. policy must work to make a responsible China feelwelcome as a great power while successfully deterring its attempts to changethe status quo. Unfortunately for the White House, Xi will arrive to aWashington that is in a state of confusion about the "what" and the "how" of itspolicy. At least the confusion will be recognizable to Xi -- China has evenless confidence in what it should do about America.



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