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我们是再youtube跟日本人贴的东东进行辩论后,他们无言以对开始‘审查’我们(屏蔽的另一种方法),这位网友是很小时候去澳洲,读商法毕业的。。他从法律角度跟我一起跟鬼子斗。。后来发现我们要上我们自己的视频。。我就先上了个波兹坦公告。。全文。。(英语的)借一个杜鲁门的演讲视频。。
但是现在下面的音频,最好有flash carton...我一方面认为中国人也应了解一下。。另一方面希望有人熟悉卡通的。帮一下。。{:soso__6235880048239246314_3:}
I didn't plan on publishing this transcript. There are probably lots of grammar and spelling errors.
I have researched this particular territorial dispute extensively and would like to share my findings.
Firstly, who are the claimants to these islands?
Actually there are 3 claimants, People Republic of China, Taiwan and Japan. Taiwan’s official name is the Republic of China and is not recognised by the International community whereas People’s Republic of China has become the de-jure successor to the Republic of China. The history of ML China and Taiwan deserve their own video and I will not expand it further here. However, both ML China and Taiwan consider Diaoyutai as associated with Taiwan and should be administered by Taiwan and hence I will treat both claimants as one of the same.
Secondly, I am going to talk about historical records from 1500 to 1895
Chinese Records
China in her recorded history has named and sighted Diaoyutai as far back as 1372. Between 1372 and 1879, China sent 24 investiture missions to the Kingdom of Ryukyu to bestow the formal title to a new Ryukyu King. The Imperial envoys kept meticulous records that were submitted to the Emperors upon their return. In the earliest surviving written records, Imperial Envoy Chen Kan recorded Diaoyutai in his mission log of 1534. In 1556, Chinese Imperial Envoy Zheng SunGong, on his mission to Japan, wrote that “Diaoyutai is a small islet belonging to Taiwan” in his journal “A Glimpse into Japan”. In 1683, Chinese Imperial Envoy Wang Chi, is his mission log to Ryukyu , recorded that Black Water Ditch – now known as Okinawan Trough, to the east of Diaoyutai, as the boundary between China and Ryukyu .
Apart from Imperial Envoy’s mission logs, Diaoyutai also appeared extensively in Chinese military and especially naval records. In 1561, Zheng Ruozeng showed Diaoyutai in his Coastal Defence Map against Japanese pirates ravaging Chinese coast at the time. The next year, Hu ZongXian, Minister of Defence, included Diaoyutai in his Coastal Territories Map, thereby incorporating the islands into the defense system for China’s southeast coast. In 1683, Taiwan was officially incorporated into Chinese territory with Diaoyutai placed under Taiwan’s control. There are extensive surviving written records from Fujian and Taiwan prefecture gazettes as well as Imperial Official Reports commissioned by Chinese emperors that recorded China’s continuous exercise of sovereignty over Diaoyutai .
Finally, official Chinese as well Ryukyu documents confirmed that Kingdom of Ryukyu consisted of 36 islands and there are no lands without owner or Terra Nullius between China and Ryukyu . After Japan annexed the former Ryukyu Kingdom and renamed it Okinawa Prefecture in 1879, a diplomatic stalemate ensued between China and Japan. In 1880, in an effort to reach a diplomatic settlement over Ryukyu sovereignty, Japan presented to China a proposal to divide the Ryukyu Islands between the two nations to formalize national boundaries. While China rejected the proposal, the draft treaty confirms that no terra nullius existed between China and Ryukyu.
Japanese Records
In 1785 Hayashi Shihei , a renowned Japanese military scholar published “An Illustrated Description of the Three Countries”. In the map, Hayashi marked the Diaoyutai Islands and China in red and the thirty-six Ryukyu Islands in light yellow so as to indicate that the Diaoyutai Islands belonged to China and not the Ryukyu Islands. Certain Japanese scholars argued that Taiwan was marked in a different colour from China and Ryukyu and hence colour schemes should not be interpreted as marking national boundaries. However, Hayashi’s map was meant to map trade routes between Fujian Coast to Ryukyu and it is certainly an arguable case that Taiwan was deliberately shown in a separate colour as it was not part of the 2 trade routes marked by Hayashi.
Subsequently, during the Tokugawa shogunate era of Japan, a large number of official maps by Shogunate officials did not include Diaoyutai. For example, the 1719 map by Shogunate Official Arai Hakuseki on Southern Islands recorded 36 Ryukyu islands without Diaoyutai. In 1810, the World Map produced by Japan marked Diaoyutai clearly as Chinese territory.
Japan claimed to have discovered and surveyed Diaoyutai since 1885 and claimed it as Empire of Japan territory in 1895. Unfortunately, neither surveying nor discovery from the period 1885 to 1894 can be found in official Japanese records. On the contrary, substantial cache of records exists in Japanese Government Archives that documented that Japan was aware of Chinese ownership and use of Diaoyutai. According to official Meiji documents, the Japanese government’s territorial ambitions around the Diaoyutai Islands began in 1885. That year, Japanese Home Minister Yamagata Aritomo 山縣有朋ordered Okinawa Governor Nishimura Sutezo 西村捨三to survey the Diaoyutai Islands and planned to set up a national landmark on the islands afterwards. However, Nishimura reported in his survey that these islands had long been discovered, named and recorded in official documents by China, and that the plan was inappropriate at that time since “this matter is not unrelated to China”. Yamagata subsequently consulted with Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru 井上馨. Inoue advised that the plan should “await a more appropriate time” since two months earlier the Shanghai-based The Shanghai Mercury 申報 issued a warning that Japan planned to seize Chinese islands near Taiwan. Inoue therefore advised the Home Minister that the plan should be postponed and further instructed that the matter must not be made public through official gazettes and newspapers to avoid “inviting China’s suspicion”. In July 1894, the First Sino-Japanese War broke out. By October, Japan had gained decisive victories both on land and at sea. Recognizing the balance of power had shifted, the Meiji government instructed Okinawa Prefecture to establish a national marker on the Diaoyutai Islands during a cabinet meeting on January 14, 1895. However, this cabinet decision was conducted in secrecy and never made public. It was not until after World War II that this cabinet decision was revealed in declassified government records included in The Japanese Diplomatic Records in 1953. These official records are now preserved in various Japanese Government Archives.
Hence given Chinese, Ryukyu and Japanese historical records from 1500 to 1895, Japan’s claim on Diaoyutai/Senkaku on the basis of Discoverer/Occupier or Terra Nullius is extremely doubtful. Since 1800, under International Law, for Discoverer/Occupier to be effective, one must show
(1) Intention to occupy
(2) Proof of Terra Nullius
(3) Proclamation of Occupation
(4) Actual Occupation
(5) Effective Control
Japan has failed both (2) and (3) and hence cannot claim Diaoyutai/Senkaku under Discoverer/Occupier. The vast cache of Chinese written records clearly proves Chinese exercise of sovereignty of Diaoyutai. Japanese Government and Scholars have tended to use 2 or 3 documents that appeared to suggest that China exercised no sovereignty over Taiwan and hence by extension not Diaoyutai. This is clearly sloppy research as most the texts were taken out of context and minor exceptions cannot disprove otherwise extensive written records surviving to this day. Interestingly, prior to 1800, the International Convention was that Discoverer is treated as having title to the land discovered.
Historical Records from 1895 to 1945
Due to China’s defeat at the hands of Japan in 1894, the Treaty of Shimonoseki was concluded between China and Japan, ceding Taiwan and associated islands to Japan. Hence since 1895 until 1945, both the Qing Empire as well as her successor, Republic of China did not object to Japan’s control over Diaoyutai, given the official Chinese position that Diaoyutai islands are part of Taiwan. Japanese Government and Officials have often quoted various newspaper clippings from Chinese newspaper that used Senkaku rather than Diaoyutai. This is certainly a straw man argument given China’s acceptance of Treaty of Shimonoseki. Interestingly though, in a 1944 Tokyo court case adjudicating fishing rights disputes between Japan administered Taiwan Prefecture and Okinawa Prefecture, the fishing rights were duly awarded to Taiwan Prefecture.
Modern Records Post 1945
At the conclusion of WWII, Japan unconditionally accepted Potsdam Declaration in her Instrument of Surrender. Of particular interest, the text of Article 8 of the said Declaration states : The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine. We, in this case, refers to Article 1 of the Declaration: We-the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war. The key text of Cairo Declaration states that “The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed”. As clearly stated, the effect of acceptance of Potsdam Declaration by Japan is
(1) Japan’s sovereignty is restricted to her 4 home islands.
(2) Restoration of former Chinese territory to the Republic of China
One extremely important legal aspect of both Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Declaration is the use of word “WE”. It is intentionally worded in such a way to prevent any individual ally from concluding a peace agreement with Japan without the consent of other Allies. The text of Teheran Conference is similarly worded by the US, UK and Soviet Union to ensure that no Ally would conclude peace with Germany without universal agreement between allies.
Hence, by virtual of Japan’s unconditional acceptance of Potsdam Declaration, Republic of China and her successor therefore regards that Taiwan and her associated island, Diaoyutai, in this case, has having been reverted back into Chinese Sovereignty.
In 1952, Japan concluded the Peace Treaty of San Francisco with a number of nations, most importantly the US to formally end the state of war. Both the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China were not invited and both did not sign the Peace Treaty. Certain Japanese scholars have argued that San Francisco Treaty supersedes Potsdam Declaration. However, there are 3 major issues with this line of argument
(1) Potsdam Declaration forms the basis of UN Charter and its wording is such that it requires consent of all powers that made the declaration for it to be varied. Hence without the consent of China, any variation is NULL and VOID.
(2) In San Francisco Treaty, Japan’s sovereignty was not restored to Ryukyu and US gained trusteeship on Ryukyu.
(3) The Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, dated Sept 29th 1972, states that Japan would continue her stand under Article 8 of Potsdam Declaration.
The above analysis shows that there are significant questions over Japanese sovereignty outside her 4 home islands, even as of today, and specifically related to the territory of former Kingdom of Ryukyu, administered as Okinawa Prefecture. However, the question of Diaoyutai/Senkaku never came up in San Francisco Treaty.
Nationalist Chinese Forces stationed at Diaoyutai until as late as 1955 after being driven from mainland by Chinese Communists in 1949. The US subsequently used Diaoyutai/Senkaku in training exercises until 1972. However, Taiwan fishermen continued to fish, anchor and make repairs during that period. It can only be postulated that the Republic of China Government failed to make strong representation over Diaoyutai to the US out of political expediency and necessity of maintaining US military presence against Communist threat.
In 1968, a UN survey made the finding that there may be significant oil deposits along the region near Diaoyutai. Interestingly enough, as I stated when dealing with the Japanese Cabinet decision on erecting a national marker in 1895, that marker was never erected and the decision to incorporate Senkaku as Japanese territory kept secret. The national marker was finally erected in 1969, after the discovery of oil deposits. Japanese Government has often accused China of only showing interest in Diaoyutai after the discovery of potential oil deposits – unfortunately, the same could be said of Japan as well.
In 1969, Japan started negotiation with US over the final status of Ryukyu. Upon learning that Diaoyutai/Senkaku was to be to reverted back to Japan along with Ryukyu, Taiwan, then the only recognised government of China by US, made strong representations to the Nixon Administration. In response, the Nixon Administration removed the Senkakus from its inclusion in the concept of Japanese "residual sovereignty" in presenting the Okinawa Reversion Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification. On October 20, 1971, Secretary of State William Rogers sent a letter to U.S Congress. In his letter, Acting Assistant Legal Adviser Robert Starr stated "The United States believes that a return of administrative rights over those islands to Japan, from which the rights were received, can in no way prejudice any underlying claims. The United States cannot add to the legal rights Japan possessed before it transferred administration of the islands to us, nor can the United States, by giving back what it received, diminish the rights of other claimants... The United States has made no claim to the Senkaku Islands and considers that any conflicting claims to the islands are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned." As a result, the US continues to maintain neutrality over Diaoyutai/Senkaku disputes. However, U.S. has publicly stated that “Senkaku Island is covered by the US Japan Security Treaty”. At the same time, People’s Republic of China also made pronouncement against US transferring Diaoyutai to Japan throughout 1969 to 1971.
Finally, Japan has often claimed that she exercised effective control of Diaoyutai/Senkaku since 1895. Unfortunately, that control was interrupted from 1945 until 1972. Modern control of Diaoyutai/Senkaku by Japan only started after the conclusion of Okinawa Reversion Treaty.
Hence, based on the Potsdam Declaration and the associated post war International Order, Japan’s claim of Diaoyutai/Senkaku also looks to be extreme tenuous at best. From an impartial perspective, Diaoyutai/Senkaku was a wedge deliberately driven by the U.S. into the China/Japan relationship.
Additional Factors:
Japan has also used a 1958 map published by PRC that marked Diaoyutai/Senkaku in Japanese name as a defence that China has long acquiesced to Japanese Sovereignty. This specific map has footnote annotation that indicated this set of maps having sourced substantial material from maps produced by Empire Japan during WWII. In previous and subsequent editions, Diaoyutai either does not appear at all, or are marked with Chinese name instead. Another map issued as Red Guard Atlas during Cultural Revolution, often cited by Japanese Government, conferred no official status. Finally, a 1953 newspaper article appearing in People’s Daily, the official Party Paper of Chinese Communist Party that used wording “Senkaku” was cited as Chinese agreement to Japanese Sovereignty. This is quite a stretch of imagination to cite one single article, published without an author and equates it as government position.
Current Situation:
When PRC established diplomatic relation with Japan in 1972, a tacit understanding was reached to shelve the sovereignty dispute and seek joint development and exploitation of economic resources. While Japanese enjoyed effective control of Diaoyutai/Senkaku, no major government level disputes occurred until 1990’s. With the ratification of International Law of Sea, Japan began to assert her control on the basis of Exclusive Economic Zone. There were many incidents where Japan Coast Guard detained fishermen from Taiwan and Mainland. Finally, the current Japanese Prime Minister Nada decided to nationalise Diaoyutai and it stoked major response from both Mainland and Taiwan. While Japanese Government maintained that the nationalisation was an attempt at reducing tensions by ensuring members of Japanese right-wing political organisations would no longer be able to use Senkaku to stir up trouble, due to the unstable nature of Japanese Government, even if Nada’s motive were indeed to reduce tension, Chinese Government would not gamble on the positions of any future Japanese Governments who could use Chinese acquiescence as further proof of Japanese ownership.
With the strong response China has mounted, which includes the regular patrol of Diaoyutai/Senkaku region, Japan Coast Guard could only look on hopelessly. Instead of effective control Japan has asserted since 1972, Japan now shares control of Diaoyutai/Senkaku with China.
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