【theage】We should co-operate, not compete, with China's rise

nbnbren

We should co-operate, not compete, with China's rise
http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/we-should-cooperate-not-compete-with-chinas-rise-20090428-am3g.html

Rory Medcalf April 29, 2009

THE United States and its allies have long chided China for revealing little about its defence thinking. But sometimes there can be such a thing as too much transparency on matters military, as Australia is about to find out.

The defence white paper, to be released within days, will set out the nation's strategic interests and goals for the decades ahead. It will launch a long march of naval expansion — including a doubling of the submarine fleet and the replacement of frigates by destroyers fitted for major fighting roles.

And it will signal, however coded its language, that Canberra sees the rise of Chinese military might as driving this profound increase in Australia's maritime clout. The message will be couched — accurately — in terms of the uncertainty that China's rise brings to regional power dynamics. Nobody in government is quite imagining China as a direct aggressor against a lone Australia. But try explaining all this in Beijing.

The diplomatic timing of Canberra's move is inauspicious. It is at odds with the direction of US-China relations under President Barack Obama.

US Defence Secretary Robert Gates has signalled that he is more interested in resourcing today's bitter fight against transnational terrorism — think Pakistan, Afghanistan — than in further bolstering America's military superiority for unlikely and mutually unwanted showdowns with China and Russia. In these financially straitened times, Washington is telling China it wants to dampen military tension and collaborate against common dangers instead.

Indeed, co-operation was part of the message at a fleet review last week to mark the 60th anniversary of the Chinese navy, in which 14 navies, including Australia's, took part. Although Beijing showcased some of its new ocean-going strength, its admirals emphasised that their fleet could help provide for the common good. An anti-piracy mission to the seas off Somalia is testing these waters

Yet another reason that Australia's defence announcement is so badly timed is that it will prolong a drumbeat of publicly aired Australian worries about China. Noise about sovereign wealth funds, resource investments, cyber snooping and the Defence Minister's personal connections are reverberating in Beijing.

For the past week I have been meeting security analysts in Beijing and Shanghai and they are baffled by the sounds from Australia, which they see as inconsistent with Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's wish to bridge differences between China and the US.

When pressed, some of them acknowledge that it is understandable for Australia to want to build a military hedge against uncertainty. But they insist that China's strategic culture is cautious, that China is motivated by self-protection, and that the net effect of an Australian defence policy defined by China's rise will be to sow mistrust in Beijing.

In the end, government should be about taking hard decisions to prepare for the future. And for diplomats there will never be a good time to announce an armaments build-up.

Capability specialists can argue specific weapons, costs and numbers, but broadly it makes sense for Australia to continue to acquire reasonable strategic weight. It is absurd, for instance, that a country with Australia's vast maritime interests can crew and deploy barely three submarines.

Still, Australians can take some comfort from the fact that, even were a strong China to flex its muscles, we would hardly be alone. Washington would contest any bid by Beijing to dominate Asia militarily. India is rattled by Beijing's presence in the Indian Ocean. Japanese suspicion of China runs deep. South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia: all are quietly wary.

The problem is that many Asian countries may read our white paper as a sign they are not afraid enough: if the Australians, way down there, feel the need to revolutionise their firepower, they could think, maybe we should redouble ours. The arms race Rudd warned of last year could move a step closer to reality.

For Canberra, the challenge will be to act swiftly to minimise the diplomatic fallout, then move on.

Beyond briefing the Chinese about the white paper, Australia should emphasise that it is not seeking to build a narrowly defined force for China contingencies alone, and that it recognises the new possibilities of working with China as a regional security partner.

Whatever its motives, China has great potential to expand its role in the delivery of public goods in global security — sea-lane protection, peacekeeping, disaster relief — and Australia could help shape this capacity for mutual benefit. Canberra could offer to train Chinese officers in English, international law and other aspects of working effectively with other nations. The navy could involve China in multinational exercises to improve ship-to-ship communication and co-ordination in a crisis. We could send a frigate to join the international presence, including the Chinese, off Somalia.

Beneath the surface, of course we should hedge against the possible strategic impacts of China's rise.

But it is premature to make this the mainstay of our defence policy or to trumpet plans for related capabilities we may never end up buying. The sooner we rebalance our messages about China's strategic future, the better.

Rory Medcalf directs the international security program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy.
【截图】

宜笑

认领！